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The controversy about whether analytic or synthetic methods should be preferred
for the solution of geometrical problems was common all over Europe, in the first
half of the nineteenth century. It was related to important issues such as the
definition of the new discipline of "pure mathematics", and it has been taken by
recent historiography of science as an exemplary case for the analysis of conceptual
change in mathematics. In this study, historical material relating to the under-
researched case of Naples is presented, and used to support a new interpretation for
the controversy. The study begins by describing the technical contents of the
Neapolitan version of the controversy, referring to publications involved in one
important, emblematic episode: the public challenge between the two rival
geometrical schools, which took place in 1839. The competing methods are
presented, and it is argued that, far from being caused by some mere "technical"
divergence, the controversy arose from two very different conceptions of the nature
and goals of geometry, and of mathematics in general. The following step is to look
at the cultural environment where these two contrasting conceptions of
mathematics were elaborated. Historical evidence supports the claim that both
schools emerged in the very same period, the 1780s, and that the common
interpretation of a preexisting synthetic school challenged by a new analytic school
is misleading. Rather, the synthetic school emerged in reaction to the diffusion of
analytic methods in Naples. It is also argued that the synthetic geometers were not
simply "backward", and that they did not ignore the modern analytic methods;
they chose to oppose the analytic conception of mathematics; they made the choice
of being anachronistic. The wider philosophical and theological meaning of
opposing the "spirit of analysis" is investigated, which brings us to the heart of the
political and cultural upheaval which Naples experienced in the revolutionary and
Napoleonic period. Two opposite networks of philosophers, ecclesiastics, scientists
and literati emerge, one siding with the modernization of the country according to
the French example, the other defending the semi-feudal structure of the
Neapolitan state. It is only against the background of this crucial debate, over the
re-shaping Neapolitan society, that the apparently detached controversy over
geometrical methods is best understood. It is indeed argued that the production of
scientific and mathematical knowledge, as that of any other form of knowledge,
was shaped by the wider cultural and social goals of the actors involved. And, in
fact, the controversy over geometrical methods, originally emerging in
correspondence with the reaction to the French Revolution, eventually lost its
scientific relevance in the early 1840s, as the cultural hegemony of Neapolitan
reactionary forces declined. It is finally suggested that this sociohistorical
interpretation of the Neapolitan case could cast light on other similar mathematical
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Establishment of the independent
Kingdom of Naples, previously a
Spanish Viceroyalty, and coronation of
King Charles of the Bourbons
1759-1776 Moderate social and economic
reformism of Prime Minister Bernardo
Tanucci;
1780-1789 Intensification of reforms, particularly
under Prime Minster Domenico
Caracciolo (1786-89). The Bourbons
tight their links with Austria, and
follow the model of the "enlightened
absolutism" of Joseph II Habsburg
Anti-French policy, and political
alliance with Rome and with Great
Britain
Reform of the University of Naples
and foundation of the Academy of the
Sciences.
Mathematical teaching of Nicola and
Pietro di Martino, who introduce
Newtonian philosophy of nature in
Naples, in opposition to traditional
forms of dogmatic rationalism.
Anti-curial campaign of the
Neapolitan Jansenist clergy, in defense
of the rights of the Crown. Antonio
Genovesi, from the chair of political
economy, supports the implementation
of an anti-feudal and a free-trade
policy.
High season of the Neapolitan
enlightenment. The members of the
school of Genovesi publish their
crucial works on the reform of state
and society. They ask for a liberal turn
in policy, and for adopting the
principle of laisser-faire in economics;
i.e. for the abolition of the feudal-
communal system of land.
Sudden change of attitude of the
Bourbons with respect to the
economic-political reforms, and to the
anti-curial campaign: both are rejected
for the sake of the new political
alliance.
1794-98 Discovery of the Jacobin conspiracy,
and political trials.
War against France, and Neapolitan
"liberation" of Rome from the French
army.
In December 1798, following the
military collapse, the Bourbons flee
Naples.
1799 21-23 January, battle of Naples;
meanwhile, on the 22, proclamation of
the Republic of Naples by Neapolitan
Jacobins.
29 January, anti-feudal laws.
13 June, the counter-revolutionary
forces enter Naples.
23 June, capitulation of the besieged
Isolation of the reformers, most of
whom are arrested for being involved
in the Jacobin conspiracy. 1796 year of
the "crusade against culture". The
Church is charged the entire system of
public education. Neapolitan
Jansenism is destroyed, and its
exponents classified as "Jacobins".
Jacobin intellectual and former
reformers are in power. Many




1800-1806 "First" Bourbon restoration on the
throne of Naples.
1806-1815 French occupation of the Kingdom of
Naples.
1806 King Joseph Bonaparte
1808 King Joachim Murat
1815-20 "Second" Bourbon restoration on the
throne of Naples. Moderate policy of
Prime Minister Luigi de'Medici, who
avoid to repeat the violent repression
of 1800.
1821-1830 Pro-constitution insurrection, followed
by nine months of "constitutional
government" (1820-21). The liberals
are eventually defeated and
persecuted by the Bourbons, with the
support of the Austrian army. It
follows a blindly reactionary
government.
The personnel of the University of
Naples is selected depending on
political and "moral" considerations.
Nicola Fergola and some members of
his synthetic school of mathematics are
offered prestigious positions. Fergola,
together with the natural philosopher
G.S.Poli, the anatomist D.Cotugno, and
some ecclesiastics, re-organized public
education in accordance with the
principles of Reactionary Catholicism.
A number of exiles re-enter Naples.
Flourishing of the late eighteenth-
century philosophical tradition of
Neapolitan sensationalism and
ideology. In mathematics, the "analytic
school" emerges, which is strongly
critical of the synthetic research and
teaching of Fergola and his followers.
Many intellectuals linked to the
previous government remain in their
places. But the Reactionary Catholic
philosophy and the synthetic school of
mathematics return to dominate the
cultural panorama.
Most of the philo-French intellectuals
and reformers are exiled or arrested
for their participation in the
constitutional government.
Reactionary Catholic apogee, in
politics as in the cultural world.
Flauti on the didactic of mathematics.
1830-1848 Ferdinando II new King of Naples Slow decline of Reactionary
Catholicism as a real political option
and as cultural model.
Steps in the direction of the
"modernization" of the country are
taken in the 1830s, not without strong
resistance.
In 1839:
-the first Italian railway is completed
(Naples-Portici);
-the unification of the weights and
measures of the kingdom is eventually
approved;
-the synthetic school of mathematics
challenges the rival analytic school.
ix
1848-49 Liberal forces in power. Ferdinando II
is forced to accept a constitution, and a
parliament begin to work in Naples.
1849-60 Return to order.
In I860, Giuseppe Garibaldi's military
campaign in Southern Italy; defeat of
the Bourbon army and annexation of
the Kingdom of Naples to the new¬
born Kingdom of Italy.
The men of sciences linked to the
analytic school, play a crucial role in
the insurrection. Most of them fight in
the anti-Austrian patriotic campaign.
Again, the normalization yield the
expulsion of those who cooperated
with the constitutional government.
Member of the analytic school are still
denied teaching posts in the University
of Naples. This all change with the re¬




In 1839 a professor of mathematics at the Royal University of Naples challenged the
members of a rival school to solve three geometric problems, in order to
demonstrate to the Neapolitan public the superiority of the synthetic method over
the analytic one. In 1839 Naples was connected to Portici via the first railway ever
built in the Italian peninsula; it was only one of the remarkable achievements of the
Neapolitan Corps of Engineers, who had been restructuring the viability of the
kingdom. In 1839 an essay arguing for the possibility of miracles and containing a
demonstration of the existence of God was published; it was a posthumous essay of
the most famous Neapolitan mathematician of the period. In 1839 the debate over
the opportunity of reforming the Neapolitan system of weights and measures
entered its final and most lively phase. At the same time, the production of the
landscape painters of the school of Posillipo, who had dominated the artistic
panorama of the Restoration, seemed to have lost its unitary character; their idyllic
representations of Neapolitan countryside were giving way to new forms of
naturalism and realism. These episodes (like many others which took place at the
sunset of the Restoration age) were rooted in the cultural atmosphere of the turn of
the century. In many respects, they were the concluding episodes of an intense
political and cultural period, which had seen a Jacobin revolution (1799), the French
occupation (1806-1815), a liberal insurrection followed by a brief constitutional
government (1820-21), a decidedly reactionary policy (after 1821), and the difficult
implementation of a series of administrative and economic reforms (1830-1839)1.
One way of looking at this part of Neapolitan history, and a fruitful way I believe, is
to recognize, as a fundamental leitmotiv, that of the struggle for tire
"modernization" of the country. By the term "modernization" I shall mean, quite
straightforwardly, the complex historical process of transformation of the
Neapolitan state, society and landscape from an ancien regime structure to that of a
centralized, administrative monarchy and of a liberal economy. The process had
begun in the late eighteenth century, it had suddenly increased its speed during the
French government, and it continued, though more slowly, in the Restoration age.
Telling the story of the 1839 mathematical contest —as it would be for the story of
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the first railway, or of the Posillipo school of landscape painting— is then also a
way to tell the story of the struggle which tore apart Neapolitan society in the
course of the process of modernization.
Historians of science have pointed out that the four decades around 1800 were a
crucial period for the definition of many modern scientific disciplines and for their
institutionalization. Boundaries were drawn between legitimate and illegitimate
methodologies and between the different fields of investigation, while curricula of
higher education were re-designed or created ex novo. This was also the period
when the figure of the professional researcher achieved a precise and recognized
social status, in the context of the new administrative structures of the modern state.
Indeed, one result of the processes of modernization which arose —or increased
their speed— in a number of European countries since the French Revolution and
the Napoleonic wars, was precisely the creation of new figures of full-time
researchers, and the establishment of new scientific institutions of teaching and
research. It has been argued that the study of these figures and of these institutions
is indeed essential to understand the changes in the practice and in the cognitive
contents of the sciences2. Similarly, the present study aims to be a contribution to
the general understanding of the nature of the cultural and scientific changes which
took place at the turn of the nineteenth century, even though attention will be
directed towards a rather different kind of explanatory factors.
The focus of the present study is a controversy which was particularly lively
among the mathematicians of the town of Naples between the 1780s and the 1830s,
regarding problem-solving methods in geometry. We will see how this specific
debate was in fact related to other relevant scientific and philosophical issues;
nevertheless, this study begins and ends up with the practice of solving geometrical
problems. In other words, a choice has been made in this reconstruction to keep a
specific form of knowledge, mathematics, in the forefront, other forms remaining in
the background. The question remains of why mathematics is in the forefront and
not, says, medicine or landscape painting, which would also offer extremely
interesting material to the sociologist of knowledge3. Quite simply, mathematical
sciences have not enjoyed the same degree of attention and have not seen the same
flourishing of sociohistorical studies which has characterized other branches of the
sciences, or even landscape painting4. Although for mathematics the years around
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1800 signalled a fundamental shift in practice as well as in conceptualization, the
sociohistorical studies devoted to them are still not enough to provide ground for
generalization, and they are limited to a few cases from Prussia, England and
France5. Much more historical material is needed then, particularly from other
countries, in order to deepen our understanding of the causes and modalities of
changes in mathematical knowledge around 1800. The lack of such historical
material, together with the persistence of certain philosophical assumptions about
the nature of mathematics as essentially different from any other form of
knowledge, has permitted the long-lasting predominance of a cumulative and
teleologically oriented account of the development of mathematical knowledge. As
a result, it is only recently that some authors in the history of mathematics have
promoted a general re-orientation of their field, which included the redefinition of
their own analytic instruments and of their general assumptions6. With respect to
these issues, which are still objects of debate, the present study aims to show the
shortcomings of the traditional, cumulative approach in the specific case under
study, and to show how considerations from social and cultural history can be
fruitfully integrated with the traditional tools of the historiography of mathematics.
The protagonists of the Neapolitan controversy were members of two schools
of mathematics, who grounded their teaching and research upon two different sets
of problem-solving techniques. The controversy was centered on geometrical
problem-solving but, by looking at the writings of the actors, one sees that
disagreement extended to every other branch of mathematics as well. Indeed, while
debating about such "technical" issues as which is the most proper way to solve
geometrical problems, the actors were also defending certain specific assumptions
about the nature of mathematics, and attacking others. Among these assumptions
were those relative to the goals of mathematics, of its basic values, and of the
relation between mathematical knowledge and empirical reality. So, for instance,
the criteria employed to judge the validity of the proof of a theorem, of the solution
of a problem, or of their "elegance" were far from being agreed upon, and they
were in fact objects of intense debate. In other words, the controversy involved
fundamental metamathematical beliefs of the actors, as well as their mathematical
practices. Given this, there are at least two kind of considerations which should be
born in mind when placing the Neapolitan controversy in the European context.
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a) First of all the controversy was an instance of the widespread opposition
between supporters of purely synthetic geometry and supporters of purely analytic
geometry. During the eighteenth century pure geometrical methods had survived
as a marginal discipline, overshadowed by the success of algebraic and analytic
methods applied to geometry. Pure geometry and its synthetic methods were
cultivated with passion in cultural areas which remained at the margins of the great
development of analysis, such as England and Scotland, where Colin Maclaurin
(1698-1746), one of the most famous synthetic geometers of the first half of the
century, worked. Nevertheless, particularly in France, in the German countries and
in the areas which were subject to their cultural influence, pure geometry suffered a
generalized and deep decline, as the "analytic spirit" extended its empire to the
solution of geometrical problems as well. The application of algebra and calculus to
geometry had in fact transformed the practice of this science. While apparently
tackling the same problems as their predecessors, analytic geometers of the
eighteenth century were acting and thinking in a very different way. To most of the
famous and extremely productive analysts —such as Euler, d'Alembert, the
Bernoullis and Lagrange— "analysis", in its wider sense, was a set of algebraic
technique, both finite and infinitesimal, which could be applied to solve problems
from the most diverse fields of experience. Geometry was seen as just another
possible field of application of analytic reasoning, which they regarded as valid and
legitimate in itself, whatever was the object under study7. And also in the case of
geometry the analytic procedures had demonstrated their enormous heuristic
power, offering solutions of unprecedented generality, and accomplishing a
remarkable homogenization and mechanization of problem-solving procedures.
Lagrange's memoir on triangular pyramids (1773) was emblematic of the purely
analytic approach to geometry, and it also signalled its point of highest refinement8.
As a matter of fact Lagrange had managed, in this memoir, to eliminate geometrical
figures as sources of intuitive knowledge, to generalize its considerations about the
properties of pyramids at the highest level, and to reduce geometrical problem-
solving to a question of mechanic procedures. It was in reaction to the diffusion of
the Lagrangian approach to geometry that, since the 1820s, a number of geometers
planned to rescue the classical synthetic methods from oblivion, and to develop
them to compete with the generality and fruitfulness of the modern analytic
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methods. Quite traditionally, Morris Kline describes this new geometrical program
of the early nineteenth century as due to a number of geometers who had
eventually realized that the abandon of synthetic geometry had been unjust and
imprudent9. Opposition to purely analytic methods emerged precisely in France
and Germany, where the analytic spirit had been dominating mathematical
teaching and research for decades. In France, this reaction came primarily from a
group of geometers who had studied with Gaspard Monge (1746-1818) at the Ecole
Polytechnicjue between 1795 and 1809. Following Monge's teaching, they developed
the new branch of descriptive geometry, but they also revived the tradition of
Euclidean geometry. It should be noted though, that while Monge had been
recovering synthetic methods in the framework of his research in analytic and
differential geometry, some of his pupils, such as Lazare Carnot (1753-1823), Jean-
Baptiste Biot (1774-1862), Jean-Victor Poncelet (1788-1867), joined later by Michel
Chasles (1793-1880), aimed to completely restore the "dignity" of synthetic
geometry, and to improve its techniques whilst being respectful of the spirit of the
Greek tradition, i.e. without betraying the proper "nature" of geometry. Their
program was designed in explicit opposition to the analytic approach; they
remarked that its great generality and its heuristic insights were obtained at too
high a price: the abandoning of the study of the particular figure, i.e. the only
source of intuitive geometrical knowledge. How can one be sure that the algebraic
solution of a geometrical problem is valid, if it is only grounded and legitimated by
algebraic reasoning? If one assumes that the meaning of geometrical propositions
can only be derived from the intuitive knowledge obtained from the inspection of
the figure, than the formal transformations of analysis appear to be "blind" steps,
whose final result shows no clear connections with the initial geometrical
conditions of the problem. So Chasles could oppose to the fast and general
procedure of analysis the step-by-step procedure of synthesis, noting how each
passage of the latter method is immediately justifiable by reference to the figure,
while the geometrical meaning of the passages of the former method remains
obscure10. This sort of argument was related to specific epistemological assumptions
about the nature of mathematics held by the synthetic geometers; so that while
geometry was thought of as a science grounded on intuitive knowledge of "real"
truths, algebra and analysis were conceived as "artificial" methods useful to suggest
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the truth about certain geometrical questions, but lacking of proper meaning and
legitimacy. Indeed, supporters of synthetic methods stressed the lack of rigor of
analytic procedures, and the need to provide a sound basis for the calculus, i.e.
those "foundational" problems which emerged precisely at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. Emblematic of the French controversy between synthetics and
analytics was the controversy between Poncelet and Joseph-Diaz Gergonne (1771-
1859), founder and director of the prestigious journal Annates de Mathematiques, and
a well-known cultivator of purely analytic geometry. The French controversy had
echoes in the German countries, where a school of synthetic geometers grouped
around Jacob Steiner (1796-1863), who was to became professor in the new
university of Berlin, and who was protagonist of the controversy with his fellow-
countryman Julius Pliicker (1801-1868), professor of physics and supporter of the
algebraic approach to descriptive geometry. With respect to these controversies, the
Neapolitan case is a rather early phenomenon, as the Neapolitan program to rescue
the Greek style of geometrizing dates to the mid-1780s. In fact, the possibility has
been raised of whether Neapolitan texts bought by French officers in the 1780s
could have somehow stimulated the French debate11. There are no historical
grounds to support such an hypothesis and, anyway, I believe this is not a
particularly meaningful point. Note instead how, in the rapidly changing
institutional situation of the beginning of the nineteenth century, the restoration of
pure geometry emerged as an issue in those states where the analytic tradition had
been until then predominant.
b) On a more general level, the controversy analyzed in this study can be seen
as representative of the crucial transition from the tradition of eighteenth century
analysis to the new discipline of "pure mathematics". It has been observed that
between the 1780s and the 1820s mathematical practice, which had remained
relatively stable and homogeneous in its goals and methods for a few decades,
underwent important technical and epistemological changes. These have been
stressed in some historical studies, which provide material to contrast the
traditional and persistent description of this period as that of the "rigorization of
calculus", implying that the advancements of the eighteenth century analysis were
finally (and rightly) perceived as lacking a sound logical basis. The risk of making
anachronistic claims is extremely high in cases like this, where one also tends to
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assume that pieces of knowledge such as specific mathematical problems somehow
preserve a stable meaning through the decades and through the centuries,
independently of the changing practice and the changing metamathematical beliefs
of the actors who try to solve them. And indeed the case of the rigorization of
calculus is emblematic of the presence of anachronistic assumptions and of the
"illusion of persistence" in much historiography of mathematics. In short, what I
am calling the traditional historiography presents the process of rigorization of the
calculus a necessary outcome of the great (but "illogical"12) expansion of eighteenth
century analysis: there were logical and foundational shortcomings in the practice of
eighteenth century analysts, and they were finally addressed by Lagrange (in his
last period) and, in the 1820s, by Cauchy, Abel, Jacobi and many others. According
to this interpretation, the changes in the practice of mathematics which are usually
associated with the rigorization of the calculus, and the new role played by pure
mathematics as founding discipline, are explainable in terms of a progressive
refinement of the theory of the calculus. It is as if the focus had moved, at some
point around 1800, from empirical applications to issues relative to logical
foundations and internal consistency. A very different view is held by the authors
of those sociohistorical studies, where the perception of the calculus as lacking
sound foundations, and the legitimization of new mathematical techniques
specifically elaborated to address foundational issues, are seen in connection with
changes in the institutional situation of mathematics, and in the role and duties of
teachers and researchers. So, for instance, it has been convincingly shown that, in
the case of Prussia, the fact that "pure mathematics" gained authority and
legitimization as a founding discipline, cannot be understood without referring to
the process of professionalisation of research which took place within the reform of
education of the early 1800, and to the newly introduced "imperative of research"13.
In this context, foundational and "internal" issues emerged suddenly as the new
and exclusive field of work of the Prussian university professor-researcher, whose
figure was defined in opposition to that of the applied mathematician, or the
engineer. Another case which has provided interesting material is that of the
university of Cambridge, where in the 1820s an analytic school was created which
pressed for the introduction of continental analysis in England, and emphasized the
study of mathematics per se, as a pure and autonomously legitimated discipline. In
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this case, it has been showed how the emergence of pure mathematics was
connected to a contemporary re-definition of the role of mathematics in the
students' curricula, and particularly to its being used as an instrument for ranking
and selecting students14. The present study aims to add another historical case
where the stress on "pure mathematics" can be seen as essentially connected to
certain cultural and institutional changes, even though of a rather different nature.
A few words must be said about why the case of Naples has been chosen.
Naples, capital of an ancient Spanish viceroyalty, and since 1734 of an independent
kingdom, presents the historian with very peculiar sociopolitical features. In fact,
one could hardly think of an institutional and social situation which was further
from the Prussian or the English one. This makes the investigation of Neapolitan
controversy particularly interesting, as confronting its dynamics with those of the
cases cited above should allow us to see if there is any relevant common feature,
and also to compare the way in which the social context acted upon the production
of scientific knowledge. The case of Naples can be contrasted with those already
studied, and from which generalizations have already been made. In addition, the
case of Naples allows us to study of the causal role of social conditions upon
scientific knowledge. This is because European mathematicians of the early
nineteenth century referred primarily to a corpus of works which was relatively
homogeneous, and included the work of the great eighteenth century analysts, plus
the Greek geometrical tradition. The presence of different social conditions, at the
macro-level as well as the level of institutions of higher education, provides the
opportunity to study the way in which the same corpus of knowledge can be
differently selected, adopted and developed in the light of different goals.
In this respect, the present study aims to contribute to that well-established
tradition of social history of science which refers primarily to the theoretical works
of the sociology of scientific knowledge (ssk)15. In fact, this study is informed by
current concerns in ssk, and among its purposes is that of strengthening the
historiographic value of the causal connection between socio-cultural conditions
and the production of scientific knowledge. In particular, the hypothesis will be
tested that the political and cultural reaction which characterized Neapolitan life in
the Restoration age shaped the production of mathematical knowledge. Scientific
and mathematical knowledge produced by a specific group of Neapolitan scientists
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is best understood when placed in the context of the Neapolitan conservative
thought. "Conservative thought" usually refers to a loosely connected body of
writings whose purpose is broadly to conserve aspects of culture and society from
radical change or disruption16. Conservative thought has been studied in its
relations to sociology17, history18, and literature19; in its opposition to certainty and
the spirit of system20; in its relations to civility and politeness21; to cognitive
pluralism22, to culture and custom23, to tacit knowledge24. In this study we shall
consider a particular form of conservative thought, labeled by historians as
"Reactionary Catholicism"25. The term "Reactionary Catholic thought" will be
employed, its meaning being restricted to those aspects which are common to the
writings of intransigent Catholic authors (mostly Italian and French) who attacked
the social and political outcome of the Enlightenment and of the French Revolution
in the early nineteenth century. This specific form of conservative thought will be
described in its relation to scientific and mathematical knowledge. The relation
between forms of conservative thought and scientific knowledge has been scarcely
researched, which is rather surprising considering the crucial role modern science
played in the very definition and in the early debates between conservative authors
and their liberal opponents. (In fact, even authors far from the practice of science,
such as Joseph de Maistre, wrote repeatedly on the nature of scientific
knowledge)26.
The present study adopts the following structure. In the first part (Chapter one)
the controversy over geometrical methods, and its links with more general
assumptions about the nature of mathematics, are introduced. The historical
reconstruction of the controversy, to which very limited attention had been paid by
historians of science, is centered around an emblematic episode: the 1839 public
challenge between the champions of the synthetic school and those of the analytic
school. Nevertheless examples and quotations have been chosen also from other
texts, so to provide an overview of the contents of the entire controversy. This part
is concluded by remarking how the methodological controversy cannot be properly
assessed without referring to the epistemological assumptions of the actors. The
second part (Chapters two and three) is devoted to illustrating some features of the
philosophical and social thought of the Neapolitan Enlightenment, and its links
with a specific political project. It is also shown how the "analytic style of thought"
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was imported into Naples to be employed as a powerful cultural resource to defend
certain specific cultural and political positions. In particular, an attempt is made to
reconstruct the political and scientific thought of those linked to the Neapolitan
Jacobin movement of the early 1790s. The importance is stressed of not detaching
their scientific (and particularly mathematical) conceptions from their political
project. An intuitive notion of the "structure of knowledge" is employed to make
sense of a crucial epistemological shift employed by Neapolitan reformers and
Jacobins with respect to traditional Neapolitan culture. From this part of the study
the connection between certain philosophical and political programs and the
practice of the analytic mathematicians should emerge. The third part (Chapters
four and five) offers a reconstruction of Reactionary Catholic thought, as it emerged
in Italy and France since the 1790s. Given the lack of reliable references in this field,
and particularly of studies concerning the epistemological implications of this
doctrine, the space devoted to this part has necessarily been extensive. This is
justified by the connection established between Reactionary Catholicism and the
practice of mathematics of the synthetic school. The possibility of investigating the
interactions between Reactionary Catholicism and other forms of scientific research
(such as medicine and experimental physics) is also suggested. Finally (Chapter six
and seven), the story of the controversy is reconstructed, from the beginning in the
1780s to its "closure" in the 1840s. The narration aims to show the links between the
many "histories" which make up this case-study. This means showing that the story
of the controversy over geometrical methods cannot be told without telling the
stories of the political, social, and cultural changes which took place in Naples
between the 1780s and the 1830s.
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Sublime Art or Mechanical Procedure ?
In the first part of this study the specific techniques adopted by two competing
mathematical schools to solve geometrical problems are described. The protagonists
of this a controversy were, on the one side, the members of the "synthetic school",
who defended purely geometrical methods; on the other, those of the "analytic
school", who promoted a purely algebraic approach to geometry. The choice
between one or the other method —both in research and didactically— emerged as
a scientific and philosophical concern after 1780, and the controversy remained
lively until the late 1830s, when it suddenly lost its scientific significance.
Debates between supporters of purely geometrical methods and those of purely
algebraic methods were not uncommon in early nineteenth century Europe. The
question was: which of the two methods is the most appropriate to solve
geometrical problems? Many of those who raised this question were interested in
both research and teaching; in their eyes one or the other method should be
decidedly preferred in order both to find new geometrical truths and to present
such truths to the pupils. Previous geometers had found it useful to mix the
methods in their practice, so that, for instance, synthetic methods were largely used
in teaching elementary geometry because of their exemplary rigour and clarity,
whereas algebraic methods were used in research because of their renowned
heuristic power. This is not the case with the geometers who debated the value of
the two methods in the first half of the nineteenth century, and certainly this was
not the case with Neapolitan geometers. In their eyes one of the two methods
should enjoy some kind of priority which was both epistemological and ontological.
This is hardly obvious to a contemporary reader: indeed, from a twentieth-century
point of view, which is characterised by a structural and (modern) axiomatic
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conception of mathematical theories, the question of such a priority makes no sense.
In other words, we cannot easily see why Neapolitan geometers considered such
styles of mathematical reasoning as exclusive alternatives. My suggestion is that, in
order to cast light on the reasons for this geometrical controversy, it is necessary to
refer to the more general conception of mathematics held by the actors themselves.
Indeed, the meaning of terms such as "certainty", "validity", "elegance",
"reliability", "efficiency", "utility", which are crucial to the debate, is far from being
straightforward. And in fact, the disagreement between Neapolitan geometers
involved the very definition of these terms, so that even when discussing some
apparently well-defined technical point, geometers from the two schools were
actually at great conceptual distance. In the following, we shall try not to translate
problems and goals of Neapolitan mathematicians in our own contemporary
language: this would imply overlooking crucial meaning-shifts of both terms and
problems. Rather, we shall try to reconstruct the original meanings of mathematical
terms together with their own original conceptual framework and the practice in
which they were used. That is to say, we shall offer an interpretation of the
controversy, linking the technical divergence to different beliefs about the nature of
mathematics. The risks connected with such interpretations are by far preferable to
the risk of falling victim to what we call the illusion of the "stability of problems",
which consists in presenting the history of mathematics as characterised by the
presence of a number of more or less general questions which are differently
tackled by different generations of mathematicians, until they are eventually
"solved", "better solved" or discarded because "unsolvable". The latter
historiographic perspective rests on a fundamental teleological assumption,
according to which mathematics has been necessarily evolving in a certain direction
(towards our own contemporary mathematics), which can be assumed as a
privileged point of view for describing the production of every previous piece of
mathematical knowledge. This study is based on the rejection of such teleological
assumption about the history of mathematics, and does not assume that there is
some necessary inner logic guiding the historical development of mathematical
knowledge. This means assuming that every problem is essentially "unstable", its
meaning being the object of continuous re-negotiation. Coming back to the
Neapolitan controversy, this means looking for an interpretation which does not
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simply refer to previous (or later) conceptions of analysis and synthesis. The
Neapolitan case is not seen merely as a step in the long-term intellectual debate
between, say, synthetic-minded and analytic-minded geometers. Rather, it is by
looking at history, and through the historical reconstruction of the mathematical
practice and of the beliefs of the actors, that a plausible interpretation of the
controversy will be constructed.
1.1 Introductory Remarks
The summer of 1839 saw what was probably the last mathematical disfida
(challenge) which took place in the Italian peninsula1. The glorious tradition of
Renaissance disfide seems to have ended with this rather obscure episode, which
occurred in the capital of one of the most conservative kingdoms in Europe, the
Kingdom of Naples2. The Neapolitan case is worthy of particular attention because
in Naples the debate over methods assumed very harsh tones, and it shaped the
local mathematical production for decades. The 1839 challenge was in fact one of
the last noteworthy episodes in the fifty-year old debate between the "synthetic
school" of geometry (usually defined as the Neapolitan school tout court, because of
its predominant position) and its analytic opponents.
At the core of the controversy was the research and teaching of Nicola Fergola
(1752-1824), the most influential and celebrated Neapolitan mathematician of his
generation. A private teacher of mathematics and philosophy since the 1770s,
Fergola was appointed professor at the Royal University of Naples (RUN) in 1789;
since then, his influence on the practice of the mathematical sciences in Naples
remained almost uncontested for around thirty years, which were the golden age of
the synthetic school of Naples. Under Fergola's guidance, young students
discovered the geometrical works of the ancients, and they were shown those
criteria of clarity, elegance and rigour which should inform their own activity as
teachers and practitioners of mathematics. Among Fergola's pupils were abbe Felice
Giannattasio (1759-1849), Annibale Giordano (1769-1836), Giuseppe Sangro
(ca.1775-1835), Giuseppe Scorza (1781-1843), Francesco Bruno (ca.1790-1862),
Vincenzo Flauti (1782-1863), Ferdinando De Luca (1783-1869), and many more.
They made up most of early nineteenth century Neapolitan mathematics. Fergola's
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teaching ability was renowned in Naples, and his lectures were crowded with
students from every province of the kingdom. Thus, his teaching was not only
relevant for the few who entered an academic career, but also for very many who
continued in different directions, including politicians, administrators, and
ecclesiastics. At Fergola's death, his school began to lose its uniform character
(while Fergola was alive, none of his students dared to open a private studio on his
own). Vincenzo Flauti emerged in the 1810s as the new leading figure in the
synthetic school, accumulating an unprecedented number of charges in public
education, and controlling the mathematical activity of the Royal Academy of the
Sciences (RAS). He was certainly one of the most powerful professors of the RUN,
and one of the most famous scientists of his age. That this happened to a professor
of mathematics is rather surprising, given the low prestige traditionally associated
to scientific disciplines in Neapolitan academic life (law and medicine being the
leading faculties). As an example of Flauti's power, we could cite his monopoly over
the production of university and college textbooks of mathematics all over the
kingdom (Flauti's edition of Euclid's Elements had no less than twenty-two editions,
granting its author scientific success as well as remarkable revenues).
We said Fergola's influence was "almost" uncontested. Indeed since its very
beginnings the synthetic school was opposed by those who inclined to adopt a
purely analytic approach to geometry, on the track of the French and North Italian
geometers, particularly of Joseph-Louis Lagrange (1736-1813). French analytic
textbooks were already well diffused in the 1780s, mainly to be used in military
schools, whereas, around 1790, the Lagrangian approach to geometry began to be
preferred by some private teachers of mathematics. The French occupation of the
kingdom (1806-1815) was the occasion for the supporters of analysis to consolidate
their position and to give birth to a proper "analytic school", which was mainly
based in the new School of Application of the Corps of Engineers of Bridges and
Roads (Scuola di Applicazione del Corpo degli Ingegneri di Ponti e Strade), a school of
civil engineering founded in 1811 and shaped on the model of the French Ecole de
Fonts et Chausses. Among those who supported the purely analytic approach to
mathematics were Carlo Lauberg (1762-1834), who played a crucial role in
introducing the "analytic spirit" in Napolitan mathematics in the early 1790s and,
later, Ottavio Colecchi (1773-1847), Salvatore de Angelis (1789-1850), Francesco
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Paolo Tucci (1790-1875), and Fortunato Padula (1815-1881). Roughly speaking, the
first stage of the controversy had Fergola and Lauberg as its main actors, whereas
since 1810 Fergola's pupils debated with the analytic teachers quoted above. While
the basic beliefs about the nature of mathematical knowledge and its role in the
wider framework of human knowledge remained stable over the fifty-year
controversy, many of its aspects evolved. For instance Flauti's interests were
significantly more narrow than Fergola's (limited to pure and descriptive
geometry), whereas some of his synthetic colleagues became mostly interested in
the history of mathematics. The controversy ended up in the 1839 challenge,
followed by a rapid decline of the synthetic conception of mathematics, which
apparently had lost much of its appeal to the new generation. The very meaning of
the controversy went lost in the new context of "Italian mathematics", following the
political unification of the country in 1860.
The question of which is the "proper" method to solve geometrical problems
cannot but appear misplaced to contemporary readers. Even more obscure are the
accusations of "moral depravity" and "anti-scientific attitude" that Neapolitan
synthetics launched against those practising and teaching purely analytic methods
in geometry. We read in their writings that such a moral connotation depended on
an allegedly negative, "corruptive" effect of analytic methods on the minds of the
students3. The reasons for such peculiar accusations are not clearly stated though:
those who launched them took for granted some background knowledge which is
not ours. What is clear is that the controversy over problem-solving methods in
geometry was strictly linked to such questions as the hierarchical structure of
different mathematical disciplines, the role of mathematics in university curricula,
and the didactic function of mathematics. In the following, we shall describe the
Neapolitan debate in its general features, and we shall take a look at the matter of
the 1839 challenge. Let us begin by clarifying the basic terminology employed by
these geometers, that is: what did they mean by "analysis" and "synthesis"?
Unfortunately for the historian, these very terms are polysemic to a degree
matched by few other terms in philosophy of mathematics. They stem from Greek
as composed terms: "analysis" (avakoaiQ can be translated as "back from
solution", "back from conclusion", or "resolution" (this is the standard Latin
translation: resolutio); "synthesis" (ouvxeaiQ can be translated as "to put together",
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or "to compose" (standard Latin translation: comipositio). However, in Greek there is
not a direct opposition between the two terms4. So, for example, Penelope
"analysed" her web during the night, but she did not "synthesise" it during the day
(rather, she "wove" it)5. On the other hand, "synthesis" is referred by Aeschylus to
the act of putting letters together to form a word: but there is no reference to any
sort of analysis to be accomplished before or after this act of synthesis6. Moving
from every day language into philosophical and mathematical terminology, the two
terms underwent a long series of meanings-shifts which it is not of interest to
describe here. Let us just note that Marco Panza and Michel Otte listed not less than
eighteen different interpretations given to the two terms by mathematicians (to
define different styles of mathematical reasoning) and philosophers (to clarify the
nature of mathematics and of knowledge in general)7. But, what about the
interpretation shared by Neapolitan geometers? A first, very simple example, will
help us to draw a rough divide between the two methods used by the Neapolitan
geometers, and in so doing we will shed light on the meaning of the terms
"analysis" and "synthesis" in this context.
When studying the properties of the conic sections, the student was asked to
solve problems such as the following: how can we trace the tangent t to a given
circle C, at the point P ? Following the instructions contained in a textbook of the
synthetic school, this problem is solved by performing a geometrical construction:
this consists in tracing the radius OP and then tracing the line t passing through P
and perpendicular to the radius OP (fig.la). According to the instructions contained
in an analytic textbook, however, the problem is solved through the use of algebraic
algorithms. Firstly, one translates the terms of the problem in algebraic form, by
choosing an opportune system of coordinates: in this case the one centred in the
circle's centre; with respect to these coordinates the equation of the curve is
2 2 7
x +y = r~,
and the point P will be individuated by the couple (a,b) (fig.lb). Secondly, one puts
in a system the equations of the curves whose points of intersection are crucial for
the solution of the problem: in this case the equation of the circle and the general
equation of a straight line passing for the point P, which is





to calculate the gradient m of the tangent line t. The solutions of this system are the
points of intersection between the straight line t and the circle (which, in the case of
the tangent, do coincide). Solving the system, the following equation of the tangent
line is obtained:
ax + by = r2.
Now, the first method was held, by the members of the synthetic school, as to be the
only proper method to solve a geometrical problem. They referred to it as to the
"synthetic method" (metodo sintetico), or "composition method" (metodo di
conrposizione). The second, an approach to geometry developed since the
seventeenth century, was recommended by the members of the analytic school.
They referred to it is as to the "analytic method" (metodo analitico)-, more specifically,
they called their own method "two or three coordinate geometry" (geometria a due o
tre coordinate), or "Lagrangian method". This example does not shed light on the
real practice of the two methods, but it is sufficient to bring out what was seen as a
crucial difference between them, namely, their degree of generality. In fact, the two
methods sketched above could be characterised in a number of different ways, but
Neapolitan geometers gave most weight to the criterion of generality. Let us go on
then, by describing the methods from their own point of view. In the first method of
solving the problem, we have utilised a specific feature of the circle —namely the
fact that the tangent to a circle at a point P is always perpendicular to the radius OP.
If one were to consider the case a different kind of curve, a parabola for example, or
an ellipse, some different characteristic of the curve in question should be employed
in order to solve the same kind of problem. For instance, to find the tangent at a
certain point P in the case of an ellipse, one should consider the following property:
the tangent in P is bisector of the angle between the straight lines connecting the
two foci to P. The second way of solving the problem, the analytic one, is a very
different one. The procedure is unchanged whether one is considering a circle, a
parable, or an ellipse. In this sense the analytic method is more general and easier to
employ. Nevertheless, it should be noted that when using this method, information
about specific properties of the studied curve becomes not only unnecessary but
also much more difficult to establish. So the fact that the tangent in P is
perpendicular to OP can be stated only by recognising the validity of the following
algebraic equation
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b/a (-a/b) = -1,
where b/a is the gradient of the radius OP and -a/b is the gradient of the line t. This
means that while the analytic method is completely adequate for solving the
problem, it fails to provide information that is immediately evident when using the
synthetic method. It should be also noticed that in the synthetic method the
geometer looks constantly at the figure in order to see which are the possible
relations between certain parts (in this case, the tangent and the radius).
Consequently, although one can achieve a certain degree of generality in his
considerations, he never distance himself from the concreteness of the figure. In the
analytic method, the geometer immediately achieves a much higher degree of
generality by translating the conditions of the problem in algebraic language; in this
phase variables and parameters are added precisely to make his considerations
much more general, so that all the possible cases falling under the initial conditions
of the problem are actually considered. Schematically, then:
1) synthetic method: one assumes the tangent as already traced —» one sees that for
every possible position of P, the tangent would be orthogonal to the radius in P -»
one already knows how to trace a radius in P => one constructs the radius in P, and
then traces the tangent t in P.
2) analytic method: one considers which quantities would bring us, if known, to the
solution of the problem -> these quantities are taken as unknowns —> the conditions
of the problem are expressed in the form of algebraic equations, and parameters are
introduced in order to consider all the possible cases -> the equations are put in a
system and solved, in order to find which values satisfy all the conditions => the
tangent can now be traced translating the numerical values in their geometrical
representation.
Accordingly, here is how the two methods were described:
1) the synthetic method is specific. Every problem to be solved calls for a different
construction; thus the geometer requires skill, knowledge and experience which can
be gained only through a long training. This method relies largely on the intuition
of the geometer, who must see the relevant relations between figures, and choose
the more suitable construction for each particular problem. Solving problems is a
difficult and sublime "art".
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2) the analytic method is general. Every problem can be put in equation, and then
mechanically solved. Through solving the "equation of the problem", one obtains
all the possible numerical solutions for the original geometrical problem: nothing
seems to be left for the intuition of the geometer. Solving problem consists in
following a "mechanical procedure" and everyone, with little practice, can do it.
More generally, Neapolitans used the terms "synthetic" and "analytic" to refer,
respectively, to the use of geometrical and of algebraic reasoning in problem-
solving; so that "synthesis" was commonly synonymous for "purely geometrical
procedures", and "analysis" for "algebraic or infinitesimal procedures". But this
was not the only meaning attached to the couple analysis-synthesis. Another, more
ancient use of these terms was followed in the context of the purely geometrical
problem-solving procedures. Thus, before going on with the historical
reconstruction of the controversy, it is necessary to know something more about the
nature of the geometrical problem-solving procedure, and about this other meaning
of the couple "analysis and synthesis", a meaning which, in Neapolitan writings,
coexists with the one stated above.
In fact, geometrical procedures employed by the synthetics were much more
articulate than the previous example could suggest. These procedures were derived
from a corpus of ancient texts which included works by Euclid, Archimedes,
Apollonius and by later commentators such as Pappus. These texts were
scrupulously studied by the synthetics, and some of them were in fact employed as
textbooks for their courses. The Neapolitan school of synthetic geometry considered
itself as the legitimate heir of the classical geometric tradition, or "the Greek school"
as they used to call it. In their historical reconstruction of the evolution of
mathematics, they were the last ring of a long chain which linked Greek geometers
to Renaissance geometers, to Galileo, to the great seventeenth century geometers
such as Viete, Descartes, and Newton. Now, not only the idea that such a
heterogeneous lot of mathematicians can be presented as sharing some unitary
conception of mathematics and a common geometrical problem-solving method is
hardly plausible, but also the idea that all Greek geometers employed a common
and well-defined method in their own research has been challenged by historical
scholarship8. Programmatic claims should be handled with care: in this case their
function was more that of creating a previous tradition, than simply referring to it.
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Let us see, anyway, what Neapolitans found so crucial in the "ancient tradition of
geometric problems".
Already during the fourth century B.C., Greek geometers dealing with the
problem of cube duplication had developed a set of geometrical techniques which
would later become part of the classical problem-solving tradition. Among these
techniques there was the twofold procedure of "analysis and synthesis", which was
"familiar as an instrument for the solution of problems several decades before
Euclid"9, and was to reach its highest refinement in the work of Apollonius (circa
262-190 B.C.). According to this tradition, a geometric "problem" (from proballein,
"to cast forward") seeks the construction of a figure corresponding to a specified
description. Basically, a problem is solved by reducing it to others which have been
already solved. The twofold method included a process of analysis which consisted
of the following steps: 1) the desired figure is posited as if it had been already
constructed; 2) a series of properties are deduced from it, until some element is
reached which is known to be constructible from previous results. Then, a process
of synthesis begins. It starts from the constructible elements to which the original
construction has been reduced and, following approximately the reverse order of
analysis, it leads, through a series of deductions, to the desired construction. If we
look to our first example, we can recognise a very simple example of the twofold
process at work: we start by assuming we have already traced the tangent, we see
that it would be orthogonal to the radius, the radius is something we already know
how to construct; then we trace the radius and we trace the tangent as orthogonal to
it. In other words, analysis moves from the unknown as if it were known to its
possible antecedents until arriving at premises we recognise to be known; whereas
synthesis moves from the known to what we have to construct to solve the problem
(this definition seems to coincide with what Panza and Otte called the "directional
interpretation" of the terms "synthesis" and "analysis"). Historians agree that the
procedure of analysis was the privileged heuristic method in the ancient tradition.
Indeed, it is suitable for advanced geometric research, given that it can be used even
when the solution of a problem is not yet known. Nevertheless, when it came to
presenting results in a systematic way, Greek geometers gave priority to the
synthetic method. Classical synthetic textbooks, such as Euclid's Elements or
Apollonius' Conies became exemplary tokens of demonstrative rigour; but still, they
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did not expose the original reasoning of the geometer and the rationale for his
choices, so that their solutions of problems and their demonstrations of theorems
are rich in (apparently) arbitrary steps, whose reasons remain obscure until the
result is eventually reached. Greek geometers also wrote texts where the analytic
method was presented, in order to train students in this practice, but very few
survived, such as Euclid's Data. This lack of information about the practice of
analysis helped to consolidate a particular image of the ancient tradition among
modern geometers, an image which was characterised by compilations of bodies of
theorems ordered according to the rigorous deductive steps of the synthetic
method10. It should be noted that the priority of the synthetic method and of
theorems over problems in the surviving corpus of Greek texts is not entirely the
result of historical accidents. In fact, authors of late commentaries such as Pappus
and Proclus, whose work is crucial for our knowledge of the ancient geometrical
productions, manifested an evident predilection for synthesis, theorems and formal
proofs. As a result, they presented a somewhat distorted image of the ancient
tradition, which was transfigured according to their own particular philosophical
interests. The ancient tradition was centred on exploiting the heuristic power of the
analytic method in order to solve problems, which was the main goal of geometrical
activity; and that in this context the formulation of theorems and the synthetic
presentation of geometrical results was conceived as a secondary activity. The
reasons for the different weight given to methods and themes by later
commentators is to be found in the particular function that mathematics played in
their own intellectual project. Generally, they were not mathematicians involved in
original research, but Neo-Platonic philosophers with an interest in mathematics as
a purely abstract and rational science. According to them, mathematics deals with
the world of eternal and immutable essences, and the statement of a theorem is the
description of an eternally true state of (ideal) things. Reasonably then, the
theorematic form, which can be seen as essentially "static", was preferred to the
problematic form, which can be seen as essentially "dynamic". Indeed, in solving a
problem the geometer performs certain operations with and on geometrical entities,
modifying them and bringing new entities into existence. These considerations can
make sense of why the analytic side of the old twofold solutions was often
eliminated by later commentators, who regarded it as "merely" heuristic and
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eventually unessential, being interested only in the ideal and timeless state of
things. Instead, the procedure of analysis was used in purely speculative
investigation over theorems, an application scarcely supported by the practice of
previous geometers, and which seems to betray the original heuristic function of
this method11.
It is this image of the ancient tradition, as one eminently interested in
demonstrative rigour and logical deduction, that "modern" geometers found
unsatisfactory in the seventeenth century12. The introduction of algebraic and
infinitesimal methods to solve geometrical problems was in many respects a
response to the limited heuristic power of the techniques offered by the received
tradition; a replacement of the ancient analysis with the new analysis of the
moderns. But this was not the only possible way to overcome what was generally
perceived as the impasse of geometry. Some modern geometers decided to revive
the original analysis, reconstructing its procedures on the basis of the scarce
information available (hence a series of "divinations" of the lost analytic texts). In
the particular intellectual context of the late eighteenth century this querelle was to
be revived once again by the Neapolitan synthetic school, in its singular and
obscure fight against "the mathematics of the moderns".
1.2 Synthetic, Cartesian and Lagrangian Method
We shall now go through some problem solutions extracted from two of the most
representative Neapolitan textbooks. Their exemplary character, and their being
slightly more complex than the previous one, will make us appreciate the real
working of the two methods. Let us begin with an excerpt from Fergola's On
Geometric Invention which circulated in the synthetic school as a manuscript from
1809, and which contained a summa of Fergola's ideas about how to train students
in problem solving (indeed Fergola had originally titled it The Heuristic Art)13. The
text introduced students to "the art of geometrical analysis" through principles,
canons, and examples. Consider the following case:
Problem:
Given a triangle ABC of kind and of magnitude, inscribe a square in it, whose
side lies on the basis BC (fig.2).
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Geometrical analysis (step 1): supposition of the fact
Suppose as already inscribed in ABC the square EGHF, so that the side
FH lies on BC and the angles FEG and HGE lie in the sides AB and BC.
Suppose O be that point of AD such that tracing for it EG parallel to BC
and for E and G the perpendiculars EF and GH, be EF=GH=EG.
Geometrical analysis (step 2): consequences of the supposition
Supposed EG=EF, then EG:AO=DO:AO. [1]
Than, for the nature of the triangle, EG:AO=BC:AD. [2]
So, BC:AD=DO:AO.
Geometrical analysis (step 3): reduction of the problem
Since DO:AO=BC:AD, and since BC and AD are given of magnitude,
the problem can be reduced to that of dividing AD according to a given
ratio; otherwise, to that of finding two segments whose sum is given
and whose ratio is also given. This can be done as seen in a previous
paragraph.
Geometrical composition (step 1): construction
Trace from B the perpendicular BP, equal in length to BC. Trace PD, to
find the point E on AB; and trace EG parallel to BC. For E and G trace
now the two perpendiculars EF and GH. EFGH is the square the
problem asked for.
Geometrical composition (step 2): proof
It is PB:EF=BD:DF, or EO.
And BD:EO=BC:EG
Than PB:EF=BC:EG.
So EF=EG, and EGHF is a square, inscribed in ABC.14
According to Fergola, this was the proper sequence of steps in order to analyse and
to compose a problem, and to prove the specific geometric truth that has been
found. To sum up, geometric analysis consists of the following steps:
1) Suppose done what is asked in the problem ("supposition of the fact");
2) Develop the consequences of this supposition. One should look both at the
consequences deriviirg from the conditions of the particular problem (from here
—in our example— one gets the proportion [1]) and at the consequences deriving
from the nature of the figure(s) involved (from here the proportion [2]).
3) Find one consequence which is constructible (that is, which reduces the problem
to one already solved).
This solution is "very simple", Fergola concludes, because accomplished with "the
minimum use of reasoning [col menomo dispendio di ragioni]"15. In his historical
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remarks, Fergola attributed (erroneously) to Plato the discovery of the method of
geometrical analysis, concluding:
if an inventor excels a wise scientist as the scientist does the ignorant people
[ignaro volgo], how much is worth the one who discovered the art of
inventing? Plato discovered it at the very beginning of Geometry, [...] and I
think that this great man should be said for this, more than for any other
philosophical speculation, the divine genius, as if an angelic mind would have
penetrated into a human brain.16
Unfortunately, Fergola continued, "destructive time has not transmitted to us the
heuristic principles of Greek geometers"; his own task was precisely providing
students with some rules based on ancient documents and on the discoveries of
modern geometers. To this extent, he began with the definition of geometric
analysis provided by Theon of Alexandria: "[analysis] est sumptio quaesiti tanquam
concessi, per ea quae consequuntur in aliquod verum concessum"17, and from this
he developed four informal "heuristic canons" that should be kept in mind while
analysing problems (basically, they codify the three-step procedure shown above).
The geometrical analysis of a problem is an "ontological principle of reduction, that
is a rich source of truths and methods", Fergola declared18. He also referred to it as
"the art of inventing", which is "one of the most beautiful dianoethic virtues"
("dianoethic" meaning —in Scholastic terminology— purely intellectual, as
opposed to empirical, practical); it is either a natural gift, as in the case of Newton,
or the result of an assiduous training19. But completing the analysis of a problem is
only part of the task of the geometer. After the "reduction" of the problem, which
lead to some previously known geometrical truths, it is necessary to perform the
"geometrical composition of the problem", according to "the doctrine of Pappus"20,
who indeed placed great emphasis on the process of "constructing" and proving the
solution of the problem. The material for performing the construction and the proof
(which together make the "composition" of the problem itself) are already
contained in the previous geometrical analysis through which it has been solved.
But the neatness of the composition, its elegance, depends entirely on the way in
which these materials are chosen and re-arranged by the geometer, i.e., in the end,
on his "skill and ingenuity" (arte e ingegno). The construction of the problem
generally proceeds, as we said, in the reverse way of analysis, i.e. from the known
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geometrical truths to the construction required by the statement of the problem. We
said "generally" because the complete reversal of the analysis into the composition
is not always possible, or desirable. The geometer can indeed decide to employ
indirect forms of reasoning, such as the reductio ad absurdum, or to introduce some
independent geometrical truths (in the form of "lemmas"), in order to make the
composition more direct and elegant. In this case, there is no strict correspondence
between analysis and composition, and the simple knowledge of the composition of
a problem is insufficient to reconstruct its original analysis (from here comes the
difficulty in reconstructing the lost analytical works of the ancients). In fact, even in
this simple example, we can see that Fergola preferred not to move backwards from
the reduced problem, but he rather found a simpler and quicker way to compose it.
This showed to the student that the skilled geometer was in fact only loosely
bounded by methodological principles, and that "the art of inventing" depended
very much on his own intuition. About the second stage of the composition, Fergola
remarked that "a proof is needed to allow the construction"21, as is clearly shown in
Euclid. In practice, the constructed solution is turned into a theorem for which a
proof is then provided (Fergola used the puzzling expression "proof of a problem").
Emulating the twofold method of the ancients was certainly Fergola's basic aim.
Thus, the reader might be surprised by finding that Fergola devoted part of his
book to algebraic problem-solving methods, which were proposed to students as
good techniques to deal with certain kinds of problems. In fact the contradiction is
only an apparent one. To clarify this crucial point, let us introduce a distinction
between two different ways in which algebra can intervene in the problem-solving
process.
1) According to the Cartesian method, or "mixed method", the use of algebraic
algorithms coexists with the consideration of geometrical figures as a constitutive
part of the problem-solving process. This reduces the role of analytic tools to a
subsidiary, economic one. In principle, any of the analytic passages could be
eliminated and replaced by the correspondent geometrical reasoning. Moreover, for
a problem to be said to be properly solved, a final "construction" of the solution
must be performed, which translates the analytic solution into its geometrical form.
2) According to the Lagrangian method, or the "very modern [modernissimo]
method", problem-solving is not introduced by any preliminary construction, as in
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the Cartesian, but rather by the preparation of a set of very general formulas which
can be thought of as expressing metric relations between geometrical figures22.
Then, these formulas are manipulated so to obtain the desired results. Such a
manipulation of algebraic and infinitesimal algorithms can be performed without
looking at any particular figure. This means that analytic reasoning is often not
translatable in some corresponding geometrical step. Eventually, finding all the
possible solutions (numerical values) for the solving equation means having solved
the problem itself, and no final geometrical construction is performed (it is taken for
granted that equations are always constructible, if one is interested in this kind of
activity). In this method analysis is not a subsidiary tool, but rather an independent
and fully legitimated way of reasoning which allows the geometer to discover new
geometrical truths in a mechanical and non-intuitive way. Furthermore, by being
detached from geometrical reasoning over particular figures, this method enable the
geometer to generalise his results and his procedures to a much higher degree than
the Cartesian method itself.
The last method was called "Lagrangian" because it had been given exemplary
employment by Lagrange in his famous essay on triangular pyramids (1773). It is
important to recall some of the programmatic statements contained in this work,
given that Neapolitan analytics were to take them as a basis for their own
geometrical research and teaching. First of all, one should note the extreme
generality of the subject treated by Lagrange: the essay is on "la maniere de trouver
la surface, la solidite, les spheres circonscrites, le centre de gravite, etc., de toute
pyramyde triangulaire dont on connait les six cotes"23. Then, the author remarked
that his essay could be of interest to geometers not only because of its particular
results, but also because of its innovative method: indeed it provided solutions
which are "purement analytiques et peuvent meme etre entendues sans figures".
This is an approach to geometry where particular figures (such as those we deal
with when we solve a typical synthetic problem) are irrelevant. The geometer is not
interested in the features of a particular figure, but only in the very general relations
existing between different classes of figures, or between different parts of some
typical figure (as —in this case —the pyramid).
[J]'y emploie des coordonnees rectangles pour determiner la position des
differents points que j'ai a considerer dans la pyramide, et je n'ai pas meme
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besoiri de dormer aux axes de ces coordonnees une position determinee; je
suppose seulement qu'ils se coupent au sommet de la pyramide, en sort que
pour ce point le coordonees soient nulles, ce qui sert a simplifier les formules
sans rien oter a leur generalite. Par ce moyen tout se reduit a une affaire de
pur calcul, et il est ties facile de determiner la valeur des lignes qu'on veut
connaitie, puisq'il ne faut que prendre la somme des carres des differences
des coordonnees qui repondent aux deux extiemites de chaque ligne
proposee. II ne s'agit plus ensuite que de rendre les resultats independents de
la position arbitiaire des coordonnees, en intioduisant a leur place d'auties
lignes relatives uniquement a la figure de la pyramide, comme les cotes de la
pyramide, les perpendiculaires sur ses faces, etc.; c'est a quoi je parviens a
l'aide de quelques reductions et transformations assez remarquables que
j1 expose au commencement de ce memorie, et qui pourront etie aussi du plus
grand usage dans beaucoup d'auties cas. Independamment de 1'utilite directe
que ces solutions pourront avoir dans plusieurs occasions, elles serviront
principalment a montier avec combien de facilite et de succes la methode
algebrique peut etie employee dans les questions qui paraissent etie les plus
du ressort de la Geometrie proprement dite et les moins propes a etie tiaitees
par le calcul.24
One innovation of the Lagrangian approach with respect to the Cartesian is its
much higher level of generality. This is obtained by moving the attention from
particular constructions (such as tracing the tangent to a given circle passing
through a given point), and from the scrutiny of particular dispositions of figures,
to general considerations about the properties of entire classes of figures (such as
metric relations of pyramids), to which problems must now be referred (and the
more a problem is general the more it is "interesting"). In the Cartesian approach
the role of the figure is still crucial. Indeed, the solution of problems such as those
treated by Lagrange in his essay, should begin with some preliminary
considerations about the particular figure, which include the choice of an
appropriate system of coordinates. Then, in the solution, geometric similarities and
Pythagoras' theorem would be repeatedly employed, and these actions would be
translated in algebraic terms. Lagrange started instead by presenting some general
sets of formulas which hold whatever the system of coordinates, then he provided
general solutions for entire families of problems just by manipulating such
formulas. As a result, Lagrange remarked, geometric problem-solving reduces to "a
question of calculation"; preliminary geometric constructions being, in fact
eliminated. Furthermore, Lagrange ignored the final composition of the problem,
considering its algebraic analysis as the only relevant goal.
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We should now see why, in the eyes of Fergola and of the members of his
school, the Cartesian method was as legitimate as the synthetic one. The reason was
precisely its essential contiguity with geometrical reasoning: from the preliminary
construction, to the analysis to the construction of the solving equation, to the final
proof, the Cartesian method could be thought of as "mirroring" geometrical
reasoning and of geometrical manipulation. The point was that, given the loss of the
ancient techniques of geometrical analysis, geometers needed the new algebraic
analysis in order to pursue their problem-solving activity. In a metaphor which was
widely used in the synthetic school, these two methods should become "the two
wings" which let the geometer advance in his exploration of geometrical truths.
This also means that synthetics, and particularly Fergola, did not oppose modern
analysis tout court; they were not merely asking for a return to the ancient tradition
of problem solving. Rather, the nature of their claims was, in modern terms, a
foundational one. What they argued for was the foundational role of geometrical
reasoning with respect to algebraic and infinitesimal reasoning, of synthesis with
respect to analysis.
If we now return to Fergola's textbook, we can make sense of why he extended
his presentation of the art of inventing to the case in which the Cartesian method is
used instead of the purely geometrical one. In some cases he in fact offered two
solutions for the same problem, one algebraic and one geometrical (i.e., "the two
methods of geometrical invention"), pointing out that the general structure of the
solution is essentially the same: analysis—>composition—>proof. This means that,
even when he employed algebraic algorithms to solve a problem, Fergola always
considered his reasoning as essentially geometric. Otherwise, the requirement of the
geometrical construction and of the final proof after the algebraic solution would
make no sense at all.
Among the four canons introduced to guide students in the solution of
problems25, the third and fourth are precisely about using algebraic equations to
solve problems, by means of translating the conditions in algebraic language,
solving the final equation, constructing and proving them. Such a problem-solving
method required the student to be trained in certain mathematical techniques
which a modern reader would judge rather odd. It is the case, for example, of the
technique of "constructing equations", a field of study whose popularity had
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greatly declined in the second half of the eighteenth century, but whose practice
was simply necessary in order to geometrically construct problems which have
been solved by means of algebraic analysis26. Similarly, Fergola insisted on the
necessity of "proving a problem which has been analytically solved". If you wonder
what this could possibly mean, here is an example offered by Fergola himself
(Fig.3). Basically this technique consisted in going backward from the roots of the
solving equation to the initial conditions of the problem. In a similar spirit, Fergola
provides exercises and guidelines in order to train the student to provide a
synthetic proof for a problem which has been algebraically solved27. To this extent,
algebraic expressions must be replaced by equivalent geometrical magnitudes, and
equations must be replaced by proportions. The chain of deductions which form the
proof will be obtained by constructing the roots of the solving equation, going
backwards to the equation itself, and from this to the conditions of the problem,
translating in synthesis those passages which would make the analytic proof seen
above.
In the end, even if algebraic means were allowed in problem-solving, the
necessity of the geometrical construction of the problem and of its demonstration,
made clear that the use of analysis had always to be founded on some "deeper"
geometrical reasoning. This made it necessary that "not only must the geometrical
construction of analytic expressions be clear and familiar to the analyst; but also the
synthetic means and the rigorous proving"28. The statement of the last "principle"
of the section devoted to the analysis of problems is extremely clear about the
relation between geometry and algebra in problem-solving: "a geometrical problem,
which is solved analytically, cannot be considered properly solved if it is not
constructible". This derives from the very "nature of geometrical problems",
Fergola said, citing the importance of constructing problems in classical sources and
in Descartes' Geometrie. In Fig.4 a schematic representation of Fergola's ideas about
problem-solving is provided. Philosophically, it reveals the fundamentally
geometrical conception of problem-solving supported by Fergola; technically, it
makes the use of algebraic algorithms purely instrumental, and provides a rationale
for Fergola's re-adoption of certain old techniques of translation from algebra into





4<)o.Data la retta AC [Jig-1 a.] •, dividerla in B,
sicclie il quadrato delle parte AB stia al retta ngolo
di tutta la AC nell' altra parte BC, in uri data ra-
gione , che per coinodita di analisi sia quclla di a
ad AC .
SOLUZIONE ANAL1TIC.V.
Tongasi AG = a , AB = x ; sarii CB — a — x , atl
AC.CD «* — ox.
Quindi csscndo , per la condizionc del prol>lcma ,
x* '■ a — ax :: 71 : a :: n ( a — x ) : a — ax [A]
«ara , per la l.El.V ,
a;1 =: an — 7ix. [B]
Ed aggiugnendo nx ad amho i raemhri dell* equazione, sara
x' -f ox = an [('.]
Ed a membri di quesla aggiugnendo ancora 7.u' , risultera
a:'-f nx 7j/t' == an -f [D]
Indi estraendo da ciascun di essi la radiee quadrata , sara
x + 'An = ± y (an -f. '/;«') [E]
E logliendo di coraune 'An , restera
x = — 7\n + \/ ( an -f •/,«' ) [K]
Dal quale risullaiuenlo [F] otliensi eon cawmino retrogrado
la segucntc
Dm.Esscndo x = — '/,/x ± \J ( an -f- V;n' ) [l:]
sara aggiugticiido di comunc '/.it
I
C
x -f- '{>n = ± \/ ( an -f* 'fin* )
Ed clcvando questi due membri a quadrato , sara
a:' -f ~h 74»* = «u -f- '/in'
Sicclie loglicndo di coinum*. i/p*1 , rcstcra
a;* -f* = an
E di nuovo toglicndovi nx , si avra
x1 — an 7LT = 7t ( a — x )
E quindi , per la 7. El. V, sara













1- system of coordinates
2-translation of conditions
(introd. of parameters)
3-equation of the problem
solution(s)
techniques of translation
from algebra to geometry
(construction of equations)
geometrical construction of the solution(s)
proof(s) of the solution(s)
geometrical algebraic
The "mirroring" of geometrical reasoning into algebraic forms is shown in the
analysis provided by Fergola for the problem of finding that triangle whose area,
perimeter, and an angle are known (Fig.5). Note the preliminary construction
(V apparecchio preliminare) and the two analyses, geometrical on the left and algebraic
on the right. Note how the algebraic solution, which is an instance of the Cartesian
method, depends on a preliminary inspection of the particular figure, and contains
continuous reference to it; and how the geometer keeps his algebraic considerations
strictly linked to their geometrical meaning (note e.g. the move from a proportion to
an equation).
We can now turn to an analytic textbook, to make a few remarks about the
Lagrangian method as it was used by the opponents of the synthetic school. The
book is a 1838 collection of geometrical problems published by Fortunato Padula.
The collection included that kind of very specific problem in plane and solid
geometry which were favoured by synthetics. The polemical aim is clear: Padula
wanted to show how, taking inspiration from the Lagrangian work on pyramids,
algebra can be effectively used in problem-solving, and particularly in dealing with
that kind of problems the Greek-like synthetic solutions of which were proudly
exhibited in Fergola's school. Padula refuses for algebra the ancillary role attributed
to it by the Cartesian method, and he claimed that, apart from a few geometrical
considerations on the kind of objects we are dealing with, the purely algebraic
method is perfectly adequate for problem-solving (i.e. it is not in need of any
geometrical "confirmation"). This assumption about the validity of algebraic
reasoning brought, on the technical level, some evident modification of Fergola's
methods. At the same time, having chosen to deal with particular problems, Padula
had to compromise: the purely algebraic nature of Lagrangian method and its
extreme generality are indeed diminished in this collection. In fact, Padula had to
start by considering the figure; furthermore, he generally provided a final
composition of the problem, i.e. instructions to move from the solving equation to
the construction of the figure. Again, this last step can be explained by placing
Padula's work in its context, which was that of a fierce attack against the synthetic
school. The main accusation against the "indiscriminate" use of indeterminate
equations a la Lagrange was precisely that the construction of the equation obtained





428. Costnxirc an triangolo, di cui sia data 1' ajay
il perimctro , ed un angolo .
Sol. Suppongasi csscrc ABC il triangolo richic-
sto , sicchb siavi dalo l' angolo in B , cd ollrc a cio sia
AB 4- BC -f GA = P, c 1'aja ACB uguale al rcllangolo di
P in M . Ed ccco di rincontro, ncllcduc scgucnti pagine ,
i proccdimcnti dc' due mctodi , sintctico , cd nnalitico ,
ondc potrebbesi guidarc lasoluzionc di un lal problcma.
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AnALISI GeOMETRICA.
f. Si prolunghi il lato AC in a , sicche sianvi Ie due par¬
ti Cb , e ba uguali a CB , e BA respettiYaraente , onde n' e-
mcrga tutta la retta Aa uguale alia data P.
" T5fi i dal punlo C la CD perpendicolarc alia AB. Sara
-j.^cie il triangolo CBD,per esserne dato I'angolo B.
jsc :' a data la ragionc di BD a BC (§.G0.) , c quclla
'
r. fangolo ABD all' altro di AB in BC {4.El.VI.) . Ma
• «•>(«» rcUnngolo e dato, per avere una data ragione al dalo
ii..ngolo ABC (§.21.). Dunque sara dato tanto il retlangolo
di AB in BC, che 1' altro di AB in BD; e qucsto potra sup-
porsi uguale ad RxP , 1' altro ad SxP*
III.Intanto e
\a> + Ca% = 2AaC + AC' ( 7. El.II. ).
Dunquc toglicndo Cb% bax dal 1* membro di qucsto pa-
rcggiamcnto , e dal 2* togliendovi CB* 4- BA1 , cioe AC*
-f 2ABD , rcslera
An* -f 2Cba = 2AaC — 2ABD.
IV.Finalmentc si pongano in questo pareggiamcnto Ic io-
ro equivalent quanlila , aYrassi
P'4-2BxP = 2PxnC — 2SxP
ciofc P 4" "h^S = 2aC .
Dunquc aC , o Ic due AB , BC hanno r/,P 4* B 4- S , per
5oraraa data , e contengono un rcttangolo dato . E cou cib
possono geomctricamcute csibirsi (§.1A.) .
SoLUZIONE A.fAL1TICA.
I. II dato peri metro del triangolo richicsto si cbiami P ;
ed i due lati AB,BC di esso dicansi respettiYamente x, edy.
Sara 1' altro lato AC — y — x — y.
II. E data 1' aja del triangolo ABC, perle condizioni del
problcma ; e per csserne dato 1' angolo ABC , c quindi il
ra[)porto di esso triangolo al rcttangolo di AB in BC(§.21.),
sara pero dato tal reltangolo, che si espriina per pc; quindi
sara xy = yc ,
;jr.
e con eio y — .
III.Ed csprimendosi la data ragione di CB a BD per mm
mjjr,
sara n : m :: ABC t ABD , eioe n : m :: yc : ABD = —5 n
Ed essendo AC1 = AD' + DC' — 2ABD ,
hnjtc
sari (,, — x —/)' = x' +/' —
IV. Si conlraggano i termini dclla prcccdeatc equazione,
xlniyc
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IMa qui sopra si e dimostrato xy ~ycf ed^ z=z-~ . Dun-x
que riportando tali Yalori in quell' equazione , ne risultera
2/i'c 2myc
f-lpx L_+2/Jc=-±
y c — 2.x- — 2 yc 4- =
when the geometer loses sight of the geometrical meaning of the quantities he is
dealing with, he reaches results which make sense algebraically, but are difficult to
construct geometrically. Padula wanted to show that this is in fact false, and he
provided constructions for each problem. But, at the same time, he assured the
reader that a problem can well be considered solved without the final construction
(let alone the final proof).
The very first problem of this collection is a problem of plane geometry. Padula
provided a few preliminary considerations about the figure, then he put the
problem in the form of an equation. The original problem is reduced to that of
finding the points of intersection between an hyperbola and the given parabola. As
we said, the purity of the Lagrangian method is here compromised by particular
considerations; still, what remains is the "spirit" of that method, as Padula calls it.
Indeed, the original problem is immediately generalised by introducing appropriate
variables and parameters, so that solutions can be provided for all possible cases
deriving from the original terms of the problem (see Appendix 1). Padula provided
his collection with a strong methodological uniformity; the reader was supposed to
perceive a unique, general and effective approach to geometrical problems, which
did not depend on the nature of the problem themselves. We can imagine how this
impression of uniformity was powerful only by comparing this book with previous
and contemporary synthetic books, where problems were differentiated, classified,
and solved employing a number of different ad hoc strategies. Instead, the general
rules employed by Padula to put a problem in equation are invariably the following
ones:
1) assume as unknowns the coordinates of that point, line, angle,... that, if known,
would determine all the other quantities, solving the problem;
2) express these quantities as function of the unknowns;
3) express with the "algebraic language" the conditions of the problem: it results
immediately in an equation.
In the example reproduced in the Appendix 1, it was clear that the problem would
be solved if one knew the position of the point M. This is why Padula took its
coordinates as unknowns. Then Padula translated the conditions of the problem in
algebraic terms, that is he translated in algebraic language the graphical operations
that should be performed to solve it (in this case: tracing AM to find N on the
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parabola, tracing MP and NQ parallel to AR, and comparing PQ with CB; in
algebraic terms: to find the equation of AM, the coordinates of N, by combining the
equations of parabola and straight line, to find the abscissas of P and Q, and
eventually put PQ equal to CB). Padula wanted to show how the practice of
problem-solving radically changes when one employs the Lagrangian algebraic
approach. Even when dealing with specific problems, he argued, such method
remain highly general and allows the reader (i.e. the student) to solve every
problem by following the same procedure. This increased methodological
generality, and the consequent uniformity in the practice of problem-solving were,
in the eyes of Padula, crucial advancements for the science of geometry. "It is for
sure" Padula argued, "that with a little practice in the application of this method,
and with the comprehension of its spirit, it will be possible to put in the form of an
equation any problem, as soon as we read its conditions. We cannot imagine how
this could happen using geometrical analysis"29. Not only did the new method
allow the geometer to immediately put every problem in the form of an equation; it
also mechanically guided him in discovering every possible solution to the problem
itself, by considering every possible case which fell under the initial conditions. In
commenting upon a problem which had a large number of possible solutions,
Padula remarked:
the true solution of a problem is its solving equation, whereas the
construction is a secondary operation; indeed the algebraic solution for the
different forms that the problem can assume is always one, and from this
solution, as from a general source [fonte] the particular constructions are
derived [...].30
A problem is solved when its solving equation is reached; if then one is interested
in performing every particular construction deriving from the solutions of the
equation, this can be easily done just by following the rules of algebra. What is
important is that this can be done "without referring any more to particular
considerations about the original figure". On the contrary, if a geometrical analysis
has been performed, particular positions of points can be discovered only by going
back to the figure and sometimes by re-analysing the problem itself in order to see
how to modify the solution. Moreover, Padula remarked that from the equation of
the general case, a much higher number of possible constructions can be derived
than from the synthetic consideration of the figure. So it can be often the case that,
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thanks to algebra, one recognises a certain problem being just a particular case of a
quite different one; "whereas to one who is only familiar with geometrical
considerations, such a case would seem to be a completely different problem". The
mechanical procedures of algebra bring out relations that the synthetic geometer
simply cannot see. Padula also stressed that for each case he offered different
solutions, "and from this point of view one cannot but recognise the superiority of
the algebraic method over the method of the ancients, given that the fecundity of
algebra is such that we could say that the solutions to a problem are almost infinite
in number"31.
The application of Lagrangian algebraic procedures brings uniformity,
generality, and mechanisation in the process of problem-solving. It provides the
geometers with a very high number of possible solutions, many of which could not
be spotted by the direct analysis of the synthetic method. "This clearly shows how
very different the two methods are, and how much algebra makes problem-solving
easier"32, concluded Padula. If the ideal synthetic geometer was a gifted and skilled
contemplator of intuitive geometrical truths, the analytic was a practitioner who,
with "a little practice", mechanically solved problems by implementing a general
and effective method.
As we have seen in our previous examples, both methods provided the
geometer with a "reduction" of the original problem to more simple tasks that he
was already able to perform. The point is that in the synthetic method the analysis
reduces the construction sought in the original problem to some other construction
which is already known to the geometer. The reasoning remains contained in the
specific field of geometry; it is on geometrical figures, their properties and our
manipulation of them. And this being strictly contained in the field of geometry is
indeed the reason why the composition of the problem result (almost) immediately
from the results of its analysis. If we now think about the Lagrangian method, or
rather the application of it to the case of solving particular problems, we see that
things are quite different. The geometer analyses the problem by reducing the
original geometrical construction to some simpler task: but the nature of this
simpler task is not geometrical any more. It rather consists in solving some system
of equations, each solution being one possible solution, in algebraic terms, for the
original problem. In the case of the Cartesian method the essentially geometrical
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nature of the problem solving-process is maintained by the composition of the
problem, which is usually quite straightforward, given the specific algebraic
translation performed at the beginning of the solution. But when it comes to the
Lagrangian approach, the geometrical nature of the problem-solving process is
definitely lost. In this case the "algebraic language" enters the process not as an aid
to geometrical reasoning, but as a method which is legitimate in itself. The roles of
algebra and geometry are then reversed: for the analytics algebra, a general method
of dealing with problems, is simply applied to the case of geometry. Lagrange
himself was very clear on this point: in his essay on triangular pyramids he was not
primarily interested in investigating the geometrical properties of such figures,
rather, he wanted to show how "the algebraic method" could be fruitfully used in
solving even those problems which were considered most suitable for a purely
geometrical treatment. His last two sentences read:
Par le moyen de ces formules et de celles que nous avons trouvees
precedemment on pourra resoudre differents Problemes curieux et nouveaux
sur les pyramides triangulaires; mais en voila assez sur un sujet que je n'ai
presque traite que pour donner un exemple de l'application de l'Analyse a ces
sortes des recherches.33
The analyst deals with geometrical problems mainly because he is interested in
applying his algebraic and infinitesimal procedures to the particular field of
geometry. It is, in other words, to underline once again the power of this way of
reasoning. This is why he chooses those kinds of problems which seemed more
suitable for a synthetic solution (Lagrange with pyramids, Padula with his
collection of simple plane and solid problems). The use of algebraic algorithms was
seen as an expansion of the empire of analysis, the last of an impressive series of
achievements by the universal language of the eighteenth century. In fact, Padula
and the other analytics were not primarily geometers; they were engineers
interested in different fields of pure and applied mathematics. What unified their
various activities and pieces of research was precisely the faith in analysis as a
universal method for any kind of problem-solving. Gino Loria remarked that
Lagrange can be considered "the last representative of the unbounded confidence in
the generality of formulas"34. Certainly that confidence was what his Neapolitan
followers most admired.
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1.3 The Last Challenge
We are now sufficiently equipped to return to the 1839 challenge. In that year the
glove was thrown down by Vincenzo Flauti, former student of Fergola and
professor at the RUN, perpetual secretary of the RAS, and member of a number of
Italian and European academies. In April 1839, he published a pamphlet titled
Program Presented to the Mathematicians of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, to Promote
and to Compare the Methods for Geometric Invention35. In spite of such a "neutral" title
this pamphlet sounded, to anyone interested in the sciences, like an evident
provocation directed against the analytic school. Later on, Flauti wrote this note
about the episode: "for the sake of ending the vain and boring debates about the
prevailing of one method on the other in the geometrical invention, he [Flauti
himself] proposed to his mathematician fellow-countrymen three geometrical
questions"36. Naturally, Flauti was convinced that the "vain" debates could be
ended by means of a decisive proof of the superiority of the synthetic method over
the analytic one. The statements of three problems were presented for solution,
introduced by a detailed historical account; the practice of introducing
mathematical works with extended historical notes was indeed one of the
distinctive features of the synthetic school. This allowed the reader to see a
particular piece of work as inserted in the secular tradition of geometrical research,
and to appreciate the historical stratification of results which were themselves part
of the meaning of the problem. Indeed, in their attempt to revive the ancient
tradition, synthetics described geometrical research as mainly related to the activity
of problem-solving. This activity was not conducted in isolation but through
inserting the new solution in the history of the problem, which usually started with
the work of some Greek geometer and then continued through the history up to the
present time. In dealing with such old problems, the synthetics were looking for
new and more elegant solutions, but always "in the style of the ancients". This
means that originality was not considered a relevant issue among the synthetics,
who rather made the greatest effort to emulate the ancients. This also means that
the same problem could constitute matter of investigation for centuries, without
ever losing its intrinsic interest. The activity of the geometer is indeed a constant
reflection on classical problems, which are both an unsurpassed didactic instrument
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and inexhaustible source of inspiration for the geometrical intuition of the
researcher.
Flauti stressed that geometrical knowledge does not consist merely of the
knowledge of geometrical truths, but also in mastering the different heuristic
methods, "and in being able to evaluate their respective force, so to employ them
properly"37. In the "Greek school" there was only one method he continued, but
being deeply known and mastered it was in fact "a very powerful lever, that
opened the way to many discoveries". In the ancient works, "geometry shows itself
pure and without veils, so that the soul of the reader remains completely satisfied
and enlightened"38. In the classical age, mathematical sciences advanced "with
progressive augmentation", but always "by measured steps, which are peculiar to
that method, a method used until Apollonius". The method of the Greek geometers
eulogised by Flauti is what we earlier described as the twofold analysis-synthesis
method. In particular, by stressing the mastery of the ancients, and the heuristic
power of their lost techniques, Flauti is obviously referring to their geometrical
analysis. The decline which took place after the generation of Apollonius, was a
crucial moment in every historical reconstruction offered by members of the
synthetic school: in the eyes of the synthetics the end of the classical tradition of
problem-solving was indeed the most significant rupture in the history of
mathematics. It coincided with the beginning of a long-lasting process of
degradation of a previous corpus of knowledge which was virtually perfect and
complete in itself. The loss of the great part of such a knowledge, including the
technique of geometrical analysis, was never to be recovered. Flauti continued his
excursus by describing the "Renaissance of mathematics" which consisted in the
partial rediscovery of Greek texts by Italian mathematicians. The birth of "modern
analysis" gave the moderns the advantage of possessing two different heuristic
methods. The new method was "easier to learn, simpler, and more manageable
[maneggevole]", and it provided the moderns with a surrogate for the lost
techniques. New research conducted with modern analysis "had a real geometrical
flavour, and it received from geometry light and confirmation"39. In this "very
happy epoch" great mathematicians emerged in almost any country, and all of
them studied and used both methods. Flauti depicted seventeenth century
mathematicians as "always combining geometry with the analytic method, which
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was employed as instrument not as a goal in itself [il principale]"*0. Calculus,
mechanics, and every other branch of the mathematical sciences, both pure and
mixed, were developed in strict contact with geometrical intuition, the real basis of
any valuable progress. Which means that geometers using the Cartesian method
joined the two practices of the algebraic-infinitesimal analysis and synthesis in a
ideal manner. The important point is that, as Flauti remarked, although analysis did
the greater part of the job, it always received "light and confirmation" from
geometry. Troubles began in the first decades of the eighteenth century, when the
mathematical sciences underwent a crucial "aberration from Geometry"41. The
method "of the ancient schools" survived only in some universities, particularly in
Great Britain and in Italy. Eventually, with the publication of the works of
Lagrange, the "instrumental part" of modern analysis reached its highest technical
development, whereas the "part depending on Geometry" went definitively out of
the scene. In this way Lagrange, through the creation of a purely algebraic method
to solve geometrical problems "dissolved geometry into analysis". According to the
Lagrangian method, Flauti wrote, the solution of a geometrical problem is reached
by "setting [incastonando] the data and the question in general formulas whose
manipulation brings to the solving equation of the problem, without taking in
consideration the figures"42. But, Flauti warned, often Lagrange didn't obtain these
final equations "in a constructible form". On this "new analytic geometry" (novella
analisi geometrica) that was developed by the French analysts Gaspard Monge (1746-
1818) and Sylvestre Lacroix (1765-1843), Flauti prefers not to give any judgement,
given that the value of the method was to be soon tested by the contenders.
Nevertheless, a critical judgement clearly emerged from certain definitions he
provided for the new method, such as "analysis reduced to combinatory art"43. The
mechanical manipulation of formulas to which modern analysis is reduced, is seen
as a poor surrogate of the once noble art of geometric analysis. Flauti supported his
dislike of the new method by appealing to the main authority in recent Neapolitan
mathematics, Nicola Fergola. Flauti noted how this esteemed scientist was worried
about the new trend in the study of geometry, he quoted passages where Fergola
criticised the "very new method", and he argued that the entire career of his master
was indeed devoted to proving "how superior analytic geometrical method is with
respect to the purely analytic method of the moderns"44. In fact, Flauti was
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attributing to Fergola a sort of radicalism which is absent in the writings of the
founder of the synthetic school. Fergola, as we will see, was very competent in some
branches of eighteenth century analysis, and his judgement on Lagrange had been
rather different from the dismissive account provided by Flauti. I believe Flauti's
interpretation of Fergola was essentially correct, anyway, as the foundational role of
geometry with respect to analysis can be seen as the basis of Fergola's entire
production. Flauti concluded by noting how Fergola's remarks were simply ignored
by Neapolitan analytics: they produced purely analytical research in geometry, they
wrote new textbooks, and they changed the way geometry had always been taught.
In short, they made classical masterpieces look old-fashioned: Euclid and
Apollonius were "reduced to ornaments for bookcases"45. Finally, Flauti came to the
point:
Given that we could not convince them by discussing openly on the value and
the extension of the methods (this would presuppose the appropriate
knowledge of the methods themselves) [...] and observing that mathematical
sciences are every day declining in our country —even if somebody seems
proud of certain hybrid advancements; we decided to renew the ancient
system, that in the last two centuries was a great stimulus to the progress of
mathematics46.
It should be noted that Flauti saw his own age as an age of decline for the
mathematical sciences. This was at odds with the perception of every
mathematician outside the synthetic school, and certainly was at odds with the
perception of the analytics, who celebrated the increasing applications of
mathematical formalism to the physical sciences as a major success of recent
mathematics. These are, in Flauti eyes, "hybrid advancements". Finally, Flauti
accused the analytics of simply ignoring ancient geometry, an accusation which was
returned by analytics who described Fergola and Flauti as unable to understand
modern analysis.
Let us see now which kind of problems were presented by Flauti for solution:
1) Present the geometrical construction of the analytic solution given by Lagrange to
the problem of inscribing in a given circle a triangle whose sides pass through three
given points. Then present the analytical proof.
2) Inscribe in a triangle "given of kind and magnitude"47 three circles, which touch
each other and touch the triangle's sides.
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3) Inscribe in a given triangular pyramid four spheres, touching each other and
touching the faces of the pyramid.
Flauti gave three months time and guaranteed, at his own expense, a prize of sixty
ducats for each question solved. The Mathematical Class of the RAS was charged
with the assignation of the prizes. Prizes would be given to the authors of the
solutions "that will be judged the more elegant"48. As in the tradition of the
synthetic school, problems were not selected because of their originality, but rather
because of their proven capacity of inspiring beautiful geometrical reasoning to a
number of different mathematicians through the ages. Nihil novi sub solis in
geometry, its practice being conceived as a never-ending intellectual reflection on
classical problems. The first problem was a straightforward choice for Flauti. It was
the famous "Problem of Cramer"49, and it had been well studied, in its variants, by
members of the synthetic school for the past fifty years; moreover, its solution was
considered particularly difficult for the analytics. Flauti remembered that Euler
himself had doubts about the possibility of reaching an elegant construction of the
analytic solution given by Lagrange. Flauti also noted that Anders Johan Lexell
(1740-1784) had failed to find such a construction. "Succeeding in this work" Flauti
said, "would complete the research on a famous problem, which has been
repeatedly solved and generalised in our school; and for which we still miss an
adequate analytical solution"50. In fact, "after the light offered by the ancient
geometry to this problem, a complete solution reached through modern analysis is
still missing, given that the one by Lagrange is very imperfect"51. What was
interesting for Flauti in this problem was the difficult passage from the final
equation, obtained through the analytic method, to its construction. To sum up:
Cramer's problem had been already solved in a series of very elegant ways by
employing the purely geometrical method of the ancients (geometrical analysis plus
synthesis); analysts, attracted by the fame of such a problem, presented analytical
solutions for it; Lagrange himself presented at the Academy of Berlin a memoir on
this problem; such analytical solutions did not include the construction of the
solving equation, and those who had attempted its construction had found it quite
hard to perform. Flauti was asking for such a construction, as he believed that the
difficulty involved in this task would stress once again the intrinsic superiority of
the synthetic approach to the problem.
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Flauti found the second problem treated in a memoir from the 1831 volume of
the Acts of the Academy of St. Petersburg52. Some time before, Flauti had asked one
of his pupils, Nicola Trudi (1811-1881), to read and to report, with appropriate
drawings, the content of the memoir. The point is that Trudi himself found a much
more elegant synthetic solution for the same problem, which impressed Flauti (the
original solution by Paucker was a geometrical one, but it made use of many
lemmas, which violated the classical canons of elegance). The problem, which could
be solved either in the analytic or in the synthetic way, was presented as one
attracting the interest of many foreign mathematicians53, "so that, without any
doubt, it would be a great merit to solve it in a more elegant way". In this case,
wrote Flauti,
we ask for a solution obtained either with the method of the ancients
(including the corresponding geometrical composition) or with Cartesian
analysis, or, finally, with the very modern method of the two coordinates. We
address this problem especially to the sagacious students of this very modern
method, to assay its force and extension. But, in the second and third case, we
also ask for an appropriate construction and proof, that must be obtained
from the very principles and formulas used in the analytic part of the work54.
In proposing this second problem, Flauti intended to directly compare the two
methods. He believed that it would be hard to present an analytic solution which
would result more elegant and direct than Trudi's synthetic one. The last problem,
the one on the spheres, was "to our knowledge" a new problem, never faced by any
mathematicians", and even this one could be solved by means of one of the three
methods. Flauti conceived it as a natural extension of the second problem.
One might wonder why Flauti thought it was important to challenge his
opponents at that particular moment. One reason is that criticisms directed at the
synthetic school were rapidly growing, particularly in connection to didactic issues.
A most significant episode in the analytic opposition to the synthetic status quo was
the publication, in 1838, of a book titled A Collection of Geometrical Problems Solved by
Means of Algebraic Analysis. The author was the young mathematician Fortunato
Padula, who was completing his training at the School of Application for civil
engineers. In this book Padula applied the Lagrangian method to solve problems of
plane and solid geometry, and concluded by arguing for a more consistent
employment of the calculus in descriptive geometry as well. The choice of the
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problems, and the reference to descriptive geometry (on which Flauti had written
an influential synthetic treatise in 1807) made clear the polemic aim of the book. An
appropriate reply was thus needed. Flauti, at that time the most representative
member of the declining synthetic school, prepared the contest as such a reply.
Flauti's Program was published in April 1839. A few days later, on the 8th May
1839, in an anonymous note on the Neapolitan periodical V Omnibus, it was pointed
out that the third problem was indeed underdetermined. In fact, the same problem
had already appeared at least three times on the Annales de mattematiqu.es, and had
been recognised as impossible to solve by Steiner already in 182655. This was only
the hint that a more effective attack against Flauti was forthcoming. In June 1839,
there appeared the pamphlet Reply to tte Program by Padula56, containing a long
introduction in which Flauti's ideas on methodology, didactic and history of
mathematics were criticised point by point. Padula referred to Lagrangian methods
in geometry as "analytical geometry" (sometimes "analytical geometry applied to
two and three dimensions"57). With this term he meant that method by which
"rather than considering the points and the triangles determining them, we
consider the straight lines of which they are the intersections, and rather than
consider the lines, we consider the planes and the surfaces containing them" so that
geometrical problems can be "put in equation without any preliminary construction
or figure" and "with the help of the forms of such equations, we proceed from the
algebraic results to the more appropriate geometrical constructions" as Padula
himself had shown in his 183858. In solving this first problem, Padula started by
"following the traces of Lagrange" and reaching the Lagrangian solving equation,
which was "suitable for numerical calculation, and this being the goal he
[Lagrange] always looked for, he didn't care to indicate the manner of proceeding to
the graphic operations"59. But now Padula's goal is precisely "to geometrically
determine the roots of this equation", that is to say to construct this second degree
equation, which he did providing what in his own words was a "very elegant
construction", as it contained a low number of graphic operations. It is more
elegant, Padula remarked, than the one provided by Castillon using the purely
geometrical method. Having done this, Padula went further "to prove the
inexhaustible fecundity of algebraic methods"60. Starting again from the solving
equation, he presented two other possible algebraic transformations of it, followed
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by the respective constructions. He wanted to show how it is easy to operate on the
solving equation, to obtain from it elegant and straightforward geometrical
constructions. "Of this kind of reasoning" Padula said, "which allow us to easily
construct equations that at first sight seem to be very complicated, there are many
examples in my Collection". Anyway, he continued, one should always remember
that these operations are not required to put the problem in the form of an equation;
they are only needed in the final construction of the equation, "and in this consists
the great superiority of algebra over geometry"61. In the final remarks on the first
problem, Padula observed that his constructions were more elegant and simpler
than the ones obtained by means of geometrical analysis; and this "shows how very
wrong is the one who judges of the elegance of the constructions obtainable from an
equation on the basis of the length of the formulas"62. He was clearly referring to a
passage from a collective work of the synthetic school where the complexity of
Lagrange's solving equation was remarked, the difficulty of its construction being
not attributed to "the great man", but to the "arte" (the analytic method)63. Finally,
about the lack of response of the analytic school on Cramer's problem, Padula
remarked that "mathematicians following the modern method" are not interested
in this kind of research; in fact, in this particular case, for example, they are not
attracted by the idea of finding a solution to the problem, because they would
recognise as adequate the old synthetic solution provided by Castillon. At the same
time, they are not interested in proving the "power" of algebra, "being themselves
already persuaded of it"64.
In August 1839, Flauti gave a speech at the RAS to report about the latest
developments of the contest. He carefully avoided any reference to Padula's book.
But, in presenting the list of the previous works on Cramer's Problem, he cited, for
the first time, a paper published in 1818 by "one of our professors". This
anonymous Neapolitan mathematician was Francesco Paolo Tucci (1790-1875), one
of the oldest and more eminent exponents of the analytic school, and a teacher of
Padula as well. Flauti could not avoid such references as Padula had given a very
positive judgement of Tucci's work in his Reply, a couple of months before. Flauti's
remarks were quite critical, instead. He considered this solution "almost identical"
to Gergonne's (1816), and found that there are no connections between the analysis
and the following construction "and this makes us suspect that he knew the
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construction before completing the analysis"65. In the same speech, Flauti praised
the solution presented by Trudi. In fact, not only had Trudi provided the requested
construction moving from Lagrange's work; he had also provided an alternative
geometrical solution starting from Lagrange's principles and, finally, a "Cartesian"
solution. Flauti said that this last part of Trudi's work was important because it
showed the strict correspondence between Cartesian analysis and purely
geometrical method, and the techniques to transform the steps of the one method
into steps of the other (in this case it implied the transformation of some
trigonometric formulas in corresponding geometrical properties). The point is that
Trudi, knowing how "to properly treat geometrical matters", chose a way which
was the most "appropriate to the nature of the subject"66. Moving from the
trigonometric formulas that "entangle [inviluppano] Lagrange's analysis", Trudi
established for any step a correspondence between formulas and geometrical
quantities. This "natural way of reasoning" lead him to the desired construction
and to the transformation of the analytic principles in geometrical truths, so that he
produced a new, very elegant geometrical solution to the problem. Thanks to these
efforts, Flauti continued, "analysis gave its own contribution to the study of this
important problem"67. By keeping an eye on the geometrical figure "the sagacious
Trudi" had overcame the usual problem of analysis, i.e. "the complexity of the
solving equation"68.
With his first problem Flauti did not intend to directly compare the problem-
solving methods, given that he only asked for the construction of an equation. Still
the formulation of the problem already presupposed the superiority of the synthetic
method. Indeed, as we have noted in presenting Fergola's textbook, the very
necessity of the construction of the solving equation only makes sense in a purely
geometrical approach to problem-solving. So that while Flauti asked for the
analytics to provide it, and criticised Lagrange for not considering the question at
all, Padula stated that one of the great advantages of analysis over geometry is
precisely that the final construction of the solution was no longer required. And if
in his reply Padula presented such a construction, still he stressed that this was not
necessary, because the problem is in fact successfully solved as soon as one get the
solving equation. So even the apparently balanced remarks by Flauti on the
productions relative to the first problem should be carefully considered. Flauti was
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very clear about the role of algebra in problem-solving: "it does not matter how
much ingenuity one has, but with only the knowledge of geometrical analytic
methods, he will never reach the proper solution of a problem"69. This can only be
guaranteed by the study of the ancient texts, where we can find the twofold
geometrical method in its most elegant form, elegance being defined, with Edmond
Halley (1656ca.-1745), as "analysi brevissima et simul perspicua, synthesi concinna
et minime operosa"70. But, Flauti observed, today our young mathematicians have a
"corrupted taste", that makes them equally value any solution given to a problem,
and sometimes they even consider as inferior the most elegant one, calling it "a
mere school exercise" (these were indeed Padula's words). Moreover they did not
consider the construction as an important part of the solution. The Program was
planned to show this superior elegance to the corrupted young mathematicians.
And to make clear that the "development of mathematics" depends on "those few
ones who can be called inventors, and to the Academies, to which only those
inventors have the right to belong"71. Trudi's work, Flauti said, was an example of
an elegant construction of the problem according to the analytic method, and this
for analysis is certainly "a great step"72. But, in the end, this was a step to "approach
to the pure and clear geometrical method of the ancients"; this, and only this,
remained the supreme model for geometers of all ages.
If the first problem was not designed to show a direct confrontation of
problem-solving methods, the second did. Here the superiority of a purely
geometrical solution over the various analytical solutions provided in the past is, in
Flauti's eyes, evident. According to Padula, this was just another case where the
superiority of the highly general analytical method can be shown. It can be useful to
see again how the two different approaches shaped the form of the solution. Let us
begin with the purely synthetic solution presented by Trudi (Appendix 2). Having
stated the problem (PI), Trudi proceeds with a geometrical analysis of it (Al): he
moves from admitting that the construction has been already performed, then he
noted that the problem would be solved if we had a triangle similar to the given one
and including the three circles; then he assumes an angle equal to one of the given
triangle and inscribe a circle in it. The original problem can now be reduced to a
new one (Trudi uses what Fergola had called the "principle of conversion"): that of
inscribing two circles, under certain conditions, in the new figure (P2). The solution
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of this problem is preceded by the introduction of four lemmas (LI, L2, L3, L4),
which are in fact four theorems which state some particular geometrical truth that is
to be used in the solution of the problem. These particular lemmas state that certain
relations hold between circles and their own tangents. Each lemma is proved by a
synthetic demonstration (LD1, LD2, LD3, LD4) which consists of a construction
performed on its own particular figure (F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8). The
demonstration of L2 is followed by three corollaries (CI, C2, C3), and that of L3 by
one corollary (C4), which are results which immediately follow from the previous
demonstration. At this point Trudi goes back to the problem P2, and states it
clearly. The analysis of the problem follows (A2): again, it starts by assuming that
the desired construction (the two circles) has been already performed. The
consequences of this assumption are then investigated, with the support offered by
the lemmas. After this second analysis, the problem is reduced to a third one (P3): it
asks a certain point to be found that divides a certain segment according to a certain
ratio. The analysis of the problem moves from the assumption of the point and then
considers its implications, with the support of the lemmas. The analysis ends with
the finding of the point. Trudi can now present the "composition" of the problem
(S): here in a few steps he moves backwards from the construction the problem (P3)
asked for; to the construction of the circles (P2) asked for; to the construction of the
circles (PI) asked for, and with this result the problem is finally solved. In his brief
comment on this problem, Trudi remarked that, in this case, the key idea was that
of using the principle of conversion: this technique is indeed "the more suitable to
its nature [of the problem] and the more effective in order to show a priori how
many and which ones are the positions the three circles can take in order to satisfy
the conditions"73. Flauti, in his own remarks, stressed the same point. "This
solution" he said, "consists of a brief and plain analysis, founded on a simple
conversion of the proposed problem"; he notes that "it only needs four geometrical
truths" (the lemmas), and that the final construction was "easily" performed. All
this means that such a solution has "a very great elegance". A further quality is that
this analysis showed "by intuition" the possible solutions for the problem in its
more general form, that involving three straight lines and three circles74. Reporting
on this solution in his speech of August 1839, Flauti stressed that this geometrical
solution provided new and important truths. The point is that, in solving problems,
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geometry always provides some new acquisition of knowledge, even if, in the end,
the attempted solution should remain incomplete, "and this isn't an insignificant
advantage of the geometrical method; whereas, and that is for sure, purely analytic
research doesn't gain anything if it doesn't get the final solution"75. Flauti also made
some interesting remarks about the choice of this second problem. He says that he
preferred not simply to publish Trudi's solution, because, in this way, no attention
would be given to it. This is because "some of us, jealous and afraid to be surpassed,
or beaten in obtaining new appointments, or for mere incompetence, would have
defined such work, without even having read it, as a mere school exercise"76. Flauti
recognised that the "simplicity" of Trudi's work, which was a value in the synthetic
school, was the reason for the lack of interest by the analytic geometers.
Let us now move to the solution presented by Padula (Appendix 3). He starts
by expressing all the conditions of the problem in algebraic form. In order to do
this, he chooses an appropriate system of coordinates (the one centred in A), then
he expresses the position of some interesting points (such as O, A',M, M', M", that is
those points whose knowledge would immediately lead to the solution of the
problem) with respect to the chosen system. On the basis of the figure, he finds that
certain relations holds among these points, relations that can be expressed by three
couples of equations, that he calls (1), (2), and (3). Having expressed all the
conditions of the problem in the algebraic form Padula begins to combine the
equations "in every possible manner", in order to obtain the values of the
coordinates of the circles' radii (which he calls: u, u', u"). He begins with the first
equation of each couple where, "following the general norms of Algebra", he
eliminates the radicals and introduce the unknowns (x, x', x"). After such
substitutions, the equations (1), (2) and (3) are transformed in, respectively, (4), (5)
and (6). Padula notes a relation between two of his earlier unknowns (7), so that he
can operate the relative substitution in (6), re-order the equation and then operate
another substitution from (5). Padula re-orders again, eliminates certain coefficients,
and substitutes from (4), obtaining the three equations in x. He solves them and
then from the values of x, x', x" obtains the values of u, u', u", and from them it is
possible to deduce the length of the segments on the basis of which it is possible to
construct the required figure, which is actually done in the final composition of the
problem. At the end of the work, that is presented as another example of the
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superiority of the analytic method, in that it permits everyone to reach without
particular intuitions every possible solution, Padula refused to provide the
"convenient proof, on the basis of the formulas employed in the analysis"; one
doesn't need any proof, said Padula, given that an equation necessarily has to be
satisfied by its own roots. In confronting the two methods, Padula remarks that
even when a problem has many solutions, not all of them reciprocally independent
(as is this case), the algebraic method guides us, without requiring any particular
attention, to certain equations that can be decomposed in other equation of lower
degree and then combined to obtain all such solutions. On the other hand, the
geometrical analysis of the ancients, which proceeds through reasoning on the
specific disposition of the elements of the figure, is not able to consider all the
possible solutions by means of a single mental operation. In this case, the geometer
has to imagine the different reciprocal positions that can be assumed by the
elements, and then to proceed to the particular analysis. And, one has to admit, that
in this way no one can be sure of reaching a priori all the different solutions of a
given problem. Padula closed his reply by showing that the third problem is
underdetermined. One could solve the family of problems deriving from the
original terms, but "let this work be accomplished by those who like to solve
problems that are similar [affim], we are not interested". In fact, "we consider
researches in pure Geometry as beautiful tokens, but too sterile and uninteresting
for those who have completed the elementary courses and are interested in
research". In fact, anyone who is seriously interested in contemporary mathematics
should look at the applications to "Natural Philosophy, Constructions, Industrial
Mechanics" where new works are, every day, expanding the body of mathematical
knowledge "in such a way that is almost impossible to be informed on
everything"77. This is why, Padula announces, he will never discuss again the
advantage of the Lagrangian method in the case of some particular problem.
Padula's reply was considered irregular. The prizes, after some inconclusive
discussions at the PAS, were assigned to Trudi, but he refused because, he said, he
had been previously working on the same questions. In the end, the whole contest
came to nothing. If anything, it confirmed once more that the outcome of the
controversy could not be decided by any clear-cut solution. Flauti intervened again
in the controversy a few years later, in an essay he wrote as an introduction to
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Fergola's On Geometrical Invention. Here Flauti recognised the generality of the
methods employed by the analytics (Cartesian or Lagrangian), but in his mind it is
precisely this generality that makes the analyst "a mere compiler [compilatore] of
algebraic formulas"; someone essentially different from the "true inventing
geometer [vero geometra inventore]"78. Certainly, Flauti says, research follows the
same principles in both methods: one supposes given what is actually requested in
order to solve the problem, and then one finds the "determinants" of this
supposition. But, Flauti says, this research can be performed following either a
"direct" way, and this is the "synthesis, as we call the method of invention used by
the ancients", or an "indirect" way, i.e. "using the Cartesian method, or any other
derived algebraic method". Here "direct" and "indirect" seem to refer to the
conceptual distance of each method from the essential geometrical reasoning which
lies behind every "proper" solution. Flauti also notes that in the direct way, "a great
amount of knowledge [un grandissimo treno di conoscenze]" is required, this "arte"
being "difficult, and really sublime"79. On the contrary, in the indirect way, once
one has found the solving equation, "the whole of the art of the geometer is reduced
to the mere use of general rules"80. Flauti's tone, when he is dealing with the
question of methods, is different from Fergola's. Where Fergola had been a
productive analyst himself in the early stages of his career, had worked in
infinitesimal and integral calculus, and had always used algebraic tools in his
geometrical teaching and research, Flauti had been working exclusively on pure
and descriptive geometry. Fergola's teaching had brought him, as many other of his
colleagues, to admire unconditionally the work of Greek geometers and, eventually,
to reject the very use of algebraic formulas in problem-solving. Even when he tries
to be equal, as in this introduction to Fergola's book, Flauti's deep dislike for
algebraic methods invariably emerges, as his devaluation of the work of Lagrange
and of the analytics. Still, when it comes to the reasons of his dislike, he does not
present any original insight with respect to Fergola. So we find him maintaining
typical Fergolian points such as the crucial role of construction in the problem-
solving process: "the construction is the essential condition for a geometrical
problem to be properly solved; in fact, every ancient and modern geometer defined
a problem as something in quo aliquid faciendum, et construendum proponitur"81.
Algebra, he continues, has to remain an economical device, given that, in the end, a
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proof has to consist in "a clear succession of geometrical reasonings executed on
geometrical quantities"82. This time no one, on the other side, was interested in
replying. The controversy was a matter of history.
1.4 Epilogue
The 1839 challenge came to nothing. Rather than being "solved" either way, the
controversy became increasingly irrelevant until it slipped out of the scientific stage
in the early 1840s. As noted at the beginning, the very reason to oppose the different
methods is far from obvious to us. Truly, one might understand the point of view of
the analytics, i.e. their search for very general methods and their wider interests in
pure and applied mathematics. But, at the same time, one can hardly sympathise
with their harsh criticisms of pure geometry, which they considered inelegant and
pedantic, and unworthy of figuring in scholastic and university curricula. Yet this
controversy caused struggles, hostilities and personal attacks in early nineteenth-
century Naples. It was also rich in consequences. Indeed, its consequences for the
development of mathematics in unified Italy are probably more important than is
usually thought. Even after the political unification of Italy (1860), Southern
mathematicians who had been educated in the atmosphere of the controversy over
problem-solving methods, continued to pursue their own anti-Euclidean battle, to
the puzzlement of their Northern colleagues. As an example of such a long-lasting
effect of the controversy, we can think of the debate about the possibility of
introducing Euclid's Elements in the licei (colleges where classical education was
provided) of the newly founded Kingdom of Italy. In 1867 important decisions
about the future structure of Italian schools were taken by specific state
commissions. In geometry, the adoption of Euclid was proposed as the best way to
immediately provide a common mathematical textbook to replace the many
different institutions used in the pre-unitary states. Euclid, it was also said, "is in
the universal opinion the most perfect model of geometrical rigour"83. But, for all its
reasonableness, the project found strong opposition among the contributors of the
newly founded Journal ofMathematics, directed by Giuseppe Battaglini (1826-1894)84.
Trained as an engineer at the Neapolitan School of Application under Padula's
supervision, Battaglini had been excluded from university teaching until the
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collapse of the Bourbon monarchy and of its educational system. In 1860 he had
been appointed a new chair of "superior geometry", while Flauti, who had retired
from teaching in 1849, was refused a place in the restored Academy of the Sciences,
and the very memory of the synthetic school was rapidly going into oblivion.
Battaglini became well-known in the national scientific world because of his
commitment to the study and diffusion of non-Euclidean geometries. In fact, major
original contributions to this field (such as Beltrami's, in 1868), as well as important
translation of foreign works (Bolyai, Lobachewski), appeared in Battaglini's journal.
The reasons why the introduction of good old Euclid was opposed by Battaglini's
generation of Neapolitan mathematicians were not obvious to their colleagues.
Having described the synthetic commitment to classical geometry, we are able to
see that this opposition was in many ways a prolongation of the long-lasting
struggle of their teachers against Fergola's school. Although in a very different
institutional and cultural context, once again the priority of pure geometry and the
exemplary character of geometrical reasoning had been stated. The value of Euclid
as a textbook ("the most logical and rigorous [geometrical] system we have"85) was
authoritatively defended by Antonio Cremona (1830-1903), who lead the specific
commission where the decision to introduce Euclid had been taken. Cremona was
to become a distinguished geometer, whose contributions were to be particularly
important in the fields of birational transformations, graphic statics and projective
geometry. According to Cremona, whose views were supported by other important
mathematicians of the period such as Betti and Brioschi, the role of mathematical
education in colleges was not limited to provide a set of truths per se, and not even a
set of useful truths to be applied in everyday life; rather, this role consisted in
supporting the intellectual development of the pupil, "as a gymnastic of thought,
aiming to develop the rational faculty, and to support that healthy and right
criterion to distinguish the truth from what simply looks true"86. In the text of the
decree prepared by the commission, pedagogical considerations ("when it is taught
with the method of the ancient, geometry is easier and more attractive than the
abstract science of numbers"; the Euclidean method "is the most proper to create in
young minds the habit to inflexible rigour in reasoning") are mixed up with
interesting remarks about preserving the "purity" of geometrical reasoning.
Teachers should not "pollute the purity of ancient geometry by transforming
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geometrical theorems in algebraic formulas, that is by replacing concrete
magnitudes (lines, angles, surfaces, volumes) with their measures: but [they should]
make their pupil always reason on former, even when their ratio is considered"87. It
has been noted that "the theme of the purity of geometrical method was very much
stressed", and that Cremona "was aware of the new dignity of geometrical
methodologies, which had been overshadowed, during the eighteenth century, by
differential calculus"88. Prefacing their edition of the Elements (November 1867),
Betti and Brioschi presented similar arguments: the Elements as "inimitable model
of logic and clearness" (as opposed to "the mechanism of arithmetical process"); its
importance as a textbook for college students (as opposed to textbooks for teaching
mathematics with "a professional aim").
As we can imagine, Padula's pupils could not be expected to agree with such
views. In response, Battaglini's journal hosted a few articles which were critical
towards the new didactic choice. Among them, pieces by J. M. Wilson, Hirst, Houel,
and the Neapolitan Raffaele Rubini, another of Padula's pupils and himself a strong
opponent to Euclid as a textbook. The experience of other countries, the logical
difficulties implied by the notion of proportion, the error of setting geometry apart
from arithmetic, the well-known obscurities contained in Euclid's text, were
employed to attack the governmental choice. In their reply to such criticisms (letter
to Giornale of 1869) Betti and Brioschi were, first of all, surprised by the
"intolerance" of their adversaries.
As we can see it would be possible to shift without loss of continuity from our
analysis of the Neapolitan controversy to other important issues in the post-
unitarian Italian mathematics, such as the adoption of Euclid as a textbook and,
more generally, the role of mathematics in the educational system of the new state.
And such a topic cannot be properly addressed without considering another crucial
point: what was the role of mathematicians themselves in the foundation of the new
state? In fact, in the 1860s and 1870s, an unprecedented number of mathematicians
entered political life, and contributed to the design of the new Italian cultural
institutions. What was their legacy? Such an analysis would clearly exceed the
limits of the present work. For our present purpose, it is sufficient to note that the
Neapolitan controversy over methods was not as isolated and peculiar as we might
expect from a superficial historical account. In particular, it was not so devoid of
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consequences as later historiography has suggested, by presenting the synthetic
school as a curiosity, a scientific blind alley, or by simply eliminating its very
memory. The historical irrelevance of the synthetic school can now be seen largely
as a reflection, at the historiographic level, of the judgement expressed by those
who had opposed Fergola and Flauti. the very history of the historiography of the
controversy would constitute an interesting case study in itself.
Let us return to the historical material that has been presented so far, in order to
add a few remarks about concepts which can be used to describe the controversy.
We defined the two approaches to problem-solving as "specific" and "general". In
fact, other pairs of opposites, all in some way related each other, can be employed to
(schematically) define the two positions. The Neapolitan controversy can be seen in
terms of locality and generality, i.e. between a conception of mathematics which
privileges the consideration of local conditions and a conception which privileges
the consideration of general conditions. As we have seen from our first example,
these are two kinds of knowledge which cannot be contemporaneously achieved: a
choice is required. So if we decide to solve problems by means of accurate
inspections of particular figures it will be very difficult to move towards the highest
levels of generality; if we decide to solve problems by means of manipulation of
general formulas, it will be very difficult to acquire specific knowledge of the
particular figure under consideration. Far from considering such a choice as a
matter of convenience, Neapolitan geometers charged it with a crucial value: either
one or the other approach should be the fundamental one, they thought, and the
knowledge whose achievement is made difficult by such an approach must be
regarded as unessential. In the synthetic practice of problem-solving the
preliminary construction sets the stage for the whole problem-solving process. The
geometer is here reasoning on a particular figure, in order to perform a particular
construction. Certainly he is interested in generalising his reasoning to include
other classes of figures and other possible dispositions (this is especially evident in
the work of Fergola), but synthetic and Cartesian methods only allow a low level of
generality. In the end, the solutions provided are derived from the particular case,
maybe with some possible extensions (for instance, the geometer provides a
solution not only for the specified case, let us say a triangle, but he also generalises
his result to the case of a polygon). The analytic practice goes, so to speak, in the
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opposite direction. In its purest form (Lagrange) it starts from the very general, i.e.
the construction of sets of equations which can be seen as expressing metric
properties of entire classes of figures, and from these equations solutions to
problems are derived. In the way Padula used it to challenge the synthetic school,
this method is applied to particular problems of the kind studied by synthetics, but
still it allows a much higher level of generalisation, and in the end it offers a higher
number of possible solutions. Clearly problem-solving played a very different role
in the activity of the two schools. In the synthetic conception problem-solving is
essential; it is the starting point of every geometrical research and the necessary
prelude to any systematic account of certain geometrical truths. A geometer is a
problem-solver; problem-solving is the way in which he discovers geometrical
truths. In the analytic conception problem-solving in the sense in which this activity
is conceived by synthetics, i.e. problems asking for specific constructions, is a
decidedly secondary activity. Lagrange simply ignored it; Padula solved such kind
of problems because of the controversy, but finally he also declared his lack of
interest (1839). The solution of specific problems can be seen as a secondary product
of that algebraic reasoning which in itself is the real core of the activity of the
analytic geometer.
The conceptual couple locality/ generality can be fruitfully related to the one
concreteness/abstractness. The synthetic geometer confines his considerations to
the local dimension of geometry; he deals with concrete entities, the particular
geometrical figures. He inspects, compares, cuts, draws concrete figures. Certainly
he would say he is dealing with "geometrical abstractions"", as he is respectful of
the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition; he would say he is not considering this
particular triangle, but rather what is typical of every possible triangle. But this
does not affect our considerations about his being restricted to the local and
concrete dimension of geometry. In his mind geometry is an abstract science
because it does not depend on any particular instances. Still, once such an abstract
nature of geometry is stated, his practice appears centred on the scrutiny of
particular, "typical" figures. The art of the geometer is indeed described by
synthetics in sensorial terms, mainly visual. The geometer sees that a problem can be
reduced to another one; he sees which are the possible solutions to a problem; he
sees that a certain solution can be constructed in a certain way. In this sense I would
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say that the practice of the synthetic is concrete: he is looking at and acting on
particular figures. Synthetics themselves considered this point as crucial, as we
know from their criticisms directed against the abstract reasoning of the analytics.
The whole argument against the reliability of analysis in problem-solving depends
on an alleged lack of concrete content. How can we know, synthetics say, that the
analyst is actually saying something geometrically meaningful with his formulas, if
these are not directly related to the figure? Formulas alone, notes Flauti, are
"abstract" in the sense that they lack intuitive content. Indeed, switching to the
epistemological dimension, the visual processes by which the geometer acquires his
knowledge are said to be "intuitive" by synthetics, as opposed to the "mechanical"
processes by which the analyst acquire his knowledge.
Intuition / mechanicity is indeed another couple which can be used to capture
important aspects of the controversy. Flauti underlines that in his solution to the
second problem of the challenge Trudi has found "by intuition" the possible
solutions. Inspection of the figure, plus experience, plus natural inclination are
required in order to obtain such a sagacious solution. On the contrary, Padula says
that "anyone can solve problems" once he has grasped the "spirit" of the analytic
method: and this is possible precisely because no special intuition is required, just
the ability to calculate (so, according to Lagrange, "every problem reduces to a
matter of calculation"). And calculation is presented as a mechanical process, which
only needs the right inputs to provide the right results. To solve problems the
analyst has no need to see anything, nor to rely on his own intuition. He has simply
to follow the general and universal rules of algebra. From an epistemological point
of view, the analyst and the synthetic are in fact referring to different faculties when
they describe their problem-solving procedures. So Fergola and Flauti call the art of
discovery and the art of demonstration "dianoethic virtues", and they think of them
as a form of intellectual intuition (in fact the highest achievement of human
intellect). Padula simply compares his method to a mechanical process. These
epistemological considerations provide us with some of the reasons behind the
synthetics' caution in using algebraic tools in problem-solving. According to them
geometry, which is "the science of extension", is founded on our intuitive
knowledge of the properties of abstract forms. Algebraic reasoning is valid in
geometry as far as it brings intuitive geometrical content, which is the case in the
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Cartesian method. When the problem's solution is detached from any intuitive
consideration about figures, algebraic formulas are simply void, meaningless. At
least, they are not talking about geometry. On the other side, the analyst believes
algebraic formulas are in themselves a powerful instrument to analyse and solve
any kind of mathematical problem. The solution of a particular problem does not
depend on some specific intuitive knowledge, but rather on the general form of
reasoning that we adopt. This general form of reasoning is that of analytic
reasoning. This is a problem-solving procedure that, whatever the field of
application is, provides the analyst with the desired solution.
Let us finally consider the explanations that historians have provided in order
to make sense of the Neapolitan controversy. Federico Amodeo, in his valuable
work on the history of Neapolitan mathematics, did not go much further than the
recognition that there are mathematicians who are "synthetically minded" and
mathematicians who are "analytically minded"89. Everyone just follows his own
natural inclination. An explanation which reminds us too closely of the virtus
soporiphera of opium to be satisfactory. In the only historical work specifically
devoted to the Neapolitan synthetic school (1892), Gino Loria presented Fergola's
project as desperately anachronistic. In spite of their "excellent quality", Fergola's
geometrical textbooks "have fallen in oblivion" because of their attempt to "revive a
corpse", i.e. Cartesian geometry. There was no space for Fergola's creature "in the
new state of things"; thus the failure was an "ineluctable fatality"90. The controversy
with the analytics is consequently presented as due to the "backwardness" of
Fergola and his school. Interestingly, Loria applies to the history of mathematics the
epigenetic metaphor, claiming that it was possibly necessary for Neapolitan science
to pass through the "Cartesian stage", represented by Fergola. But he also noted,
with his distinctive macabre gusto, that Fergola's program "contained in itself a
deadly germ which brought it to the grave", so that his geometry was, by the early
1840s, "a putrefying corpse"91. The theme of backwardness returns in other
historical judgements, such as Vito Volterra's, who in his survey of nineteenth
century Italian mathematics remarked that in Fergola's school "men who were
otherwise ingenious opposed Lagrange's great discoveries and what was modern
and new in science, considering a valuable task that of setting [science] back a
number of centuries"92. More recently, Massimo Galluzzi has presented an analysis
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of Fergola's school, where its restoration of the "dignity of geometry" is placed in
the wider context of the European flourishing of geometrical studies during the first
half of the century. The specific fact that the Neapolitans favoured the classical
geometrical methods is explained by the limited opportunities they had to actually
get in touch with the mainstream of mathematical production at the end of the
eighteenth century, and by the highly "anti-scientific environment" that
surrounded their school. According to this argument, the classics being "the only
scientific education he received", Fergola trained a generation of pupils who were
to obstinately defend Greek geometry against Lagrangian analysis93. The
controversy over methods is explained as a confrontation with a group of younger
and better "informed" mathematicians. Finally, in a recent study on Nicola Fergola,
Giovanni Ferraro and Franco Palladino have argued, on the basis of manuscript
material, that the geometrical turn of Neapolitan mathematics was a responsibility
of Fergola's pupils, of Flauti first of all94. As for Fergola, he was instead deeply
interested in analysis, particularly calculus in its Eulerian and Lagrangian form. The
controversy with the analytics was entirely due to his pupils, and it is considered as
scarcely relevant for the history of science, as it is reducible to extra-scientific
causes, primarily to the political divergence between the two groups of scientists95.
Explanations of the controversy are essentially based on the unproblematic
recognition of the "backwardness" of the mathematical knowledge produced and
transmitted by the synthetics, possibly related to the alleged cultural isolation of the
Kingdom of Naples. Such an interpretation can be convincingly refuted on the basis
of some simple empirical considerations. First of all, the ages of the protagonists:
two generations of mathematicians were involved in the controversy, and they
were more or less of the same age (if Flauti speaks of "young analysts", it is because
he mainly refers to Padula's works; but Padula's teachers were of the same age as
Flauti himself). Secondly, and more importantly, we do not find traces of an old,
pre-existent synthetic school, which was later challenged by some innovative
researchers. On the contrary, the consolidation of the synthetic school took place
contemporaneously with the introduction of the analytic methods in the Kingdom of
Naples, and the debate on methods had a constitutive role in the definition of the
school itself. The connection with the previous traditions, with the works of
previous Italian and European geometers, which we find in synthetic writings, was
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mainly the result of an operation we might call "inventing a tradition". The role of
custodians of a venerable tradition was in itself part of the new image of
mathematics sustained by Fergola. Thirdly, it will be shown that Fergola was far
from being incompetent in the analytic methods, and that he was familiar with
Lagrange's writings.
Undoubtedly, we have to look for a more satisfactorily explanation for the
emergence of the synthetic school and for the controversy over methods. This
explanation should first of all problematise what has always been assumed as
unproblematic, i.e. Fergola's "backwardness". Far from casting light on the
controversy, the appearance of backwardness is, indeed, what is most in need of an
explanation. A first step in this direction is that of showing how Fergola's specific
position about geometrical methods depended on a wider strategy of his, which
was essentially a foundational strategy, and which included interesting
considerations about the possibility of offering a sound (geometrical) basis for
infinitesimal calculus. The discovery of such internal coherence in Fergola's thought
and practice is certainly an advancement with respect to previous interpretations of
the controversy, and even judgements about Fergola's historical relevance; yet, it is
still not enough to understand why it was that Naples provided the site for the
emergence of such a peculiar (anachronistic, in fact) Greek-like geometrical
movement. To this extent, the birth of the controversy, the main works of its
protagonists, and the cultural and social environment that surrounded these early
productions will be analysed. It will be suggested that only broader cultural and
social considerations provide us with a satisfactorily explanation of the Neapolitan
controversy.
Notes to chapter one
1 Public challenges between mathematicians were not uncommon in Italy during the
Renaissance. These contests could have the form of cartelli, i.e. exchanges of letters containing
problems to solve, so that each one of the duellists had to solve the problem proposed by the
opponent. Or they could be public duels, in which a problem had to be solved in front of an
audience. Particularly famous was the opposition between Niccolo Tartaglia and Gerolamo
Cardano, in the sixteenth century. The dispute, about the general method of solving cubic
equations, led to a public challenge between Tartaglia and Lodovico Ferrari (Cardano's
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Chapter 2
Knowledge and Society in the Critique of the
Neapolitan Enlightenment
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Fergola's project to restore the "dignity"
of geometrical methods loses some of its eccentricity when placed in the context of a
wider foundationalist program. Still, it is the specific nature of this restoration, and
its very reasons, that should attract the attention of historians, and push them to go
beyond the mere recognition of the "backwardness" of Fergola's ideas. In order to
set the stage for my further analysis I shall present, in the next part of this study,
some aspects of that "analytic way of thinking" which became so popular in France
and in the Italian states during the second half of the eighteenth century. This will
provide the background against which the emergence of Fergola's school can be
best understood. A main tenet of this study is indeed the reactive nature of
Fergola's approach to geometry, and to mathematics in general. Only by clarifying
the more general meaning of embracing an analytic approach to mathematics (and
to knowledge in general), it will be possible to make sense of Fergola's reaction. If in
the first chapter we made sense of the controversy by linking the opposing methods
to two different conceptions of mathematics, now we shall link the analytic
approach to a specific representation of the structure of knowledge. Yet the study of
a structure of knowledge requires intellectual history to be integrated with other
relevant resources. In the present case these are chiefly social and economic history.
The system of ideas of those criticising the ancien regime did not spring out of pure
speculation, as we will see1. The protagonists of the next pages were not just
65
speculating. They were thinking and acting for "the sake of the country", and for
that of their own fortunes.
2.1 Early Reformism and the School of Genovesi
The emergence of the controversy over geometrical problem-solving method as a
relevant scientific issue traces back to the 1780s. Its emergence coincided with what
has been defined as "the high summer" of Neapolitan Enlightenment, i.e. a period
when important reforms of the economic, juridical, administrative and cultural
institutions of the kingdom were discussed and implemented. The independence of
the Kingdom of Naples (1734) and the arrival of King Charles Bourbon had ushered
in a period of structural changes, a new economic policy and a new foreign policy
being indeed urgently required. The ancien regime structure of the Southern state
was inadequate to support the ambitious plans of the newly established monarchy,
and this contingency provided the opportunity for a group of intellectuals actively
to co-operate with the Crown to design a new, more "enlightened" society. Themes
in focus were: the overly complex legislation; the inefficient administrative system,
particularly the revenue system; the economic policy; and the system of public
education. A particular feature of the authors of the Neapolitan Enlightenment was
their prevalent interest in social and economic matters, the themes of scientific and
technological innovation remaining somehow subordinate. These "reformers" had
first of all to contest the cultural and economic power of the Roman Church over
Neapolitan society. In its defence of the rights of the state and of the Crown against
the claims of the Church, Neapolitan reformism could indeed rely upon the rich
local tradition of "jurisdictionalism" (giurisdizionalismo), which had been fighting
the interference of the Roman curia in the public life of the kingdom during the
previous decades. A hated symbol of the Roman claims was the annual tribute of
the chinea, a white horse which was offered yearly by the Neapolitan King to the
Pope, in recognition of his formal condition of vassalage. Given the crucial value of
the issues at stake in the dispute between curia and state (taxation of ecclesiastical
possessions, investiture of bishops, limits of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, book
censorship, education), it is hardly surprising that a wide juridical apparatus had
been refined by lawyers close to the Crown in order to fight back the Roman
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pretensions. In the end, the anti-curial battle had always found strong support in
every section of the Neapolitan society, being hardly a reason of social divide. What
was new in the reformist approach to the problem was its being inserted in a much
wider cultural and social project. The anachronistic and historically unfounded
claims of the curia were seen as just one of the many irrational aspects of Southern
society. The battle for a state freed from the control of the Church had to be
integrated with a serious anti-feudal program, in order to permit a redistribution of
wealth among a peasantry impoverished by a long-lasting agricultural crisis; by
economic programs to increment and to regulate the growth of trade and
manufacture; and by legislative programs to re-design the entire legislation. It is in
the context of this early reformism that we can make sense of certain specific
cultural phenomena of the 1740s, such as the growing opposition to traditional
streams of thought which had been dominant at the turn of the century —namely
Cartesianism and Platonism— to the advantage of a revised version of Newton's
natural philosophy. The renewal of the scientific and philosophical culture found
concrete institutional realisation in the impulse given to the teaching of natural
sciences and mechanics. This included the foundation of a new scientific academy,
born under the protection of the government with the explicit goal of supporting
Newtonian philosophy. Key-figures in this early reformist phase were Bartolomeo
Intieri (1678-1757), defender of the new analytic methods in geometry2, Celestino
Galiani (1681-1753), responsible for a reform of the university which improved the
teaching of scientific disciplines (1735), and for the foundation of the Royal
Academy of Sciences (1732), and Antonio Genovesi (1712-1769), professor of
political economy and, in fact, the most influential philosopher and economist in
eighteenth century Naples. In Genovesi's writings themes of local interest, such as
the need of specific reforms in agriculture and administration, were treated from a
new perspective inspired to British and French authors. Without openly rejecting
the Neapolitan tradition in theological and juridical studies, which had framed the
production of knowledge in the previous decades, Genovesi gave unprecedented
space to themes from the empiricist tradition linked to the work of John Locke, such
as the philosophy of nature and the methodology of science and logic. Resistance to
the new empiricist culture — and to the program of social reforms that this culture
supported— was strong, as it is clear from Genovesi's failure to obtain the chair of
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Theology at the RUN during the 1740s. In 1754 Bartolomeo Intieri established at his
own expenses a new chair of political economy (Commercio e Meccanica, literally
"Trade and Mechanics"). It was the first chair of its kind ever created in Europe,
and it was offered to Genovesi. In his inaugural speech, significantly titled Discourse
on tJie Real Goal of the Letters and the Sciences, Genovesi stated clearly his cultural and
social program, which was based on the assumption that every intellectual activity
must be directed towards the improvement of the material conditions of life of
mankind3. Human reason, the greatest and most noble divine gift, is described as
the "universal art", which through the "instrument" of the "human machine"
originates the "life improving arts"4. Following the nature of reason, one has "a
geometry which is not idle, but perfects the mechanical arts" and "a physics which
promotes our welfare, without being magic"5. So that "one cannot say that reason
has achieved its maturity in a country where it is still placed in the abstract intellect,
rather than in the heart and in the hands"6. The attack on the idle metaphysical
speculations and the need for philosophers to co-operate with artisans in order to
promote industry and trade continued in Genovesi's Academic Letters on the Question
Whether the Ignorant are Happier than the Scientist (1764), where the myth of the good
savage is ironically discussed (and rejected). About the sciences, Genovesi wrote:
I would say to mathematicians: more instruments and more practice, more
mechanics, get familiar with the arts, be useful to mankind. I would say to
physicists: fewer subtleties, fewer useless questions, more about mechanical
motion, more experience. Help mankind: the sciences have to work for its
benefit.7
Around this chair the so-called "school of Genovesi" coagulated between the 1750s
and 1760s. Its members were to be at the core of Neapolitan Enlightenment. The
institution of the new chair marked symbolically the turn of Genovesi's interest
from metaphysics to political economy and to the rational administration of the
state. It was "a definite move away from the world of tradition, the clergy and the
academics"8. Genovesi's teaching was characterised by his Lockean perspective,
integrated with elements from French sensationalism, particularly Condillac's.
Materialistic interpretations of reality were offered later by some of his pupils, but
they were extraneous to the orthodox religiosity of Genovesi. Between 1754 and
1769, the year of his death, Genovesi trained a new generation of young reformers
in the exercise of designing a governmental economic policy suitable to face the
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critical situation of the Southern state. Public incentives to manufactures; free-trade
— particularly for cereals; the creation of agrarian societies; the improvements of
specific cultures such as silk and olive oil, are among the themes which can be
found in his writings. The need for a more effective policy in this sense became
tragically evident in the occasion of the 1764 famine, which ravaged the whole
kingdom causing thousands of deaths. It was the last great famine to hit an Italian
state, and its effect on reformers was deep. An inefficient state and an old-fashioned
system of grain deposit were among the causes of the disaster, which in turn
highlighted the striking gap existing between the conditions of life of the privileged
groups and those of the growing masses of agricultural day-labourers. To Genovesi,
one primary issue arising from the 1764 famine was that of public education. His
favourite themes, such as the teaching of modern agricultural techniques, the
creation of public schools, the use of the Italian language in printed books, the
publication of manuals of agriculture, economy, law, and the reform of the
university, all acquire their most proper meaning when seen on the background of
the 1764 famine. But in the last years of Genovesi's life the structural limits of the
co-operation between reformers and Crown also emerged. Too many compromises
and too much gradualism had indeed characterised the policy of Prime Minister
Bernardo Tanucci (in charge from 1759 to 1776). The socio-economic conditions of
the kingdom required, according to the reformers, a more resolute action. The late
sixties and early seventies marked a moment of crisis for Neapolitan reformism.
Genovesi himself, in his last writings, attacked with unprecedented violence the
clergy, the provincial landlords, and the lawyer class of the capital: three "orders"
which he accused of actively opposing any serious process of reform in the
kingdom, because it would harm their corporate interests. Genovesi pointed out
how their interests were inextricably connected to the preservation of the present
state of abuse. Such themes are central in the most representative text of the early
reformist tradition, Genovesi's Lessons on Trade (1765-67)9. They are the best
example of the new civil philosophy, which is "practical and useful to mankind".
The public addressed by this book is, in Genovesis's own words, the "ceto
mezzano" (middle order). The overcoming of a society founded on exemption and
privilege, and the equality of everyone in front of the law are stated as fundamental
goals of every "civilised state":
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Let the land of the state be measured palm by palm. Let it be evaluated. Let all
of it be subject to taxation: not an inch be exempted. There is neither to be
ecclesiastical nor baronial exemption, when it comes to the royal taxation. Let
all the citizens enjoy the fruits of civil society and of the government. Thus,
everyone's possession must be subject to taxation proportionately to their
value. Let inequality be abolished, because it was born in times of ignorance
and partiality. Let civil freedom be given back to the families. Let be the spirit
of peasants, of shepherds, of artisans freed from those ties which humiliate it
and make it lazy.10
This is the "fundamental law of the every people", Genovesi remarks "fertilizer of
industry and the arts"; but he concludes by remarking "how many enemies" such a
program has in Neapolitan society. About the role of the sciences, we have already
seen that Genovesi considered the sciences and the arts as real forces behind the
civil development of the countries, and on this basis he included in his plan the
creation of scientific academies, agrarian societies, libraries, and professional
schools. The mathematical and physical sciences were not taken as sources of
eternal truths (or, at least, this wasn't their more important aspect), but as the
instruments for the social and economic progress of the country. Throughout the
entire Discourse an instrumental conception of science was presented, with social
problems having absolute pre-eminence over theoretical ones. The main polemical
target was the idea that a "pure science", deprived of practical utility, is intrinsically
superior to the applied sciences (or "mixed mathematics").
In the 1770s the voices of the so-called "second generation" of reformers began to
be heard. Its members included first-rank politicians, such as Domenico Caracciolo
(1725-1789), and well-known students of law and society such as Giuseppe Galanti
(1743-1806), Gaetano Filangieri (1752-1788), Mario Pagano (1748-1799), and
Melchiorre Delfico (1744-1834)11. All of them had studied with Genovesi. It is by
considering the activity and the theoretical framework of these reformers that we
shall reach the period of our present concern, the 1780s and 1790s. While keeping
Genovesi's empiricism and sensationalism as a background for their investigations,
late reformers did not delve into the philosophical problem of the origin of
knowledge, which had intrigued their maestro. Rather, they followed his indication
about turning attention to the real problems of the country. Their common aim was
indeed that of "demystifying" their own disciplines (economy, law, history), that is
to say, to detach technical considerations from their traditional metaphysical
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presuppositions. The existence of an ultra-mundane sphere of religious values was
rarely denied by these authors, who mostly thought of themselves as orthodox
Catholics. Still, they believed their spiritual inclinations should not interfere with
their planning of a modern, "civilised" society. Such a secularised conception of the
moral and natural sciences was indeed considered as the first step to reducing the
practice of politics, legislation and economics to a matter of rational administration.
By the mid-seventies the only area where the reformist front had partially
succeeded was the battle against the abuses of the Roman curia. The most
significant episode of this campaign was the expulsion of the Society of Jesus from
the kingdom, in 1767. But the results of the process of reform of the structure of the
state and of its economic policy were considered deeply unsatisfactory. The very
structure of the Neapolitan society, with its striking inequalities, had been left
untouched. In fact, the Southern kingdom was still a feudal-communal society.
Deprived of much of their political power, the barons kept almost unaltered their
juridical and economic privileges, particularly in the provinces and in the Sicilian
viceroyalty. Here the authority of the central government was filtered by a number
of intermediate bodies, which reduced the exercise of power to a complex activity of
mediation between contrasting local interests, which were embedded in institutions
such as baronial jurisdictions, feudal autonomies, and common lands. This status
quo came under attack when members of Genovesi's school moved from their
master's battle against feudal and ecclesiastical abuses to question the very
existence of feudal system tout court. The feudal-communal system of land came
indeed to be considered the main reason for the lack of economic and civil
development of the country. The abolition of feudalism in all its forms, which had
never been openly discussed by Genovesi, became the conditio sine qua non in most
of the new reform plans since the late 1770s.
The fall of the moderate Minister Tanucci in 1776 seemed to open a new space of
action for the second generation reformers, whose theorising was becoming more
radical in its analysis of the nature of power. The Bourbon monarchy supported this
anti-feudal trend, particularly the Queen, the Austrian Maria Carolina, sister of
Joseph II Habsburg and of the French Queen Marie Antoniette. Genovesi's pupils
entered in number the government ranks, and more resolute actions were taken.
The most significant were the university reform (1777), the foundation of a new
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Royal Academy of Sciences (1778), the creation of the Cassa sacra, an institute of
credit designed to support the creation of a new class of small landowners (1784),
and the reform of the army (1785-88), which reduced drastically the right to
command of the aristocracy12. In 1781 Domenico Caracciolo became Viceroy of
Sicily: he began a campaign against the privileges of the local barons and abolished
the local Tribunal of the Holy Inquisition. He was soon to be prime minister (1786-
1789). Still, the intrinsic limits of the absolutist strategy of the Bourbon were
evident. Radical issues were emerging from the philosophical reflection about the
foundations of property and power, and about the controversial notions of
"equality" and "freedom". Moreover, the resistance to socio-political reforms was
growing strong, as they —unlike the anti-curial reforms— were touching at the
heart a well rooted system of economic and political privileges.
2.2 The Critique of the Feudal-Communal System of Land
Let us consider now, more concretely, some of the typical issues of late reformism13.
A first important claim was that the kingdom was unknown to its inhabitants. This
meant that basic infrastructures such as roads and canals had to be rationalised on
the basis of a better knowledge of the nature of the country and that, in general, the
economic potential of the natural resources existing in the provinces was still to be
studied and exploited. Indeed an important contribution to the reformist movement
came from the provinces, mainly by landowners who had an interest in
rationalising the productive processes under their control, in developing new
agricultural techniques, or in commercialising certain products (the so-called
industrianti). It is the case of the reformer Domenico Grimaldi (1735-1789), from the
province of Calabria, who introduced in his lands the irrigation techniques from the
Lombard plan, and hydraulic reeling machines for silk from the manufactures of
Piedmont. He had personally studied such innovations during his travels in
Northern Italy. Grimaldi was particularly known for another technical innovation,
on which he wrote in 178114. One of the major producers of olive oil from Calabria,
Grimaldi was looking for the support of the government to improve the quality of
his product. In fact Calabrian olive oil was notoriously inferior in quality to
Genoese oil, its direct competitor on European markets. Difference in price was of
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about one-fourth. In his more general reflections upon the economic situation of the
kingdom, published as Reform Plan of Public Economy in 1780, Grimaldi stated that
"ignorance" was the main obstacle to progress in agricultural production15. He
meant the ignorance of both peasantry and government as to which are the more
"effective" methods of production. The remedy was, quite typically, the institution
of agricultural schools to diffuse the practice of the new techniques, and of
economic societies, in order to provide credit to landowners to renew their
instrument of production15. We are here at the core of Neapolitan reformism, which
greatly relied on the intervention of the government to demolish the ancient
institutions, given that the socio-economic conditions of the kingdom were
considered too backward for the immediate introduction of a policy of laisser-faire.
But the experience of Grimaldi proved that similar initiatives were to face
unexpectedly strong resistance.
The Neapolitan economy was essentially agrarian, based upon two main sectors.
One was the subsistence sector, which was predominant; the other was the
commercial sector, which was located in some coastal area where specialised
cultures such as olives and mulberries (for silk) were concentrated. Given the lack
of internal industrial and commercial growth, these specialised products could only
rely on the demand of foreign markets. It is clear why, in this very limited context,
the attention of reformers focused on the improvement of the transformation
processes. The main problem was to move productive techniques from the
subsistence framework to a modern commercial framework, to make the best out of
the growing foreign demand (exportation was actually growing, in spite of the
pessimistic statements of reformers). This was the aim of men like Grimaldi.
The most formidable obstacle to such a program was the land system17. A feudal-
communal regime was operating all over the kingdom, its salient feature being this:
no one class possessed the full propriety over land. The kingdom was divided into
small autonomous administrative units, called universita, which included common
lands, private lands and ecclesiastical lands. But every piece of land was in fact
subject to a number of different "rights" owned by different legal agents. So, for
instance, peasants enjoyed certain rights on private lands (grazing was one),
whereas the feudatory possessed monopoly powers over the production or
transformation of specific products (like milling olives). Such a system granted the
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peasantry a relatively secure entrenching upon land, by means of the traditional
share-cropping tenures. This land system made the switch from subsistence crops to
commercial crops very difficult. The universita were scarcely responsive to the
pressure towards the commercialisation of its products and towards specialisation.
The land system operated constantly as a factor of resistance to any change of the
subsistence economy on which it had grown up. This considered, the lack of credit
available for landlords was possibly less relevant a factor than it could seem. It was
the land system itself that denied landowners the opportunity for investments. The
maintenance of the subsistence economy was also defended by a fiscal system
which openly discriminated against the commercial sector. Indeed, the fiscal system
had been designed during the seventeenth century by the Spanish rule in order to
obtain short-term revenue; heavy taxation was consequently put over prosperous
branches of the economy such as production and exportation of olive oil and silk.
A general consequence of this stagnant economy, where investments were
discouraged by the land and the fiscal systems, was a high propensity to consume.
Consumption took place almost exclusively in the capital, where most of the
landowners owned residencies. Merchants of the town owned special rights to
import products from abroad at reduced duties. More than one tenth of the whole
population of the kingdom lived in the overcrowded capital (around 600,000
inhabitants), whose economic existence depended ultimately upon the continuous
influx of funds from the provinces, be they public revenues or baronial incomes.
These highly schematic remarks should be enough to point out that the low level
of investment and the slow rate of development of provincial agriculture on one
side, and the overgrowth of the capital on the other side, were in fact closely
interconnected phenomena. This precarious economic equilibrium would be
seriously endangered by any attempt aimed at changing the landowners'
absenteeism or diverting their profits towards agricultural investment. The
dismantling of the feudal-communal system would produce —at least as an
immediate result— a dramatic increase of the level of unemployment in the capital.
Other economic and financial activities grew up within the feudal-communal
system, with the effect of reinforcing its stability. Since the late eighteenth century
the credit system which allowed most of the agricultural producers (landowners or
tenants) to survive was in the hands of a restricted group of financiers and
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merchants of the capital. Large revenues at low level of risk were guaranteed by the
institutionalised methods of advancing credit, such as the contratto alia voce ("verbal
contract"), by which merchants bought crops one year in advance at very low
prices, exploiting precisely th chronic lack of agricultural investments which was
related to the ongoing crisis oi agrarian economy.
The forces opposing attempts to overthrown the feudal-communal system and to
improve the production and transformation of oil and silk appear now to their full
extent. It is not surprising that most of the reformist efforts, including Grimaldi's,
ended in failure. Consider the improvement to the production of oil introduced by
Grimaldi in his own lands, as it is described in his 1781 essay. It consisted in the
introduction of the Genoese olive press to replace the traditional one (trappeto).
Grimaldi began to experiment in 1769, and the results were reported to the king
himself. The first experiments were successful, and in 1771 Grimaldi hired
specialised Genoese personnel and transformed his entire crop according to the
new method. The results were crystal clear to Grimaldi: the Genoese press required
less labour, it produced more oil, it produced better oil (i.e., more clear and
palatable). On the basis of these results, Grimaldi forecast a rapid diffusion of the
machine all over the kingdom. In fact, the method began to be adopted by some of
Grimaldi's neighbouring landowners. The new press was smaller and cheaper than
the old one, so that a producer could install more presses over his land overcoming
the traditional problem of periodical overproduction. Because they were expensive
and complex, the old presses were indeed too few to deal with particularly rich
crops in due time. Grimaldi calculated that 400,000 ducats were wasted every year
because of the inefficiency of the old system, based on a few scattered pressing
plants18.
By 1783, when Grimaldi re-organised oil production after the Calabrian earth¬
quake, he could state that "in that province [i.e. Calabria] there are already many
Genoese presses introduced by myself"19. The Calabrian earthquake was to
Grimaldi an occasion not to be wasted. Most of the traditional fixed plants for the
production of oil had been damaged: they could now be replaced with Genoese
ones. But this required a special availability of credit for the impoverished
Calabrian landowners, who had been suffering a block of the trade following the
American war (1777). Grimaldi asked for a state loan. He denounced the "illegal"
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profits made by Neapolitan financiers with the contratto alia voce. Grimaldi's
suggestions were only partially met by the government. In the end the "occasion"
provided by the earth-quake was lost, the state-lead "modernisation" of oil
production did not begin, and the whole experience remained an isolated case.
Behind Grimaldi's substantial failure was not simply "ignorance" of the new
techniques or the lack of funds. It is quite clear that the introduction of new
techniques of agricultural production and transformation would have a deep
impact on the existing feudal-communal system. In the case of the Genoese press
one can remark that, for a start, the diffusion of the new cheap presses would
certainly jeopardise the feudal monopoly over oil milling. To those of the feudatory
who possessed mills but did not produce oil, Grimaldi's arguments in favour of the
new press would hardly sound convincing. But, let us consider the producers
themselves. The remarkable reduction in the number of required hours of labour
would cause further unemployment in an already overpopulated countryside,
accelerating the process of social desegregation which was threatening the
traditional structure of the rural world; this was hardly a pleasant perspective if this
single technological innovation was not part of a wider network of technical
innovations and socio-political reforms, as it was indeed for Grimaldi. Furthermore,
the production of a better quality of olive oil would necessarily require a re¬
orientation of the overall strategy of their commercialisation. Those markets
interested in Calabrian oil for industrial usage, such as the soap manufactures of
Marseille, would be lost if its price rose; and new investments would be required to
open new markets, entering into competition with the Genoese oil. Grimaldi was
well aware of these strategic implications of his innovation, as is clearly shown by
his attempt to constitute a society of Calabrian oil producers, around 178520. But
such commercial developments were at odds with the interests of the merchants
and financiers of the capital, who enjoyed de facto a monopoly on both olive oil
exportation and the sale of credit to provincial landowners, both of them based on
the lack of similar organisations of producers. These remarks can help to make
sense of the failure of Grimaldi, and of the "ignorance" on the governmental and
entrepreneurial side. Similarly, the argument of the "ignorance" of agricultural
labourers advanced by Grimaldi should not be uncritically accepted. Historical
information on this issue is scarce; but Grimaldi himself tell us of attacks by locals
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against the families of Geonese workmen, and of the attachment of local (unskilled)
labourers to the rudimentary Calabrian press. Such hints suggest a more articulated
explanation for Grimaldi's failure. I hope they also suggest that the feudal-
communal system of land management can indeed be thought of as a complex
network of technical devices, social and juridical institutions, and cultural
resources21. The radical change of a single element of the network is then impossible
if other elements and the relations among them must be conserved unaltered.
Certain specific technical innovations or certain specific social reforms which would
harm the stability of the system can be seen as "structurally" impossible. This was
the case of Grimaldi's press.
Another important voice of the provincial reformism was that of Giuseppe
Palmieri (1721-1794), from the province of Apulia. An analysis of his campaigning
for export tariff reform will bring us to the core of the Neapolitan taxation system,
another bete noir of the Neapolitan Enlightenment. Unlike Grimaldi, Palmieri was a
civil servant, being a member and later the president of the Supreme Council of
Finances. Still, his campaigning was to encounter the same formidable opposition
as did Grimaldi's. Palmieri considered primarily the exports of olive oil, the most
important single Neapolitan export22. He remarked that the duties on oil export
were excessive and they were seriously damaging its potential expansion, which
was a commonplace among reformers. Furthermore, heavy duties on exports were
not damaging the merchants of the capital or the great landowners, as they had the
power to discharge additional costs upon small tenants and day-labourers caught
up in the feudal-communal system. The central issue here was the system of the
arrendamenti, by which the government charges private companies to raise taxes
over specific products. (Notorious for their voracity were the arre?idamento della seta
and the arrendamento dell'olio e sapone). Palmieri pointed out that in the case of olive
oil the damaging effects of duties were most evident. Duties had been accumulating
over the years, regarding every single stage of the process of collection,
transformation, and transport of the product. The overall complexity of the revenue
system was a clear expression of the inability of the central government to control
its local branches and to contrast local interests. But a serious tariff reform would
require, first of all, a reform of the system of weights and measures, without which
it would be impossible to raise a single uniform duty on the export of oil. The
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effects of the lack of a uniform system of weights and measures upon Neapolitan
society were many and profound. It was considered as the main obstacle to
commercial progress in general23. The problem was to re-emerge again in the early
nineteenth century, as we shall see. Palmieri's proposal to address the tariff
question contained two main points: the government should recover control over
public revenues and it should introduce a new single system of weights and
measures. But the resistance of groups whose interests were to be affected by the
reform, in this particular case the shareholders and the administrators of the
arrendamento dell'olio e snpone, was too hard to overcome. Palmieri acutely noticed
that the strongest opposition to his proposals originated from members of the lower
provincial administration of the arrendamento, whose livelihood was directly
threatened24. Their opposition was so obdurate that they attacked every part of the
proposed reform, even those less directly relevant, such as the reform of the system
of weights and measures, whose complexity was presented as an heritage of
"ancient wisdom". Interestingly, not even the powerful lobby of the oil merchants
of the port of Gallipoli, in Apulia, supported the reform of weights and measures.
An abstract sociohistorical description where the "middle classes" or the
"merchants" supported the plans of reform against the resistance of the landed
aristocracy would be unable to capture the complex reality of late eighteenth
century Naples. Merchants themselves had built their fortunes upon the feudal
system we have been describing. In this case, one reason for their opposing the
reform was that they had been exploiting to their advantage the lack of an
homogeneous unit of measure for olive oil, and increasing their profit at the
expenses of local producers. In 1790 it finally became clear that the battle for tariff
reform, which included the reform of weights and measures, had been lost. The
plan presented by Palmieri had been introduced with substantial amendments and
the few surviving innovations were not practically actuated. Reformers began to
believe that the main obstacle to any real change in the economic and social system
of the kingdom was the Crown itself, too sensible to the pressures of the financial
oligarchy of the capital. In fact the Bourbon were themselves heavily mortgaged by
those very same elements which had built their fortune upon the feudal-communal
system.
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The manufacture of silk also reveals the relations between mode of production
and feudal-communal system. The duties on silk were many and were extremely
high. Almost every Neapolitan reformer asked for their lowering and for state loans
to modernise the techniques of reeling, to face the growing foreign competition,
particularly by Northern Italian producers. Here an hydraulic reeling machine,
called Piedmontese after the state of Piedmont, was employed which permitted the
production of high quality raw silk (organzino). Grimaldi, Galanti, Palmieri, and
others pointed out that hydraulic reeling machines —which had been praised by
Diderot himself in the first edition of the Encyclopedic— should be immediately
adopted in the provinces of the kingdom. They also denounced the arrendamento
della seta for its constant opposition to any change25. In fact the arrendamento, which
controlled the whole production and transformation of silk, had been designed, as
the other arrendamenti, to collect taxes. The "logic" of this institution was not at all a
logic of the market; indeed for its members it was perfectly rational to fight
technical innovations, and to preserve the "inefficient" traditional methods. Indeed,
duty was imposed upon every pound of raw silk produced. From a given quantity
of cocoons, the traditional method produced a greater weight of raw silk than the
new Piedmontese one. Introducing the new method would improve the quality of
raw silk, but it would also imply a loss of revenue for the arrendamento. The position
of the administrators and shareholders of the arrendamento was backed by the
reelers (maestri trattori) themselves, who were paid for each pound of silk reeled. A
number of other issues reinforced the resistance to such technological innovation.
So, for instance, hydraulic machines had to be placed outside of the inhabited
centres (where traditional plants were), and this would increase smuggling, with
further losses for the arrendamento. Or, again, women workers were preferred for
the hydraulic machine, whereas traditional reeling was an activity reserved to men.
The only possibility of change would come from the direct intervention of the
government, in the form of the abolition of the monopoly of the arrendamento and
the introduction of private initiative in the production process, which was precisely
what reformers were asking for, in the name of the principles of economic
liberalism. Again, as in the case of the press, one single technical innovation was
rational and desirable only to those who were willing to change the whole network
(the feudal-communal system). The evident "rationality" of the technical innovation
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faded before the eyes of those whose interests were served best by the existing
network. That the Genoese press or the Piedmontese reeling technique were
"better" than their traditional counterpart could only be consistently claimed by
those who agreed with the reformers on the need for a free-trade economy, for the
industrianti landowners to become competing entrepreneurs, and on other goals
which can be more or less directly related to economic liberalism. These
considerations should help us not to lose sight of the fact that the theoretical
productions of the Neapolitan Enlightenment were elaborated by men who were
themselves deeply involved in very practical questions. Landowners, civil servants,
professors, and even clergymen, were attacking the feudal-communal system in its
very concrete manifestations, whether they were "excessive" duties, "confusing"
systems of measures, or "ignorant" resistance to technological innovation. This is
why I believe that their referring to English and French economists, or their
defending — contemporaneously — neo-mercantilist and liberal ideas, should not be
seen as essential issues in a historical reassessment of this movement. Reformers
used those ideas that seemed more suitable to fight their own battles, case by case,
everyone according to his personal experience.
That the enemies of their plans of "modernisation" of the country were many
and powerful ones emerged clearly around 1790, when the wave of reformism
ended up in a generalised failure. The 1790s began with the diffused feeling that the
monarchy was no longer a reliable ally. By the 1780s every provincial centre had his
own place where noblemen, bourgeois landowners, clergymen, physicians, and
scholars regularly met to discuss issues such as those I have been describing.
Usually these meetings were hosted in the mansion of some "enlightened"
landowner. There was a lack of specific institutions devoted to such a function. The
lodges of Neapolitan freemasonry offered precisely the form of organisation that
was needed26. Most of the reformers took advantage of the new form of
"sociability" offered by the pre-existing Masonic lodges. Grimaldi, for instance, was
a member of the lodge of Reggio, in Calabria. Another important provincial
reformer, Melchiorre Delfico, from the Abruzzi, hosted the local lodge in his own
mansion of Teramo. The provincial reformism was generally technical, problem-
specific, based on accurate descriptions, and supported by men who were
themselves part of those productive processes that they wanted to change, or by
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civil servants aware of the need for structural modifications in the current rules on
trade, or in the tariff system. Reformers from the town of Naples conducted
generally a more theoretical kind of work. Men like Francesco Antonio Grimaldi
(brother of Domenico), Gaetano Filangieri, Mario Pagano, Francesco Longano were
scholars and professors whose essays dealt primarily with problems such as the
science of legislation, the principles of criminal law, or the role of the monarchy in a
modern state. As in the provinces, even in Naples the party met in private
mansions. After Genovesi's death (1769) the RUN had ceased to be the main point
of aggregation for the reformers of the town. Mario Pagano held a chair (Criminal
Law), but his position in the academic world was not as relevant as Genovesis's.
The villa of the Dukes di Gennaro, just outside Naples on the road to Posillipo,
became the place where reformers regularly met. Among them were Melchiorre
Delfico, Antonio Pianelli and the famous physician and botanist Domenico Cirillo.
The works published in the 1780s by members of this group were the most
significant theoretical production of Neapolitan reformism: Grimaldi's Reflections on
the inequality among men (1779); Filangieri's The Science of legislation (since 1780);
Pagano's Political Essays (1783); and Pagano's Considerations on Criminal Trials
(1787)27. Between 1783 and 1784 the group also had its own periodical, the
Miscellaneous Selection, where pieces by Genovesi and Vico were reprinted, together
with comments on the Constitution of the United States of America, and reviews of
the books by Grimaldi, Filangieri and Pagano. As in the provinces, even in Naples
the group reinforced its theoretical and social cohesion through the Masonic
connection, particularly from 1786, when a lodge of the politically subversive
Illuminati was founded in Naples28. These reformers were fighting the same battle as
the provincial reformers, though in different fields. Filangieri, for instance,
denounced the conservative attitude of the legal world towards any transformation
of the legal system in the direction of a modern enlightened despotism. Pagano did
the same with the juridical system. They aimed to overcome that same feudal-
communal structure which was attacked by economists; and they had to face the
same formidable resistance.
A remarkable character of these works is the elaboration of a complex
philosophy of history, as a framework where reformism could be theoretically
articulated and justified. Vico's cyclical theory of history enjoyed great success, as it
81
was re-interpreted to fit with the reformists' anti-feudal polemic. Following the
success of Filangieri's work, the historical origins of feudalism were investigated, as
well as the current political function of aristocracy. The fact that the legitimisation
of baronial jurisdiction was a matter of discussion was in itself a crucial novelty. In
the late 1780s, the pessimistic tones of Pagano's cyclical vision of history seemed to
prevail. That a modern, civilised society could be established by means of a gradual
and painless transition was hard to believe, given the failures of the reformist front.
The overcoming of the feudal system began to be compared with some sort of great
natural catastrophe. It is indeed remarkable the way in which Pagano made use in
his work of the great Calabrian earthquake of 178329. In the preface of his Essays, the
natural disaster is not only employed metaphorically, but it is also presented as
revealing that the very basis of civil society could be easily dissolved by natural
events; and in this case there would be a return to an original form of equality and
liberty. Pagano's work is permeated by the feeling that the inertia of the
government in turning the reform program into reality will have disruptive effects
on society. Not surprisingly, the Considerations' motto is from Tacitus: Sed, durn
veritati consulitur, libertas corrumpebatur. Knowledge about the social and economic
conditions of the kingdom, and about the necessary reforms, was now available to
the ruling class: two generations of reformers had worked for that; any further
delay of action would be deadly for the country. The example of the late
seventeenth century modern movement was there to warn reformers. Francesco
Saverio Salfi (1759-1832) wrote in 1787 that "a little practical application [of
reformist principles] is what the interest of the people now cries out for"30. During
the 1780s most reformers had personally entered public administration. It was the
moment of maximum reformist effort. Pagano entered the Admiralty Tribunal;
Filangieri and Palmieri the Council of Finances; Domenico Grimaldi and Galanti
became Visitors of the Realm. But we have already seen the kind of quick-sands
they were getting into. In spite of the action of sympathetic ministers such as Luigi
de' Medici and John Acton (1736-1811)31, resistance to change could not be
overcome, particularly at the local level (recall the practical impossibility of
changing the tariff system, even when its reform had the approval of the central
government). By 1794 the reform movement as such did not exist any more. The
court and the government had deprived it of their support, while both internal and
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foreign policy were suddenly changing following the revolutionary events of
France. Among the last voices of Neapolitan reformism to be heard was Nicola
Fiorentino (1765-1799), who proposed the last plan of general reform in his
Reflections on tlie Kingdom of Naples (1794)32; and Galanti's New description of the Two
Sicilies (1786 to 1794, when he was forced to stop publication). Galanti is dominated
by historical pessimism. His criticisms of the provincial gentry were as violent as
they were despairing:
Our laws, for most part belonging to feudal government, have scorned the
condition of the farmer and have favoured the classes of idle men [...] All
those among us who have talent and a little money devote themselves to the
lawcourts, or to medicine, or to become a notary or a priest and in this way
scrape a living among the people [...] From here stems the wretched and
wasteful kind of existence in which the inhabitants of small provincial towns
aimlessly idle away their time.33
By 1794, when reformers were outplayed by the government, those who believed in
the necessity of change had found new forms of organisation, and were preparing
much more radical plans of action. The "catastrophistic" vision of Pagano, together
with the "facts of France" were taken as suggesting a different approach to the
question of demolishing the feudal system. From our point of view the failure of the
pressure of the reformers in achieving any relevant result seems almost an obvious
outcome. In the 1780s they were little more than an elite group of authors who
represented the interests of urban tradesmen and entrepreneurs, as well as
"enlightened" landowners in the provinces. Such interests would be better matched
by some form of controlled liberalism and free-market. But these interests proved to
be extremely weak when it came to direct confrontation with the interests
embedded in the feudal-communal system. Large sectors of the public
administration, particularly its local branches; shareholders and administrators of
private companies holding monopolies over the production and taxation of specific
products; the big merchants of the capital who monopolised the exports and were
able, thanks to the legal system, to discharge the risks of a fluctuating market upon
the agricultural labourers; lobbies of local tradesmen and merchants who exploited
the confusion of the measures system; bankers of the capital who sold credit to
impoverished tenants at 20% rate of interest. From the few examples shown above it
should already appear that the economic system that grew up within the feudal
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system in the eighteenth century had an inertia that a gradual policy of reforms
could not easily sweep aside. Another source of resistance should not be
underestimated: the peasantry. The general condition of life of the peasants had
been declining during the whole century, as landowners (feudal and bourgeois) and
central government were gradually eroding the system of common lands on which
they could rely. The result was a deterioration of the traditional forms of social life
in the countryside. The plans of the reformers were seen as threatening yet further
the already precarious conditions of agricultural labourers (witness the opposition
to new presses for olive oil). These feelings were particularly strong among the
peasants of the poorest provinces, such as Calabria, and they were to find their most
concrete expression in the counter-revolutionary phenomenon of the Army of the
Holy Faith, in 1799.
2.3 Reformism, Mathematics and the Structure of Knowledge
In the previous pages we have been drawing a picture of the Neapolitan situation,
according to which, in the 1780s a rather aggressive movement for the reform of the
feudal state seemed to have encountered the favour of the Bourbon monarchy, even
if concrete results were obtained only in very limited sectors (mainly the anti-curial
campaign), without touching the economic and social structure of the kingdom. It
should be noted that, at the same time, teaching and research in the mathematical
sciences was languishing in Naples (on the historical and cultural reasons for the
decline of mathematics in the early eighteenth century see Appendix 4). Vito
Caravelli (1724-1800), a former pupil of Nicola di Martino, was the only noteworthy
mathematician active in the 1770s and early 1780s. Indeed, he wrote the first
textbook of calculus ever published in Naples34 (1786), for his pupils at the Royal
Academy of the Navy. He also prepared textbooks in arithmetic, algebra, geometry,
trigonometry, mechanics, hydrostatics, hydraulics and nautical science. Since 1770
Caravelli was Director of the Military Academy (Regia Accademia Militare), which
had been created the year before by the reunion of the former Academy of Artillery
and the former Academy of Military Engineering (Regia Accademia del Corpo degli
Ingegneri, founded in 1754). The "de-professionalisation" of the mathematical
sciences at the RUN to the advantage of the military schools and academies had
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been continuing even in the period of the greatest reformist effort. University
professors had to supplement their low wages with private tuition, and the
conditions of scientific careers had remained remarkably precarious. The fact that
Caravelli never entered the RUN, while a chair was held by the obscure Giuseppe
Marzucco, was a clear sign of the governmental orientation. Still, something was
changing in the scientific culture of the mid-1780s. First of all, calculus finally
entered the curriculum of the military schools. This fact can be seen as an attempt
by the government not to "fall behind" in the crucial sector of military engineering.
But why did this happen precisely in the 1780s, when in Northern Italian states the
teaching of calculus had already been institutionalised for decades? I believe that
the appearance of calculus in Naples can indeed be related to the cultural battle of
the reformers. A particular reading of Newton's philosophy of nature enjoyed a
great success in Naples since the 1730s. This reading was decidedly empiricist about
the investigation of nature and voluntaristic in religious matters. The study of the
calculus and the philosophical issue of the mathematisation of reality had had
much less success35. In fact, since the 1730s onwards, apart from the brothers
Martino and Vito Caravelli, no one had devoted his career to the production of
original work in mathematics, nor even to up-to-date teaching. University courses
were elementary and the military schools just added to their curricula what was
strictly necessary for training engineers. It is not surprising that the generation of
reformers which was active in the 1770s and 1780s lacked a good mathematical
education. They, almost invariably, had been trained in one of the two most
prestigious faculties, Law or Medicine. It is in the eighties that the relevance of the
exact sciences to the administration of the modern state emerged as a well-defined
issue. It had already been treated by Genovesi, of course, but in the eighties the
reference was changed: reformers did not look any more to the first generation of
the encyclopedistes but to the radical sensationalistic epistemology of Condorcet and
to the algebraised calculus of Lagrange whose applicability to empirical reality
seems more and more universal. By that time French scientific books circulated
freely in Naples. In 1786 the government, led by the reformist Domenico Caracciolo,
invited a group of French military engineers to re-organise the artillery of the
kingdom on the basis of the French model. Reformers were indeed willing to
modernise the teaching and research of mathematics not only by words. In 1781,
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Caracciolo had invited Lagrange himself to move to Naples, and to take the lead of
the new RAS (1779)36. Caracciolo, who was a personal friend, would have known
the work of Lagrange well. In the 1760s, during his stay in Paris as ambassador for
the Kingdom of Naples, Caracciolo had enthusiastically embraced the arguments of
the first generation of encyclopedistes, and he had been an admirer and a friend of
d'Alembert. Caracciolo knew Lagrange in the 1760s, while he was in Turin. He soon
realised that there were better places for the young mathematician than the
Kingdom of Sardinia. It was indeed under Caracciolo's protection that Lagrange
moved from Turin to Paris, where the well-known ambassador permitted him
immediately to enter the drawing-rooms of the enlightened aristocracy. By 1781,
when Caracciolo wrote to him, Lagrange had already moved to Berlin. As he
explained in his answer, he was enjoying an extremely gratifying position, which
he was not willing to leave.
In the early 1780s a young member of the class of mathematics of the new
academy delivered three memoirs where he applied of integral and differential
calculus to solve problems of practical interest for the state. This was afterwards the
fundamental aim of the academy. His name was Nicola Fergola. He had been
probably chosen as a member of the academy on the suggestion of Vito Caravelli,
who had been informing the king of the more meritorious mathematicians.
Caravelli himself published his textbook of calculus in 1786. In 1790 a private studio
was opened in Naples where Lagrangian analysis was taught. It attracted a great
number of young students willing to be trained as mathematicians, but lectures
were attended also by well-known protagonists of the reformist movement, such as
Mario Pagano. All this gave the impression that, by the mid-eighties, the cultural
environment was ready for a serious modernisation of mathematical teaching and
research. It would have been sufficient to look at the rich Northern Italian
mathematical productions, which included good textbooks (such as the Analytic
Institutions by Gaetana Agnesi, from Milan) and interesting applications of calculus
to mechanics. As it turned out, this was not going to happen. In fact, an alternative
option that could be taken in order to give new life to the study of mathematics in
the kingdom was seen and adopted.
Before moving on to the events of the 1790s, which deeply shaped the cultural
and social future of the kingdom, it is worth reflecting on the philosophical
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dimension of the Neapolitan reformism. I suggest this is best understood in terms of
a fundamental epistemological shift. Traditional historiography has arguably been
too keen to follow the history of ideas, and to look for sources and followers rather
than focusing on the very specific problems reformers had in front of them. What
seems crucial to the strategy of the reformers is rather the re-organisation they
accomplished of the whole structure of knowledge, according to a new set of
guiding principles and of new sources of legitimisation. In the new structure new
branches of knowledge received legitimisation, whereas other branches were
excluded. The very "way of thinking", or style of thought, which shaped the
reformist texts presupposes —and in fact reinforces— the validity of a particular
structure of knowledge, whose hierarchies and values were different from the
traditional one. Describing the impossibility of radical technological innovations of
production in the frame of the feudal-communal system of land I have suggested
that we should think of technological devices as inserted in a network which
includes other devices, administrative bodies, political institutions, economic
interests and so on. A specific structure of knowledge must be part of the same
network, as an essential cultural resource, a source of legitimisation which reinforce
further the stability of the network. To test this working hypothesis we can begin by
trying to define the features of the new structure of knowledge defended by the
reformers.
The historian Ferrone has characterised what he call "the style of thought" of
late Neapolitan reformism as "neo-naturalism"37. He has rightly pointed out that
most of the production of the second generation of Neapolitan reformers, such as
Filangieri, Pagano, Grimaldi, Cirillo, and Longano was shaped by their Masonic
experience. Doctrines from the Hermetic tradition circulated in the twenty or so
Neapolitan lodges, such as the metaphor of the universe as an animal, pantheism,
cyclical conceptions of time, and the dislike for mechanist reductionism. It was
often the case that similar doctrines could be traced back to the roots of Southern
Italian Renaissance naturalism, whose re-emergence has already been signalled in
the years of the fight against the Cartesians. In Ferrone's reconstruction, late
Neapolitan reformism was founded on a renewed version of Renaissance
naturalism, which can be interpreted as a pessimistic reaction to the failure of the
earlier reform programs. This failure put in question many previous assumptions,
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such as that of history being a progressive process, or the very possibility for
Southern society to escape its destiny of backwardness and inequality. Themes such
as the circularity of time, the catastrophic evolution of the Earth, the inevitable
decadence of civilisation enjoyed great popularity among the late reformist writers,
and can be related to the declining belief in the real possibility of modifying a state
of things that seemed more and more unchangeable. The reference to this cultural
stream, and to its main places of elaboration, the masonic lodges, can help to put in
context the historicistic perspective shared by many reformers and its tendency to
subsume the evolution of the physical and mathematical sciences under historical
categories. It also helps us to make sense of the Vico-revival which took place in
those years. But then Ferrone goes also on to include under his descriptive concept
of neo-naturalism the scientific productions of the period. In particular, he consider
as neo-naturalistic the mathematical project of Nicola Fergola and of his influential
school of geometry. Fergola and his pupils are classified as neo-naturalists on the
basis of their declared anti-reductionism in the natural sciences, and their dislike for
the productions of the contemporary French geometres, particularly for the
philosophical writings of Condorcet and the mathematical writings of Lagrange. By
this stage the descriptive concept of neo-naturalism has became like that night
where all cows are black. Too many and too various phenomena are being grouped
under its label. This suggests that the concept is not a very useful tool for the
cultural historian. As we shall see by analysing the writings of Fergola, his whole
cultural project, which included his approach to mathematics, was precisely at odds
with the social program and the philosophical perspective of the reformers. To let
this crucial opposition emerge more clearly, we can make use of the notion of the
"structure of knowledge" (without attributing to it any sort of explanatory power,
though).
Let us begin by noting that the whole reformist front did not, in fact, share this
supposedly neo-naturalistic, i.e. non-mathematical character. In reformist writings
we can find optimistic statements about the "calculability" of things. Genovesi
himself, a convinced Newtonian, declared he was mainly interested in discovering
the "true laws of politics and economics". In his mind "politics, like economics, has
its own certain and eternal principles: thus it has its own theorems and its own
problems"38. It was precisely the definition of such universal and rational laws
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which enabled Genovesi to attack the feudal social setting and the juridical system,
whose complexity openly favoured the landed aristocracy in its quarrels with local
communities. As Genovesi pointed out, the system of law was functional to
maintain a status quo which was irrational, i.e. not based on the universal laws
which must define a rational administration, but on an illegal action, namely the
acquisition of feudal rights during the Middle Ages. Indeed, some of Genovesi's
students gave primary importance to the definition of a set of laws to re-organise
the political and economic life of the kingdom on a rational basis, which they saw as
the universal laws which should regulate every human society39. So it is a fact that
in spite of the neo-naturalistic tone of much reformist production, we can also find
crucial themes and styles of thought which were much closer to the contemporary
encyclopaedic project of the philosophes, where the "spirit" of the exact sciences
(theorems, rational deduction, universal laws), was employed as a resource to make
sense of social and political reality and to project its modification.
Consider now the second generation of reformers. Gaetano Filangieri founded
his monumental work on the science of legislation, probably the most influential
text of the late reformism, on his belief in a rational order of nature:
no man can ignore his own laws [...]. These are the dictates of the principle of
universal reason, of the moral sense that the Author of nature has impressed
on every individual of our kind, as living measure of justice and honesty,
which talk to the whole mankind with the same language and has always
prescribed the same laws in every time [...].40
"Our redemption" Filangieri wrote in another work, can only arrive "from the
progresses of public education", and on this point he openly criticised the
militaristic choices of the Minister of the Navy, and of the monarchy itself, which
absorbed too large an amount of material and human resources (remember the
moving of the best mathematicians from the university to the academies). Such
criticisms were part of a large anti-despotic campaign which emerged clearly in the
late 1780s, inside the Southern freemasonry, as the trust in King Ferdinando IV was
fading away. The principles of the new-born American democracy were widely
debated in the lodges. In fact Filangieri was in correspondence with Benjamin
Franklin41. Despotism, militarism, feudalism, are the "monsters" attacked by
Filangieri and by other members of the Neapolitan "brotherhood" in the name of
the "social harmony" which should derive from following the "natural and eternal
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laws" of man and society. It is indeed false, Filangieri claims, that the science of
legislation has no fixed principles, and that "the only rule of legislation is the will of
the legislator". It is certainly true that "the state is a complex machine: the wheels
that compound it are not always the same, and the forces that make them move are
different" (notice the mechanistic metaphor), but this does not mean that "the rules
which let us know the different wheels and the different forces cannot be always
fixed and constant". The science of the social order cannot lack certain principles, it
cannot be "vague and uncertain" a. Filangieri died still young in 1788. In 1786 he
had taken part in the foundation of the egalitarian lodge of the Illuminati, founded
in Naples in occasion of the visit of the Danish theologian Friedrich Miinter (1761-
1831). A few months later Filangieri had met the "brother" Wolfgang Goethe, with
whom he agreed about the despotic nature of the government of Joseph II
Habsburg and of Ferdinando IV43. In his Eloge of Filangieri (1788), the fellow-
reformer (and "brother") Donato Tommasi pointed out that Filangieri was working
to the creation of a whole system of knowledge, the "new science of the sciences",
which should be able to explain the particular history of the nations as well as the
general history of man. This is described as an anti-scholastic system, were the
sciences do not deal with the essences of things, but rather with the relations among
them; and every science would be linked to any other, because "all the truths are
connected" to form "a chain". The universal chain of truths is the object of the
science of the sciences, of which the science of legislation is a part. At this point the
masonic nature of Filangieri's project becomes clear: the search for "harmony" is
what lies behind his investigation of the "chain of truths", which will end up with
the construction of "the science of the sciences". The new society resulting from the
"regeneration" will be a society of equal and fully educated men, a society "senza
volgo" (without low people). In Filangieri this social Utopia, like the quasi-mystical
term "regeneration", reflected the masonic doctrines and the religious tones in
which the ambitions of specific social groups were encoded. Just a couple of years
after Filangieri's death, this same Utopia and the same word "regeneration" was to
enter the doctrinal apparatus of the much more aggressive Jacobin movement. We
have no reason to believe that they were expressions of different interests, and the
elite nature of Neapolitan Jacobinism confirms this hypothesis44.
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Mario Pagano was the other great figure of Neapolitan reformism. Professor of
Criminal Law and a freemason himself, he was not from an ancient aristocratic
family of the capital as was Filangieri, but more of a provincial self-made man. In
his Political Essays, firstly published in 1783-85 and reprinted in the early nineties
1791, he was mainly interested in the construction of a reliable method to collect
circumstantial evidence. The method has to deal with the natural laws, and Pagano
states that
nature does not delude and does not deceive anyone. The immutable relations
of things are not subject to human corruption. Moral laws are as constant and
necessary as the physical laws. The judge's mind is forced by witnesses,
whereas it is convinced and persuaded by circumstances.45
Following the results of the scientific investigations of his "brother" and famous
physician Domenico Cirillo, Pagano recognised the validity of a fundamental
methodological principle: there is no essential difference between the laws of the
physical universe and the laws of the moral universe. Indeed, the main reason for
the lack of advancement in the moral sciences is precisely the lack of understanding
about this point.
Considering differently the laws of the physical world and those of the moral
world we have been separating the sciences and the knowledge which should
be treated along with them; so both remained dry and imperfect, and the most
interesting have been less treated.46
The fact that the study of history, of language, of nature, of antiquity do not share
the same principles make them superficial and emblematic of a period of
decadence, where the real fundamental and unitary truths are covered by ignorance
and error. The belief that there are constant and necessary moral and physical laws,
plus the confidence in the possibility of their re-discovery in order to "regenerate"
the corrupted humanity, are the basic tenets of Pagano's masonic science. Natural
laws being essentially similar to moral laws, Pagano reads the history of the world
as a succession of parallel physical and political revolutions, articulating a new
version of the old cyclical cosmological model of progress and decadence (recall his
usage of the 1783 earthquake). In the background, was the image of an immutable
and harmonic natural order.
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Nature, though always changing, is always the same. The force that moves
and gives life [anima] to everything, and the matter of which everything is
made are always the same. Still the old forms of things change, and are
followed by new ones. So that nature, reproducing itself, always assumes new
appearances. [...]. The innumerable phenomena are just different ways in
which that power operates which pervades everything. So nature changes in
every moment, but in its essence it is always one and the same.47
Turn now to the scientist whose work inspired Pagano, Domenico Cirillo. A second
generation reformer of Genovesi's school and a freemason since the 1770s, Cirillo
was a leading physician, botanist and entomologist. He was Professor of Botany
(1759-1789) and of Practical Medicine (1789-1799) at the RUN, and a member of
many European academies, including the Royal Society of London. He had regular
correspondence with Voltaire, d'Alembert, Diderot and he was particularly
interested in Rousseau's egalitarian ideas. His critical reflections on the present state
of the Neapolitan socio-political situation were published —with a false indication
of place, under the apparently neutral title of Academic Speeches48. An early follower
of Lavoisier in chemistry, Cirillo devoted most of his experimental work to the
study of the physiology of plants, where he attributed a central role to the "vital
fluid [i.e. oxygen]" that is the "fundamental support of life". He also introduced in
Naples Linneus' system of classification, which he applied to the flora of the
kingdom. As we noticed above, his fellow reformers Pagano and Filangieri found
his experimental work interesting particularly for its general perspective, where
Cirillo do not trace any clear cut distinction between the sphere of the moral and the
sphere of the physical. Consider, for instance, the passage of the Speeches where he
explains the universal feeling of compassion for our suffering fellow-humans by
reducing it to the particular physical constitution of human beings, which is in turn
explained on the basis of the universal principle that "nature has the essential
attribution of maintaining peace and equality among its creatures, and it is
perturbed by the presence of misery, by the expression of sorrow". So that our
"pure spiritual affections" (in this case compassion) are "strictly linked to the body
and to inert matter".
Similar ideas will be re-elaborated by the provincial reformer Melchiorre Delfico
(1744-1835). Delfico was probably not the most coherent thinker in Genovesi's
school and not even the most original, but his activity was exemplary of the
relations between the reformist authors and the central government; moreover, he
92
was to exercise a deep influence on the Neapolitan ideologists49 of the turn of the
century. Delfico's work has been taken as the crucial link between the Lockean
empiricism and the early sensationalism of Genovesi's school and later forms of
sensationalism and ideology which were to be current in Naples until the
Restoration50. Delfico was personally involved in the reformist programs of the
1780s, to which he contributed with a number of works on practical questions such
as the reform of the army, the changes in agricultural and breeding techniques, the
trade legislation (in favour of a free-hade policy), and the abolition of the feudal
system51. Later on, his interests moved to the philosophical foundations of
reformism. The tenor of these theoretical productions can be grasped by looking at
the titles of his publications and speeches, which include Thoughts on History and on
its Uselessness and Uncertainty, Remarks on the Real Foundations of the Moral Sciences,
and On the Necessity for Physiological Knowledge to Precede the Study of Intellectual
Philosophy52. Delfico's publications were was mainly devoted to showing how
intellectual and moral spheres are always —in principle— reducible to
physiological processes. He applied this philosophical perspective to a number of
questions he worked on during his long active life, including the reform of the
juridical system, moral philosophy, pedagogy, and aesthetics. Delfico's interests
and conclusions are very close to those of contemporary French ideology, indeed,
when he firstly read Cabanis in the early years of 1800, he recognised in the French
ideologist an ally fighting the same cultural battle as his own53. He was also in
correspondence with Destutt de Tracy, who declared himself a "disciple" of the
Neapolitan. Later on, Delfico referred to his own work as part of that stream of
thought which had originated from "the principles of Locke's philosophy, and
which has been extended and brought to its most useful application by Condillac,
Bonnet and Tracy, and embraced by the most loyal friends of reason". In his book
against the authority of Roman Law, Delfico's radical anti-historicism is the basis
for a critique of the extremely conservative juridical system of the Kingdom of
Naples, where not less than five different legislations were contemporaneously in
force, as a result of historical stratification54. The habit of legislating more maiorum is
irrational, Delfico wrote, and must be rejected because it is an inexhaustible source
of confusion and of abuse. Rather, the universal features of human nature should be
taken as the foundations of society and of its legislation. According to Delfico, the
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organic constitution of human beings is the real cause of their social nature, as of
every moral phenomenon in general. And this belief is not affected by the
recognition that "the natural sciences are not yet so advanced as to shed light on the
physical principles of the intellectual sphere and of the morals"55. This reductionist
belief lies behind every stance taken by Delfico, such as his conclusion that
humanity is certainly perfectible (given that social nature is based on a sort of
organic disposition). This perfectibility included goals as women's emancipation
and universal peace56. Legislation must be founded on the common organic
constitution of human beings, and this means that there should be a single rational
legislation for the entire human race (in opposition to Montesquieu's idea of specific
constitutions for each specific people), i.e. the same conclusion already drawn by
Gaetano Filangieri in 178057. Delfico's anti-historicism is more radical than
Fontenelle's or d'Alembert's, and was probably stimulated by the reading of the
ideologist Volney, who defined history as "l'une des sources les plus fecondes de
leurs prejuges et de leurs erreurs"58. The radicalization of Volney's judgements is
accomplished by Delfico arguing for the intrinsic incertitude and absolute
uselessness of history, where the French had defended the utility of historical
considerations at least in the field of politics. Note that Delfico grounded his
argument on the recognition that "the elements of history are complex, shifting and
uncertain", and for this reason they cannot be made objects of calculation59.
Experimentation and observation as they are accomplished in the natural sciences
are not possible in history. And Delfico is not claiming here that history has
different but equally legitimate methods for its investigation; he is claiming that
history is not a source of reliable knowledge at all, and consequently it should be
eliminated from university curricula. Significantly, he dedicated his Thoughts to
"the students of the natural sciences", who are "the investigators of the truths most
useful to man and the real opponents of the most powerful prejudices and errors".
A remarkable thesis of the book is the sensationalistic foundation of morals
(through the discovery of a necessary connection between the ideas of pleasure,
moral good, and virtue) on which, in turn, the science of politics must be founded.
It is clear that if our knowledge of morals and politics have to be founded "on
physiology and on other physical knowledge", then history cannot be regarded as
relevant for their advancement. The only guides, in these fields as everywhere else,
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must be "analysis, experience and observation". In Delfico's sensationalistic
framework, the source of certainty in human knowledge is to be found in
sensations: their reality is somehow transmuted into the evidence of the
corresponding ideas, and this evidence is the origin of certainty in human
knowledge60. As a result, certain beliefs can only be originated from direct
sensation. The Thoughts end with a reference to the history of science, which is
reduced to the exhibition of the proper method of invention and to the analytic
presentation of physical truths. Delfico also renews his appeal to the "physicists",
because the knowledge of reality and of "real causes" is in their hands alone. The
neo-idealist historian Gentile remarked that the Delfico's Thoughts have "scarcely
any theoretical value", but he admitted that they played a "remarkable" role in the
history of philosophical thought, as is proved by their many editions61. Also
influential were Delfico's ideas on pedagogical matters. In a memoir read at the
RAS in 1813, he deepened his early thesis about the sociability of human beings
arguing that civilisation itself has physiological foundations, which he described as
"imitative sensibility"62. This is a supposedly fundamental phenomenon of animal
physiology, which is originated by the organic interplay between sensory organs
(mainly those of sight and hearing) and the central nervous system ("internal
sensibility" as Delfico calls it). Referring to this model of mechanical imitation of
external inputs, Delfico explained phenomena such as the birth of language among
primitive populations. Language arises naturally from the human physical
constitution, it is not the result of some artificial convention, as maintained by
Rousseau and Adam Smith. On the basis of a similar "principle of imitation", Mario
Pagano had already explained not only the origin of language, but also those of
dance and music63. Evidently Pagano's attraction for Vico and for Hermetic
philosophies of history did not prevent him from providing physiological
explanations for "moral phenomena". Delfico became even more radical when he
extended his considerations from primitive language to narrative, works of art and
religious rituals. In the end, the mechanism of imitation was recognised as the basis
of morals themselves, the imitative sensibility being the foundation of a "physical
sympathy" which in turn is the organic cause of the feeling of compassion, which is
simply a "disposition of the [human] machine". If morals and civilisation derive
from the organic mechanism of the imitative sensibility, then it is possible to
95
operate on this latter in order to modify and improve the moral qualities of pupils,
according to the principle that "habits are more the effect of sensations than of
ideas"64.
Delfico was active until the mid-thirties, but by that time new issues were
emerging in the philosophical debate, and he remained an authoritative but isolated
figure. The last representatives of the "spirit" of Delfico's sensationalism were
Pasquale Borrelli (1782-1849) and Francesco Paolo Bozzelli (1786-1864). Borrelli was
a physician and a lawyer, and his out-put includes poems, pieces of mathematics
and philosophical essays65. He actively supported the French government (1806-
1815) and was minister of police within the constitutional government of 1820-1821.
Afterwards he was exiled. Borrelli had been a student of Domenico Cirillo since
1798, and a defender of the ideas of John Brown, as it emerges from his first book on
physiology (1803), where he presented more geometrico the work of the Scottish
physician66. Borrelli was indeed interested in the possibility of applying
mathematics to animal physiology, and this is the topic of his Principles of
Zooarithmy, a study "in the modern mathematical medicine"67. According to Brown,
"life" is the result of the presence of "organic force" (i.e. irritability of the muscular
tissue and sensibility of the nervous system) and of its reaction to stimulation.
Borrelli believed that such organic force, or excitability, coincided with Cabanis'
notion of sensibility, and consequently he saw the possibility of reducing ideology
("the process of mental operations") to its physiological basis ("the organisation of
man"). The materialistic implications of a similar project are quite evident, as is its
rigid determinism when it comes to the question of human freedom. At least, they
were evident to the scrupulous Bourbon censorship. The formal postulation of an
immaterial soul was plainly superfluous, once he has already made sense of every
mental process by means of organic processes. The ideological part of Borrelli's work
concerns the origins of ideas68. Here he proceeded by the method of analysis: the
analysis of ideas (their "resolution") brings us to the surface their own genesis.
Locke, Condillac, Bonnet, Tracy, Erasmus Darwin and Cabanis are the "empiricists"
whom continuously Borrellli opposes to the "rationalistic" philosophies of
Descartes, Leibniz and Kant, which he had read in their original versions during a
staying in Germany. A "physiological ideology" should be, according to Borrelli, the
goal of a new generation of ideologists, given that our knowledge of the real
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functioning of intellectual operations is still in need of much elaboration. Among
the reasons for the stagnation of ideological studies, he points to the lack of a
common and clear philosophical terminology. He also highlights the lack of a
proper system of classification for the "acts of the soul [atti dell'anima]", on the
model of Lavoisier's classification of chemical elements. Indeed, Lavoisier's new
chemistry is probably behind the request for a new terminology as well. In
particular Borrelli makes clear that memory cannot be considered as an
autonomous, elementary faculty of the soul, and so it should not be employed in
our classification of knowledge (this divergence from the French encyclopedistes was
a typical feature of Neapolitan Jacobin thought). Another crucial point of Borrelli's
ideological theory is that no lack of continuity must exist between ideology and the
natural sciences: ideology must be scientific and sciences must be founded on
ideology. This is not yet the case, Borrelli remarks, and this is indeed another reason
for the present problems of ideology. The request for a fusion of ideology and natural
science is grounded on the belief that the "science of the soul" should not be
isolated from the works of physicists, to be founded only on the introspection of
conscience, as maintained by the Scottish Dugald Stewart. Instead, even if soul and
body are certainly different (one is extended and compound, the other is not
extended and simple), they have relations which can be studied and described as
laws, and this makes necessary the contemporary study of the two dimensions.
Bozzelli can be placed in the same stream of thought. He was particularly
interested in extending Borrelli's considerations to the dangerous field of morals.
Morals should be transformed into a real science, characterised by rigor and
systematic coherence. Moving from sensationalistic premises, Bozzelli concludes
that the real foundation of the morals is, in the end, the perspective of a pleasant
future. The normative nature of morality is thus rejected in favour of a purely
hedonistic perspective. He was not saying that moral laws are arbitrary; rather they
originate in the "human spirit", and from the properties of human organic nature.
Bozzelli can thus claim that they are intrinsic to human beings as physical laws are
intrinsic to natural bodies. Note the conclusion: our knowledge of moral laws
enjoys exactly the same status as our knowledge of physical laws. Like Borrelli,
Bozzelli was involved in the constitutional insurrection of 1820-21; following the
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Bourbon repression he was exiled, and he settled in Paris. He was to be minister of
the interior in the 1848 Neapolitan revolutionary government69.
Our selection of Neapolitan authors included first-rate reformers such as
Filangieri, Pagano, Cirillo, Delfico, as well as later ideologists such as Borrelli and
Bozzelli. Roughly, we have been moving from the 1780s to the 1820s. Other names
and works could be added, but one point should already have emerged quite
clearly. In spite of their various interests, the authors linked to the reformist
movement of the late eighteenth century, and their early nineteenth century
followers, can be consistently grouped on the basis of a common aim: the
elimination of any essential distinction between the nature of explanation in natural
sciences and in the moral and social sciences. Epistemologically, this meant that
knowledge about morals and about society enjoyed the same status as scientific
knowledge, both originating from the investigation of empirical phenomena
(human mental processes in the one case, and physical bodies in the other).
Methodologically, this meant that the investigation of empirical phenomena, be
they natural or moral, should be unified under one and the same approach. This
approach has been differently described by different authors; yet everyone agreed
that the study of mental processes (i.e. ideology) and the study of natural
phenomena should be performed by means of the "analytic method", where
"analysis" refers roughly to the resolution of complex ideas and natural phenomena
to their elementary constituents. Studying these elements and the range of their
possible combinations would enable the philosopher-scientist to discover the real
laws of both the natural and the moral world. Sensible -perceptions and the analytic
method are thus the key-points of any investigation whose goal is to produce sound
— i.e. legitimate — knowledge. The knowledge of the moral world is assimilated to
the knowledge of the natural world in the new "structure of knowledge" of the
reformers. At the same time super-natural knowledge, metaphysical and religious,
is de-legitimated. It is expunged from the realm of sound knowledge. The only
reliable sources of knowledge are our senses and our natural reason. No knowledge
can be legitimate if it is not their product. While metaphysical questions are simply
considered irrelevant, religious beliefs are excluded from maps of knowledge, being
attributed to the sphere of individual consciousness.
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Far from being homogeneously non-mathematical as maintained by Ferrone,
Neapolitan reformers perceived mathematics and the mathematical style of
reasoning as a powerful cultural resource for their battle. In particular, those more
informed about mathematical development abroad, like Caracciolo, perceived the
potential support that their cultural and social projects could obtain from a specific
style of mathematical reasoning that was increasingly popular in France and
Northern Italy, but that was certainly not common in Naples: namely the analytic
style. It was indeed in connection with the implementation of the reformist plans of
the 1780s, that thinkers in Naples perceived the backwardness of the local
mathematical teaching and felt the need for a sudden re-alignment with the French
geometres, particularly through the works of Lagrange. This "modernisation" of
mathematics was perceived as crucial by men who were not mathematicians
themselves, mainly because they were aware that what could be imported with the
new mathematical knowledge was a new "way of thinking", which was also a new
"way of acting", a savoir-faire. The practitioners who actually brought the analytic
style into Naples were looking at France with very much the same expectations that
Genovesi had when he imported Lockean empiricism from England. Only, this
time, they were convinced of the necessity of a much more radical confrontation
with the present system of power.
Notes to chapter two
1 The dynamics of ideas has been traditionally privileged in historical accounts of the
Enlightenment; even in those more sensible to the social and cultural dimensions, such as
Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, 2 vols. (New York: Random House 1966 and
1969), or Franco Venturi (ed.), Illuministi italiani. Vol. 5: Riformatori napoletani (Milan-Naples:
Ricciardi, 1962). By Venturi see also Franco Venturi, Settecento riformatore, 2 vols. (Turin:
Einaudi, 1969 and 1970); in English, see Franco Venturi, Italy and the Enlightenme?it. Studies in
a Cosmopolitan Century (London: Longman, 1972). In the same tradition see Vincenzo
Ferrone, The Intellectual Roots of the Italian Enlightenment. Newtonian Science, Religion and
Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995).
2 See Amodeo, Vita matematica napoletana, vol.1, p.68.
3 Antonio Genovesi, Discorso sopra il vero fine delle lettere e delle scienze (1753), in Antonio
Genovesi, Scritti (Turin: Einaudi, 1977) p.41.
4 Genovesi, Discorso, pp.44-45.
5 Ibidem, p.53.
6 Ibidem, p.56.
7 Antonio Genovesi, Lettere accademiche su la questione se sieno piu felici gl'ignoranti che gli
scienziati (Varese: Sugarco, 1993; ed. orig. 1764) p.82.
8 Venturi, Italy and the Enlightenment, p.201.
99
9 Antonio Genovesi, Lezioni sul commercio, 2 vols. (Naples: 1765 and 1767). Excerpts in
Genovesi, Scritti, pp.133-207.
10 Genovesi, Lezioni sul commercio, p.207.
11 And also Giuseppe Palmieri (1721-1794), Filippo Briganti (1725-1804), Domenico de
Gennaro (1720-1803), Francesco Antonio Grimaldi (1741-1784).
12 On the reform of the army, indeed one of the most significant and successful! reforms, and
on its cultural and social meaning, see Anna Maria Rao, "Esercito e societa a Napoli nelle
riforme del secondo Settecento", Studi Storici, 1987, 28:623-677.
13 For a selection of writings on policy, economics, legislation and administration by
Neapolitan reformers see Venturi, Illuministi italiani: riformatori napoletani; and Francesco di
Battista (ed.), II mezzogiorno alia fine del Settecento (Bari: Laterza, 1992).
14 Domenico Grimaldi, Istruzioni sulla nuova manifattura dell'olio introdutto nel Regno dal
Marchese Domenico Grimaldi (Naples: 1781).
15 Domenico Grimaldi, Piano di riforma per la publica economia delle provincie del Regno di Napoli
e per I'agricoltura delle Due Sicilie (Naples: 1780).
16 Venturi, Italy and the Enlightenment, p.206.
17 For a presentation of the Neapolitan feudal communal system of land in the late eighteenth
century see Patrick Chorley, Oil, Silk, and Enlightenment. Economic problems in XVIIIth Century
Naples (Naples: Istituto Italiano di Studi Storici, 1965).
18 Grimaldi, Istruzioni, p.60.
19 Domenico Grimaldi, Memoria per il ristabilimento dell'industria olearia nelle Calabrie (Naples:
1783) p.35.
20 Domenico Grimaldi, Relazione umiliata al Re d'wi disimpegno fatto nella Ulteriore Calabria,
(Naples: 1785) p.40.
21 The network metaphor has a long tradition in the philosophy and sociology of science. It
has been employed by Duhem, Quine and, more extensively, by Mary Hesse, The Structure of
Scientific Inference (London: Macmillan, 1974). More recently it has been re-elaborated in
Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Milton
Keynes: Open U.P., 1987), and in his following works. In this context, it is employed in a
rather intuitive way.
22 Giuseppe Palmieri, Osservazioni su vari articoli rigurdanti la pubblica economia (Naples: 1790).
23 Carlo Ulisse de Salis Marschlins, Nel Regno di Napoli. Viaggi attarverso varie provincie nel
1789 (Lecce: Congedo, 1979; orig.ed. 1793) pp.40-41.
24 Palmieri, Osservazioni, p.99.
25 See, for instance, Palmieri, Pensieri, p.8; and Grimaldi, Osservazioni, p.19.
26 Eighteenth-century Neapolitan freemasonry is described in Carlo Francovich, Storia della
massoneria in Italia dalle origini alia Rivoluzione francese (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1990). See
also Aldo Mola (ed.), La massoneria nella storia d'ltalia (Rome: Atanor, 1980); and Giuseppe
Giarrizzo, Massoneria e illuminis?no nell'europa del Settecento (Venice: Marsilio, 1994). On the
relations between European freemasonry and eighteenth-century socio-political reformism
see Margaret Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment. Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1981); and Margaret Jacob, Living the Enlightenment: Freemasonry and
Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1991). But see also the critical
remarks on Jacob's interpretation in Graham Gibbs, "The Radical Enlightenment", British
Journal for the History of Science, 1984,17:67-81.
27 Francesco Antonio Grimaldi, Riflessioni sopra Vineguaglianza tra gli uomini (Naples: 1779);
Gaetano Filangieri, La scienza della legislazione (Naples: 1780-83); Mario Pagano, Saggi politici
de' principi, progressi e decadenza delle societa (Naples: 1783-85); Mario Pagano, Considerazioni
sul processo criminale (Naples: 1787).
28 The Illuminati was a masonic association founded in 1776 in Ingolstadt, Bavaria, by Adam
Weishaupt (1748-1830), professor of law at the local university. Its adherents supported the
party of the Aufklarung, which was decidely minoritarian in the Catholic and baroque
Bavaria. The Illuminati played an important role in the anti-clerical and anti-Jesuit campaign.
Their principles were inspired by Holbach's materialism, Rousseau's egalitarianism and, in
religious matters, by deistic authors. The "regeneration" of mankind would be achieved,
100
according to the Illianinati, through the practice of a renewed morals and through the
diffusion of scientific knowledge. Lodges of Illuminati were opened in a number of towns of
the Aurtrian empire, including Vienna, Prague, Innsbruck, and Milan. Around 1783, when
Goethe and Herder enter the association, the Illuminati were characterized by their
opposition to "despotic" political regimes, including the Bavarian one. Opposed by
governements, and by rival, mystically-oriented masonic associations such as the order of
the Golden Rosicrucians, the German Illuminati were persecuted and dispersed in 1785. But
some of the foreign lodges were still functioning in 1789. The Neapolitan lodge had been
founded in 1786, by former members of the Gran Loggia di Napoli, which dated to the early
1770s, and which followed the "Scottish rite", opposing the penetration of the mystically-
oriented lodges inspired to the "Strict observance". Most of the Neapolitan reformers and
Jacobins were members of the Gran Loggia and, later, of the lodge of the Illuminati.
Freemasonry was already diffused in Naples around 1750. In fact, the papal bull Providas
(1751, where freemasonry was openly condemned) was emanated by Pope Benedetto XIV as
a directed response to the Neapolitan situation, forcing the Neapolitan soveregn to intervene
more drastically. In fact, it was only after the Bavarian trials of 1785, when the eversive
political goals of the Illuminati emerged clearly, that freemasonry declined, in Naples as
everywhere else in Europe. The alliance between monarchies and the Church against the
Illuminati was a prelude to the "throne and altar" politics of the Restoration. On the Illuminati
see Rene Le Forestier, Les Illumines de Baviere et la franc-magonnerie allemande (Paris: 1928); and
Carlo Francovich, "Gli Illuminati di Weishaupt e l'idea egualitaria in alcune societa segrete
del Risorgimento", Movimento Operaio, 1952, 4:553-597.
29 On the numerous philosophical and scientific productions inspired by the 1783 Calabrian
earth-quake, and on their social and cultural significance, see Augusto Placanica, II filosofo e
la catastrofe. Un terremoto del settecento (Turin: Einaudi, 1985).
30 Quoted in Venturi, Italy and Enlightenment, p.219.
31 John Francis Edward Acton, from an English family which had moved to France for
religious reasons, was educated in Italy (Pisa), and was at the service of the Grand Duke of
Tuscany (1767-1778), as captain in the navy. In 1778 he was invited in Naples, to re-organize
the Bourbonic fleet. In 1782 he was nominated minister of war and, at the death of
Caracciolo, he became prime minister (1789-1795). On Acton see Harold Acton, The Bourbons
of Naples, 1734-1825 (London: Methuen, 1956); see also his biography in Dizionario Biografico
degli Italiani, sub voce.
32 Nicola Fiorentino, Riflessioni sul Regno di Napoli (Naples: 1794).
33 Quoted in Venturi, Italy and Enlightenment, p.222.
^Vito Caravelli and Vincenzo Porto, Trattato di calcolo differenziale di Vito Caravelli, e del calcolo
integrale di Vincenzo Porto, per uso del regale collegio militare (Naples: 1786).
35 On the penetration of Newtonianism in Naples see Ferrone, The Intellectual Roots of Italian
Enlightenment, pp.183-247.
36 See Lagrange's response to Caracciolo in Lagrange, Oeuvres, vol.14, p.279-282. On the
reformist aims of the renwed RAS see Elvira Chiosi, Lo spirito del secolo. Politica e religione a
Napoli nell'eta dell'illuminismo (Naples: Giannini, 1992) pp.107-142.
37 Vincenzo Ferrone, I profeti dell'illuminismo. Le metamorfosi della ragione nel tardo settecento
italiano (Bari: Laterza, 1989).
38 Antonio Genovesi, Logica per gli giovinetti (1766), in Genovesi, Scritti, p.232.
39 The most famous work in this direction was Filangieri, La scienza della legislazione.
40 Filangieri, Scienza della legislazione, quoted in Giarrizzo, Masssoneria e illuminismo, p.280.
41 See Giarrizzo, Massoneria e Illuminismo, p.281.
42 Quotations from Filangieri, Scienza della legislazione, in Giarrizzo, Massoneria e illuminismo,
p.290.
43 Giarrizzo, p.284.
44 On the presence of mysticism in the culture of the late eighteenth century, and on the
mystic freemasonry, see Auguste Viatte, Les sources occultes de Romantisme. Illuminisme-
Theosophie, 1770-1820 (Paris: 1928). On the social meaning of these mystic trends see Renzo
de Felice, Note e ricerche sugli "Illuminati" e il misticismo rivoluzionario, 1789-1800 (Rome:
101
E.S.L., 1960). Note that de Felice used the term "illuminati" to refer to the eighteenth-century
visionaries, not to the homonymous association founded by Weishaupt, which was in fact far
from being mystically oriented.
45 Quoted in Giarrizzo, p.351.
46 Quoted in Giarrizzo, p.352.
47 Idem.
48 Domenico Cirillo, Discorsi accademici (Nice [Naples]: 1787); a new and more complete
edition was published in Naples in 1799, under the republican government.
49 The word "ideologic" was coined by Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) in
1796, meaning "the science of ideas". See Destutt de Tracy Elements d'ideologie (Bruxelles:
1804-1818). Other crucial texts of the ideologic were those by Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis
(1757-1808), particularly his Rapports du physique et du moral de I'homme, 2 vols. (Paris: 1796-
1802). The doctrines of the ideologues found enthusiatic supporters in the Italian states,
particulalry among reformers and Jacobins; nevertheless there are no studies on the diffusion
of ideologic in Italy. On the thought of the French ideologues see the classic Joseph-Francois
Picovet, Les ideologues. Essai sur I'histoire des idees et des theories scientifiques, philosophiques,
religioeuses, etc., en France depuis 1789 (Paris: 1891). The most complete reconstruction of the
thought of the ideologues is Sergio Moravia, II pensiero degli ideologues: scienza e filosofia in
Francia, 1780-1815 (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1974). See also Emmett Kennedy, A Philosophe
in the Age of Revolution: Destutt de Tracy and the Origins of "Ideology" (Philadelphia: American
Philosophical Society, 1978); Brian Head, Ideology and Social Science: Destutt de Tracy and
French Liberalism (Dordrecht: Nijohff, 1985); Martin Staurn, Cabanis: Enlightenment and Medical
Philosophy in the French Revolution (Princeton, Princeton U.P., 1980). In the following, the term
ideologue and ideologic will be rendered with ideologist and ideology (in italics).
50 See Giovanni Gentile, Storia della filosofia italiana dal Genovesi al Galluppi (Milan: 1930)
pp.25-120.
51 See a complete list of his writings in Raffaele Liberatore, "Necrologia di Melchiorre
Delfico", II Progresso, 1835,11:292-318.
52 Delfico, Pensieri sulla storia e su la incertezza ed inutilita della medesima (Forli: 1806), reprinted
in Naples in 1809 and 1814; the others are memories sent to the RAS after 1823 (cited in
Gentile, Storia della filosofia italiana, p.45).
53 Delfico praised Cabanis's Du degre de certitude de la medecine (Paris: 1797); see Delfico,
Pensieri, p.151.
54 Melchiorre Delfico, Ricerche sid vero carattere della giurisprudenza romana e de' suoi cultori
(Napoli: 1791).
55 Melchiorre Delfico, Memorie storiche della Repubblica di San Marino (Milan: 1804) p.239.
56 The belief in human perfectibility emerged already in the 1791 work on Roman Law, few
years before the publication of Condorcet's Esquissee des progres de Vesprit humain, where the
indefinite perfectibility of mankind is defended.
57 "I call absolute goodness of laws their harmony with the universal principles of morals,
which are common to every nation, to every government, and adaptable to every climate.
The right of nature contains the immutable principles of what is right and equitable in every
case. It is easy to see how this souce is fruitful for the science of legislation. No one can
ignore its laws. They are neither the ambiguous results of the precepts of the moralists, nor
the results of the sterile meditations of philosophers" (Filangieri, Scienza della legislazione ,
quoted in Gentile, Storia della filosofia italiana, p.59).
58 Constantin Francois de Chasseboeuf (Volney), Legons d'histoire pronongees a I'Ecole Normale
en Van III de la Republique frangaise, in: Volney, Oeuvres completes, vol.6 (Paris: 1843) p.v.
59 Delfico, Pensieri, p.144 and following.
60 Ibidem, p.41.
61 See Gentile, Storia della filosofia italiana, p.88.
62 Melchiorre Delfico, "Ricerche su la sensibilita imitativa considerata come il principio fisico
della sociabilita della specie e del civilizzamento dei popoli e delle nazioni", read in 1813 and
published in Atti della RAS, 1819,1:343-376.
102
63 Mario Pagano, Discorso sull'origine e natura della poesia, in Opere, vol.2 (Lugano: 1836; orig.
ed. 1791) pp.360-363.
64 For his pedagogical ideas, see Melchiorre Delfico, "Memoria sulla perfettibillita organica
considerata come il principio fisico dell'educazione, con alcune vedute sulla medesima",
read in 1814 and published in Atti della RAS, 1819, 1:377-415; and Melchiorre Delfico, "Su la
perfettibilita organica considerata come il principio dell'educazione", read in 1816 and
published in Atti della RAS, 1819, 1:417-445. The last quotation is from Delfico, "Ricerche",
Atti della RAS, p.367.
65 See Lorenzo Balbi [Pasquale Borrelli], Bibliografia di Pasquale Borrelli (Koblenz [Naples]:
1840). For the identification of Borrelli as the author of this bibliography see Gentile, Storia
della filosofia italiana, p.131.
66 Pasquale Borrelli, Principia zoognosiae medicinam physicae legibus scientifica methodo
superstruentia (Naples: 1803); translated in Italian in Naples, in 1808.
67 Pasquale Borrelli, Principi di zoaritmia scoverti da Pasquale Borrelli e preceduti da un
ragionamento istorico su la moderna medicina matematica (Naples: 1807).
68 Pirro Lallebasque [Pasquale Borrelli], Introduzione alia filosofia naturale del pensiero (Lugano:
1824); and Pirro Lallebasque [Pasquale Borrelli], Principi di genealogia del pensiero (Lugano:
1825). His philosophical works were reprinted in Pasquale Borrelli, Opere filosoficlie, 4 vols.
(Lugano: 1839).
69 We have mainly refereed to Francesco Bozzelli, Essai sur les rapports primitifs qui liens




Towards a Cultural History of Neapolitan Jacobinism
(1790-1799)
3.1 Remarks on the "Spirit of Analysis"
By the term "analytic spirit" historians usually refer to a specific phenomenon
which took place in the second half of the eighteenth century: the emergence and
the success of a particular "way of thinking" or, according to the subtler definition
of the philosophes, of a particular "savoir-faire". By the end of the century the
"analytic art of thinking" was regarded by many as the paradigm of rational
thinking in geometry, in the physical and empirical sciences, and even in the moral
sciences. This is why a recent book entitled The Spirit ofAnalysis contains essays on
the mathematical sciences as well as on natural philosophy, chemistry, medicine,
education, scientific institutions and on other topics1. The analytic spirit penetrated
indeed, in the eyes of its supporters, every branch of human knowledge. The need
of a more generalized use of the new savoir-faire was justified by showing the
impressive development of the mathematical sciences since the adoption of analysis
as their unifying method. In fact, from Descartes onwards the refinement of the
analytic method resulted in an unprecedented growth of mathematical knowledge
and encouraged its successful application. The adoption of the new method had
brought uniformity to the previously fragmented disciplines of geometry and
algebra, clarity to their procedures, and practical efficacy to their application to
empirical reality. Such a discrepancy between the development of the mathematical
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and physical sciences on the one side and the humanities and the moral sciences on
the other, was certainly striking and somehow scandalous to men who had been
mostly educated in Jesuit colleges, where a quite advanced mathematical education
coexisted with the most dogmatic and rhetorical teaching of the "moral sciences".
As we have seen in the first chapter, one meaning of the term "analysis" was, in
the eighteenth century, the method of solving mathematical problems (including
those of "mixed mathematics") by means of reducing them to equations. The
techniques employed in this process of analysis included algebra, differential
calculus and integral calculus. The most varied problems of geometry or mechanics
were translated into a linear sequence of symbols and then "reduced" to their
simplest components via analysis. Each component could be considered in
isolation, as an autonomous sub-problem, and this brought great economy of
thought in the problem-solving process. But the term "analysis" also acquired
another meaning: that of the proper scientific method. Indeed, the shift of interest
from geometry to analysis in the mathematical sciences was accompanied by a more
general philosophical elaboration according to which analysis should be accepted
as a general way of thinking, and its use extended well beyond the boundaries of
mathematics. In the writing of the philosophes the term "analysis" became almost
synonymous with "rational thinking". So the abbe de Condillac (1714-1780) insisted
that every science should be taught by analysis, this being the true method of
discovery, and he considered the greatest error of the ancients their predilection for
"synthesis". Voltaire argued that "the only way man can reason on the objects [of
experience] is analysis"2. The paradigm of mathematical analysis lies behind much
of the output in the natural sciences of the late eighteenth century3.
In fact, claims about the possible extension of the analytic method beyond
geometry are already present at least since the 1740s, following the continental
elaboration of the work of Newton. It was at that stage that d'Alembert presented
integral calculus as the privileged instrument of the savoir-faire of analysis.
According to analysis, a mathematical or physical problem was solved by
progressively reducing it to more simple operations, until certain operations are
reached which are already mastered by the geometer. In his article on the
Encyclopedic, d'Alembert explained to the common reader that analysis, as we
already know, "est proprement la methode de ressoundre les problemes
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mathematiques, en le reduisant a des equations". But he also added some more
general considerations:
elle fournit les exemples les plus parfaits de la maniere dont on doit employer
l'art du raisonnement, donne a l'esprit une merveilleuse promptitude pour
decouvrir des choses inconnues, au moyen d'un petit nombre de donnees; et
en employant des signes abreges et faciles pour exprimer les idees, elle
present a l'entendement des choses qui, autrement, semblairent hors de sa
sphere.
"Analysis" was an "art de raisonner"4, an instrumental "savoir-faire", a way of
thinking; it was not a corpus of specific knowledge, a set of principles, or a
mathematical theory, as it was to be in the nineteenth century. The extreme
generality of d'Alembert's formulation allowed the reader to draw the following
conclusion: analysis is not necessarily linked to the field of mathematics.
Much of the heuristic power of analysis, the philosophes realized, lies in its use of
a symbolic language, by which complex ideas are decomposed and the relations
among simple ideas are presented in the most clear and immediate way. The
necessity, for the advancement of knowledge, to employ this way of reasoning and
its rational language was most prominent in the writing of a pupil of d'Alembert,
namely Condorcet. Eric Brian has studied the attraction for mathematics showed by
Condorcet since the 1770s, and the influence that "l'art de penser analytique" had
on his philosophical and political thought5. In particular, Brian has pointed out the
relation existing between Condorcet's promotion of the universal validity of
analysis, and his belief in an ontological uniformity of reality. The metaphysical
assumption of uniformity is indeed required, if we are going to decompose-
recompose pieces of knowledge ("ideas" the philosophes would say) according to the
analytic method, with the objective of discovering "new truths". Condorcet
believed that the whole of mathematical reasoning consisted, in the end, in an
enormous exercise of analysis; i.e. it consisted in a "decomposition of an ontological
unity"6. But what does mathematics deal with, according to Condorcet?
L'objet de l'analyse pure consideree dans sa plus grande etendue n'est autre
chose que les diverses combinaisions d'une meme idee et de l'idee la plus
generale ou les abstractions reiterees puissent conduire. Cette idee est celle de
Tetre en tant qu'il est un [...] Une science ou tous les resultats ne sont que des
propositions identiques, ou tous les termes ne sont que des idees composees
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d'une meme idee, une telle science, dis-je, doit etre a l'abri de toute
equivoque, de toute erreur, de toute incertitude.7
Such a view of mathematics has a neo-positivistic flavor; but, in fact, this analogy is
misleading. Far from having any axiomatic conception of mathematical theories,
Condorcet made it clear that mathematical truths are "real", that they
"appartiennent a la nature reelle", and that they are "discovered" at the end of the
analytical investigation. This point, i.e. the nature of mathematical knowledge
according to the "analytical orthodoxy" of the late eighteenth century, is
particularly important for our present purposes. We should remember that in the
eighteenth century the development of mathematics was essentially interwoven
with that of the physical sciences. So that, on the one hand the more productive
mathematicians of the period are driven in their refinement of mathematical
techniques by the application of calculus to problems of mechanics; on the other
hand, "les progres de la conceptualisation physique sont inseparablement lies a ceux
de l'analyse mathematique"8, i.e. the new mathematical concepts provided a fruitful
conceptual framework to make sense of aspects of physical reality (by making them
measurable). This is the historical background against which d'Alembert presented,
in the Discours, the sciences of nature as a continuum of abstractions imposed on
reality by the human reason. Far from our contemporary distinction between
"pure" and "applied" mathematics, eighteenth century mathematicians considered
the problems of "mixed mathematics" (mechanics, hydrodynamics, etc.) as always,
in principle, reducible to problems of pure mathematics, where "pure" had quite a
different meaning from our own, and closer to that of "maximum abstraction from
empirical reality". Indeed the reduction of physical problems was accomplished by
means of a progressive elimination of unessential physical circumstances (i.e.,
abstracting from such physical conditions)9. Mathematical sciences could be thus
presented as dealing with the results of a series of abstractions operated by human
reason on natural reality. A conception which is closer to Galileo's diffalcare gli
impedimenti than to the modern axiomatic approach.
The point is that, at the proper level of abstraction, everything can become subject of
a process of analysis. And indeed Condorcet, following a suggestion of d'Alembert,
remarked that the analytic procedure can be employed to discover the truth
relatively to "un grand nombre de questions de metaphysique, de morale, de
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politique"10. Analysis has became a method to solve "les erreurs de l'humanite et les
bassesses de ses contemporains"11. The practice of analysis, in these cases, consists
in a de-composition of complex ideas in their own elementary parts; the knowledge
of these constituents will then make possible the solution of problems involving
such complex ideas. So, for example, if one has to judge on the advantages of
certain financial operations, "il suffira presque toujours d'avoir analyse les idees
pour en voir d'un seul coup d'oeil ou les avantages ou les inconvenientes". The
same is true for every other field of investigation; chemistry for example, where "il
y a un grand nombre de verites que la decomposition des corps fait recormaitre".
The analysis of complex ideas in their elementary constituents is presented by the
followers of d'Alembert as the universal key to the understanding of reality, and as
a necessary prerequisite for rational action in the empirical and moral sciences.
Alexandre Koyre recognized indeed a crucial structural analogy between
Condorcet's political and mathematical savoir-faire.
[S]a methode est tout abstraite: on pose un principe, on en determine les
conditions d'application et on en deduit les consequences; ou inversement, on
determine le probleme et on cherche la solution conforme aux principes. On
pourrait dire que Condorcet a traite le probleme de la constitution a donner a
la France comme un probleme d'integration.12
What Koyre sees as analogous in the two procedures is precisely the common spirit
of analysis. In fact, the reduction of an integral is intrinsically linked to the
analytical savoir-faire13. But we could equally consider the analytical solutions of
geometrical problems seen in the first part of this study: the "mental habit" at work
there is the same.
We are now to consider another important aspect of the analytical savoir-faire,
which concerns the relation between the procedure of reduction by analysis and the
procedure of classifying objects by means of so-called "analytical tables". "To
analyze a problem", as we have seen, means to present systematically all the
possible cases that can be originated by the conditions of the problem itself.
Analogously, an analytical demonstration must consider every possible case falling
under the theorem. In the words of Gilles Granger: "constamment, il [Condorcet]
appuie sa demonstration sur une classification des cases juges possibles". In this
perspective, which is present not only in Condorcet's writings but in every
contribution offered at the French Academy in the section "analytical memoirs", a
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satisfactory demonstration is accomplished when all the possible cases have been
taken into consideration. Such demonstrations are founded not only on the formal
coherence of their passages (as in the modern conception of proof), but also in the
"systematic coherence" of the set of the possible cases which has been taken into
consideration. This means that, in proving a theorem or in solving a problem, the
analyst is bringing to light something like a tableau, i.e. a subjacent classificatory
table. Or, to put it differently, that the composition of classificatory tables and the
solution of problems by means of analysis are founded on one and the same savoir-
faire. To grasp this essential connection between analytical classifications and
method of analysis is crucial, if one wants to follow the historical enlargement of
the empire of analysis well beyond the boundaries of mathematics. Condorcet and
his followers assumed that where it is possible to analytically classify, there it is
possible to reason analytically. This means that the belief in human knowledge
being wholly analyzable, and of analysis being the most rational way of thinking,
cannot be properly understood without referring to the structural re-ordering of
knowledge performed by the philosophes.
Before presenting this new "structure of knowledge", a question must be
addressed which arises from our previous exposition. In the first part we have
described the problem-solving methods of the two Neapolitan schools of geometry.
By "analysis" of a problem they both meant the reduction of that problem to some
task that was already familiar to the geometer, with a movement from the unknown
to the known. The process of reduction as such was not peculiar of the analytic
school; geometrical analysis consists itself in a reduction of complex problems (i.e.
constructions) to more elementary problems that we have already solved (i.e.
constructions that we have already performed). This point has not been stressed
enough by historians like Brian, who focus on the innovative character of the
"analytic spirit". So, what is properly innovative in the analytic method? As I have
already remarked, the crucial difference among the two methods is that in the
synthetic one the reduction is operated from complex geometrical constructions to
more elementary geometrical constructions; whereas in the analytic one a general
method of reduction (analytical savoir-faire), which operates through a universal
language (algebra), is imported into geometry "from outside". Geometrical analysis
is a process which begins and ends up in the science of geometry; its procedures
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and its final justification are to be found in geometry. Algebraic analysis, as it was
used by Lagrangian analytics, is in need of some external foundation; geometry
being only one of its many possible fields of application.
We can now recapitulate and re-elaborate the previous arguments, in the light of
the results of our study of the geometrical controversy in Naples. What we take as
essential in the "analytic spirit" is not just the breaking down of an aggregate into
its constitutive and autonomous parts; traces of the very same process are indeed
evident in the classical synthetic approach to geometrical problems. What is new is
that analytic geometers employed a method which was not specific to geometry,
being rather an expression of a general savoir-faire, a mental habit whose use is not
restricted to the sublime world of pure geometry. The analytic habit was indeed
claimed to be the "natural way of reasoning", once human reason is freed from the
conceptual darkness of the scholastic tradition. Algebraic analysis works whatever
the problem is, whatever the branch of mathematics is and, as we have seen in this
section, whatever the branch of knowledge is. Rather than just a method to reduce
the complex to the simple through analysis and classificatory tables, we are dealing
with a method to reduce the complex to the simple through a universal analysis on
the basis of a new classificatory table. And indeed, only a new classificatory table of
knowledge could allow analysis to be truly universal. Only in the framework of a
new hierarchical disposition of the different forms of knowledge would it be
possible to think of analysis as a universal method, and not a mere specific
technique for geometrical problem-solving. This is why, to make sense of the
success of the analytical savoir-faire, we have to look at the contemporary re¬
ordering of knowledge accomplished by the encyclopedistes.
The whole enterprise of the Encyclopedic is founded on a new and very influential
classification of human knowledge, which is presented in the Discours preliminaire
by d'Alembert. This new table is indeed a summa of the epistemological revolution
accomplished by the first generation of philosopites, and the manifesto of the
"analytical orthodoxy". Let us follow its principal divisions. First of all, we see that
human knowledge is presented as a whole, and its unifying factor is the nature of
human understanding. This unity is then divided in three main parts, depending on
the three intellectual faculties: memory, reason, and imagination. A further division
is made in each branch according to the three objects of knowledge: God, man, and
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nature. Then different criteria of division are adopted, depending on each specific
case. A few remarks can be made about this "system". Firstly, "analysis" is not
classified under "mathematics", but instead under "art of thinking". Secondly, the
criterion used to classify natural and mathematical sciences is their degree of
generality; they are ordered as if they were the result of progressive abstractions
imposed upon natural reality by the human understanding. The most crucial
innovation contained in the encyclopedic table consists in an epistemological shift,
whose effects are not immediately evident when reading the articles. It is a matter
of fact that the articles contained a great amount of useful information, and that this
was one important reason for the editorial success of the enterprise14. Yet the
volumes of the Encyclopedie were considered "dangerous" by the political and
ecclesiastic authorities. Collaborators were under police control from 1748, the
Royal Privilege was withdrawn in 1759 (seven volumes had been published up to
that moment), and in this very year the volumes entered the Index Liber Prohibitorum
of the Catholic Church. Why? The reason can be clarified with an example. Look up
the article "Eucharistie", and you will find an orthodox presentation of the
sacrament of the Holy Communion; but also stressed is its intrinsically irrational
nature: "il s'agit d'un mystere. [...] la chose se reduit a une pure question de fait,
aisee a decider par le monumentes que nous venons d'indiquer: car si l'on veut
rendre la raison seule arbitre de cette dispute nous convenons qu'elle est un abysme
de difficultes"15. Things get even worse if one pays attention to the subtle messages
embedded in cross references. Under the heading "Anthropophagy" one reads
""voyez Eucharistie, Communion"16. The average eighteenth century reader would
experience, at this point something like a sudden frame-switch: something would
seem to him clearly out of place. The mystery of the Eucharist, the everyday miracle
which is the very center of the Catholic liturgy has been neither de-mystified nor
denied in plain words but, more subtly, it has been removed from its original
conceptual space and placed together with a phenomenon such as anthropophagy:
a monstrosity, an aberration, a deeply irrational practice. The underlying change
can be identified as an epistemological shift, consisting in the re-organization of the
whole conceptual space according to new grouping principles; which can also be
seen as the introduction of a new structure of knowledge. According to this,
religion is at the margins of human knowledge, it cannot really fit the rational
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divisions which regulate the other fields of human understanding and human
action. If we now look at Chambers's tree of knowledge, which appeared in a
French translation of 1741 and was taken as a starting point by the encyclopedistes,
we can see that here "Religion" is classified under "Rational Knowledge", where
we can find the "intrinsic characters of sensible things", such as: Powers (Physics,
Natural Philosophy), Abstracts (Metaphysics), Quantities (Pure Mathematics — by
the way, "analysis" is down this branch), "Relations to our happiness" (that is,
Religion). This means that Religion was, in fact, the Queen of the Sciences. Francis
Bacon's tree was the other important reference, and indeed it presents an evident
morphological analogy with the encyclopedic tree. Still, in Bacon's system Natural
Theology is fully legitimated as a branch of philosophy, together with Natural
Philosophy and Human Philosophy. The crucial step taken by the encyclopedistes
was the introduction of elements from Locke, particularly the epistemological tenet
according to which all knowledge, which derives from the three faculties, is based
on sensations. If we are going to accept this sensationalistic position, it will follow
that religion cannot be considered genuine knowledge; it has lost its place in the
space of knowledge. Now, let us go back to the encyclopedic system, and let us look
where Religion is placed. Natural Theology and Revealed Theology are in an
apparently reassuring position: on top of the system, as in Bacon. But they are out of
the kind of knowledge deriving from sensations and, what is most revealing, they
are classified together with "Knowledge of Good and Evil Spirits", "Divination",
and "Black Magic". Religious knowledge shares the same epistemological status as
Black Magic, and its practices have the same rational foundation as the practice of
Anthropophagy. This vehement anti-religious spirit was not obvious to the
standard reader of the technical articles of the Encyclopedic, but the Catholic censor
could not escape the ambiguity of the internal references or the fact that, regularly,
religious conclusions are supported by faulty logical arguments. And in fact he
didn't. The censorial action was not directed against any specific heretical
statement, but rather against the epistemological shift that pushed religion and its
scholastic conceptual apparatus out of the region of legitimate knowledge. To sum
up, in the encyclopedic system of classification, religion is relegated to an
ambiguous limbo, it is out of place, with all the risk and the emotional tensions
involved by this being not-classifiable knowledge17. Yet the epistemological shift
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was not neat and explicit; in many ways the tree of the Encyclopedic is a compromise
between previous systems of knowledge and the new one. To Neapolitan Jacobins
the encyclopedic tree had to be itself overcome, in the direction of a more radically
sensationalistic epistemology, according to which traditional metaphysics and
religion would simply disappear from the tree of knowledge.
3.2 The Spirit of Analysis in Naples
The introduction of specific textbooks of integral and differential calculus in the
curricula of Neapolitan institutions of higher education was not straightforward,
and it was relatively late when compared with the situation in Northern Italian
states18. Infinitesimal methods had been used to treat specific questions of
mechanics and physics at least since the publication of the treatises of the brothers
di Martino in the 1720s and 1730s. Still, there was no space devoted to differential
calculus there, apart from Nicola's treatise which, anyway, remained in manuscript.
His successor at the university chair, Giuseppe Marzucco (1713-1800), employed
some differential and integral calculus in his 1767 textbook on the squaring of
curves19. In the 1750s calculus was privately taught in Naples by the Tuscan
Girolamo Saladini (1731-1813), who was to become professor of Analysis at the
University of Bologna in 1761. In 1775 Saladini, who had remained in touch with
the Neapolitan scientific community (he was to enter the renewed RAS in 1779),
published in Bologna a textbook of analysis in two volumes (algebra and calculus)
specifically designed for the cadets of a Neapolitan military college, with a
dedication to King Ferdinando IV. The second volume was to be re-edited in 1790
as a textbook of calculus by a professor of the Neapolitan Military Academy20. Great
space had been given to algebra in the many volumes of the courses of mathematics
written by Vito Caravelli for the Military Academy (1759-1770; 1770-72), which
included a wide treatment of the sciences of mechanics and artillery. And it was
Caravelli who, with the contribution of Vincenzo Porto21, published the first
textbook of differential and integral calculus ever published in Naples, in 178622.
A reason for the late contribution of Neapolitan authors to the publication of
textbooks of calculus was that the few active mathematicians in Naples had been
charged with the organization and direction of the military academies. Their
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energies were absorbed by the publication of massive elementary courses in
geometry, algebra, "practical geometry", the science of artillery and nautical
science. Those in chairs at the RUN were secondary figures, such as Marzucco, who
showed little inclination to any sort of renewal of mathematical teaching and
research. But the situation was rapidly changing in the 1780s. We already referred
to signs of a new interest in analysis that arose among the reformers. By 1790 a
group of mathematical practitioners had enthusiastically embraced the "analytical
orthodoxy" a la Condorcet. That is to say, they adopted analysis as the fundamental
and more general way of scientific reasoning, from the mathematical to the moral
sciences. The school of Genovesi had already taken inspiration from the
encyclopedic program. The idea of a science which was not "pure", contemplative,
but "modern", i.e. linked to the real needs of the population, had been spread by
the writings of the reformers and by their translations of the French philosophes since
the mid-century. Still, their programs and analysis are inserted in a reformist
perspective; furthermore, there is no particular interest in the quantitative analysis
of the social world. At the turn of the 1790s, however we find exactly this emphasis
on the "calculability" of social reality, combined with a new political radicalism
which is already in the cultural and political area of Jacobinism.
If the personal development of a few members of this heterogeneous group have
been studied by historians, still the phenomenon of Neapolitan Jacobinism is in
need of a general assessment. More importantly for our present purpose, the
relation of Neapolitan Jacobinism with scientific thought has never been addressed.
The lack of research in this direction becomes evident when we look at the crucial
figure of Carlo Lauberg (1753-1834). Lauberg was a Jacobin leader as well as a
scientist and a teacher of mathematics, but his scientific and pedagogical activity
has been considered irrelevant in making sense of the political and social features of
Neapolitan Jacobinism. In the following, the two parts of Lauberg's artificially split
biography will be presented instead as crucially related.
3.3 Carlo Lauberg and the 1794 "Tacobin Conspiracy"
Let us begin from Lauberg's political activity. To follow Lauberg in the last decade
of the eighteenth century means to reconstruct the nature and the operations of
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Neapolitan Jacobinism itself, of which Lauberg was the undisputed leader —as well
as the main theorist. Most of what we know about the conspiratorial activity of
Lauberg in the early 1790s is contained in the surviving proceedings of the political
trials against the Jacobins which began in 1794; this is indeed the source for the
following reconstruction. A crucial crossroads within his complex activity was
provided by the private studio of chemistry and mathematics that he had opened in
May 1792 together with Annibale Giordano (1771-1836) In piazza Santa Caterina23.
Lauberg and Giordano had been teaching privately at university level since around
1790, at Lauberg's house in Vico dei Giganti, a dark, narrow street in the heart of the
ancient town, a few hundred meters from the Cathedral. This was known as a place
were students and colleagues met regularly to discuss modern chemistry and
mathematics, i.e. the recent works of Lavoisier and Lagrange. At that time Lauberg
was a temporary lecturer of chemistry at the Military Academy, and he was
attempting to enter university as a professor. Giordano, in spite of his age, was
already a well-known mathematician. He had been trained at the school of Nicola
Fergola and in 1789 he had been awarded a chair of mathematics at the Military
Academy. In 1786, aged fifteen, Giordano had presented to the members of the RAS
a very elegant and original synthetic solution for the "problem of Cramer". This
solution was published in the acts of the Societa Italiana delle Scienze by Antonio
Maria Lorgna (the only mathematical work from Naples published in this
prestigious Italian journal in a long time24), and it was to be cited by Michel Chasles
and Lazare Carnot in their historical works.
Since its foundation in the Spring of 1792 Lauberg's "academy" was an
important center of the scientific life of the town. Lessons were given twice a week
to young men "of distinct condition", who were taught mathematics, chemistry, but
also "democratic doctrines"25. Indeed, at the end of the lectures, Lauberg used to
discuss with some of his students the works of Neapolitan reformism, of the French
philosophes and, most interesting to the inquisitor, he spoke about "politics, the facts
of France, and about the success of talented individuals living under popular
governments"26. Most of the young students were from well-off families of the
province, and they had moved to Naples to study law, medicine or to enter the
professions. Among them were Emanuele de Deo (1772-1794) , Ignazio Ciaia (1766-
1799), and Matteo Galdi (1765-1821). But the academy attracted people from various
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backgrounds: from young students fleeing university lectures to well-known
professors and intellectuals, such as Mario Pagano, from professionals (mainly
lawyers and physicians) to specialized artisans (such as cabinet-makers and clock-
makers). A few young members of the most ancient aristocracy of the town were
also attending the courses, as did some clergymen and indeed almost "everyone
who was to be involved in the political trials of the following years"27. In fact, the
meetings of the "academy" assumed soon a conspiratorial character. The previous
masonic experience of many participants (including Lauberg and Giordano) was
exploited to establish a new kind of secret society.
By the late 1780s the institution of freemasonry was in deep crisis, following
internal fractures, the failure of the reform movement to which it was strictly
linked, and the new anti-Masonic moves of the government, whose suspicions were
growing about the anti-despotic plans of freemasons. Yet, the model of association
offered by the lodge was still to play an important role, while disappearing from the
scene. Around 1790, this model underwent a transformation which turned the
enlightened lodges into cells inspired to the Jacobin clubs. An intermediate model
of association was the system of clubs introduced in 1789 in the town of Tropea,
Calabria, by abbe Antonio Jerocades, a former student of Genovesi and author of
some anti-curial pamphlets., and a frequenter of the academy of Santa Caterina.
Jerocades' clubs were a sort of terrorist-conspiratorial cells, directly depending on
the secret society Sans Corneromission, which was active in Marseille28. In 1789
Jerocades published a book which enjoyed a certain success, where in the form of a
poetical composition, the author exalted freemason values29. In 1790 the head of
Neapolitan police reported to the government about the existence of unusual
Masonic lodges in Calabria, depending directly on Marseille. He reported that in
these lodges "the French events are not ignored", that they "are discussed, and the
circumstances are well known"30. Between 1791 and 1792 Jerocades was in Naples,
where he founded a few lodge-clubs of the new kind. One was presided by
Domenico Bisceglie (1756-1799); "here gazettes and excerpts from Condorcet's
Chronical [Chronique de Paris, 1791-93] were read; religion was freely discussed;
monarchs were criticized [...]; the French revolt was defined as an attack against
tyranny"31. The theoretical framework of these early conspirators was indeed
deeply influenced by Condorcet's writings. They planned a radical opposition to
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the present authorities; they justified violent rebellion appealing to the "rights of
reason" and to the cause of "civil progress"; they stated as their main objectives
"liberty" and "equality", which can be achieved only in the context of a republican
state; they attacked official religions, because they support fanaticism and
superstition, and are instruments in the hands of political power. Annibale
Giordano was among the frequenters of Bisceglia's club, together with Francesco
Saverio Salfi (we met him briefly as a reformer) and Ignazio Ciaia, employed at the
ministry of Ecclesiastical affairs. Salfi and Ciaia set up in the town a network of
conversazioni (conversations), small groups of masons who met in private houses or
in artisan workshops. Giordano and Lauberg were both frequenters of the
conversation at Salfi's house, together with abbe Giuseppe Cestari (1751-1799). Salfi
and Cestari also made propaganda among the workers of the harbor, and at the
opera theater, where elements of the ancient aristocracy had shown interest in an
anti-monarchic plot. A group of university students from the province met
regularly in a book-shop in via Toledo, under the supervision of Raimondo
Grimaldi (1762-1852) a Benedictine monk who ran a school of algebra and was
"very close to Giordano and Lauberg"32. Indeed those frequenting the Toledo book¬
shop could be invited to join the meetings at Lauberg's place in Vico dei Giganti,
where French gazettes were read twice a week, or at the academy of Santa Caterina.
Eventually, the most reliable elements were affiliated to the secret society. Troiano
Odazi (1741-1794), one of the most authoritative economists of late reformism, was
another important member of these early conspiratorial groups. Since 1781 he had
been teaching from the chair of Economy that had once been Genovesi's. In August
1792 the French ambassador Louis-Armand de Mackau settled in Naples. He
himself protected a Marseilleise club guided by a professor of French of the Military
Academy. Lauberg frequented this club and met regularly with the ambassador,
who provided him with recent Parisian press.
Whether the label of "Jacobinism" is indeed suitable to describe the Neapolitan
movement is controversial33. Venturi, for instance, maintained that it is improper to
employ the term after the dispersion of the Jacobin movement in France; he also
underlined the original features of the Neapolitan conspirators, who referred
chiefly to the experience of Neapolitan reformism. In the present study the term
"Neapolitan Jacobinism" is employed as a useful label for what was in fact a
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A Jacobin conversazione in 1794 (at the centre, Saverio Salfi)
republican, democratic and anti-Catholic movement that planned violent
insurrection against the government and the monarchy. The program of the
movement was inspired by French Jacobinism and opposed the policy of the French
Directoire, represented in Naples by ambassador Mackau, who attempted a late
reconciliation with the Bourbon monarchy. Certainly the links between Neapolitan
Jacobinism and Neapolitan reformism are many and important. It is a fact that
among the Jacobins of the 1790s one finds many of the reformers of the 1780s. I have
also remarked that the specific interests represented by reformist projects and the
specific interests represented by the Jacobin project were largely overlapping. To
adopt a different term ("Jacobinism") is nonetheless useful in order to capture the
radicalism of the goals and means proper to the new political project.
Neapolitan Jacobins saw an essential link between political action and "moral
action", so that their fight was against despotism as well as ignorance and
superstition34. The movement was composed of academics, military officers
(particularly from the artillery and from the navy), students, professionals,
craftsmen and small traders of the town. In the provinces, it attracted mostly
bourgeois landowners and the minor aristocracy. Neapolitan Jacobinism has been
rightly described as defending the interests of "the small minority of the
enlightened bourgeoisie that opposed the old regime"35. Nevertheless, an
aristocratic element was present in the movement, particularly in Naples, as
remarked by the Neapolitan ambassador in Rome in 1792: "the majority of
Neapolitan Lords [Signori] and lawyers were all [...] democratic and they look
forward to seeing the French in Naples"36. The reason is probably to be found in the
strong anti-monarchist feelings of the ancient aristocracy of the capital, whose
political and juridical status was seriously threatened by the recent attempts of the
Bourbons to pursue an absolutist and anti-feudal policy. Among the founders of the
academy of Lauberg and Giordano was indeed Ettore Carafa Count of Ruvo (1767-
1799), from one of the most eminent families of Naples37. It is precisely because it
was linked to very specific interests that the Jacobin movement, in the end, was to
fail to earn the crucial support of the peasantry and of the popular strata of the
town38.
Little more was needed to transform these variously related conspiratorial lodges
and clubs a la marseillaise into a well organized anti-monarchist plot. A noteworthy
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episode in December 1792 acted as a catalytic factor. The Neapolitan government,
fiercely anti-French since the very beginning of the revolution, had recently plotted
to prevent France from being diplomatically represented in the Ottoman Empire. As
a response the French government sent a naval force to the Gulf of Naples
threatening to bomb the town. Admiral Louis de La Touche-Treville was in
command. Diplomatic meetings followed, with La Touche being received by King
Ferdinando IV. But this is not the interesting part of the story. The point is that the
French Admiral and his officers sojourned in town between December 1792 and
January 179339. In this period La Touche repeatedly met Jacobin leaders, particularly
Lauberg and Giordano. The Admiral also attended to some experiments performed
by Lauberg (whom he called "le citoyen chimiste") at the academy. During one of
his visits to the academy, La Touche made a speech inviting the audience "to
emulate the French nation"40. Giuseppe Cestari, one of the frequenters of Bisceglia's
club, offered a dinner where local Jacobins met the French officers; then, in January,
the admiral reciprocated the courtesy on board his flagship Languedoc. Among those
invited were Odazi, Jerocades, Salfi, the mathematician Vincenzo De Filippis,
Ascanio Orsi, and some artillery officers. On this occasion the project of a general
reform of Neapolitan lodges was discussed and approved by La Touche, who also
promised military support in case of an armed insurrection. Shortly after the fleet
left the Gulf, the well informed head of Neapolitan police, Luigi de' Medici,
cautiously intervened. Without too much clamor, the ecclesiastics Jerocades and
Cestari were segregated in monasteries far from the town. At this point Lauberg
took charge of the whole movement: he decided to re-shape it in the form of an
organic society, and to prepare a concrete program of short-term action. Flis
propagandizing was intense, and the movement increased his favour among
groups of merchants and financiers who saw their interests threatened by the new
anti-French policy of the government (France was at that time the main importer of
Neapolitan products). In May 1793 Lauberg was at the head of the Society of tiie
Friends of Liberty and Equality, and became the real "political author of the
conspiracy"41. New members were enrolled and a translation of the radical 1793
French Constitution was completed by Lauberg and Grimaldi, published in two
thousand copies, and clandestinely distributed. In July 1793 rumors ran in Naples
about a military alliance with Great Britain. Immediate action was required. In the
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Summer 1793 Lauberg met his "most surely democratic" friends in Posillipo to plan
the abolition of the surviving traditional lodges (mostly aristocratic ones) and their
definitive absorption in the network of Jacobin clubs42. Among them were some
lawyers, the mathematicians Giordano, Grimaldi, and Carlo Antonio del Giorno —
professor of algebra at the University of Catania— and the artillery officer
Ferdinando Visconti. Lauberg pointed out the objectives of the movement: a
republican government, the end of the feudal abuses, liberty and equality for every
citizen and the rejection of "every religion, as extraneous to the natural order and
invented by sovereigns and supreme authorities to guarantee their stability". The
structure of the new association, the Neapolitan Patriotic Society, was approved at the
same meeting. It was an interesting variation on the traditional Masonic lodge. The
elementary clubs were small autonomous units with no more than eleven members;
each one having a president and a secretary. No hierarchical differences existed
among functionaries, as "in these clubs they hold to the equality of individuals"43.
Elementary clubs were "the elementary parts of the whole body [the secret
society]". Each elementary club elected a deputy; all deputies met in a "deputy
club", again with no more than eleven members. Each deputy club elected a
representative to be sent periodically to the "central club". Thanks to the deputies,
"the harmonic chain" among different levels was preserved. Lauberg was elected
"central point" of the society. The central club had executive and legislative power.
Its members were elected through a complex procedure, and they could be
members of any level. Clearly enough the organization was shaped by practical
considerations, such as that of rendering the identification of members extremely
difficult, but it was also being employed as a social laboratory where new forms of
social life were tried. Its "democratic" and "egalitarian" nature is evident. Note the
fragmentation of the organization in a set of "elementary" units; each one contains
members all enjoying the same rights and duties, differences among members being
only in function.
By Autumn 1793 Lauberg, President of the Patriotic Society completed his
"reform" of freemasonry and was in the middle of his activity of "democratization
of souls"44. The primary objective of the new association was the forging of a
revolutionary plot. This included the occupation of the Royal Palace and of the
fortresses, the physical elimination of the monarchs, and the constitution of a
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provisional government. The reactionary author Augustine Barruel, evidently
horrified, described the details of the Neapolitan plot in his memoirs45. In
September 1793 the ambassador Mackau left Naples, because of the state of war
between France and Naples. Many more entered the Society, confident in a French
expedition which would support the newborn republic. In those very days, at the
meetings held at the club hosted in the workshop of the clock-maker Andrea
Vitaliano, questions such as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and
the political conditions of the country were discussed. Vitaliano and his friends
maintained that "the people have the faculty of accepting or rejecting kings"46.
Similar points were touched at the meetings hosted by Marquis Giovanni Letizia in
his palace at Capodichino, a few miles out of town. Letizia was one of the links
between the Society and aristocratic freemasons, who "were looking with sympathy
at Republican France". The number of elementary clubs rose between December
1793 and January 1794. There were clubs in the army, in the provinces, and also in
the Osped.de degli Incurabili, a major Neapolitan hospital and a center of medical
research. The students of Lauberg's academy were active founders of clubs all over
the kingdom, exploiting the diffused hostility against a government which had been
unable to prevent the scarcity of food due to the bad crops of Summer 1793. But it is
precisely in the provinces that the Jacobinic movement was to clearly show its
limits. The "new men" of the rural areas were fighting their own battle to strip the
barons of their feudal rights and to control local administrations, real keys of the
economic development. Little consideration was given to the growing complaints of
the peasantry. It is indicative that among the peasants the term "Jacobins" meant
wealthy landowners and professionals, that is, the new oppressors. Peasants had no
part in the struggle between bourgeois landowners and feudal barons. Their
conditions were indeed worsening, as the common lands were being enclosed by
barons and new landowners, and their communal rights abolished without any
form of compensation. Flostility was growing against the abuses of the "gentlemen"
(gdantuomini), as peasants called the new landowners.
In December 1793 the student Emanuele de Deo, from Lauberg's academy,
traveled to his native province of Apulia. He brought copies of Lauberg's edition of
the French constitution. He met members of the local authorities, informed them
about a near insurrection, claimed "that the people have the right to dethrone the
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king and to execute him"47. His activity did not pass unnoticed, though. Following
de Deo's mission in Apulia, a spy infiltrated Lauberg's academy. He reported on
the meetings at Lauberg's house, and about the dangerous religious and political
opinions of Giordano, Grimaldi and Ciaia. House searches were carried out
following this report. Nothing compromising was found in Naples; at Lauberg's
place officers seized and confiscated "pages covered in mysterious algebraic signs".
But copies of the French Constitution were found at de Deo's place, and he was
immediately arrested. The Society decided that Lauberg had better flee the country.
This happened in January 1794, with the economic support of Marquis Letizia.
Lacking its charismatic leader, the Society soon split into two distinct revolutionary
circles, one supporting immediate action, the other suggesting a more cautious
preparation of the insurrection. In March 1794 an informer revealed further names
and the circumstances of the plot. By now the police had an almost complete picture
of it. Searches and arrests followed. A special tribunal was established (giunta di
stato) to judge the hundreds of people involved in the Jacobin conspiracy (congiura
de'Giacobini). The accusation was very grave ("conspiracy against Religion,
Monarchy and State"), thus trials were conducted with the exceptional procedure ad
modum belli ("as in a war"), which meant judgment was reached and sentence
passed in the space of a few hours, and without granting basic rights to the accused.
Mario Pagano denounced the improper use of the special procedure, and organized
a plan of defense for de Deo and his comrades. But he himself was arrested in 1795,
because of his links with Lauberg's academy. Emanuele de Deo and the clock-
maker Vitaliano were hanged in Largo Castello in October 1794, the town immersed
in an atmosphere of extreme tension. Bourbon soldiers opened fire on the mob
without any clear reason, and a few people remained on the ground, shot dead.
Meanwhile, hundreds of others were given various sentences. In 1798 arrests and
trials were still going on, and by then it was clear that the dimensions of the
conspiracy were indeed remarkable, involving members of the aristocracy and high
functionaries of the government. Panic was indeed spreading at the Bourbon court,
where the 1793 execution of the French sovereigns had already had a remarkable
effect48. Annibale Giordano was sentenced to life imprisonment in the fortress of
Aquila. Ettore Carafa Count of Ruvo was arrested in 1795; in the same year —to the
astonishment of most— Luigi De' Medici, head of the police, was also arrested,
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suspected of having protected Giordano and the academy from an early
investigation in Summer 1792. The artillery officer Ferdinando Visconti (1772-1845),
who had taken part to the most crucial events of the conspiracy, was accused of
being a member of the Deputy Club, and of keeping Giordano informed about the
activity of the clubs established inside the Body of Artillery; he was sentenced to ten
years in the fortress.
3.4 Lauberg's Political Thought
We have already found, in the proceedings of the trials, traces of Jacobin political
thought, mainly arguments in favor of republicanism and of democracy (frequent
claims that sovereignty is of the people). So, we read that when Giordano's house
was searched, the following documents were found: "an handwritten excerpt from
Locke, treating the nature of government and its real origin, extension and goals,
and the argument that happiness is to be found in equality, because men are made
of one and the same nature"; the Political Essays of Mario Pagano; a manuscript
where it is argued that "whatever a nation on the Earth desires, it has the right to do
so" 49. Giordano was also charged with having repeatedly declared his "lack of
belief in matters of religion" at the meetings held in the house of Raffaele Netti
(1776-1863), teacher of physics50.
For a clearer presentation of these tenets of Neapolitan Jacobinism we must
move from the proceedings of the trials to the more coherent political speeches and
writings of Lauberg himself. Dominant themes were: republicanism, democracy,
and religious freedom (religious beliefs must not be a matter of legislation). The two
values on which the whole Jacobin project was grounded were "freedom" and
"equality", which were to become the motto of the Neapolitan Republic (Fig.X).
Freedom means "the freedom of doing whatever is not forbidden by the law"; and
"equality" means not some sort of "absolute" (read: economic) equality which
would be "unnatural", but rather —in the best reformist spirit— that every citizen
must enjoy equal political and juridical rights. Consequently Lauberg planned the
destruction of the monarchical institution; the immediate abolition of the feudal-
communal system, based on political and juridical inequalities; and the confiscation
of the goods of the Church. The attack on the Church was crucial to the anti-feudal
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plan of the Jacobins. Already in the proceedings one can find reports of various acts
of scorn for religious institutions: Lauberg's students scoffing at the images of the
saints51; the existence of God and the immortality of the soul questioned in
Vitaliano's workshop52; Lauberg claiming that "hell is a tale to keep the people in
control; there is neither Hell nor Heaven, as death is the end of everything"53. The
recognition of a crucial ideological function for institutional religion caused the
Jacobins to transform the traditional anti-curialism of the reformers into a full-
blooded attack against the Catholic Church. The two-fold attack against Church and
feudal system emerges in almost every page of Lauberg's political articles written
after 1794, as indeed in those of the other Neapolitan Jacobins who had fled the
country in that year.
In 1794 most of the Neapolitan Jacobins were in France. In 1796 they entered the
Northern Italian towns, following Napoleon's army. Milan became the main center
for their activity of propaganda. Between 1796 and 1799, the so-called "triennio
giacobino", Neapolitan Jacobins were to act as public speakers, journalists and
political organizers in Northern Italy54. As a matter of fact, their activity was not
welcomed by French authorities, worried about democratic radicalism and Italian
patriotism which their speeches referred to repeatedly. In 1797, Napoleon himself
referred to them as those "qui ont toujours apporte en Italie le trouble et
l'anarchie"55. Lauberg had entered the French army as officer pharmacist
("pharmacien de premiere classe") in September 179356. He settled in Milan with his
former students Matteo Galdi and Flaminio Massa. They organized "patriotic
theaters", societies "of public education", celebrations to make the planting of the
"trees of freedom", and they founded and directed periodicals such as II Termometro
Politico, II Giornale dei Patrioti d'ltalia, II Monitore Italiano. Their immediate goal was
to win the support of the educated classes in the newly occupied towns by
presenting the advantages of a republican form of government, and of a philo-
French policy. As a town fell into the hands of the French army, these political
activists scrupulously performed their work of "democratization". These patriot-
Jacobins also referred to their mission as being concerned with the "regeneration"
of the Italian towns, a term which clearly resonates with the masonic doctrine of
social harmony that we have found in Filangieri. Lauberg himself was active in the
"regeneration" of Bergamo, Brescia, and Verona. In Venice he was president of the
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Society for Education, where he presented the "moral and political principles to be
taught to the people"57. Among his political works is an essay about the best form of
government for Italy (1796), where Lauberg defended the form of a democratic
republic. He also maintained that the republic must be formed by the reunion of
"individuals" in a single "body", and he rejected any form of federalism as
extremely dangerous to the well being of the state. It is not difficult to see the
criticism of the plethora of intermediate bodies existing in the Neapolitan feudal-
communal system behind such remarks. In Lauberg's view, the old enemies of the
Italian people have always been "superstition, aristocracy and federalism". This
was why in the future republic the institutions of hereditary aristocracy, majorat
and fidei-commissum —as any other source of "particularism" in jurisdiction,
customs, and currency— would be abolished.
In a piece in II Monitore Italiano, Lauberg celebrated —a la Condorcet— "the
progress of the human spirit in Italy"58. Lauberg moved from the remark that the
Italian Renaissance lacked "the theories of quantity", those which allow us "to
measure, to evaluate, to calculate and to know with precision the natural beings,
their qualities and attributes". Coming to the eighteenth century, Lauberg praised
the work of scientists such as Gaetana Agnesi, Morgagni, Vallisneri and Redi, and
of philosophers such as Vico, whom he saw as a crucial source of Condorcet's
conception of progress in history. The advancements in mathematics, physics,
chemistry, and botany had been the basis for advancements in the "economical
sciences", agriculture and in the "mechanical sciences". But, said Lauberg, in spite
of the efforts of these valuable thinkers, the Italian states could not enjoy the fruits
of cultural and social progress, mainly because of their erroneous system of laws
(and here Lauberg cited Filangieri's Science of Legislation). In particular, the "feudal
system prevented the Southern regions from achieving that progress that would
have been natural"59. Because of an irrational social system, "trade did not grow,
and mathematicians did not have the opportunity to emulate England in naval
science". The French revolution gave Italy the occasion to free itself from such a
social system, and to participate in the "regeneration of humanity"60. In this most
important moment the intellectual class had to take command and lead the nation:
"the mathematician abandoned abstruse calculations to become a legislator; the
physicist moved from his cabinet to the committee, the chemist forgot the
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laboratory to become a statesman , the lawyer, the physician, the tradesman, the
shopkeeper, the peasant, even the priest, they all did their own part to be useful to
the cause of humanity". In the end, the truth "will enlighten the people and will
guide the government, [...] will give back to Italy its freedom, its virtues and its
ancient grandeur".
In an economic article in the same newspaper, Lauberg dealt with the question of
prices61. He maintained that high prices are indeed the sign of a healthy economy:
"the high price of things revives national prosperity", he wrote, because it pushes
both individuals and governments to entrepreneurial action. Land reclamation,
ploughing, and other forms of productive investments are indeed natural
consequences of high prices. High prices cause "movement", Lauberg synthesized.
And everyone benefits from such a movement: landowners as well as peasants and
artisans. Lauberg wanted freedom of action for entrepreneurial activity: the
legislator should not be "wanting to regulate everything". And the usual policy of
artificially lowering food prices to feed urban masses is in the end deleterious to the
healthy functioning of the economy, because it damages agricultural producers.
Lauberg concluded with a plea for a free-trade policy: "the Pope used to prohibit
exports —you must knock down all those infernal barriers". From our previous
remarks about the functioning of the feudal communal system in the Kingdom of
Naples at the end of the century, it is quite clear that similar economic ideas were
radicalizing the position of the 1780s reformers, and were in fact at odds with the
real conditions of Southern agriculture and trade.
An interesting and distinguishing feature of Lauberg's political speeches is the
reference to scientific knowledge as a source of legitimization for political action.
He did not simply exalt the progress of the sciences under a republican
government; he always tried to found his political reasoning on a precise scientific
conception of the world. In a piece in the Journal of the Italian Patriots, Lauberg
celebrated the conquest of Mantua as an important step in the political and social
progress of Italy62. This progress cannot be stopped by any historical force. Its
"necessary" character depends on its being grounded in the very nature of man.
Civil progress is the necessary path of mankind once it has been freed from
ignorance and oppression. Lauberg made an analogy: "as the sensations in the
small sphere of our individual existence shape our heart and our understanding, so
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political collisions, which are the sensations of mankind, gradually shape human
reason". In this way "pure reason emerges from the chaos of the centuries, and its
laws reunite all men in a single family". Political revolutions are the necessary
outcome of previous history, and "we cannot stop the work of time, which is
founded on our own physical constitution and on our relations with the beings that
surround us". If anything, we can accelerate it: so "the light of the sciences armed
the republican courage in France and reason [...] has produced in six years the
work of six centuries". Venturi was certainly right when he remarked that
Neapolitan Jacobins owed a great debt to the thought of reformers like Filangieri
and Pagano. And, as a matter of fact Pagano and Cirillo joined the Jacobin
movement. Lauberg's political writings show clearly the stamp of Neapolitan
historicism and of Vico; but this heritage is transposed in the new form of a reason-
led progress, where reason itself emerges historically as a natural consequence of
the organic constitution of human beings. Condorcet is clearly one of the main
references, as well as the authors of French ideology and their Neapolitan
counterparts, such as the Melchiorre Delfico. The idea that reason should be left free
to naturally develop and grow, both at the individual and to the social level, is also
central to Lauberg's teaching. In a letter to the editors of the Journal of the Italian
Patriots, Lauberg recalls his own experience as "preceptor of the young"63. The
students of the university of the "regenerated" town of Pavia had been complaining
about traditional teaching, asking their professors for "useful notions"64. Lauberg
points out that the young, not "corrupted" by interests and prejudices, can be
educated best by simply following the natural inclination of their minds. This
means starting from "very simple principles", then moving to their applications and
down to their very last consequences. Young minds follow "easily" such a natural
order, whatever the discipline. Given this natural inclination, it is obvious that
students complain about their teachers, who regularly "oppose the progress of their
reason". Most interesting is the remark that often old-fashioned professors of
chemistry or physics "oppress the students with the infinite series of their detailed
experiments". This can be read as a precise criticism against the dominant
empiricist approach to the natural sciences, where the elaboration of hypothetical
systems is avoided in favor of the contemplation of nature, and of an apparently a-
problematic collection of data. Such an approach can be related to the stream of
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Newtonian scholasticism which was popular in Italy through the eighteenth
century, and that was being revived in late 1780s Naples by the teaching of Nicola
Fergola and others.
"Natural reason" is a key-concept in Lauberg's arguments. The defense of
natural reason legitimizes both his cultural battle and his political battle. In 1798
Lauberg gave one of his many speeches at the Constitutional Circle in Milan, which
was part of a network of circles created to "educate the people" and to "explain to
the people the democratic truths"65. Lauberg attacked what he defines as "the two
tyrannies", namely superstition and despotism, which "sustain each other and with
their weight oppress the centuries and the generations". He exhorted his public to
find in due knowledge the first weapon to demolish "imposture and throne". His
speech is unusually philosophical:
Republicans, the slaves have until now looked for justice in imaginary
archetypes; you study the man — he is sensitive and his relations [with
external reality] will show you the due ideas of good and evil. Tyrannies
imagined a being invested with their own attributes in order to justify their
crimes; you are rational, so look to your own reason for the model of your
operations. Nature is not a vain name, it exists, and its existence confounds
itself with the eternity of the centuries. It is indeed active, and its ultimate,
imperceptible molecules are forces that, with their necessarily constant action,
produce every phenomenon within the universe. This is what you should
study, in order to find your way among [philosophical] systems. If you depart
from its principles, you will fall in the inextricable labyrinth of human
opinions. Man does not need mysteries but facts [...]66
So Lauberg spoke to the citizens crowding the Constitutional Circle in Milan. One
wonders how historians could dismiss Lauberg's early scientific activity as "a
cover" for his political conspiracy67. It's evident, on the contrary, that Lauberg's
political action and his scientific investigations were strictly linked, and that they
were shaped by a common "way of thinking". What did it consist in, more
precisely? In order to answer this question we must turn to his scientific output. But
before that, let us complete our picture of Neapolitan Jacobin thought.
3.5 Other Sources for the Study of Neapolitan Jacobin Thought
The scientific foundation of the Jacobin political program was shared by every other
significant ideologist of the movement. The most representative text of Southern
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Jacobin thought, and in fact its only complete and organic presentation, was a
bilingual (Italian and French) volume titled Catechism of the Rights of Man (1794)68.
The text reproduced and commented upon the Declaration des droits de Vhomme et du
citoyen, which introduced the French Constitution of 1793, whose centrality for
Neapolitan Jacobinism has already been remarked. The authors were two "Jacobin
priests": Ascanio Orsi (1770-?) and Michele de Tommaso (1765-1830). Orsi was
linked to Lauberg and had participated in the conspiracy since 1792; he was indeed
a member of the Deputy Club. He had been arrested in 1794, but had managed to
escape, and to join the Jacobin organization in Northern Italy. He was an activist
and a teacher of "Morals, Natural Rights and the French Constitution" until 1796,
when he entered the republican police in Milan. De Tommaso had been a strict
collaborator of Lauberg. In 1794, he had managed to flee Naples before being
arrested. In Northern Italy he was the assistant of Lauberg, then a teacher of
"Elements of Mathematics and Analysis of Sensations". He also opened a private
school of philosophy. The 1794 Catechism was completed in the French occupied
town of Oneglia, on the Italian riviera. Local patriots had established there a Jacobin
Republic, and the atmosphere was certainly favorable to the enterprise. The
Catechism became a textbook in the republican schools of Northern Italy and a
reference for any further activity of Jacobin propaganda. The Declaration of 1793
was an extremely radical document, where "equality" is the first and most
important right (as opposed to "freedom", which prevailed in the 1789 declaration).
The first eleven pages of the book are an introduction to the principle of
sensationalism, which is taken as the scientific foundation of the Declaration. Then
the Declaration itself is commented on article by article. The goal of society is
"common happiness", which is defined as the full possession for everyone of the
basic rights: "equality, freedom, safety, and property". "Equality" means in this
context "natural equality": every man is made in the same way as any other man, so
that they share "the same needs, passions, faculties". Equality must be established
and preserved in society by means of laws. Laws are the "expression of the general
will". Laws which defend particular interests are thus illegitimate. The only way to
discriminate in the disposal of posts and charges must be merit. "Freedom" consists
in doing whatever does not harm others. It follows that religious freedom and
freedom of expression must be guaranteed. "Religion is a matter which cannot be
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judged by us, only by God", the authors claim. When it comes to government, we
read that it must not "oppress the individuals"; and this means that "those who rule
must themselves be subject to the laws, so that they cannot abuse them". About the
right of "property", this consists for a citizen in "freely disposing of his own
possessions". The sovereignty is of the people, "the one and only nation".
Sovereignty is indivisible and inalienable. The right of insurrection and of
tyrannicide are consequences of the principle of popular sovereignty.
Other pamphlets —mostly anonymous— were to appear in Naples in 1799, to
celebrate the birth of the republic. Recurrent themes were that Neapolitans "are not
rebels against a sworn Government", the abolition of all the "particular
jurisdictions", and the return to a "pure religion" 69. A couple of days before the
declaration of the Neapolitan Republic, in January 1799, the Patriotic Journal
(Giornale Patriottico) published a bilingual "Letter of a Neapolitan Patriot to the
French" by Ignazio Gentile, where a coherent political program for the republic was
outlined70. At home, the decisive battle was that over popular education. Again:
sensationalism is the scientific foundation of the Jacobin social and political project.
Neapolitans have to study themselves, because "the examination of ourselves yields
to the examination of our faculties, and that of our rights and duties; it convinces us
that our freedom is inalienable, and that we cannot be happy unless we are all
equal; and on this all the social virtues depend, and political virtue as well, and love
for the home country and for the laws". "To be equal" is defined in physical terms:
"the reaction of all the diversities among two citizens is always to be equal to the
constant action of each one's rights and duties"; whereas "to be free" is to obey the
general will as a citizen and the proper will as a man". These are "the two points
from where laws begin and return, being analogous to those of Nature". This makes
republican government one "founded directly on the nature of man, and of his
faculties"; his "portrait" is in fact "the Temple of Nature". Religion is hardly a topic
in Jacobin literature. Apart from the political anti-curialism, Jacobins tend to
consider religion as relative to the personal sphere, and as such it escapes any form
of social sanction. The policy of the 1799 Republic will confirm this trend, which is
already clearly expressed in the Jacobin Catechism of 1794, by devoting almost no
attention to the issue.
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3.6 Lauberg's Analytic Program: from Mathematics to Society
Lauberg's revolutionary career began around 1792. But by that time he was already
known in the scientific circles of Naples as a teacher of mathematics and chemistry.
A man with a passion for Lavoisier and Lagrange, and many enemies in the
academic establishment, Lauberg was the first son of a lieutenant of a Walloon
regiment in the service of the King of Naples and, following the family tradition, he
had entered the Royal Military Academy as a cadet in 177171. Here he met some of
his future comrades, such as Gabriele Manthone, who was to be the head of the
republican army in 1799. The Academy was at that time directed by Colonel
Giuseppe Parisi. Parisi and his professors were linked to the "enlightened"
branches of freemasonry, and they were remarkably philo-French in their cultural
and political orientations. Pupils of the Military Academy studied French language
as a means of access to French scientific culture. Colonel Parisi was a supporter of
scientific exchange between European countries and he himself organized missions
of students to visit relevant engineering sites all over the continent. Lauberg did not
enter a military career though, being inclined to the study of philosophy,
mathematics, and apparently, to a religious life. In 1777 he became a secular priest
in the congregation of the scolopi (Chierici Regolari delle Scuole Pie), which had been
founded in the seventeenth century to provide free education to the young from
poor backgrounds. The course included, at its higher level, mathematics,
philosophy and theology. French biographers report that Lauberg had studied
natural sciences and medicine with Domenico Cirillo and Angelo Boccanera72.
Around 1787 Lauberg was sent by his congregation to Chieti, in the province of
Abruzzi, to teach philosophy. He wrote a textbook of philosophy of chemistry for
his students, which was printed in Naples in 178873. The book was dedicated to
Minister Acton, responsible for the reform of the Neapolitan army (1785-88), who is
thanked on behalf of his father and brothers (who, we may suppose, benefited in
some way from the reform). To Acton was also dedicated the second work
published by Lauberg in the same period, Reflections on the Operations of Human
Understanding74. In this epistemological piece, Lauberg refers to French and British
philosophers (he read both languages), placing himself in the stream of Genovesi's
Lockean empiricism. Indeed Lauberg followed the orthodoxy of Genovesi's school
when he remarked that after centuries of vain speculations on the soul, Locke began
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"to investigate the phenomenon of thought, teaching to his followers Condillac,
d'Alembert, Diderot, Buffon, Bonnet", the method "to reconstruct the history of
human understanding", and "the order by which man proceeds in acquiring his
knowledge". The question of the "natural order of ideas" is the crucial point in
Lauberg's version of that sort of ideological and sensationalist current which became
influential in Naples in those years. "Only a well directed analysis of the operations
of human understanding can clarify the development of our ideas and the order
according to which they follow each other". Lauberg's aim was that of presenting a
short version of this epoch-making revolution to his students. The influence of
Condillac's sensationalism is one of the most evident features of this work, but there
are points where Lauberg departs from his main source. He follows Condillac in
criticizing Locke for having regarded "reflection" and "sensation" as two different
sources of ideas, whereas reflection itself is founded on sensation. Reflection is
indeed the sensation that the soul has of itself and of its operations. But he believes
the spirit is not only passive, but also active, by virtue of its capacity of directing the
"attention" towards the impressions received. Furthermore, he does not believe that
the senses can guarantee the existence of an external reality. Lauberg tried to defend
the assumption that external objects do exist, but he also claimed that we can only
know them "relatively to ourselves", and not "in themselves". On the other hand,
he seems to rule out a full-blooded materialism a la La Mettrie, defending a more
cautious sensationalism. Lauberg argued for matter being "active", even if such
activity is said to be different from proper spiritual phenomena. Also, if the
reciprocal influence between human organism and human spirit is undeniable, its
physical conditions are unknown (for Delfico this was not much of problem, as we
have seen). In morals, Lauberg seems to follow closely Helvetius (1715-1771),
grounding morality on the notion of "self-interest", or "pleasure principle" ("amor
proprio", in Lauberg)75. I have tracked down only one other philosophical work by
Lauberg: an annotated translation of a work on fatalism by the Jansenist theologian
Francois Pluquet (1716-1790), published in Naples in three volumes in 179176.
Pluquet listed and commented upon a number of ancient and modern "systems"
about the origin of the universe and the nature of the soul. Lauberg, in his
footnotes, is invariably polemical with metaphysical arguments, and with
"questions of words". He links different philosophical systems to the personality of
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the different philosophers, to "the circumstances of their own life". These
circumstances are indeed causes of strong "impressions", which attract "the activity
of the spirit", and are relevant to the construction of systems of ideas77. One also
finds the instrumentalist conception of religion that was to be central in his later
political writings. Lauberg condemns those who use religion in order to attack and
"oppress" philosophical adversaries78, and he finds the way to insert an apology for
Giordano Bruno79. Lauberg also finds a way to refer to chemistry, "which is
nowadays the most interesting branch of physics"80. Indeed in those years (1788,
according to the French biographer) Lauberg was making experiments on a new
method for the extraction of indigo from Isatis tinctoria; and he also tried to establish
an industrial plant for the production of sulphuric acid (both processes had
remarkable economic relevance). Lauberg's teaching and experimental activity did
not meet with the favor of the natural philosophers of the university. A French
biographer remarked that the experiments "were very successful, but they were not
encouraged", and that he was persecuted by the "partisans of the ancient
doctrines", because he used to teach Lavoisier in his courses81. Interestingly the
French biographers skipped over the political activity of Lauberg, and over his
major role in the Neapolitan events. In 1793 he went to France, they said, because
"he wanted to participate to the scientific movement". One plausible reason for this
striking lack of memory is that the notes were based on information provided by
Lauberg himself in his later years, when he was living in Paris under the restored
Bourbon, and he feared his Jacobin past could harm his career and those of the
members of his family.
But Lauberg's teaching was appreciated in the Military Academy of Naples. In
1788-89 he was offered a temporary lecturing position. In 1789 a competition was
organized to assign the chair of mathematics of the Academy. Lauberg submitted
an essay but this time he failed, the chair going to Annibale Giordano, a young
student from Fergola's private studio. Lauberg's essay was on mechanics: he aimed
to prove the fundamental principles of the science of motion "in an easy and direct
way [con vie facili e dirette]"&2. The first step consisted in stating clearly "the
conventions that are at the basis of this science", and in deriving the laws of
mechanics from them "through simple induction". Once such preliminary work is
accomplished, "the solution of every problem is reduced to a matter of pure
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calculation". These considerations, Lauberg continued, made him decide to study
mechanics "by means of new analytic views [con nuove analitiche vedute]". Following
the very recent example of Lagrange (1788), Lauberg aimed to show that all
theorems of mechanics are merely different expressions of a unitary principle, the
axiom of virtual velocities. Lauberg's analytic approach to mechanics relies on
certain fundamental beliefs about the nature of the sciences, which are connected to
his sensationalistic epistemology. "Every science" he wrote, "is nothing but the
combination of all the simple ideas which constitute the complex idea of a
phenomenon, and of the conventions that have been established". In the case of
mechanics, we know that
all bodies are active beings, and are in movement: thus there must be a
general expression that comprehends all the combinations of simple ideas
constituting this phenomenon of the bodies' activity [force, distance, time],
which will give us the general equation to obtain the solutions for all the
particular problems of mechanics.83
By means of this general equation, Lauberg argued, we can mechanically obtain the
solutions for every particular problem of mechanics, regardless of any metaphysical
consideration about the "essences of the bodies", the "nature of the forces", and the
"useless" questions such as "whether the force is intrinsic or extrinsic to the body".
Importantly, Lauberg stated that his analytic approach is not limited to mechanics,
but can be employed in "every science".
Later attempts of Lauberg to obtain a university chair in 1791 and 1792, in
Experimental Physics and Natural History respectively, also failed. But in the
meantime, he was making his name outside official teaching. By 1792 he had left the
religious congregation, "to be a man of letters and a professor of physics and
mathematics"84. In fact he had been running a private studio in Vico dei Giganti,
since 1790. In May 1792, as we have seen, he founded the "academy" of Santa
Caterina, where he taught with the assistance of Giordano. In 1792 they published
their own textbook of elementary mathematics, entitled Analytical Principles of
Mathematics85. It consisted of two parts entitled respectively "Principles of
Arithmetic" and "Principles of Geometry". The sciences of arithmetic and geometry
are here "analyzed", that is, reduced to their most simple, elementary notions and
laws, and then re-built according to the "natural order" in which our own thoughts
tend to be actually structured. The "natural order" turned out to be the order of
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algebra. In the preface, the authors clarify which image of mathematics they
support86. As in the 1789 essay on mechanics, Lauberg merges sensationalist
epistemology and analytic methodology. The whole of human knowledge, it is said,
derives from "very simple sensations", which are the basis for the construction of
our concepts. The cognitive content of every science derives from a particular class
of sensations, and from the conventions stipulated by human beings about them.
Between elementary sensations and general scientific laws there is a "necessary
link". This link is provided by algebraic reasoning, thanks to which phenomena are
"connected to each other with analytic order". The science of mathematics, for
example, derives from the class of our basic sensations and conventions about
magnitudes (which is the phenomenon studied by this science). Physics is "the
generalization of phenomena resulting from the activity of matter"; it is not "that
crowd of substances and qualities whose only utility was to teach us words without
meaning [vocaboli privi affatto di idee]". Similarly, metaphysics has been freed from
"the darkness with which the [philosophical] schools had surrounded it". This
science consists, in fact, of two main branches: the study of human sensibility, and
the investigation of those general physical laws called "cosmological laws". Morals
are "merely" the analysis of the sensations caused by human needs, and of the
means to manage them; politics is limited to the problem of satisfying individual
needs within the satisfaction of general needs. The authors conclude that:
[I]f Physics, Metaphysics, Morals, Politics are merely the analysis of the effects
of the activity of matter, of human sensibility, of the control of this sensibility
relatively to human needs, as Mathematics is the analysis of quantity; then,
Mathematics being an exact science, so also must we consider the other ones,
when we regard them without mystery, and from the right point of view.
In every science, we must investigate "the natural development of the simple ideas
constituting the primitive phenomenon which is the object of the science itself".
This natural development of primitive ideas is given, in any area of human
knowledge, by rules of algebra and calculus. It is by now clear that the choice of the
analytic method as the method in mathematical textbooks is a crucial step for the
whole political and scientific-philosophical enterprise of Lauberg and Giordano. If
we aim, the authors wrote, "to promote public education, and to eradicate the old
prejudices, the only way [...] is to accomplish this simplification of the sciences, so
that —reduced to the analysis of our sensations— they no longer constitute that
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congeries of isolated truths which is presented by the method of Composition [i.e.,
the synthetic method]". Presenting geometrical truths to students by means of the
synthetic method is confusing because in synthetic reasoning there are no traces of
the necessary connections which our mind naturally recognizes among them.
Truths are just presented as a non-ordered lot, a random collection. The student has
to acquire the very general method to discover every geometrical truth, not a few
disconnected and local truths. Analytic method is then the key to access that
universal "chain of truths" which had already been theorized by Neapolitan
freemasons, and which is now assumed as a model for scientific disciplines by the
Jacobins. "These considerations", the authors continued, "made us regard the
textbooks of mathematics and philosophy compiled according to the synthetic
methods as unworthy of the education of man". Indeed these books "present a
history of the single truths, instead of presenting the methods of invention which
contributed to the development of human spirit". The synthetic method presented
the pupils with a set of disconnected, particular truths (in geometry, the more
skilled we are, and naturally gifted, the more we can find out new geometrical
truths), while the analytic method was a "complete" and universal one. It was, so
the argument went, the method which opened a new era for the mathematical and
empirical sciences; it was the method that would permit the development of social
and political sciences in the near future. "We decided to prepare this textbook
according to the view that we have presented above" they concluded, "with the
only aim of being useful to our Country".
The Jacobin project of social, political and cultural "regeneration" was grounded
on the universal applicability of analytic method, that is on the employment of the
analytic style of reasoning to connect and structure the cognitive content of every
branch of knowledge. To "regenerate" a people meant to let them discover the
functioning of their own mind ("republicans, study the man!" proclaimed Lauberg
in his speeches), in order to find the sources of the values of good and evil, of
morality and immorality, of right and wrong. The method to be employed in this
investigation was the "analysis of our ideas", i.e. the breaking down of complex
into elementary ideas, deriving from simple sensations; this material was then to be
re-structured according to the analytic method to naturally reach the new complex
ideas. To "regenerate" a branch of knowledge meant, analogously, to analyze it into
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its elementary ideas (sensations and conventions) and then to re-structure it
according to the analytic method.
On the nature of mathematics, Jacobin practitioners claimed that mathematics
was not a question of individual intuitions, of difficult and long training, and its
aim was not limited to the discovery of eternal truths in the heavenly kingdom of
geometrical entities. On the contrary, mathematics was a universal language,
comprehensible to every rational being, which can be applied to every field of
human experience, even to human sciences (as for the reformers, no epistemological
or ontological divide exists among the two branches of knowledge). They can be
mathematized, and they can reach the same degree of certainty which is proper to
mathematics. This implied that the whole existing social and political setting could
be criticized as "unscientific", and that it could legitimately be re-built on the basis
of the new theorems of the sciences of politics and economics. Once their "very
simple elements" had been well defined, it would be possible to deduce the laws of
the social sciences in the same way in which it had been done for those of
hydrodynamics87.
3.7 Other Jacobin Mathematicians
If Lauberg and Giordano were the two most popular analytic mathematicians in
Naples at the turn of the 1790s, they were not the only ones. Consider the scientific
and political activity of Vincenzo de Filippis (1749-1799), from the province of
Calabria88. Like many of his generation, Filippis went to Naples to study law. After
having completed the studies, he was employed as an administrator by a
landowner in his native province. But he soon decided to follow his inclination for
the sciences, and he won a place at the Collegio Ancarano in Bologna, where at that
time noteworthy mathematicians and physicists were teaching, such as Gerolamo
Saladini (1731-1813), Vincenzo Riccati (1707-1805), Paolo Frisi (1728-1784) and
Ruggero Boscovich (1711-1787). He obtained the laurea in philosophy in 1773. Back
in Naples, he was in contact with Vito Caravelli, possibly his former private teacher,
and he visited the naturalist Nicola Pacifico (1734-1799). In 1779 Filippis was in
Naples "for certain affairs"; on this occasion he bought the works of d'Alembert,
and he was asked to enter the new RAS. In the 1780s Filippis was involved in
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debates over the economic reforms of the province of Calabria. He hailed
enthusiastically the suppression of monasteries in the area hit by the 1783
earthquake; and in his correspondence he praised the works of the reformers
Gaetano Filangieri, Antonio Planelli, and Francesco Antonio Grimaldi. He
completed an essay on the Calabrian earthquake where the phenomena preceding
and following the event were analyzed, and the most likely explanation suggested,
which was that of an underground electrical accumulation. The social and economic
consequences of the earthquake were also analyzed. Filippis was again in Naples in
1786, where he met Donato Tommasi and other reformers of the capital. In that year
Tommasi was organizing the new anti-despotic lodge of the Illuminati, to which
most of the reformers belonged, including Filangieri, Pagano, and Pacifico.
According to his biographer, it is very likely that Filippis entered the lodge as well.
He presented to his Neapolitan friends a manuscript on mechanics, which was
favorably received and commented on. Mechanics was described as "the most
important and useful science of nature", and "the source" from which originates
every other physico-mathematical science. Mechanics also enjoys, according to
Filippis, "metaphysical and mathematical certitude", given that all its conclusions
derive from a few basic evident principles through mathematical reasoning.
Between 1787 and 1792 de Filippis taught mathematics at the Royal Schools of
Catanzaro, in Calabria. We are told that his lectures included "practical" parts,
where Filippis discussed applications of the sciences to the wealth of society, and to
morals. In 1789 he was in Naples again, this time to study Lagrange's mechanics.
The new cultural atmosphere of the 1790s soon affected Filippis' career and life. His
close friend and colleague, the mathematician Gregorio Aracri (1749-1813)89, was
accused of atheism by religious authorities. In his Elements of Natural Lazv (1787)
Aracri, who was a priest, had defended the thesis that moral laws are innate in
human nature. The attack was against an ecclesiastic, but the real targets were
Jerocades and other Calabrian reformers and freemasons, including Filippis. In 1792
Filippis left his post at the college of Catanzaro. In 1798 he was interrogated about
the Jacobin conspiracy, but we do not know about the result of the investigation. In
January 1799 he was a member of the Jacobin provisional government, and in April
he became Minister of the Interior of the Neapolitan Republic.
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Abbe Nicola Pacifico (1725-1799), as we have seen had scientific and, possibly,
Masonic contacts with de Filippis90. He had been trained at the Archiepiscopal
Seminar of Naples, where a rather good scientific education was provided91. In 1779
he was chosen as a pensioner member of the RAS, in the class of Natural History.
He was enrolled in the Great National Lodge and, later on, in the reformist and
anti-despotic lodge of the Illuminati. He wrote a memoir on the Calabrian earth¬
quake of 1783, for which he suggested an alternative explanation to that of
electricity. More interesting for our present purposes was his plan of research
presented at the RAS for the years 1780 and 1781, which included "improvement of
the methods for the study of convergent series, for the integration of differential
formulas, and extension of their use; particularly to find a series more convergent
and more practical for the rectification of conic curves"; "to promote the elegant
theory of the reduction of the integration of certain differential formulas in the
rectification of conic curves"; to clarify certain points of the "analysis finitorum"
(theory of equations) 92; furthermore he planned to extend "his philosophical
considerations to agriculture and trade"93. This was quite a wide program for a
member of the class of Natural History. Note the interest in branches of analysis, in
the practical applications of calculus, and in political economy. Not surprisingly
"among his dearest friends" were Filangieri, Cirillo and Caravelli94. The "choice
library" of Nicola Pacifico was always open for Nicola Fiorentino (1765-1799), a
former student of Saladini and the author of an Essay on the Infinitesimal Quantities
and on the Live and Dead Forces95. He wrote the essay to intervene in a debate about
the nature of infinitesimal quantities his aim being that of showing how differential
calculus can be grounded in geometry, so that he can conclude that "all this calculus
is exact, and free from any imputation"96. But Fiorentino is mostly known for his
essay on "the public economy of the Kingdom of Naples" published in 1794, when
he was professor at the Royal College in Bari, Apulia97. It was the last study in the
reformist tradition. Fiorentino offered an analysis of the present miseries of the
country, and of the constant oppression of the poor and of the "gentlemen"
("uomini dabbene"), which both originate from "our ignorance", particularly in
agricultural matters98. Too many people study law, while agriculture is abandoned
to itself as if it were an easy art. But it requires indeed a great amount of knowledge
to rationalize agricultural production, and every innovation has to be introduced
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fighting "against the great force of prejudices"99. The unchanging conditions of
production show that the teaching of Genovesi had been largely wasted, Fiorentino
argued. He also called for tribunals and schools to be reformed and to be
established all over the kingdom, ending the secular concentration of juridical
power in the capital. Universities should be opened in the provinces, and chairs of
agriculture should be established, as this discipline is the most important for the
nation. Academies of agriculture should be encouraged, grouping professors,
physicians and landowners100. A new code of legislation should be introduced. The
end of the feudal system and of the partial juridical systems would make it easier to
invest in productive enterprises and this would improve agriculture, trade and
manufactures101. The link between science and economy was crucial to Fiorentino as
it was to the other reformers: trade and nautical science depend "necessarily" on the
sciences of mathematics, physics and chemistry102. But in Naples, Fiorentino says,
there are at most "buoni elementisti" (good writers of textbooks). Specific
institutions should encourage "professors of pure and mixed mathematics" to
cooperate with engineers and other scientists103; the families should address their
children to the study of the sciences; and investments in agriculture should be made
compulsory104. In the present agricultural system (the "badly-understood
agriculture") people are merely employed to survive; instead, agriculture should
provide new capital, and increase the wealth of the nation105. Other claims concern
the importance of a free-trade legislation106, and the abolition of import taxes in
order to increase internal competition107.
These and other similar stories of scientific and civil passion contain a recurrent
pattern. Young students from the provinces of the kingdom are sent to Naples to
study law or medicine, or to enter a military career. They generally complete the
studies, but then are captured by scientific passion. They are attracted —in
particular— by the mathematical sciences and by their applications to practical
problems, from mechanics to agriculture. They study abroad or, if in Naples, with
an unorthodox teacher such as the Bolognese Gerolamo Saladini, or again with Vito
Caravelli (either privately or at the Military Academy). The most brilliant ones end
up teaching at the Military Academy, while the others generally get posts in
provincial colleges. Very few have links with the RUN. The oldest ones took part in
the movement of reform of the 1770s and 1780s, and support the claim that the
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sciences have to be useful to the civil progress of Southern society. They join the
"progressive" branches of freemasonry; in 1786 they are grouped in the lodge of the
Illuminati. At the turn of the 1790s they are attacked by the most conservative
elements of the Neapolitan Church, whose influence is rapidly growing on the
government. Common accusations are those of "atheism" or "indifference" in
religious matters. In 1794 they are more or less directly involved in the Jacobin
conspiracy. Their participation in the Jacobin Republic of 1799 was to be crucial.
Scientifically, they all teach algebra and infinitesimal calculus showing no interest
in pure geometry; they are chiefly interested in the application of calculus to
mechanics and to the physical sciences; they believe that the certainty of
mathematics can be introduced in other branches of human activity, once they have
been rationally re-ordered. They are fascinated by the rational construction of
Lagrange's mechanics (where the whole science of mechanics is analytically derived
from a few fundamental principles), and in their later works they refer to his
algebraized version of calculus.
3.8 Jacobins on Religion: from Institutionalized Knowledge to Personal Faith
From what we have seen up to now, the ex-scolopio Lauberg had been violently anti-
religious in his Neapolitan years. In his political speeches and articles of the period
1796-1799, he continued to condemn institutional religion as an instrument of
oppression in the hands of political power, but he seemed more sensible to the
question of a spiritual inclination in human beings. In 1797 Lauberg gave a speech
at the Constitutional Circle in Milan where he supported the diffusion of
Theophilanthropy, the cult born in France in 1796 to replace Christianity as official
religion108. Catholic reaction to the French Revolution was indeed growing in
strength in France and in Italy, and it was being particularly successful in gaining
popular support. The introduction of the Theophilanthropic cult was a response to
this threat. Theophilanthropy was directly opposed to Catholic Church and to its
temporal structures; so that Catholicism could be held responsible for supporting
despotism and feudalism, without condemning religion tout court. There was
something like a "pure core" which should be extracted from the corrupt structure
of Catholicism, and preserved. The Constitutional Circle in Milan had among its
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duties that of diffusing the Theophilanthropic cult. Matteo Galdi, former student of
Lauberg and the president of the circle, also proposed (in an Apostolic Letter) to
search for a church in the city to be consecrated to the new cult. In spite of these
efforts the cult was not to be successful in the Italian "regenerated" towns. Others,
such as the Jacobin priest Giovanni Ranza (1741-1801), were more inclined towards
a return to the simple Christianity of the primitive church109. This direction was also
advocated by the Jansenist priests, who had joined the Jacobin movement in
significant numbers110. Unlike Theophilanthropy, these rigorous forms of
Christianity had a long tradition inside Catholicism, and they were well grounded
in specific sectors of the Italian middle-classes. In Naples, most of the eighteenth
century fight of the Crown against the Roman Catholic Church had been conducted
by Jansenist clergymen. The expulsion of the Society of Jesus had indeed been one
of their great victories. They had been less successful in trying to eradicate those
forms of superstitious religiosity which were typical of the Neapolitan populace. On
the 25th of December 1797, Lauberg gave a speech at the circle. The speech was on
religion, on the "purest cult" that should be offered to the "Supreme Being"111. He
praised religious freedom, granted by the constitution of the Cisalpine Republic. It
is not in the power of men to condemn someone for his religious beliefs, he argued.
He then explained the meaning of the new cult, which implies love for the Supreme
Being as well as for our fellow humans. Indeed, this is the basic tenet of most of the
traditional religions, once they are purified of their temporal structures. Few basic
principles characterized this "regenerate" religion: God created all men equal; he
has put in their heart the aspiration to conservation and happiness; but individual
happiness depends necessarily on public happiness, so all our efforts must be
directed to the well-being of the entire society. This cult is indeed the most
"conformable to reason" and "advantageous to society". Lauberg concluded: "let us
enter the temple of Reason, daughter of God"112. The following day the frequenters
of the circle agreed that the cult was the most "conformable to nature, to reason,
and that it was worthy of republicans"113.
The polemic against papacy and clergy was intense in those days, and Lauberg
offered his own contribution. He maintained that the properties of the Church were
to return in full to the people, and he described the Pope as, at best, an "assassin"114.
Plans were made for a military expedition against the State of the Church. The
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atmosphere of those crowded and lively assemblies is well rendered by episodes
such as that of the young citizen Sangiorgio, daughter of the chemist Paolo
Sangiorgio (1748-1816), who jumped on the stage and promised her hand to the one
who would bring back the head of the Pope115. When the "theocratic tyrant" was in
fact defeated and departed from Rome, Lauberg hailed the victory of both
republican arms and philosophy. "The monster" — superstitious religion — has been
defeated in Rome, and now "philosophy hunts it down in the most hidden refuges,
and in the heart of man". Against the attempts to restore the old monstrous
principles it will be enough to employ "the weapon of ridicule": "we will laugh at
the Gothic sacerdotal barbarism which is being prepared"116. In 1798, while
directing the newspaper II Redattore, official organ of the Executive Directoire of the
Cisalpine Republic, Lauberg collaborated with a Neapolitan friend, Raffaele Netti
(we cited him earlier as a friend of Giordano and the organizer of a Jacobin
conversazione). He too had fled the country in 1794, to settle in Milan as a bookseller
and an editor. Netti is an extremely interesting case of a revolutionary intellectual,
and his work should be further investigated by historians. His Printing-Office of the
Italian Patriots (Stamperia de'Patrioti d'ltalia) was characterized by publishing
violently anti-religious books and pamphlets. Between 1798 and 1799, Netti
published texts like the Democratic Institutions for the Regeneration of the Italian People,
by the Jacobin Girolamo Bocalosi117; Le bon-sens, ou idees naturelles opposees aux idees
surnaturelles by d'Holbach; Cult et loix d'une Societe sans Dieu, by Sylvain Marechal,
one of the numerous and anonymous Traite des trois imposteurs, and the Hell
Destroyed, or Examination of the Dogma of the Eternity of Punishments by Nicanore
Nicomaco (a pseudonym), where one reads: "Priests! Archimedes looked for a point
outside the world in order to move the world itself. You have found it!" Among the
forthcoming volumes, Le christianisme devoile by Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger (1722-
1759), the Sisteme de la nature, ou des lois du monde physique at du monde moral by
d'Holbach, and an anthology of passages against superstition by eighteenth-century
philosophers were listed118. Lauberg had also translated and edited Helvetius'
L'Esprit, specifically to show to the Italian young the "horrors caused by [the
alliance of] mitre and throne"; Lauberg thought that France itself had not done
enough in this direction. He is caustic against contemplative monastic orders,
whose members "when not doing wrong, are perfect nothingness" and against any
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form of useless anachoreticism119. One should note that Netti did not exclusively
publish books against religion. In 1798 Lauberg translated for him three volumes of
the Lectures for the Normal Schools of France, which included essays by Lagrange,
Laplace, Monge, Volney and others; and he planned to publish a volume of
Republican Speeches. Again, the two sides of the Jacobin battle —scientific and socio-
cultural— seem to be inextricably embedded in the activity of the Neapolitans.
In 1797 Flaminio Massa, a former student of Lauberg and a disciple of Mario
Pagano, was in Pavia, studying mathematics with the well-known mathematician
and Jacobin Lorenzo Mascheroni (1750-1800), who was a deputy of the Cisalpine
Republic. Massa published a History of the Establishment of Christianity, allegedly by
an anonymous "English author"120. In his notes, Massa aimed to ground the morals
of the virtuous citizen on a very different basis than "the monstrous building of
scandalous tales" that "criminal fanatics" and "certain enthusiastic philosophers"
have being defending. Massa referred with blasphemous tones to the removal of the
Madonna di Loreto by the French, and to a public experiment conducted at the
University of Pavia by a certain "professor Nocetti" where the miracle of Saint
January had been reproduced using chemical substances instead of dried blood.
The meaning of such a result could not escape a Neapolitan, given the particular
devotion of the Southerners for the beheaded saint. It has been remarked that the
violent tone of the anti-religious campaign was indeed a distinguishing trait of the
productions of the Neapolitan Jacobins with respect to Jacobins from other Italian
states121.
To sum up, Neapolitan Jacobins directly attacked the institutional dimension of
the Roman Catholic Church and the use of religious knowledge as an instrument of
power. They identified the specific function of institutional religion in the
traditional socio-cultural system. Yet, the destruction of the Church did not imply
the refusal to recognize a spiritual inclination in human beings. New substitutive —
and rather artificial— cults were supported with the aim to reinforce the civil
commitment of citizens. More interestingly, the consistent Jansenist component of
the Jacobin movement proposed to return to the original simplicity of early
Christianity, leaving aside both the baroque religiosity of the Jesuits and the
temporal ambitions of the Roman Church. This call for a regeneration of religion
was indeed rather successful in Naples, particularly among the lower clergy and the
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middle-classes. Essential features of the religiosity supported by the numerous
"Jacobin priests" were the need to retire from the mundane sphere, and the move
away from religion as knowledge to religion as personal belief. As Lauberg said,
religion must not be a matter of legislation. The exit of religion from the realm of
knowledge is very clearly stated in the epistemological work of a Jansenist abbe
who had been a friend and collaborator of Lauberg in Naples, Gennaro Cestari
(1753-1814).
The brother of Giuseppe, whom we encountered when dealing with the
protagonists of the Jacobin conspiracy of 1794, Gennaro Cestari had studied at the
seminar of Naples in the 1770s, under the guidance of the Jansenist ecclesiastic
Giuseppe Simeoli. The seminar was at that time relatively open to French
philosophical and scientific culture, in spite of official prohibitions. Descartes and
Condillac were already well known by Cestari in his years at the seminar as, in
theology, was Gallicanism. In 1780 he published an anti-curial pamphlet in defence
of the rights of the king upon Episcopal benefits and, in 1788, a very successful book
on the right of the king to create bishops, which was reprinted after a few
months122. The book was radical in attributing to the king the right to create bishops
and in denying any supremacy of the Pontiff over the Episcopal community; the
Papal authority is indeed reduced, through historical analysis, to a matter of
"habit". The Archbishop of Naples defined the book as "scandalous, seditious,
dangerous in itself and for its consequences". Ecclesiastical authorities denied
permission for publication. But, in August 1788, the minister of Ecclesiastic Affairs
Carlo De Marco123 — in an unprecedented act of autonomy — claimed that the book
was not heretical, and questioned the very right of the Church to practice
preventive censorship over books printed in the Kingdom of Naples. The book was
published, and it was praised by regalist and Jansenist theologians all over the
Italian peninsula124.
Gennaro and Giuseppe Cestari had both entered Neapolitan "enlightened"
freemasonry, and they both joined the Jacobins at the establishment of the
Neapolitan Republic in 1799. Gennaro was indeed charged to write the official
Christian Catechism of the Republic. His reward for this, at the return of the
Bourbons, was arrest and exile. By 1803 Gennaro Cestari had settled in Milan. He
was reflecting and publishing on the Jacobin experience in Naples, and on its wider
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cultural implications. For Cestari, as for Lauberg and the other Neapolitans, the
"regeneration" of humanity included the regeneration of society, of the morals125, of
the sciences and of religion. And the "organic system" of the "regenerated sciences"
is what Cestari described in his Essay on the Regeneration of the Sciences (1803)126. The
book is an extremely interesting —and rare— document on the epistemological
doctrines of Neapolitan Jacobins, and on the modifications they introduced to the
model of the French Encyclopedie.
Cestari was convinced that, contrary to common opinion, the sciences were in
need of new foundations. Indeed, he spoke for all those "dissatisfied with the
present state of human knowledge"127. Contrary to those who believed that the
sciences were at their highest point, and that only a natural decline could be
expected (e.g. Boscovich, or Algarotti), Cestari claimed that the accumulation of
scientific knowledge was only at its beginning128. Fie compared the construction of
the system of the sciences to the construction of a "complex machine", each of its
parts having a precise function. Similarly, sciences have to be mutually linked "to
form a single whole"129. This provides the "texture of the general system"; then each
science has to progress properly, otherwise the whole system works imperfectly, as
"a machine whose pieces are not fulfilling their proper function". Now, the means
"to recognize the internal and original structure of the system" was twofold. On the
one hand Cestari provided a historical reconstruction of the way in which the
system of the Encyclopedie had been formed ("an historical and progressive guide",
a sort of genetic investigation130); note that this should not go back to Greek and
Roman thought, because "they had no influence on the formation of our present
system"131. From the genetic investigation it emerges that the sciences are not yet
free from the "ancient barbarism", which is well entrenched in language and in the
doctrines taught at the universities. Much of the old philosophy has indeed entered
the system of the Encyclopedie132. These defects are analyzed in the second —
"structural" — part of the book. "It is necessary to create a new foundation for the
whole scientific system, in order to build a completely new order of things, more
coherent with the real progress of the human spirit" Cestari claimed, and to do this
the sciences must be re-ordered according to their relations with the sources of
knowledge: this is indeed what "re-generation of the sciences" means133. Cestari
presented his enterprise against the background of an accurate critique of
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d'Alembert's Discours preliminarie, whose analysis exceeds our present purposes.
Let us sum up Cestari's basic remarks.
First of all, the encyclopedistes have included too much. They betrayed their
original intention of considering only those branches of human knowledge which
are worth their name: that is, the "clear, certain, real and true" ones. As the work
went on, the encyclopedistes kept inserting topics such as "scholastic philosophy",
"rhetoric", or "heraldry" arguing, in the preface to the third volume, that nothing
should be left out of an encyclopedia. As a result the encyclopedia is a mix of
"heterogeneous pieces of knowledge: natural, supernatural, true, false, opinions,
superstitions, conjectures". Another problem is with the "harmony" of their system.
The authors take for granted that a link among their heterogeneous materials does
indeed exist. D'Alembert suggests the genealogical study of the formation of our
ideas as a unifying factor for the system134. The genealogical tree and the
encyclopedic tree do not coincide though, because of historical contingencies.
Different systems are compared by d'Alembert to different mappae mnndi, drawn
using different projections. A "principle of arbitrariness" is thus introduced:
different systems simply offer different perspectives on human knowledge, and the
choice depends on personal preferences, since they are all equivalent. But then,
Cestari remarked, this means that we do not know which is the universal principle
from whence all the connections among pieces of knowledge derive135. The systems
are equivalent "conjectures", their connections are "imaginary" and not real. So
what about our original plan of a scientific system of true knowledge? Another
problem with the encyclopedistes is that they are only interested in deducing and
classifying the speculative faculties of the soul, without considering the "active,
operative faculties", and the crucial role of passions, which are the real source of
every useful invention136.
The solution to these and other related problems lies, according to Cestari, in
founding ex novo a new system based on the new epistemology of the philosoplies,
leaving aside Chambers' and Bacon's systems. We should look for the real
principles of knowledge, and for the real chain of human knowledge. Cestari
advocates rejection of the rather traditional division of human understanding into
the three faculties of memory, reason, and imagination (and the correspondent
division of human knowledge into three main subjects: history, philosophy, and
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fine arts). Bearing in mind Genovesi's Latin logic, Cestari notes that there are
indeed a number of alternative subdivisions of faculties137. Cestari himself seems to
incline towards Condillac's, who admitted only one faculty: sensibility. Overall,
Cestari disliked the choice of "memory" as a primary faculty. Memory depends
entirely on sensibility and perception, and on the capacity of associating ideas; it is
a mere attitude to retain sense impressions138. Instead, the first and fundamental
faculty by which we acquire knowledge seems to him to be "sensibility, or
perception"139. He then claimed that there is also the "faculty of abstraction", which
is precisely what distinguishes humans from animals, and is the origin of the
sciences (a clearly Lockean echo). By abstraction human beings generalize their
ideas, mix them, and proceed to the discovery of truths. All the sciences founded on
the notion of "proportion, order, symmetry, calculation, cause, effect, virtue, vice,
glory, etc." depend on such a faculty for generalization140.
Having adopted a radical sensationalist epistemology, Cestari can criticize
d'Alembert for his "scholastic" division between material and spiritual beings141.
He recalled someone characterizing matter as "brute, inert, coarse, inactive, without
motion, the weakest and most imperfect of all beings, vile, only worthy of being
down-trodden"142. "He sounds like a Manicheist" Cestari commented, "but he is a
modern apologist of the Roman Catholic religion". The point is that this "brute"
matter does not even exist. In fact, what we see is that matter continuously changes
its shapes; its compounds being organized, dissolved and re-organized. A
continuous flux involves all beings, including the sensitive and intelligent ones.
Elementary matter "can be characterized as brute and organized, passive and
active, inert and living, insensible and sensible, depending on its different states"143.
So we should talk of states of matter, not of matter itself (which reminds us of
Pagano on the continuously changing character of nature). Cestari rejects the
"coloured glasses of spirit and matter": they are useless for the investigation of
nature144. With this rejection, Cestari reaches the crucial issue of the relation
between the natural and the supernatural dimension of reality. Bacon and the
encyclopedistes, Cestari says, divided knowledge into knowledge of God and
knowledge of man. But this clearly shows "the great incongruity in placing God
and nature on the same level, as objects of the same science. As if this Supreme
Entity was capable of being known by man" as the sensible things are145. There is no
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such thing as a particular "science of God", and belief that it was "possible to
reason about the nature and the operations of God" has always damaged "the
advancement of true knowledge"146. Contrary to their programmatic indications,
the encyclopedistes considered God as the first (spiritual) object of the sciences, and
placed metaphysics at the basis of their own system147. Cestari, not unlike his
fellow-Jacobins, aimed to free sciences from the "mysterious terms" of metaphysics.
In fact, he says, human beings have no access to any sort of metaphysical reality,
and the preeminence of metaphysics over the sciences is simply due to historical
reasons148. Religion is not a science, and it is not based on reasoning: religion is in
fact "the feeling of subjection to the Author of our being". Religion is not the
product of the progress of the sciences and it is not grounded on any sort of
scientific proof; it is instead caused by a "disposition" of human nature. It is "a
relation between man and God", which can be understood "only by those who feel
the strength of this link"149. This religion take many external forms, like different
theological systems, ceremonies, and practices. But all these forms "have no reality"
apart from that which is received from the essence of religion, i.e. the "internal
feeling"; and "those who lack for whatever reason this religious sentiment cannot
but regard forms of religious life as human inventions, opinions, tales, chimeras".
This being so, one cannot put "the theological systems and the different forms of
cults of the different nations" together with "arithmetic, algebra geometry,
mechanics and astronomy" without making "terrible mistakes". Forms of cults can
be classified, at most, under History, together with other kinds of opinions and
practices. Cestari concludes his work with these remarks on the relation between
natural knowledge and revealed doctrines150. A "separating wall" must be
constructed between "pure reason and reason enlightened by Revelation", between
"divinely revealed doctrines and human speculations", between the human mind
and the human heart. This would bring "multiple advantages": sciences would not
be distracted by extraneous questions, and revealed religion would not depend on
inconstant speculations.
This is how the Jacobin priest Gennaro Cestari, who never rejected his Christian
faith, presented the epistemological shift operated by Neapolitan reformers and
Jacobins. As a result of this shift, legitimate knowledge was defined as only that
grounded on human sensibility and on human natural reason. The epistemological
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divide between the material world (known through physics) and the spiritual
world (known through metaphysics) was rejected. The encyclopedistes were
criticized because their system still, at least formally, shared many properties of
previous systems. The basic problem with their system was the subordination of the
physical sciences to metaphysics. The cause of this problem lay in the fundamental
confusion between religion and science. The solution, and the basis of the
regeneration of the sciences, was a neat separation between science and religious
belief, i.e. the expulsion of religion from the realm of legitimate knowledge.
3.9 The 1799 Republic: Apotheosis and Defeat of Neapolitan Tacobinism
In the Summer of 1794, at the beginning of the trials against the Jacobins, the White
Dragons of the King of Naples were fighting the French in the Po Valley with some
success. Elite cavalry units were indeed the only reliable forces the king could now
count upon, considering the remarkable penetration of Jacobinism in other sections
of the army. At the end of 1798 the French commander in chief of the Italian Army,
General Joubert, planned the invasion of the Southern Kingdom. He asked Lauberg
to join General Championnet in Rome, the starting point of the new campaign.
Lauberg headed a commission of Neapolitan exiles charged with preparing the
terrain for the French occupation. The French found scant resistance by the
Neapolitan army, infiltrated by Lauberg's men. Instead, there was a noteworthy
and unexpected resistance offered by the "low people" of Naples. It was only after
three days of house to house fighting that the French entered the town, with the
crucial support of the fortress's guns, in the hands of Neapolitan Jacobins. A few
days before the Jacobins had proclaimed the birth of the Neapolitan Republic. The
chaotic days of January 1799 tell much about the social fragmentation of late
eighteenth century Neapolitan society. In December 1798, on getting the news of the
poor military actions at the Northern border, the court had moved to Palermo, in
Sicily. At this point the ancient aristocracy claimed its own right to rule the town in
the absence of the king, refusing to recognize the authority of any royal delegate.
Giving new life to medieval institutions, representatives of the families met in their
own parliament (i sedili), which in the last century had been reduced to little more
than a harmless political curiosity. They elected Antonio Minutolo Prince of
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Canosa, one the most conservative elements of the group, to be sent to treat with the
French in the name of "the Town of Naples". Little wonder that Canosa, at the
return of the Bourbon, was charged with conspiracy to establish an aristocratic
republic. Canosa found himself on the same side as the "low people" (popolo basso),
who were planning to resist the devilish and anti-Christian French. Canosa met
General Championnet, and offered him a sum of money not to enter the town;
Lauberg, who was present as Championnet's councillor, insisted that the General
refuse the offer151.
At the end of January 1799, Lauberg was elected President of the Provisional
Government of the Republic of Naples. At his side were the comrades of exile and
those just freed from the fortresses. Vincenzo de Filippis was a member of the
government; Annibale Giordano was in the Military Commission; Nicola Pacifico
was a captain in the Republican Guard; Mario Pagano was called to work on the
constitution of the new republic. Almost everyone involved in the 1794 conspiracy
can be found among the members of the various commissions or in the republican
army, headed by some of Lauberg's colleagues at the Military Academy. The
clergymen Giuseppe Cestari and his brother Gennaro, champions of Jansenism and
anti-curialism in the 1780s, also played important roles. Giuseppe was in the
commission for internal administration. Like Lauberg, he was a radical on the
feudal question: he was for the abolition of feudalism without any from of
compensation. He also ordered the suppression of many monasteries. Gennaro was
in the Ecclesiastical Commission, whose goal was to prepare, together with other
"Jacobin priests" a "catechism of morals" comprehensible to the people, to free it
"from superstition and error". The catechism, clearly Jansenist in its orientation,
made clear that "only under a democracy does man enjoy these rights [equality,
freedom, property, safety], which had been given to him by the Creator, and taken
away by tyranny"; that "the people are the true sovereign"; and that "Christ
recommended democracy". In the last days of the republic, Gennaro ordered the
confiscation of the ecclesiastical silverware in order to finance the Republican
Army.
There is no need to delve into the political history of the five month life of the
Neapolitan Republic, which is well known and not directly relevant to the present
study. Time was too short to introduce any real change in the scientific life of the
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town. Remarkable was the law on the abolition of the feudal system, prepared by
Giuseppe Cestari and Mario Pagano, one of the few to be actually approved152.
Lauberg's political life as president was difficult: he had to mediate between officers
of the French Directoire, willing simply to despoil the country, and local patriots
who believed in the autonomy of the newborn republic. Being a hard-liner on the
feudal question worsened his position. In April he was excluded from the new
government, established with French approval. The most incredible stories ran in
Naples in those days about Lauberg's alleged misconduct; old and new enemies
were taking revenge. The "unfrocked priest" had thus to leave the country, after
risking being lynched by the mob.
Meanwhile, the military situation was rapidly deteriorating. Cardinal Ruffo had
been extremely successful in raising volunteers among Calabrian peasants to fight
under the crossed insignia of the Holy Faith. From February 1799, thousands of
armed peasants followed him, occupying one after another every republican town
of the South-West. The bourgeois landowners and professionals who had planted
trees of liberty in their own squares were victims of indiscriminate massacres and
their properties were sacked. Notorious was the siege and sack of the wealthy town
of Altamura, whose middleclasses had enthusiastically embraced the republican
government. The social dynamics of the crusade against the republicans are
complex and extremely interesting. Not only did Ruffo cleverly exploit the hatred of
the impoverished peasants for the "Jacobin gentlemen"153, but he also recruited
different men to attack different objectives, making the best of secular rivalries
between provincial towns. When the Holy Faith Army met the Russian and Turkish
troops landed on the coast of Apulia the circling manoeuvre was completed, and
the siege of the capital could begin. In the first days of May the French army retired
Northwards, due to the victories of the Austro-Russians in the Po Valley. The only
Republican Guard was now facing the allied troops and the Holy Faith Army. On
the 5th of June, a state of emergency was proclaimed in Naples. On the 13th all those
defending the Republic were at the Ponte della Maddalena, the southern gate of the
town, where the attack had begun early in the morning. It was the day of Saint
Anthony of Padua, patron saint of the Holy Faith Army. Around ten thousand
Republican troops were facing seventy thousand attackers supported by Russian
artillery and by the guns of a British naval squad. After a day of fighting, the
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attacking troops entered the town, joining the "low people" in the sack. A week
later, the surviving Jacobins entrenched in the fortresses of the town were offered
an armistice by the allied generals, and the possibility of reaching France safely.
They were embarked, but Admiral Nelson, backed by the Bourbon and by his own
government, argued that any word given to rebels against the king need not be
kept. New special tribunals were created to try the "rebels", and about one hundred
of them were executed in Piazza Mercato. Some of the people we met in our story
lost their lives in these events. Giuseppe Cestari was killed in the fight at the Ponte
della Maddalena; Mario Pagano was hanged, along with three men who declared
themselves "mathematicians" when arrested: Vincenzo de Filippis, Nicola
Fiorentino, and Nicola Pacifico. Ex-aristocrats, such as Lauberg's student Ettore
Carafa Count of Ruvo were beheaded, in respect of their status. Annibale Giordano
was sent to a fortress, waiting to be executed (but he managed to escape his fate and
to settle in France, where he became an engineer). Gennaro Cestari was exiled.
Many managed to leave the country in the confusion of those days, and to continue
their political battle in France and in Northern Italy.
3.10 Summary
Since the mid-century part of the Neapolitan intelligentsia actively promoted the
study of the "useful" sciences in order to make sense of the Southern natural and
social reality. The "reformers" referred to a set of cultural resources which included
British empiricism, French sensationalism, and the new "analytic spirit" of the
French Encyclo-pedie. Mathematical sciences were crucial in the plans of the
reformers, who aimed to reproduce the certainty of mathematics in political and
social matters. Yet, for specific historical contingencies, they could only rely on a
very elementary level of mathematical teaching. The military academies absorbed
the few mathematicians whose interests covered the recent development of
analysis, and turned them into textbook writers. Collaboration between the
enlightened Bourbon monarchy and the reformers became intense in the 1780s,
when many of them entered the ranks of the administration. This was the decade of
reformist minister Domenico Caracciolo, who threatened the privileges of the
Church and of the feudatories as had never been done before. At the same time, he
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tried to modernize Neapolitan mathematics (he contacted Lagrange and, as we will
see, he criticized anti-analytic mathematicians). This was also the decade of the
successes of Jansenist clergy against the temporal pretensions of the Roman
Catholic Church, which we have referred to by means of the activity of the brothers
Cestari.
Around the mid-eighties it was becoming clear to many that the monarchy had
neither the power nor the will seriously to reform the feudal-communal setting of
the kingdom. The foundation of the anti-despotic lodge of the Illuminati (1786) is
emblematic of this new trend in Neapolitan reformism. I have claimed that the
battle of reformers can be best understood by interpreting it as grounded in a new
structure of knowledge. This was characterized by:
1) an epistemological shift which excluded religious knowledge from the realm of
legitimate knowledge, confining it to that of personal consciousness. This move was
possible because sensation and natural reason were taken as the only reliable
sources of knowledge;
2) the sensationalistic shift in epistemology justified in turn a methodological
unification of the natural sciences and the moral sciences. In principle, the same
criteria must be followed when investigating the laws of nature, the moral laws,
and the laws of society.
At the turn of the 1790s masonic lodges, crucial centres of elaboration of
reformist thought, were gradually transformed into Jacobin clubs. The ideology of
the new conspiratorial organization was inspired by French Jacobinism, but the
themes in focus were essentially those of the previous reformism; indeed many
reformers turned themselves into Jacobins. Neapolitan Jacobinism was pursuing the
objectives of the reformers, all of them related to the abolition of the feudal-
communal system of land and of its economic and juridical implications. Little
wonder that in support of the 1799 Jacobin Republic we find those provincial and
urban middle-class groups who had asked for reforms during the 1780s, while the
"low people" were to march under the standards of the Holy Faith. The socio¬
political thought (and action) of Neapolitan Jacobinism was imbued with the "spirit
of analysis", which pervaded the mathematical sciences and all other forms of
knowledge. Unnoticed by political historians, almost every single noteworthy
figure in Neapolitan Jacobinism had some mathematical —indeed analytic —
154
training (at the private academy of Lauberg and Giordano, at the Military
Academy, or abroad). A basic understanding of the working of the analytic method
in mathematics was, I maintain, an essential part of their being Jacobins, as was
republicanism and religious indifference. Far from being a useful "cover", as
argued by other students of Neapolitan Jacobinism, the academy of Lauberg and
Giordano is a key-point in understanding the nature of the movement. Here their
specific social goals shaped the new scientific knowledge which in turn was to
legitimize the immediate political and revolutionary action. One and the same way
of thinking —or savoir-faire— pervaded their social theories, their organizing
structure (the Society grouping the Jacobin clubs), their theory of knowledge, and
their problem-solving methods in mathematics. This was the analytic savoir-faire,
something that everyone could learn simply by looking at his own mind working
"naturally". Analyzing phenomena in their elementary constituents, and then
observing the natural relations among these constituents and the necessary order
which connect them to each other. This was the true method in mathematics, as
everywhere else in the realm of knowledge.
The supposed "neutrality" of science has prevented historians from recognizing
in the regenerated natural and mathematical sciences of the Jacobins the print of
their social and political aspirations154. The image of "nature", the "natural way of
reasoning" and the "scientific knowledge" on which they based their own political
system are social productions whose nature is essentially connected with the
demand for overcoming the feudal-communal system of land. As in the case of the
reformers, the administration of the state and the entrepreneurial activities of
private individuals (the industrianti) are detached from any metaphysical
consideration. It was precisely on a metaphysical system such as that ridiculed by
Cestari, that the feudal jurisdiction and legislation were grounded. The de-
legitimization of this kind of scholastic metaphysical knowledge (a la Wolff), the
shift of religious knowledge "from the mind to the heart", and the resulting new
autonomy of the moral and natural sciences —which are "naturalized" and re¬
organized in a new analytic structure — were the indispensable cultural resources to
support the social critique of the feudal-communal system.
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Chapter Four
The Knowledge of Reaction: Religion and Society
At the beginning of the 1799 revolution, Fergola had left Naples for the quiet hill of
Capodimonte, a few miles east of the town. "Not agreeing with the new political
aspirations, he remained forgotten and isolated during the whole revolutionary
epic", one biographer wrote1. The see of his school of geometry at the Collegio del
Salvntore (College of the Savior) was transformed, under the republic, into a military
hospital. When Fergola returned to Naples, in Autumn 1799, he found himself
charged with the re-organization of scientific and mathematical education in the
restored kingdom. This, and the next chapter, are devoted precisely to investigating
the reasons for the predominance of the synthetic approach to mathematics around
1800. I shall argue that Fergola's approach —like Lauberg's— was shaped by
specific cultural and social goals, and that the fortune of his school cannot be fully
assessed without considering the socio-political process of the "return to order".
Thus, as an introduction to the analysis of Fergola's work, we shall look at the
salient aspects of the response of Catholic culture to both the external attacks of
eighteenth century philosophers and to the internal criticisms of reformers such as
the Jansenists. It is as part of this general reaction of Catholic culture against the
"culture of the century" that Fergola's approach to science and mathematics is best
understood.
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King Ferdinando IV of Naples, Restorer of the True Faith (1799)
4.1 Early Reactionary Catholicism
During the second half of the eighteenth century the Roman Catholic Church
assumed a position of intransigent reaction against the culture "of the century"2.
The rejection of the modern vision of the world was evident since the beginning of
the pontificate of Clemens XIII, in 1758. The fight against the philosophes, according
to the Pontiff, had to be the common aim of both the Church and the monarchies. In
an early version of the throne and altar argument, the Roman curia had identified
the roots of the political culture of the philosoplies in the corruption of fundamental
moral and religious values. This corruption, which stemmed from the original
rebellion of the Protestant Reform, would eventually generate a crisis of European
culture and society. From this perspective, the only possibility for Christian society
to escape self-destruction was to return to a pseudo-medieval theocratic structure,
where the Pontiff was charged with the crucial, temporal role of mediator between
the monarchies and the peoples.
The short pontificate of the moderate Clemens XIV saw a limitation of the
temporal pretensions of the Church, and the abolition of the Society of Jesus (1773),
following the intense anti-Jesuit campaign of most European monarchies. The
reaction of the conservative clergy was marked by a flourishing of anti-modern
publications. Meanwhile, an unprecedented series of supernatural phenomena,
such as prophetic signs and mystic visions, was registered all over Europe. These
were interpreted by conservative clergy as announcing an incoming divine
intervention to punish the impious actions of the Pontiff and of the "enlightened"
monarchies, which were fighting their own battle to strip the Church of its
traditional social functions. The accounts of these super-natural phenomena, the
renewal of superstitious practices and cults by intransigent clergy, and the activity
of propaganda performed by the semi-clandestine network of the "Christian
Friendships" (.Amicizie Cristiane)3, where many ex-Jesuits were continuing their anti-
modern campaign, were to be the sources of Reactionary Catholicism. This was a
theological, cultural and political movement which enjoyed a remarkable success in
France, Italy and Germany between 1790 and 1830.
The condemnation of "modern philosophy" is clearly stated in the encyclical
Inscrutabile divinae sapientiae (1775) by Pope Pius VI who openly supported the anti-
modern trend. The encyclical saw in the spread of atheism the main cause for the
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dissolution of social structure, a thesis which was essential to Reactionary Catholic
thought. In the 1780s, the role of the Church in maintaining social stability was
stressed in the articles of The Ecclesiastical Journal of Rome. But the Church was not a
monolithic bloc. The reactionary trend, supported by the Pontiff and the curia, was
contested by internal movements aiming to renew the structure of the Church and
to re-define its role inside society. Jansenism was the most influential among these
movements, its rigorous moral connotations providing strong theological support to
national governments in their fight against the economic and cultural pretensions of
the Roman Church. The crisis of the temporal power of the Church was taken by
Jansenist ecclesiastics as an opportunity to return to the original spirit of the
evangelic message, and to the original poverty of the Church. This internal debate
and the very possibility of reforming the Church from the inside came suddenly to
an end with the anti-Christian policy of the newborn French Republic. In fact, the
1790s saw the elaboration of a well structured response by the Church to the
encyclopedic system of thought of the philosophes, which was taken as directly
responsible for the "great insurrection", the French Revolution. Catholic authors
dealt with two main themes: on the one hand they provided an idealized
representation of the political life of the Middle Ages (when the authority of the
Pontiff guaranteed the stability of the social setting of the res publica Christiana); on
the other, they attacked the culture of the eighteenth century. Jansenists,
freemasons, philosophes, and Jacobins were, from this perspective, the authors of a
single, enormous conspiracy against the Church and against society4.
In 1796, the passage of the French Army through the countryside of Northern
Italy was surrounded by a new series of disquieting miracles and terrible visions, as
rural populations experienced the anti-religious policy of the new Republican and
philo-French governments as dissolving those fundamental social links which had
informed their life under the ancien regime. Between 1796 and 1799, in the
"regenerated" towns, religious reformist movements experimented with new forms
of religious life, under the protection of the Republican governments. We have seen
some of this ferment when dealing with Lauberg's participation in the regeneration
of Northern Italian towns. Since 1799, with Napoleon's normalization of the
revolution and the fall of the Jacobin republics in Italy, the debate inside the
Catholic Church was restricted to that between the pragmatic supporters of a
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Napoleonic "Neo-Costantinism" and the ultra-reactionary elements grouped
around the medieval theocratic project. These, who had firstly operated in the
Christian Friendships, introduced into Italy the themes of French Traditionalism. In
the same years, the number and relevance of the "popular missions" increased. The
missions, initially organized and directed by the Jesuits, had the goal of re-grouping
people around the parishes and, more specifically, of diffusing a kind of baroque
religious devotion which was at odds with Jansenist rigor and individualism. The
cults of the Sacred Heart of Jesus (symbol of the Vandean Counter-Revolution), of
the Sacred Blood of Jesus, of the Virgin Mary, of the saints and of the holy images
were supported and organized by the missions.
Among the books which contributed to the early elaboration of Catholic
Reactionary thought, were the very popular The Rights of Man (1791) by Nicola
Spedalieri (1740-1795)5, and the Theological-political Letters (1794) by Pietro
Tamburini6. They were the first consistent response of Catholic thought to the
events of the French Revolution, and were written by two ecclesiastics. The first,
published with the approval of the Roman curia, was an interesting attempt to
combine a theocratic conception of power with the principle of popular sovereignty.
Christianity is presented as the necessary foundation of society and the only
defense against the excesses of a popular government. In fact, the "real" human
rights which are clearly stated in the Gospel, have been suppressed by the French
Revolution. Any attempt to built a society based on "natural" or deistic principles is
doomed to failure. Atheism, religious reformism, Jansenism, the French Revolution,
are deadly enemies to those who want to save the very possibility of a civil society.
Spedalieri asks the monarchies to renounce their reformist policies (the regalist,
anti-curial and anti-feudal trend of the eighteenth century), and to return to the
Church its ancient privileges and its central position in social life. Otherwise,
Spedalieri threatened, the Church could finalize its theocratic project with the
support of the new democratic governments.
Tamburini's book was a reply to Spedalieri by a counter-revolutionary Jansenist.
Spedalieri had denounced the dangerous, hidden alliance between regalist policy,
Jansenist reformism and revolutionary ideas. In fact, during the 1790s, Italian
sovereigns were abandoning the reformist policy supported by Jansenist clergymen
to approach the reactionary position of the Roman Church. Tamburini tries to
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oppose this political re-orientation, by arguing that Jansenists cannot be confused
with revolutionaries, because they recognize the divine origin of monarchic power.
Reversing current criticisms, Tamburini claimed that the moral rigor of Jansenism
turns the religious man into a faithful subject1.
Another very interesting piece of information about the early diffusion of
reactionary thought in Italy is provided by the 1789 essay "Some Thoughts on the
French Revolution", by the democratic thinker Pietro Verri. Verri described the
growing hostility expressed by the Italian upper classes towards the developments
of the French Revolution. FFe observed that
the more essential and concrete principles about government, about human
rights, and about the nature of monarchy — principles so simple that they are
norms among the savage tribes— are called, among us, metaphysical
principles. 8
This means that the accusation of "abstractness" and "artificiality", referring to the
principles of the French Revolution, was already widespread in Italy. This
argument was to be one of the central points of the theoretical elaboration of
Reactionary Catholicism. Verri reported that part of the Italian intelligentsia was
turning its initial enthusiasm for the Revolution into fear and hate for Jacobinism.
The anti-religious policy of the French Republic, which resulted in the "civil
constitution of the clergy" (1790), was certainly a crucial factor for the consolidation
of the intransigent position inside the Church. Still, in the Italian states a minority of
"Jacobin priests" remained active during the 1790s, preaching the "democratic
message" of the Gospel; and a number of them, as we have seen, were to share the
gallows with Neapolitan Jacobins.
Revolutionary ideas (which would later be re-elaborated into liberal positions)
continued to be popular among important sectors of the Italian middle classes. The
adoption of democratic and egalitarian ideas had been facilitated by the previous
diffusion of the culture of Enlightenment in the Italian states. A crucial factor was
the generalized crisis of the socio-economic structures of the ancient Italian states. A
still economically powerful feudal aristocracy shared with the Church the
ownership of the majority of land, and enjoyed a number of privileges such as tax
exemptions and special jurisdictions. Economic crisis pushed these aristocratic
landlords to increase the pressure on tenants and day-labourers, mainly by
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restoring forgotten medieval rights and enclosing (abusively) portions of the once-
communal land. This form of "aristocratic reaction" was only increased by the new
threatening competition of the active bourgeois landowners (recall the industrianti
defended by Neapolitan reformers). They were very soon to constitute the backbone
of the Italian landed middle class. Relations among these social groups were
complex and continuously re-negotiated. So, for instance, bourgeois landowners
and peasants were allied in the fight against feudal and ecclesiastical rights over
land and production; bourgeois landowners and landed aristocracy were sharing
among themselves the communal lands, they were contesting the communal rights
of peasants, and applauded the suppression of landowning monasteries; landed
aristocracy and peasants were defending the existence of the feudal-communal
system of land, by which they were granted certain basic rights threatened by the
new bourgeois model of "full ownership" of land. What is certain is that the old
socio-political setting was inadequate for the new kind of society which was
emerging during the second half of the century. The fact that in Italy we do not find
revolutionary ideas before 1789 —but instead a number of reformist projects— can
perhaps be linked to the predominance of landed bourgeoisie among the emerging
classes.
The Italian Jacobin movement took shape in the 1790s, and it produced the short
experience of the Jacobin republics (1796-1799). After the crucial break of 1799, the
Italian middle classes were to express their moderate social and political aspirations
in the forms of political and economic liberalism and of the clandestine patriotic
movements, aiming to unify Italian states under a modern constitutional monarchy.
When we look at the specific case of the Kingdom of Naples, we find that this
general description of social conflict is in fact radicalized, due to the unusual power
of Southern feudatories, to the remarkable influence of the Church, and to the
extreme poverty of agricultural laborers. In short, in the Southern kingdom the
feudal-communal system was much more an obstacle for landed bourgeoisie than
in any other Italian state. One can thus expect that Naples was one of the main
centers for the elaboration of reactionary thought, and indeed this was the case.
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4.2 Religion and Society in French Traditionalism
Catholic culture had provided early responses to the Revolution with authors such
as Spedalieri and Tamburini. But it is in France that Reactionary Catholicism
emerged, since the mid-1790s, as an organic corpus of religious and philosophical
doctrines. The reason is to be found in the deep crisis undergone by Catholicism in
France since 1790, a crisis which was cultural as well as social and economic. In its
French form, Reactionary Catholicism is known as "Traditionalism", and its
elaboration was mainly due to the work of Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald and
Felicite de Lamennais, two aristocrats and one ecclesiastic respectively.
Traditionalist writings have been described by Catholic historians as part of a more
general renewal and reinvigoration of Catholic thought after the rather mediocre
theological and moral production of the eighteenth century; indeed as "a real
spiritual spring"9. The spread of the popular missions was one of the first signs of
the new reactionary spirit10. At the end of the Empire, missionaries began their
work to bring France back to Catholicism in the shortest time possible. There was
neither space for compromise, nor for internal debate. Gallicanism and Jansenism
were fought as vigorously as was atheism. The Church must return to the center of
society: this social goal was primary, and it overcame any other theological
preoccupation. Thus the stress on symbolism, on public forms of worship, on
processions; every single moment of human activity must be signed by Catholic
symbols. This missionary renewal was accompanied, in ecclesiastical culture, by an
unprecedented preeminence of apologetics over other kinds of theological
production. The traditional theological controversies were largely abandoned in
favor of the new "demonstrations" of the existence of God, of the immateriality of
the soul, of the necessity and social utility of religion11.
At the fall of the Napoleonic Empire those counter-revolutionary elements in
French Catholicism which had been active since the 1790s took the lead in this
movement of renewal, and tried to establish its hegemony over the whole of
Catholic culture in France. There were a few crucial elements m French
Traditionalism which are worth underlining, before moving back to Italy.
Traditionalist authors began to publish during the Republic and the Empire.
Maistre's Considerations sur la France and Bonald's Theorie dn pouvoir politique et
religieux were published in 1796; Lamennais' Reflexions sur Vetat de I'eglise en France
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pendant le XVIIe siecle et sa situation actuelle in 1808. Such writings were prepared in
response to the exceptional situation of France: every available cultural resource,
from the fathers of the Church, to Bossuet, to Rousseau, had to be employed in
order to attack the new culture and the new society. As a result, going through the
massive out-put of Traditionalists is a supremely tedious experience. Every single
argument, whatever its nature and its premises, ends up reinforcing one or other of
the few basic tenets of the doctrine. The monotony of the content is only partially
compensated by the indisputable writing skills of the authors (the cynical irony of
de Maistre, the poetical sensibility of Lamennais). Among the tenets of their
doctrines was the identification of social crisis and religious crisis, both originating
from the "pride" of human reason, and whose first manifestation was the religious
reform of the sixteenth century. The restoration of the "principle of authority" both
in the Church and in the state was, consequently, the primary goal of
Traditionalists. Every author contributed to this program from a somewhat
different perspective.
Maistre, from the province of Savoy, in the Kingdom of Piedmont, ridiculed the
ideals of the Revolution, the principles of the Enlightenment and the pride of the
modern sciences. He showed the paradoxes and the "artificiosity" of both
encyclopedic knowledge and constitutional forms of government. The Traditional
order had been broken, and it must be restored, in knowledge as in society. In
knowledge, human reason must recognize its own limits: "the masterpiece of
reason is to discover where to stop reasoning"12. Reason is nothing more than "a
trembling light", unable to guide human action without the support of the dogmas
of Tradition: "this is what man needs, not unfounded systems based only on what
they call reason and which is simply reasoning; man needs prejudices, practical rules,
sensible, material, palpable ideas"13. Equally abstract and misleading is the notion
of "man", as a universal concept. There never existed anything known as "the
man", to which laws should be referred; there only existed specific people, and
specific, locally valid civil laws. The idea that laws must be written down in the
form of a constitution is a symptom of crisis of the institution: "the more one writes,
the more the institution is weak"14. In politics, Maistre criticized any form of
contractualism. There never existed such a thing as the absolute "state of nature", so
the origin of society was necessarily transcendent. "To talk of nature as opposed to
170
society is to talk nonsense", Maistre wrote criticizing Rousseau15. In fact, the
evidence is that society and sovereignty appeared together; that of the original
covenant being only a myth. And the only plausible explanation is that God himself
created human society and gave to it its original laws. God is then the only
legitimate legislator, and the real source of sovereignty. What is left to men is the
mere re-elaboration and codification of the original divine legislation. Indeed, "one
of the greatest errors of this century was to believe that political constitutions were
a human creation; and that a constitution can be made as a clock is"16. This is why
"the greatest calamity of the universe has always been philosophy, which is human
reason acting on its own"17. A constitution is the useless attempt to write down the
rules of the form of life of a specific nation, whose origin is transcendent.
Consequently, sovereignty is essentially absolute, indivisible, and unaffected by
any mundane limitation. Whatever the form of a state is, power must be in the hand
of a single actor, and must be absolute, according to the principle that princeps
solutus est legibus. This makes monarchy the most "natural" form of government,
even if specific local conditions have always to be taken into account in such
considerations. In fact, "the art of reforming governments does not consist in
subverting and re-building them according to certain ideal theories, but rather in
bringing them back to those internal and hidden principles discovered in the
ancient times"18. Prior to writing and to complex culture is the intuitive knowledge
about nature and society that God himself gave to mankind. This knowledge is
essentially non-discursive, and every attempt to conceptualize and systematize it
would end up compromising its truth ("writing is always a sign of weakness, of
ignorance, of danger; the more perfect an institution is, the less it writes").
The only antidote to the disruptive action of individual reason is the defense of
the "organic" and "compact" world of European Christianity. Sceptical about the
effects of the Vienna Congress, Maistre presented in his Of the Pope (1819) an
ambitious theocratic project. Europe can be saved only by the Catholic principle,
according to which truth and authority are one and the same thing. Indeed, the
metaphysical principle of the "unity of authority" finds its best expression in the
conjunction of spiritual infallibility and temporal sovereignty. The absolute
authority of the Pontiff is of the same kind as that of kings, but much superior as it
is "universal". The authority of the Pope is then the necessary basis for every
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temporal authority; take this basis away, and the whole society would collapse.
"There is no society without government, no government without sovereignty, no
sovereignty without infallibility"; infallibility is "absolutely necessary" to avoid the
dissolution of society. Maistre's considerations on power are, so to speak,
"structural"; he did not deny that the exercise of power of certain monarchs can be
tyrannical —but this is not the point. Such contingent factors do not affect the
argument for the necessity of the integrity and infallibility of power. Europe has to
find its way between the "two abysses" of tyranny and anarchy: only the supreme
authority of the Pope —as universal mediator between peoples and temporal
sovereigns— can save it from self-destruction, in the form of a modern res publica
Christiana.
Bonald worked on grounding these tenets on a sound philosophical basis. The
restoration of the principle of authority can be successfully completed only by
rejecting the "individualistic philosophy" of the eighteenth century (by which he
refers to both sensationalist and rationalist trends). The focus of philosophical
reflection must move from the single individual to society as a whole. Indeed,
Bonald found it overly abstract to study the natural constitution "of man"; what one
can do instead is to study man as shaped by society, since "man only exists in
society". This means every contractualist theory about society must be rejected, as
society "preexists" man. Its origin is, in fact, divine. In this perspective, Bonald can
provide a metaphysical foundation for the claims of the contemporary apologetic
production. So, for instance, the crucial alliance between absolute monarchy and the
Catholic Church is justified by referring to the "natural constitution" given by God
to both society and the Church19. If in Maistre it is Providence that guides —often
mysteriously— the history of mankind, in Bonald the inclination of religious and
social life towards specific forms of organization (i.e., absolute monarchy and the
Catholic Church) is due to metaphysical necessity. The nature of the elements
which form each "society" determines the tendency towards specific forms of social
and religious life, which are not the result of calculation, but the incarnation of the
divine "constitution" of these two societies (by "constitution" Bonald means here
the set of necessary relations existing among the elementary components). This
tendency can be temporarily contrasted by ill-judged human action, but in the end
the "real constitution" will always impose its necessary relations. According to
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Bonald power is essentially absolute, indivisible, and its fragmentation coincides
with the disintegration of society, when in the absence of a true "general" power,
everyone exercises his own "private" power. Nature reacts to such deviations with
"violent explosions", such as revolutions. When dealing with the "natural laws of
social order", Bonald is particularly explicit about the function of religion and
knowledge in preserving traditional social order:
Existence et unite de Dieu, spiritualite et immortalite del'ame, ces dogmes
sont vrais parce qu'ils sont utiles a la conservation de la societe civile [...].
Tout ce quie est utile a la conservation de la societe est necessaire: tout ce qui
est necessaire est une verite: done toute les verites sont utiles aux hommes ou
a la societe; done tout ce qui est dangereux pour l'homme et pour la societe est
une erreur.20
Particularly successful was Bonald's social theory of language. Language is
described as necessary to articulate the most simple thoughts, so that it is
impossible for language to be the product of a human invention: "man cannot
invent without thinking, and he cannot think without signs". Typically, Bonald
concluded that "one must refer to a being other than man to explain [...] the art of
expressing our thoughts through words"21. The basic elements of language are a
divine gift. God gave them to mankind, and in them were already deposited all the
basic truths about nature, religion and society. These truths manifested themselves
through the historical use of language; the result of this historical process was the
creation of a cultural and social Tradition (the Hebraic-Christian one), which must
be held as the only guide in political action. Such a theory of language allowed
Bonald to defend a form of "social innatism", which differs from Maistre's Platonic
innatism. The theological resonance of Bonald's argument is clear: as God is known
only through its word, so the laws of society are only known through our common
language, i.e. through Tradition. From language, which is conceived as coextensive
with thought, mankind receives the idea of God which provides the basis for any
other idea, from that of human reason to moral, social and political ideas22.
Consequently, truth cannot be achieved individually; it manifests itself in Tradition
through language. It follows that eighteenth century ideological investigations
inspired by Locke are useless exercises where the human spirit "extenuates,
consumes and desiccates itself in a sterile self-contemplation"23; because it is
"outside" that we have to look, when searching for "the certain basis of human
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knowledge", and for "the criteria to tell truth from error". This basis must be
external, but not material; objective, but not sensible; and it must be a priori, certain.
It is language, the words, which "make" man as well as society. Note that the
possibility of a materialistic foundation of knowledge and society is ruled out by
Bonald, who argued, against the physiological foundation of reason theorized by
the ideologists (he referred explicitly to Cabanis), that matter and spirit are
completely separated; that intelligence is substantially different from the body and
it is in fact "served by the organs"24.
Lamennais, the youngest among these Traditionalist authors, defended the same
principles well into the age of the Restoration. He was less inclined to use that
pseudo-medieval mythology which abounds in the writings of Maistre and Bonald;
instead he was at the forefront of the religious debate for an authentic spiritual
renewal of the Church. He himself was an ecclesiastic, and his influence on Italian
Reactionary Catholicism was certainly deeper than that of the previous authors. In
his writings we find again the issues of the organic relation between social and
religious principles; of the Reform as original rebellion against the divine order; of
the essentially subversive function of the main philosophical and theological
doctrines of the eighteenth century, from rationalism and sensationalism to
Gallicanism and Jansenism. Lamennais' most original claims are those relative to
the attribution of grave political and moral responsibilities to the monarchies: they
have in fact caused the recent social disorders by supporting reformism in society
and religion. Indeed, Lamennais theorized the supremacy of religious authority
over civil authority: Europe must become a single great theocracy. Lamennais soon
became the most read of the Traditionalists; his Essai sur Vindifference en matiere de
religion (first volume published in 1817) sold around forty thousand copies25. The
book criticized the increasing secularization of culture and society, and it pointed to
the theocratic form of state as the solution to disorder and violence. The target of
the book is not some specific erroneous doctrine, but the modern "spirit of
indifference". This is the attitude of those philosophers who have renounced any
search for truth, who do not believe in God, and do not even care to deny him; who
do not commit themselves to any doctrine. It is a state of "spiritual sleep", the
"tomb of intelligence", the nihilistic conclusion of the philosophy of the
Enlightenment26. Under the label of "religious indifference" Lamennais grouped a
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number of different positions whose common aspect was the non-recognition of the
supreme authority of the Catholic Church and, in its structure, of the Pontiff.
Lamennais analyzed instrumentalist visions of religion, deism, and Protestantism,
and concluded that all these positions lead, ultimately, to atheism and to the
divinization of human reason. The terrible effects of these theoretical positions
upon social order had been clearly shown by the Revolution. Following a typical
argumentative form of Traditionalist literature, Lammenais moved from the alleged
effects of certain ideas to their theoretical evaluation. Again we find the idea that
human reason must know its limitations, as man alone cannot know any certain
truth. One should indeed distinguish between the capacity to know, to "perceive"
truth, and the operation of reasoning, which is "the spiritual operation by which
one discovers relations among known truths and deduces consequences from
them". It is with reference to this second sense that "reason" is said to be weak,
erroneous and insufficient. In fact, the complete knowledge of a truth excludes
reasoning, as it is a perfectly clear intuition. But if reasoning (raisonnement) is
deceptive, how can something be certainly known? The only guarantee is common
sense (sensus communis), the universal consensus. Like Bonald, Lamennais provides
a "social" alternative to individual reason as a source of certainty. Every sort of
knowledge, from social relations, to justice, to morals, is grounded in the authority
of the universal consensus; certainty is a social production27. Common sense
supports the fundamental truth, the existence of God, and from this knowledge
every other knowledge descends. Individual reasoning is then contrasted with
believing what the common sense states. To believe is to respect a testimonial, and to
obey an authority. Only authority can tell truth from error, and then only authority
can point at the true religion. Believing in the autonomy of individual reason is the
great error of modernity: the self-foundation of individual reason cannot but end up
in scepticism. All this proves the invincible necessity to believe; and indeed faith is
the foundation of human reason, as it provides the basic truths on which reasoning
can be performed. Traditionalists never detach their epistemological and
ontological considerations from the political dimension. So, Lamennais says, the
political equivalent of the primacy of individual reason over authority and common
sense is the democratic doctrine (democraticisme). In a democracy, nothing is stable,
everything changes following passions and opinions, so that the people and their
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leaders are "dragged" towards destruction. Once again, Christianity is in fact the
only antidote to social crisis28.
The remarkable success of Traditionalist authors shows that the cultural
atmosphere was favorable to the reception of such themes, and to a new mystical
form of religiosity. Think of the reverberations caused by of Fredrick Schlegel's
conversion to Catholicism in 1802, for instance; or of the enormous popularity of
Chateubriand's Genie du Christianisme oil beautes de la religion chretienne (1802).
Chateubriand presents Christianity as crucial to the spiritual life of Europeans. His
Christianity is nostalgic and filtered by an aesthetic sensibility, the underlying
assumptions being those of Traditionalism. An overview of the contents of this
book can provide an idea of the features of this new apologetic literature
specifically designed for the wider (non-ecclesiastic) public. The goal of the book
was to contribute to the restoration of the positive influence of revealed religion
upon every aspect of human life. In the first part of the book the dogmas and the
"mysteries" of Catholicism are presented, and their truth is defended according to
the new apologetic style; the notions of vice and virtue are discussed; the existence
of God is proved "par les mervailles de la nature"; the immortality of the soul is
proved "par la morale et le sentiment". The second part deals with the "poetics of
Christianity", and the main topics are: the poetical work of Christian authors
(including Dante and Milton); the allegorical (Christian) meaning of Greek
mythology; the nature and importance of passions (religion itself is described as a
passion); the nature of the supernatural entities. The third part deals with fine arts,
philosophy, and history as inspired by religious feelings; atheism is recognized as
the main cause of the historical decline of taste and ingenuity. The fourth part deals
with various aspects of Catholic worship, which includes the furniture of the
churches, the religious songs, the prayers, funerals, the mass, the regulations for the
clergy, the missions, the military orders, and so on. The book is concluded by a
chapter entitled "services rendus a la societe par le clerge et la religion Chretienne
en general".
A few central themes are obsessively recurrent in Traditionalist literature. They
are all part of a reaction against the process of secularization of state, society and
culture. The process had been evident during the whole century, but its speed
increased dramatically with the Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire. The way to
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reverse this process was, to their eyes, to restore the "principle of authority" both in
politics and in religion. The authority of the Church must not be discussed, it is the
repository of absolute truth; and inside the Church, the authority of the Pontiff is
supreme and ultimate. Consequently Traditionalists focus upon certain aspects of
religious experience while underplaying others. The institutional, hierarchical
dimension and the missionary spirit are predominant, as the need to reconstruct the
lost unity of the Christian society; conversely, the sense of grace and the individual
dimension are absent. The contact between God and the believer is presented as
necessarily mediated by a number of different institutions whose authority is itself
absolute and unquestionable. On the political side, Traditionalists asked for the
unity and the absolute independence of sovereignty; any constitutional concession
would necessarily result in political chaos. The modern state is founded on the
contingent interests of the ruling groups, which makes it essentially unstable;
contrarily, the Traditionalist state is grounded upon transcendental and immutable
values derived by the revealed religion and by its historical incarnation, Tradition
(to be found in language, or in common sense). Traditionalists are inspired by the
pre-modern state, where "not only did one not think of separating the Church from
the state, but the very idea of such a separation was inconceivable, it was
meaningless"29. Consequently, they opposed strenuously the secularization of
education; the abolition of religious censorship; and any form of religious tolerance
(which is equated with "indifference"). Another crucial target was the process of
political and administrative centralization of the state, which had reached its most
advanced stage under the Empire. It has been remarked that behind the presence of
this anti-centralist theme were "the forces of the ancien regime which, by the pen of
Chateaubriand, demanded the restoration of the ancient local autonomies as the
presupposition of an aristocratic revival"30. We can add that, as it emerged from our
previous considerations on the Neapolitan feudal-communal system of land, the
interests supporting local autonomies and intermediate bodies were not only those
of the ancient feudatories, but they could be of a very different nature.
Unlike ordinary counter-revolutionary literature, the work of the Traditionalists
was intended not simply to fight the revolutionary principles, but to show their
irrational and unnatural character. The principle of sovereignty is transcendent, and
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individual human reason is subordinate to the pre-conceptions of Tradition.
Revolution is in-human and, in the end, its is logically impossible.
4.3 Reactionary Catholicism in the Italian States
The diffusion of forms of intransigent Catholicism in the Italian states was
characterized by specific circumstances which differentiated them in many ways
from French Traditionalism. I shall henceforth use the general term "Reactionary
Catholicism" when referring to the productions of Italian authors. Essentially, they
had to face a situation which was not as radically changed as the French situation.
The political forms of the restored Italian states and the presence of the Church in
their internal affairs were indeed relatively close to the pre-Revolutionary situation.
Another crucial point is that in the Italian states the control of the Roman curia was
much more effective. The fortune of the "ultramontane" authors (as the Italians
called those close to French Traditionalism) was thus linked to the political and
theological orientations of the Roman curia and of its docile and faithful instrument:
the restored Society of Jesus.
It was only after 1820 that Reactionary Catholicism appeared to be well
organized all over Italy. By that time, a network of personal relations,
correspondence, periodicals and publishers was working efficiently to diffuse the
work of French Traditionalism and of Italian intransigent Catholic authors of the
eighteenth century. Unlike in France, the movement was mainly composed of
ecclesiastics, whose action was directly supported by the restored governments.
Three main centers were the backbone of the movement: Turin in the North;
Modena in the Center; and Naples in the South. Not surprisingly they had been the
centers where early forms of intransigent Catholicism had already been elaborated
by local ecclesiastics in the late eighteenth century. This cultural heritage, and the
fact that they were host to three of the most conservative regimes in the peninsula,
favored their emergence as main centers of Reactionary Catholicism. A necessary
condition for an incisive action of the reactionary groups was indeed the rejection
by local governments of any regalistic and jurisdictionalist policy.
In 1817 the "Christian Friendship" founded by the ex-Jesuit Diessbach in Turin
around 1780 was transformed in a "Catholic Friendship". Its goal was the diffusion
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of "good press", which included pieces by Gerdil, Bossut, Marchetti, Haller, Bonald,
and Lamennais31. The association had a distinctive aristocratic and anti-bourgeois
nature, the same as was well exemplified by the Piedmontese Maistre. The
aristocratic group was close to the government, which had been completing the
most radical return to the past to be seen in Italy (which included: abolition of every
law issued after 1800 and a return to the 1770 statutes; abolition of the Napoleonic
code; restitution of education to the Jesuits; restoration of guilds, corporations and
internal barriers; limitations over import and export; expulsion of compromised
professors from the university). Similarly, in the small Duchy of Modena, one finds
the ideal political conditions for the constitution of an active reactionary group. The
safe town of Modena was to be a core of the whole Italian movement.
From 1820, Reactionary Catholics founded their periodicals. The first one was the
Neapolitan Ecclesiastic Encyclopedia, directed by the Theatin Gioacchino Ventura in
1821. We will consider the work of Ventura in the next paragraph, when dealing
with the Neapolitan situation. In 1822 The Friend of Italy began to be published in
Turin under the direction of Marquis Cesare d'Azeglio. The attachment to the
legitimate dynasty and to the Pope is the line of this rather poor periodical. In the
same year The Memoirs of Religion, Morals, and Literature appeared in Modena,
directed by the ecclesiastic Giuseppe Baraldi (1788-1832), professor of Ethics at the
local university, and with the collaboration of well-known academics such as the
mathematician Paolo Ruffini. The ideological framework was the same for the three
journals, but the tone and the quality were rather different. Ventura found himself
in the middle of a political battle for supremacy over the Neapolitan government,
which makes his tone violently polemical and the articles very specific. In Modena
political life was much quieter, and the academic component was more relevant;
indeed, Baraldi aimed to renew Italian culture, and to contrast the flow of "evil
books" by using the best scholars available in every branch of knowledge32.
Particularly interesting was the attempt to de-mystify the use of scientific
knowledge made by the philosoplies and the Jacobins in order to legitimate their
political action, and to show that the sciences are best practiced in the framework of
a solid Christian education. Also remarkable was the critical response to the liberal
conception of "patria" (fatherland), which included the whole Italian peninsula and
was the basis for the liberal-unitarian movement. The contributors of the Memoirs
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accepted the value of patria, but the term referred to the village, the family, and to
the religion of the ancestors.
The key figure of Reactionary Catholicism was that of Gioacchino Ventura. By
following his actions we shall reconstruct the parabola of the whole movement and
we shall describe the transfiguration of Reactionary Catholicism into Neo-
Scholasticism, which was to be dominant in the Catholic Church from then
onwards. The battle of Ventura began in Naples.
4.4 Naples: from Eighteenth-Century Anti-Modernism to Reactionary
Catholicism
The reaction against the cultural enterprise of the Encyclopedic and the defense of
the dogmas of Catholicism from the attacks of the philosophes had begun in Naples.
Naples, thanks to Genovesi's school, had been a main center of the Italian
Enlightenment; it soon became a main center of Catholic reaction. Its cultural
tradition offered much material to the new apologetic effort of Catholic authors,
and the reactionary policy chosen by the government since the early 1790s favored
the organization of the movement and its control over Neapolitan culture. Still, the
political conditions were not as favorable as in Modena, given that the reactionary
elements of the government had to face, since 1815, the powerful opposition of the
ex-Napoleonic elite which inclined to a moderately liberal and centralizing policy,
according to the general orientations of France and Austria. Neapolitan reactionary
forces directly participated in the battle for power which took place in the years of
the Restoration. Significantly, the Neapolitan movement enjoyed particular strength
in the crucial conjunctures of the 1790s, of 1815 and of 1821, that is to say when the
monarchy needed the support of the most reactionary elements to face specific
socio-political problems. The alternate fortune of Reactionary Catholicism in
Naples, and its contrast with rival political and cultural conceptions, make the
Neapolitan case a most interesting one. In between the situation of Modena and of
the Italian states under the influence of Austria and France, Naples was indeed the
scene of the most direct clash between the forces of reaction and those of moderate
liberalism. The whole of its culture was deeply shaped by such a clash.
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In Naples the culture of Catholic reaction could count on valuable resources,
largely derived from the anti-modern campaign which had been organized in the
late seventeenth century to respond to the new atomistic philosophy (see Appendix
4). It was a reaction which mobilized scholastic philosophy and Catholic orthodoxy
to fight the emergence of a secularized culture and a more individualistic vision of
religion. Since then the issues of the role of the Church in social and cultural life,
and of the relation between state and Church had been central to Neapolitan
culture. The eighteenth century was indeed characterized by the jurisdictionalist
controversies over the influence of the Roman curia in the kingdom; not even in its
most successful years did the anti-curial front (which reunited Genovesi's school
and Jansenist clergy) manage to neutralize its opponents. This is clear from the
university reform of 1777, which compromised with the requests of the Roman
party (for instance, the chair of Decretals, defined by Genovesi as "the codex of the
universal monarchy of the Roman curia", was maintained). The defence of the
temporal role of the Church found its main cultural expression in the activity of the
Congregazione dell'Oratorio (Congregation of the Oratory) of Naples. The Neapolitan
Oratory had been founded in the sixteenth century, on the model of the Roman
Oratory run by Filippo Neri. A typical post-Tridentin institution, its main goals
were to renew the apostolic mission and to take care of the education of the young
from poor backgrounds. In 1741 the Fathers of the Oratory asked permission to
open an Academy of Ecclesiastic Sciences in their remarkable House facing the
Cathedral, under the official patronage of Cardinal Giuseppe Spinelli, Archbishop
of Naples. The academy was the main center of elaboration of anti-modern thought
in Naples during the second half of the century. Its goal was the confutation of
heresy in order to enlighten Neapolitan clergy, and its productions were almost
exclusively apologetic ones. Remarkable and unprecedented was the prevention of
secular scholars from joining the academy. The heart of the academy was the
famous Library of the Oratory, one of the attractions the town offered to foreign
visitors, and the place where the philosopher Giambattista Vico had mostly worked.
The collection of the library included patristic texts, treatises of dogmatic and moral
theology, texts of ecclesiastical history and biblical chronology, and also texts of
Protestant theology, anti-Jesuit pamphlets, as well as recent productions in the
natural and mathematical sciences33. The members of the academy, professors,
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bishops and missionaries, were mostly Oratorians, but Theatins, Franciscans and
Dominicans were also represented. In 1747, Genovesi himself was invited by the
Archbishop to participate in the reunions of the academy; he reluctantly read a
dissertation on the Christian conception of hell, which was strongly criticized by
academics for its weak commitment to the dogma of eternal punishment. In this
very period Genovesi failed to obtain the chair of Theology at the RUN and ended
his career as a theologian. He did not participate any more in the academic
reunions: the intransigent position of the Neapolitan academics was in fact at odds
with Genovesi's attempt to conciliate modern philosophy and Christianity34. As the
reactionary crusade of the Neapolitan Church against modernity became manifest,
the Catholic Genovesi placed himself on the other side of the barricade. After the
appearance of the first volume of the Encyclopedie in 1751, deism and "religious
indifference" were the most recurrent polemical targets of the academic speeches.
These were mainly grounded in the patristic literature, which was taken as a source
of indubitable truths. The clear intent of this strategy was to make it extremely
difficult to establish a real dialogue with secular adversaries. The academy offered
young authors the opportunity of improving their skill in philological and exegetic
techniques, but always in a rigidly pre-defined perspective where any doubt and
any variety of interpretations was perceived as a deeply negative phenomenon.
Among the themes treated by the academics in this early period were the dogmas of
the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, the miracles, the transubstantiation, the
primacy of the Pontiff, the structure of the Church and its infallibility35. Each year
the academy concentrated on a specific "enemy of the Catholic faith", to obtain the
greatest effect. The "pure and spotless truths" of religion were mostly defended
against Protestants or against the supporters of forms of "Enlightened Catholicism",
where faith and reason were conciliated along the lines of John Locke's argument
for the reasonability of Christianity. Any sort of religious tolerance was similarly
opposed because it fell into the category of "religious indifference"; this concept
was elaborated to justify the attacks of the Neapolitan academy against a number of
different philosophical positions, and it was to be used well into the nineteenth
century (e.g by Lamennais). Among the early "indifferent" philosophers attacked
by the academicians was Raimondo di Sangro, the mid-century leader of
Neapolitan Anglo-Dutch freemasonry. The fight against masonic "indifference",
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"pure naturalism" and "Spinozism" (i.e. pantheism), marked the beginning of the
anti-modern campaign of the Neapolitan Church. By 1753 the academy had ceased
its works, due to the departure of Spinelli and the death of his main champions. In
1758 it was restored by Cardinal Antonino Sersale, under the name of
Archiepiscopal Academy as members met weekly in the Archiepiscopal palace.
Themes of the sessions were Theology, Canon Law, History of the Church and the
Liturgy. After another interruption of around five years, the academy was
eventually re-opened in 1780 by Cardinal Serafino Filangieri with explicit anti-
encyclopedic aims. A former professor of the Roman College, Filangieri held the
chair of Physics at the RUN. The academy, divided into the two branches of Moral
Sciences (thirty-nine members) and Theological Sciences (thirty-seven members),
returned to the palace of the Oratory. The confrontation was now with the
Neapolitan reformist thought of the 1780s. Among the members was the well
known apologist Giovanni Camillo Rossi, the great enemy of deism in Naples. His
work shows how the style and the goals of apologetics had been changing in the
1780s and 1790s36. The new apologetic had explicit political implications, aiming to
prove the divine nature of the authority of both legitimate sovereigns and the
ecclesiastic hierarchies. Indeed the new political alliance between the Bourbon
monarchy and the Pope (1791) found in this new apologetics its cultural
legitimization37.
The Catholic anti-modern trend remained marginal to Neapolitan culture until
around 1791, when the political alliance with Rome was integrated by a general re¬
orientation of the whole cultural policy. Accepting the Roman interpretation of the
Revolution as a "great philosophical rebellion" left no space for further activity by
the Regalist, Jansenist and Gallican clergy. The supremacy of the Pontiff was no
longer a matter of discussion, and the crusading spirit of reactionary clergy was
fully supported by the Bourbon police and censorship, particularly after the
discovery of the Jacobin conspiracy of 1794. This pre-Revolutionary phase of
Reactionary Catholicism was characterized by the febrile activity of the members of
the Archiepiscopal Academy and of a very particular literary association, the Royal
Arcadia. Between 1794 and 1796 the Dominican Vincenzo Gregorio Lavazzoli (a
member of both) emerged as one of the champions of the anti-philosophical
campaign thanks to his contributions to a periodical specifically designed to present
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the reader with "healthy readings". The defence of religion was joined with a
demand for a theocratic organization of the state. To counteract false Jacobin
"regeneration" one must recover "the anchor of public safety": subordination to
authority. The Royal Arcadia was another important institution which contributed
to the elaboration of Reactionary Catholicism. It was a secular institution, founded
in 1794 by the lawyer Vincenzo Ambrogio Galdi "to fight the atheistic and heretical
errors of the eighteenth century"38. Galdi had been promoting an anti-Masonic and
anti-Encyclopedic literary society in Salerno since 1759, the Accademia degli
Immaturi. In 1792, he decided to move to Naples in order to pursue a more effective
counter-Revolutionary action. The academics asked the King to add to their
institution the attribute "Royal", which was immediately accorded. The Arcadians
founded a number of "colonies" all over the kingdom, enrolling influential
members of proven legitimist and Catholic convictions, which were confirmed
under a pseudo-Masonic oath. The statutes of the society offered the profile of the
ideal Arcadian, who was an intellectual respectful of the legitimate sovereign, of the
dogmas of the Church and who used his knowledge only to become more virtuous.
In fact, they were a manifesto for the mobilization of culture in defense of religion
and monarchy. The most popular churches were used for the ceremonies of the
Arcadia, and on these occasions pamphlets and books were freely distributed. The
Arcadia had its own Printing-Office and the exceptional authorization to print its
texts without waiting for the approval of censorship. It is significant that the
Arcadia was placed under the protection of the Holy Trinity. In Reactionary
Catholicism, as in French Traditionalism, the anti-deistic dogma of the Trinity was a
crucial symbol. It was indeed seen as the basis of all the "mysteries" of Catholicism,
the dogma which required the greater submission of human reason to revealed
truth. The rebellion of reason against this dogma was considered as one and the
same with the rebellion of the egoist bourgeois against his legitimate sovereign39.
The text which presented the Holy Alliance to the world famously begins with the
words "In the name of the Very Holy and Indivisible Trinity".
With the 1799 Revolution, the activity of the Arcadia became clandestine. Its
capillary structure permitted indeed the organization of an active counter¬
revolutionary movement, which supported in many ways the crusade of Ruffo's
Holy Faith Army. Ruffo himself was an Arcadian, as were the bishop-officers who
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were assisting him on the battlefield. Membership of Arcadia during the Revolution
is one of the few sources for investigating the composition of the reactionary
groups. Around one third of Arcadians were ecclesiastics, mostly abbes teaching at
various levels in the colleges and in the universities of the kingdom. Of the seculars
(70%), half were aristocrats, mostly from the lower provincial aristocracy, and the
rest were commoners, mostly lawyers, who had often invested in land, which they
administered traditionally, as absentee landlords. A few were physicians and
military officers. This seems to confirm Genovesi's claim that the main opposition
to a serious reform of the state (in 1760s) was to be expected mostly from the three
"conservative orders": aristocracy, lawyers and clergy.
4.5 Aristocratic Reaction: the Invention of the Middle Ages
Among the books diffused by the Arcadia were The Trinity (1795) and The Utility of
Monarchy in the Civil State (1795), by the Arcadian Isocrate Larisso, alias Antonio
Capece Minutolo Prince of Canosa (1768-1838). We met Canosa while describing the
events of the 1799 Revolution; in that context he acted as leader of the ancient
legitimist aristocracy, for which he claimed back full feudal rights. His aristocratic
vision of society had eventually compromised his own position at court, and cost
him arrest. At the restoration of the Bourbons in 1815 he was to be called back as
Minister of Police, and again in 1821, after the defeat of the constitutional
movement. His political life was difficult though, as the direction of Neapolitan
policy was in the hands of moderate conservative groups in line with Metternich's
policy. This moderate conservative policy was best represented by Luigi de' Medici,
formerly linked to the Neapolitan enlightened tradition. Metternich himself backed
Medici's line, as he was considered the only person able to save the finances of the
kingdom (and to repay the debts to Austria). It has also been noticed that Medici
had important links with the financial oligarchy of the capital, which had
consolidated his power during the French occupation. Among them were a branch
of the Rothschild family, whose opinion was highly regarded in Vienna. To
politicians like Medici the ideas and the methods of Canosa would seem
desperately outmoded, as was his black seventeenth-century suit (for which he was
known as "the Black Prince"). To Metternich, Canosa was a dangerous "hot head".
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But in the most critical periods Canosa, the hammer of freemasonry and Jacobinism,
had been an important counselor of the Bourbon court, an ambassador, and a
minister. Even more importantly, his writings enjoyed a remarkable success in
Naples and abroad. Canosa was certainly expressing the ideas of many, including
King Ferdinando I, who only reluctantly abandoned his faithful knight when he
was ordered by Vienna to do so, in 1821.
Canosa came from a family whose service to the kings and the popes traced back
to the thirteenth century (under the Swabian dynasty), and which held a family
chapel in the Cathedral of Naples. The Canosas had suffered greatly from the
progressive erosion of feudal privileges actuated by the reformist policy of the
Bourbon during the second half of the eighteenth century. This family was indeed
emblematic of that part of the sword aristocracy which was unwilling to turn itself
into a courtier aristocracy, and unable to face the agricultural crisis by moving from
a traditional absentee administration of land to a "modern" administration. The
new centralizing policy and the attempt to get rid of the feudal-communal system,
with its plethora of intermediate bodies —while supporting new forms of
agricultural production and commercialization— had grave effects upon the
Canosas. The French occupation of the kingdom and the anti-feudal laws of 1806
precipitated their decline. As the family lost its feudal rights upon the town of
Canosa, economic ruin became unavoidable. Canosa was born into a powerful and
rich feudal family in 1768, but by 1816 he was living on a state pension.40.
These considerations make it difficult to understand the standard historical
judgment which has been given on Canosa: that he was a naive idealist, a
disinterested paladin of the ancien regime who sacrificed his fortune to his
anachronistic cause. In fact, when Canosa decided to enter active political life his
fortune had already disappeared. The image of the disinterested paladin was
originally drawn by Canosa himself in his memoirs; and that this image has been
taken for granted by the most recent historiography testifies to his remarkable
ability in mystifying and idealizing what was the last battle of the traditional feudal
aristocracy against emerging groups of financiers, investors and landowners.
Biographical errors have probably contributed to the legend of the disinterested
knight. Croce, who supported the idealistic thesis, claimed that Canosa had been
educated in the ancient values of the family and that "he had sucked Catholic
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religion with his mother's milk". By looking at his correspondence and private
archive, Maturi reconstructed quite a different story. Canosa had frequented the
famous Jesuit College Nazareno in Rome, studying philosophy and the sciences; in
1786 he wrote a dissertation of anatomy on the different parts of the human body,
their disposition and functioning41. In 1787 he was back in Naples to administer the
feudal possessions of the family. It was the period of the fiercest anti-feudal policy
(Caracciolo was Prime Minister) and in few years Jacobinism was to threaten
Naples. "I entered the world" Canosa wrote, "precisely when in France disorders
were beginning due to the sects and to the perverse philosophy, which brought so
many calamities to that very rich kingdom and to the whole of Europe"42. Following
"the facts of France" Canosa began to deepen his knowledge of Catholic dogmas,
"as it seemed to me that the question was most important", and "this is how I
became Catholic". Canosa dated his decision to abandon his previous
"Pyrrhonism" and "semi-atheism" from the crucial year 179443. From that time on
he was to be the most popular author of Reactionary Catholicism in Naples.
Significant also are the spiritual guides chosen by Canosa: Nicola Spedalieri and
Stefano Borgia, i.e. those Italian ecclesiastics who were explicitly supporting the
counter-revolutionary use of Catholic religion44. Nicola Spedalieri had been the
early theorist of theocratic society; Cardinal Stefano Borgia (1731-1804), was a
leading "intransigent" cardinal in Rome, and the most firm opponent of Neapolitan
Jansenism and Regalism during the 1780s (his direct adversary being abbe
Giuseppe Cestari). Borgia was also the author of recent counter-revolutionary
pamphlets45. In the following years, a few other authors would add to Canosa's
favorite sources. First of all Tamburini, whom he used to substantiate the argument
of the empirical and a-geometrical nature of the political and social sciences. Then
foreign counter-revolutionary texts such as Edmund Burke's Reflections on the
Revolution in France (1790) and Augustin Barruel's Memoires pour servir a Vhistoire du
jacobinism (1797)46. Barruel elaborated and articulated Spedalieri's argument that the
French revolution can be explained only as the final outcome of a long-lasting
hidden conspiracy organized by philosophes, Jansenists and freemasons ("the
sects")47. The theoretical apparatus of Barruel's work was to be largely used by
Neapolitan Catholic reactionaries, and the conspiracy theory was immediately
embraced by the Bourbon court. Canosa reported that Barruel's Italian translation
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was indeed promoted by the Neapolitan Crown in 1803. Through all his work,
Canosa would remain convinced that history has indeed a hidden dimension,
which is the field of action of obscure forces, and that the "real", important events
are those happening —unknown to most— precisely in this dimension48. This
"conspiratorial" explanation excluded any social consideration, looking at the moral
corruption of a few as the only reason for the revolutions. Canosa also saw the
action of freemasonry behind his removal from the Neapolitan government in 1816
and in 1821. He adopted a typical corollary of the "conspiracy theory": the king is
"good", but he is naive and deceived by corrupt counselors (so, according to
Canosa, Ferdinando was "the very good but deceived king", in the hands of the
Masonic liberals of Medici's moderate government49). From around 1800 Canosa
read the texts of French Traditionalism, which aroused enthusiasm among
Neapolitan reactionaries.
Canosa emerged as an author in the years of his "conversion", when his work
provided a historical and philosophical legitimization for the new reactionary
policy of the Bourbon50. Their importance must not be seen in their specific content,
which was rather poor and unoriginal, but in the new, large public to which they
were addressed, i.e. legitimist aristocracy and those groups who, for different
reasons, had an interest in preserving the feudal communal system (think of the
lawyers and the minor provincial aristocracy grouped in the Royal Arcadia). Not
surprisingly, the first political-religious productions of the Arcadian Canosa were: a
defence of the dogma of the Holy Trinity, and a defence of the institution of
monarchy, both published in 1795. The Trinity was the work where Canosa
announced his new faith to the world; it was essentially a confutation of deism in its
many variants51. It is argued that mystery is necessary to religion and that any
attempt to rationalize religion destroys its very essence. The dogma of Trinity was
known to ancient Hebrew and Indian wise men, but it was kept hidden from
ordinary people so as not to contaminate its fundamental truth52. Note the presence
of the doctrine of the philosophia perennis, the original corpus of esoteric knowledge
(sapientia) which has been transmitted from civilization to civilization and finally
codified in the dogmas of the Catholic Church. Canosa also defended the
infallibility of the Pontiff (which was not yet a dogma), as the necessary basis for
stability in the Church, which is the first premise for stability in society53. History,
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Canosa remarked, teaches that every religious insubordination leads to social
insubordination54. More specifically, in The Utility ofMonarchy in the Civil State55, he
argued for the impossibility of maintaining social stability within a democratic
system of government. The theoretical consistency of Canosa's argumentation
seems rather weak when compared to that of his contemporaries Maistre and
Bonald, and the tone is overly polemical, due to Canosa's direct participation in
political life. The basic elements of Canosa's political ideas are derived from
Montesquieu's The Spirit oftlie Laws, the book against which Gaetano Filangieri had
written his The Science of Legislation. From Montesquieu, published in Naples in
177156, Canosa extracted those points which were to remain unchanged throughout
his political production: intermediate institutions such as aristocracy and the
Church are essential to monarchic governments; consequently every reform aiming
to dismantle the power of feudatories ("the jurisdictions of the Masters"), the
Church, the Towns, the guilds, and other similar bodies, is in fact threatening the
existence of monarchy itself; monarchies are based on the fundamental value of
aristocracy: honor (the virtue of chivalry, which pushed Canosa into political
activity, as neo-idealist historians have remarked). On the other hand republics can
only be based on disinterest and on the absolute and generalized love for
homeland. Moving from these tenets, Canosa reached his openly anti-democratic
conclusions: it is impossible to establish durable republican regimes in the modern
world, due to the ignorance, corruption and violence which are proper to the
common people57. A democracy, a "government of the multitude", would soon self-
destruct. The only viable alternative is the monarchic system. Of course Canosa did
not refer to the modern absolute monarchies; his model was rather some sort of
feudal monarchy, whose power is sustained by feudal aristocracy and by the
structure of the Church, and more generally, by all those intermediate and local
bodies which are proper of the feudal-communal system of land58. In line with his
medieval conception of feudal monarchy Canosa, in 1796, defended some fellow
aristocrats from alleged governmental abuses, and criticized the government for
introducing a new tax in Naples without previously consulting the ancient
representative organs of the town, which gave a voice to aristocracy and to artisan
guilds59. Meanwhile, Canosa frequented the house of Lord Hamilton, the British
ambassador, where he expressed his admiration for Burke's idea that the moral and
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political sciences must be based on experience and not on abstract speculations.
Canosa's political battle continued with an attack against a royal magistrate who
had recently questioned the privileges of feudatories in military matters60. The book
became immediately famous; it was indeed an unprecedented and courageous
defense of the feudal system in face of the centralizing Bourbon monarchy. At the
suggestion of Cardinal Borgia, this anti-absolutist pamphlet was very positively
reviewed in the Ecclesiastic Journal of Rome and in the Venetian Literary Gazette.
Canosa had officially entered the group of Reactionary Catholic authors61.
In 1798 a French army headed by General Championnet moved from Rome
towards the Neapolitan border. In accordance with his conception of aristocracy as
a crucial element for the defense of the state, Canosa "left the pen for the sword"
and personally recruited soldiers on his land, participating in the military
campaign. As the government and the royal family left Naples, he was elected by
the aristocratic parliament to lead the "Extraordinary Deputation for Good
Government and Internal Tranquillity". Canosa refused to recognize the authority
of the king's representative and, on the basis of some old precedents, he claimed
that —in the absence of the legitimate king— the "Town of Naples" was called to
represent and to lead the whole "Nation" (the Town of Naples being represented by
a parliament of elected aristocrats and members of the guilds). In the feudal view of
Canosa such institutions possessed proper juridical authority, and were able to
assume their own responsibilities when the situation required it. As we have seen,
the negotiation between Canosa and Championnet fell through — mostly thanks to
Lauberg. Canosa then called for the "low people" to defend their own town and
their own religion from the foreign invasion, and organized the three-day anti-
French resistance. At the establishment of the republic, Canosa escaped prison
thanks to the intercession of an aristocratic family he had defended against abuses
in 1796 (it was the family of Ettore Carafa, a student of Lauberg)62. He could then
participate to the public life of the short-lived Neapolitan Republic. Unsurprisingly,
when it came to the abolition of feudalism, Canosa opposed vehemently the radical
faction of Carlo Lauberg and Vincenzo Russo, who supported the complete
abolition without indemnity63. Russo said feudality "was no right"; but Canosa, and
the moderate Jacobin faction headed by Pagano, claimed that the republic had
inherited the duties of the extinguished monarchy. Interestingly, Canosa moved
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from juridical considerations to sociological ones: he remarked that those who
attack feudal rights more violently are not "the poor, but rather those few wealthy
people who live in each town", who control the administration of the universities
and who hate the ex-barons and "tyrannize the population to get rich at their
expense"64. Canosa's description of the aggressive landed bourgeoisie, the
"gentlemen" (galantuomini), was certainly based on first-hand experience. For a
while the ex-aristocratic Jacobins managed to stop the law, but this was eventually
promulgated on the 27th of April 1799. Meanwhile Canosa had been arrested in
connection with a legitimist conspiracy, for which he was sentenced to death. But
the republic fell in a few days, and Canosa ended up with a five-year sentence
inflicted by the counter-revolutionary tribunal for "attempting to establish an
aristocratic republic". Freed on the occasion of the 1801 amnesty, and temporarily
out of the political arena, Canosa reinvigorated his religious vein. In 1802, the year
of Chateaubriand's Genie du Christianisme and of the conversion of Schlegel, Canosa
began a vigorous campaign against atheism, publishing a couple of works which
are representative of the new apologetic style of Reactionary Catholicism, where the
apology of religion and political reaction are tied up in an indissoluble way. One
was an essay "on the passion and death of Our Divine Redeemer", and it was
dedicated to the particularly devout King of Sardinia Carlo Emanuele IV of Savoy,
who had repaired to Naples in 1800, following the French occupation of Piedmont65.
In spite of the topic, Canosa found a way to attack the "innovators" of the
eighteenth century, and Spinoza, who had questioned the resurrection of Christ.
The battle against the philosophes continued in 1803, with an interesting satirical
pamphlet against the French academics who had been discussing the case of an
"incombustible man" 66. Quoting classical sources, Canosa defended the idea that it
is possible to prepare a mixture to protect a man from the action of fire; the
philosophes who ("as usual") ridiculed this possibility were denying a matter of fact
in order to cover their own ignorance. The aim of the pamphlet seems to be that of
showing how weak are the reasons for believing that the philosoplies of the
encyclopedist tradition are indeed the "true interpreters" of nature. Meanwhile, in
an unpublished memoir "on the decadence of nobility", he returned to the central
theme of the role of aristocracy67. He pointed out that the reason for its decadence
was the anti-feudal and anti-ecclesiastic policy of the Crown, and he suggested that
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now, with the support of Great Britain and the other counter-revolutionary nations,
a solid "aristocratic monarchy" could be established in Naples. He criticized the
well-known anti-aristocratic remarks of "the suspect Genovesi", "who is believed
to be a genius of our philosophy and the most admirable man of our country", but
who was instead an enemy of the throne and the altar, as the intransigent
Dominican Tommaso Mamachi —another of Canosa's ecclesiastic sources— had
soon understood68. In another manuscript Canosa remarked that Genovesi had in
Naples a role equivalent to that of the philosophies in France, and if this was not
immediately clear it was because the cultural conditions of the two countries were
very different69.
Meanwhile, the restored Bourbon monarchy was pursuing an ambiguous policy.
The feudal law promulgated by the Republic was abolished, and the Church re-
appropriated many of its previous privileges; but the aristocratic parliament of
Naples was abolished as well (April 1800), to the astonishment of men like Canosa.
It was "the most revolutionary decision taken by the enlightened Bourbon
despotism", by which "Neapolitan aristocracy was destroyed as a political body"70.
In fact it was more a symbolic than a substantial act, given that the feudal system of
land remained largely untouched; but it made clear the absolutist direction taken by
the monarchy, and its distrust in the ancient aristocracy. During the French
occupation (1806-1815) Canosa followed the court to Sicily, from where he
coordinated the secret network of counter-revolutionary resistance (the Arcadians).
His hope was to convince the king of the error of an anti-feudal policy. At the
second restoration of the Bourbon in Naples Canosa was nominated Minister of
Police, but his repressive plans, inspired by the reactionary Spain of Ferdinando VII
(from which he had been given the Great Cross of the Immaculate Conception),
clashed with the moderate policy of Prime Minister Luigi de' Medici. The clash
between Canosa and Medici was total, and highly significant; they disagreed on
every single point: on economics (free market versus protectionism and lowering of
food prices); on the Sicilian question (unification of the two kingdoms and
rationalization of the administration versus preserving the two separate identities);
on the question of the ex-Napoleonic elements in the administration (amalgamation
versus exclusion). Finally, when it emerged that Canosa had intrigued to create a
secret reactionary sect (I calderari) to fight the liberal freemasons, he resigned (1816).
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The anti-liberal and Reactionary Catholic movement remained represented, in the
public administration, by men like Giovan Battista Vecchione, President of the Gran
Corte dei Conti. In 1818 the king expressed his appreciation of Canosa, awarding
him the medal of the Order of Saint January.
Once again out of active politics, Canosa published what was his most successful
book, I pijfari di montagna, which saw six editions between 1820 and 1831. The book
was stimulated by an article which appeared in the Literary Gazette of London,
where his police methods were criticized71. The leitmotiv of the book was that a
specific legislation is good only for a specific country at a specific time of its history.
In this way he could make sense of the "exception" of the liberal Great Britain. The
rest was a repetition of previous themes, such as the need for a feudal monarchy
founded on the structure of the Church, charged with controlling social and cultural
life, and the aristocracy which control the land and is charged with the defense of
the country; the need for (violent) counter-revolutionary repression; the need for
the Pontiff to be accorded absolute authority and infallibility, in order to prevent
religious and social insurrection. The local nature of legislation is explained by
Canosa in terms of the essential a-mathematical character of the moral and social
sciences. In spite of his habit of expressing his own ideas in a pseudo-geometrical
form, Canosa was clear about the terrible consequences of using mathematical
speculations in politics. Politics is an empirical science, he claimed; it is not an exact
science, it is not a matter of universal and "abstract" principles. In the difficult "art
of politics" there is no room for rational discussion: the "meaning" of institutions
comes from history. Only a long field experience together with a deep knowledge of
the history of the country enables the politician to take his decisions. The solution of
a political problem is not obtained as the outcome of a calculation; it derives instead
from a judgment grounded on experience. This crucial thesis is defended by
arguing that social reality is far too complex to be captured by some set of
universally valid laws. Political practice requires natural inclination, acquired skills
and a long experience. In the end, "the art of politics" reduces to a private affair of a
few wise and experienced individuals: the king and his counselors. In later writings
Canosa compared the revolutionary attempts to build a perfectly egalitarian society
on a scientific basis to the alchemic aim of finding the philosopher's stone. Also, he
used a mathematical metaphor: "[the Neapolitan Jacobins of 1799] seemed to me
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like an artisan of my knowledge who, being competent in the theory of conic
sections, and having a perfect understanding of the geometrical properties of the
parabola and of the hyperbola, decided to put the abstract theory into practice to
produce a parabolic or hyperbolic burning glass"; but the result was that he wasted
a lot of time and good metal, as "there are very many abstract truths which cannot
be verified in practice by man, who is an imperfect and infirm being"72. Following
the pro-constitutional insurrection of 1820-21, King Ferdinando I recalled back
Canosa as Minister of Police, but again, his permanence was contested and short. In
1822 Canosa left Naples for good. His activity from then on is not relevant to the
present study and no new ideas were presented in his later writings. It may be
remarked that he offered his services to the governments of some Italian states,
mainly organizing local police forces. Most importantly, he strengthened his
contacts with the compact group of Reactionary Catholic publicists active in the
Italian states during the 1820s: his fellow-aristocrat Monaldo Leopardi, and the
ecclesiastics Ventura and Baraldi. Canosa himself contributed by promoting the
Italian translation of Lamennais's De la religion consideree dans ses rapports avec Vordre
politique et civil, a crucial text of French Traditionalism73. Eventually, in 1830 Canosa
settled in the ultra-reactionary Duchy of Modena, where he contributed to the local
periodical The Voice of Truth (whose motto was non commovebitur) with his anti¬
democratic and anti-bourgeois articles (see Fig.X). By that time Canosa was an
anachronistic figure, as even on the conservative front new forms of thought were
emerging to replace the medieval conceptions of the Black Prince. He died in the
States of the Church, poor and forgotten, in 1838.
With respect to French Traditionalists Canosa played down the direct action of
the absolute monarch, and highlighted the crucial role of the intermediate
institutions (orders, guilds, local authorities). In fact Canosa's model can only be
loosely related to pre-Revolutionary Neapolitan society. He rather looked at
medieval Christian society as the perfect example of an "organic society", where the
"natural inequalities among men" where mirrored by the social structure, and
religion shaped the whole of social and political life. This is the image that Canosa
opposed to the "individualistic", "materialist" and "artificial" democratic republic,
where the abstract principles of "equality" and "popular sovereignty" were
instrumentally used to subvert the natural order of things. In religion, Canosa
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opposed any reform of Catholicism, whose essence lies precisely in the
immutability of the dogmas. He also rejected any attempt to separate religion from
social and political life: this separation would destroy the basis of any moral bond,
i.e. the very possibility of a stable social structure. Only the Christian believer is a
faithful subject. Indeed, the foundations of morals and politics are not to be found
in the natural constitution of man or in some original "contract". The only possible
foundation is the supreme authority of God, mediated by the temporal structures of
the Church and the state. Any non-religious foundation of the morals and of society
would be essentially individualistic and thus unstable. Look at that perfect form of
natural and organic society which is the family, Canosa wrote. It is certainly not
based on a contract; it is simply imposed by the nature of things. In the same way,
subjects are liable to social duties without having agreed to any contract.
Historians of political thought associate the figure of Canosa with those of his
fellow aristocrats Monaldo Leopardi (1776-1847) from Recanati, in the States of the
Church, and Clemente Solaro della Margherita (1792-1869) from Turin, in the
Kingdom of Sardinia. In fact they shared basic ideas and the basic political and
religious goals. Their work can indeed be taken as the most significant elaboration
of Reactionary Catholicism in Italy outside the ecclesiastic circles (in which fell the
more coherent work of Spedalieri, Tamburini, Ventura, Baraldi and many others).
The three aristocrats shared the same reactionary Catholic ideology, although
stressing different aspects of it: Canosa was the defender of the rights of the sword
aristocracy; Leopardi eulogized the self-sufficient medieval commune; Margherita
mostly argued for the submission of human reason in the face of religious truths, by
which political and social life must be inspired. Because they were not active in
Naples, and because of the lack of further original themes in their work, we need
not analyze their texts. Still, a few words on the figure of Monaldo Leopardi —
whose books enjoyed a remarkable success all over Italy— can be useful to
complete our picture of aristocratic Reactionary Catholicism.
In many ways Leopardi continued, in the 1830s and early 1840s, the anti-modern
battle of Canosa. His Philosophical Cathechism, which he wrote specifically for
students, effectively summed up the demand of Reactionary Catholicism for
inequality and for an unconditional submission to political authority74. Being active
in the climate of the late Restoration his enemy was not the revolution, but the
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growing liberal forces and their openly patriotic and nationalistic programs.
Against them, Leopardi wrote satirical books and founded The Voice of Reason, a
periodical published in Pesaro, whose motto was: praeliare bella Domini. Leopardi's
publications had the privilege of exemption from preliminary censorship. His most
popular book, The Short Dialogues on the Matters ofl83175, is a series of witty, ironical
dialogues where fictitious characters ridicule such fundamental ideas of the liberal
ideology as the constitution, popular sovereignty, and public education76. One may
remember that Lauberg, already in 1797, had written about the "Gothic barbarism"
which was being prepared by counter-revolutionary forces; he said that the
revolutionary intelligentsia should use the weapon of ridicule against it: "we will
laugh at them". Canosa, like Maistre, had been quick in resorting to the same
weapon against the Jacobins. But the masterpiece of counter-revolutionary and anti-
liberal satire are probably Leopardi's dialogues. The Dialogues had six reprints in
three months; they were praised by Canosa, and (allegedly) by the Pope himself77.
One of the most famous dialogues is Pulcinella's Travel (II viaggio di Pidcinella) which
inspired a large production of popular prints in Naples. Indeed Pulcinella is the
traditional Neapolitan mask-character, who represented —in the teatro dell'arte —
the simple-minded but resourceful Neapolitan "low people". In Leopardi's piece
Pulcinella (common sense) and a Doctor (the liberal intellectual) discuss the
establishment of a constitutional government in Naples. The Doctor explains to
Pulcinella that the King of Naples is an absolute king.
PULCINELLA: [...] What does it mean absolute king?
DOCTOR: It means that he rules according to his own will, without
depending on anyone else.
P: What a mess! But tell me one thing. The shoemaker rules in his shop, the
host rules in his tavern, the head of the house rules in his family, and why
should the king not rule in his own kingdom?
D: He can rule, but according to the laws.
P: This is right. I understand. Justice for everyone. But tell me, signor Doctor,
does not the king of Naples rule exactly like this? He makes laws, and he rules
according to them. When the laws are not good anymore, he makes new laws,
and again he rules according to them.
D: And this is precisely what is wrong.
P: Why?
D: Because the king should not make the laws.
P: Why?
D: Because he is not the sovereign.
P: The Devil! And who's the sovereign if not the king?
196
D: The people.
P: That's the best one. And the people didn't know it?
D: We used to live in ignorance.-78
In a truly "natural" society political constitutions are —at best— useless. Everything
is indeed already regulated in the most natural way, i.e. according to tradition. A
father does not need a set of abstract rules to govern his own family; similarly a
king does not need a constitution to govern his own country (note that a
patrimonial conception of the state is taken for granted). Constitutions are always
presented by Leopardi and Canosa as artificial, imposed from the outside,
extraneous to the specific traditions and to the natural inclinations of the people.
When they are forcefully introduced, they act as diseases on the organic body of
society (so Leopardi's Pulcinella regularly mistakes the word "constitution" for
"constipation"). The crucial theme is that of sovereignty: the king, according to
Canosa and Leopardi, cannot be subject to any law —not even his own. In fact, he
himself is the source of sovereignty. It follows that a constitutional system leads to
paradoxical situations: if sovereignty resides in the throne, the king is subject to his
own laws (which is considered absurd); if the sovereignty resides in the people,
then the king is reduced to a mere representative figure and the principle of
authority is fragmented, with consequences that can only be disastrous for the
stability of society. As argued by the sensible Pulcinella, laws are mere contingent
instruments the king uses to rule his kingdom. It is moral corruption which
prevents modern philosophers from recognizing in nature and tradition the basis
of the feudal setting, Leopardi argues. If only they looked at the empirical world
without the glasses of their own artificial systems, they would recognize such
natural principles, which are the basis of every "organic" society. In fact, the "two
books of the Lord" —scripture and nature— teach mankind the very same
principles79.
Leopardi's exemplary anti-liberal campaign was that against the introduction of
the nursery school in the States of the Church. Nurseries are considered
instrumental to the goals of the liberal forces: they detach the process of education
from the family and from the Church in order to suffocate the natural tendency to
religion and to the subjection to parents and public authority. Nurseries infuse a
"moral of rebellion and pride". As a Neapolitan reactionary author wrote: "that of
the parents upon their sons is the most ancient authority, and the purest image of
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the supreme authority of God; so that in the Scripture parents are called the visible
Gods of their family"80. Thanks also to Leopardi's campaign, nursery schools were
forbidden, in the States of the Church, in 1837.
The anti-modern world Leopardi was fighting for was a fanciful world of quiet
peasants and laborious artisans living around the manor of their good feudal
master, under the unifying wing of Catholic Church. This looks very much like the
idealized version of his own small town, Recanati, in the rural province of Marche.
Most of Leopardi's energies were indeed devoted to the study of local traditions
and of local history. Any innovation threatening the traditional assets of his small
patria was decidedly opposed in his writings: this held for the introduction of a
general land register as well as for the construction of the railway. And one must
admit that in his rough but lucid reasoning Leopardi individuated correctly some of
the social consequences of administrative and technological innovations (whereas
in the liberal literature they are presented as "natural progress"). He also realized
that his town had entered an irreversible process of decline, as it was outside the
new lines of economic development. Interestingly, Leopardi participated in the
political life of his town during the revolution of 1831. Far from being a
revolutionary, he saw in the new local government an example of those aristocratic
intermediate bodies which he had always praised. Here, together with other
landlords, he acted like "a medieval Count", as —in the words of his biographer —
he "hoped for the restoration of the Gnelfo Commun [which means that] he would
found a local university, close the old borders of Recanati, provide it with proper
administrative structures in order not to depend on the town of Macerata, and
finally he would have built around it a Chinese Wall"81.
The biographical data of Leopardi and Canosa are significantly similar. They
spent their youth in the magnificence of the ancien regime feudal aristocracy. Then,
in the 1790s, they saw the ruin of the patrimony of the family, due to the crisis of the
traditional absentee administration of land, the inability to shift to a new model of
production, the anti-feudal laws and, finally, the French occupation. Canosa and
Leopardi had direct experience of that feudal-communal system they defended so
vehemently. Their fathers had been in fact feudal masters ruling over huge estates,
and over entire towns. But what is most interesting is the influence their writings
had upon an entire generation of educated readers who had certainly never
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experienced any similar feudal form of life. The dimensions of their editorial
success means that, after the Jacobin revolutions of the 1790s, the atmosphere was
particularly receptive for such reactionary themes; themes which, as Canosa tell us,
were not at all popular in Naples in the late 1780s.
Reactionary Catholicism elaborated a complex re-invention of that very tradition
on which it based the authority of its claims. In fact, as has been shown by
Mannheim with regard to early German conservative thought, for these authors the
present situation acquires its real meaning from the past. The present social setting
is given its "sense" by showing how it naturally emerged during the centuries, to
assume its present form. To be the product of a historical process is to be justified, it
is to be "natural", and this holds for the rights of the feudal landlords, as well as for
the dogmas of Catholicism. So Leopardi derided the "pseudo-scientific" arguments
employed to demystify a certain miracle, and he justified his belief by means of the
antiquity (i.e. authority) of the popular tradition82. But what is the "past" that
reactionary authors looked at? "Natural" social and political institutions are
invariably rooted in the Middle Ages, which is regarded as the golden age of
humanity. The knowledge (or better "wisdom") on which such institutions are
founded is much more ancient: it coincided indeed with the pre-Greek philosophm
perennis or prisca sapientia83. Still, it was in the organic Christian society of the
Middle Ages that this wisdom was best expressed by the socio-political and cultural
setting. The modern epoch, since the Renaissance onwards, is portrayed as afflicted
by an increasing moral corruption, whose direct outcome is a social, cultural and
religious fragmentation and decadence. Modern history is the history of the
dissolution of the medieval organic society and of its unitary Catholic culture into a
set of artificial political and cultural creations. Political reforms, which
characterized the eighteenth century, came directly from the minds of "arrogant"
philosophers, who thought they had penetrated the secret laws of the universe, and
imposed their fantastic creations (romanzi) upon empirical reality. What they
considered as universal values and laws, are merely the artificial products of their
own minds.
The idea of an ancient wisdom is used to link the present institutions to a
mythical past, from which they derive their meaning and their authority. The
invention of such a continuous and consistent tradition is performed at the expense
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of the much praised historical sensibility of the reactionaries, who accomplish an
impressive simplification of the cultural history of the West, and the attribution of a
univocal "meaning" to the whole modern age. Furthermore their image of the
Middle Ages as a world crystallized in its perfect structures has nothing to do with
the dynamic and confrontational medieval society as described by modern
historiography.
Reactionary authors refused to recognize the substantial social mutations that
occurred in the eighteenth century. This period had seen a conspicuous rise of the
population in the Italian states, and the expansion of a new kind of trading and
landed middle-classes, emerging from the groups of small-landowners, lawyers,
and administrators of feudal land. In the Northern states, characterized by a more
advanced economy, the most dynamic classes were the "enlightened" landed
aristocracy and the landowning bourgeoisie, who began to directly manage their
properties by breaking with the tradition of the absent feudal landlord. In general,
the political structures of the ancien regime states were unable to guarantee the
interests of these groups, as the failure of the enlightened absolutist policy of the
late eighteenth century testifies. Even the most centralized and efficient monarchies,
in spite of fighting the feudal power of landlords and of the Church, were unable to
accomplish radical administrative and economic reforms. As Hobsbawm
underlines, in spite of all the reformist projects announced in the siecle des lumieres,
"what did abolish agrarian feudal relations all over Western and Central Europe
was the French Revolution, by direct action, reaction or example, and the revolution
of 1848"84. Against the background of the social tensions which characterized the
life of the Italian states during the whole century (impoverishment of peasants,
absolutist ambitions of the monarchies, aristocratic reaction, new landed interests of
the bourgeoisie) the idyllic descriptions of the ancien regime offered by Canosa and
Leopardi show their fictitious and mystifying nature. According to Canosa, the
French had occupied and destroyed "a kingdom which was an earthly paradise"85.
As in the Neapolitan views of the Romantic "Posillipo School", the countryside is
represented by reactionaries as a bucolic landscape, rich in natural beauties and in
peasants wearing traditional clothes, happily engrossed in their agricultural work,
or resting in the shade of Roman and medieval monuments. The perfect organic
Christian society of the Middle Ages, which followed the natural inclinations of
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human beings and gave to their lives the fullest meaning through the respect of a
transcendent hierarchical order, became, in the eyes of Canosa's and Leopardi's
readers, an idyllic image to oppose to the "materiality" and "violence" of modern
liberal society. At the waning of the last remains of the feudal world, its idealization
became a diffused and powerful ideology, the only one which (together with
contemporary Catholic thought) seemed able to counteract the democratic and
liberal systems.
4.6 Theological Reaction: from the Counter-Revolutionary Crusade to the Neo-
Scholastic System
In the mid-1830s aristocratic Reactionary Catholicism entered its final and declining
period. By that time, liberal Catholicism was emerging as the religious ideology of
Italian bourgeoisie; on the opposite side, the intransigent clergy had been
elaborating a much subtler theoretical position to fight liberalism and reformism,
leaving behind the embarrassing and Gothic apparatus of French Traditionalism
and Reactionary Catholicism: Neo-Scholastic philosophy. Naples was the birth
place of Neo-Scholasticism86. Indeed, if Canosa was the most well-known secular
representative of aristocratic Reactionary Catholicism, the Theatin Gioacchino
Ventura was certainly the most authoritative exponent of ecclesiastic Reactionary
Catholicism in Italy, and he was to be one of the fathers of Neo-Scholastic
philosophy.
In 1821 Ventura founded in Naples the first and most lively ultramontane
periodical: The Ecclesiastic Encyclopedia87. His aim was to refute the French
encyclopedic and reformist culture, and to offer an alternative system of knowledge
on which political reaction could be founded (a "new counter-revolutionary
encyclopedia" Ventura called it). The articles are unified by a clear reference to
Lamennais, of whom Ventura was a personal friend. Ventura also linked his work
to the preexisting Italian reactionary culture; so that he contacted Canosa for advice
and contributions, and established solid links with the ultramontane groups of
Turin and Modena. Ventura's primary goal was immediately political: the
reconstruction of society according to traditional Catholic values, moving from the
only "sane" components left: people and legitimate kings. The enemy was the
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liberal elite who asked the king for a constitution and a free-trade economy. The
ideological construction behind Ventura's articles is rather simple: rejection of the
secularized culture of the eighteenth century and a new foundation of culture and
society on Catholicism. One finds the familiar themes of the revolution as the
product of a minority, and of its schismatic nature. The Reform is described as a
rebellion against the Roman Church in the name of individual reason88, whose
consequence was that of dissolving society, since the Church is crucial to
maintaining social order89. Consequently, being liberal, pro-constitution or Jansenist
is one and the same thing90. Religious tolerance is only a sign of religious
indifference91. Sovereigns are criticized for their anti-ecclesiastic and anti-feudal
policy during the late eighteenth century: the Church must have supremacy over
civil power. New emerging classes are portrayed as "a crowd of new men emerging
from the mud"; they are the egoistic and materialist bourgeois who aim to found
society on profit. The remedy advanced by Ventura is the supremacy of religion in
every aspect of social and cultural life, on the infallibility of the Pontiff, on the
priority of society over the individual, "of the whole over the part"; and on society
being founded on subjection to authority92. Other themes treated by Ventura
include social contracts, which cannot exist because they would imply the
independence of man from God (in fact, the social contract, guaranteed by unstable
individual interests, is ultimately based on materialism and atheism93). The
expansion of trade, and the "full property" of land are also opposed, as they
"nourish human cupidity"94. Religious censorship is defended95, for all works which
could provoke "social envy"96. Freedom of the press is "the greatest plague of the
century"97. Modern didactic methods bring rebellion into the schools98, as state
universities do99. The "happy state" of the pre-revolutionary age is frequently and
nostalgically eulogized100 (but consider that Ventura was born in 1792). Ventura
thought that conceding one single point to the enemy would destroy the whole
building of Reactionary Catholicism101. His was a dramatic ideology: the barriers
were continuously being assaulted, and without doubt, no compromise with the
corrupting principles was possible at all.
In 1820 Lamennais had published the second volume of his famous Essay on
Indifference. His theory of common sense is articulated and opposed to the
individual reason of the philosopher, who "refuses to receive his reason from
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society and mankind, to believe on the basis of their testimonial and authority;
similarly the heretic refuses to receive the scripture from the hands of the Church,
to believe on the basis of its testimonial and to submit his interpretation to its
authority"102. Certainty cannot be reached by individual reason (through reasoning
and perceptions); it can only be received from society and ultimately from the
supreme authority of God. Ventura, who was a member of the Commission for
Public Education and a royal censor, preached the doctrine of common sense in
Naples with great enthusiasm103.
The fundamental goal of Ventura, as of the reactionary groups of Turin and
Modena, was to oppose a new, Catholic Encyclopedia to the revolutionary one,
showing how every branch of human knowledge can be grounded on Catholicism,
as opposed to sensationalist philosophy. From this perspective, philosophy
coincides with religion, and the individual is organically connected to society, so
that the possibility of individual reason being creative about social order is ruled
out ab initio. Now, Lamennais' theory of common sense and Bonald's social theory
of language had been crucial resources for Reactionary Catholicism in the years of
the "emergency" (mid-1790s to the restoration); but they were soon perceived as
philosophically inadequate by the Italian reactionary clergy. Moreover, from the
mid-1820s Lamennais began to diverge from the Roman orthodoxy, as he disagreed
with the "diplomatic policy" of the curia.
Neo-scholasticism was elaborated precisely by those men who, a few years
before had been Lamennesian, and Ventura was among them. Fontana wrote that
"Thomism was the Italian version of Traditionalist philosophy"104. In fact, the re-
elaboration of the Scholastic tradition accomplished the ambitious project which
had been originally expressed by Traditionalists and Reactionary Catholics: that of
presenting a Catholic encyclopedia, an organic system of knowledge to oppose to
the modern one. There was an important reason why Lamennais could not agree
with the restoration of Scholasticism. In his mind, after the demolition of the
pretenses of individual reason and of all the philosophical systems, there was no
need for a rational foundation of religious belief. His sociological considerations
and the principle of authority were all he needed to ground his theocratic
conception of society. This was certainly not the view of the Jesuits and of the Holy
See. In Italy, the battle of Traditionalism was seen as naturally linked to the re-
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discovery of Thomas Aquinas; the concerns about social order which lie behind
Neo-Scholastic thought are exactly the same as those of the early reactionaries. "It is
impossible" wrote one of them, "that someone who has studied Saint Thomas
would become a revolutionary"105. This situation makes sense of the oscillations of
Italian Reactionary Catholic authors between the conception of the absolute
impossibility of founding religion on reason (a la Maistre or Lamennais), and the
attempt to do that, maybe adducing pseudo-mathematical proofs. The Italians (and
the Neapolitans in particular) appeared not to see any contradiction in their own
writings, where Neo-Scholasticism and theory of common sense are indeed
presented as compatible. Another Neo-Scholastic wrote that "Aristotelian
philosophy was in fact common sense transformed into philosophical method"106.
Religious belief and common sense are identified tout court with Neo-Scholastic
philosophy.
In fact, the best example of the Traditionalist interpretation of Aristotelian
philosophy is provided by Ventura, who was at once the most authoritative
follower of Lamennais in Italy and the most convinced restorer of the Scholastic
system of knowledge. His De methodo philosophandi (1828) was devoted to this
cultural operation107. Ventura argued that the present religious indifference was not
the result of some sort of ignorance, or of the progress of the sciences; it was instead
the consequence of the specific methodology of modern philosophy. In the past,
Ventura remarked, many different methods were employed to study different kinds
of realities: in theological matters the principle of authority was adopted; in moral
and social matters the method of common sense; in the natural sciences the
empirical method. The goal of modern philosophers and of Neapolitan reformers
has been directed to remove such differences, and to reduce the many
methodologies to a single, absolute methodology. All sciences are placed at the
same level, destroying the traditional hierarchy, and everywhere empirical method
is adopted. The result is that philosophers pretend "to discover the truth" even in
fields where they previously used to "explain appearances". The absolutization of
the empirical method makes it necessary that only natural truths can possibly be
known. But this is to deny the very essence of Christianity, which is founded on
revealed, super-natural truths. From here stems the spread of irreligiosity, moral
subversion and ultimately, social subversion. This is the core of Ventura's
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argument; it is in fact an original re-elaboration of the themes of French
Traditionalism, where the methodological and epistemological dimensions emerged
as the crucial ones, and the methodological plan is precisely where the connection
with scholasticism is made. In the previous part, I described how the work of
Neapolitan reformers and analytics is best understood in terms of an
epistemological shift towards a unitary methodology based upon sensationalistic
philosophy, and with the goal of excluding religion and metaphysics from the
realm of legitimate knowledge. Now I suggest that precisely this shift is the
phenomenon studied by Ventura in his Latin book, and it is against this shift that
his action was directed.
Scholastic philosophy is presented by Ventura as one and the same thing as
Lamennaisian common sense108. The principle of scholasticism is the "substantial
unity" of every reality; so for instance man is an indissoluble composition
(compositio) of body and soul; whereas "recent philosophy" attributes certainty only
to sensations (impressions of the soul)109. Ventura refers here to the substantial
unity of "form" and "matter" in Aristotelian philosophy. By analogy, it is only the
unity of "truth" and "intelligence" (reasoning) that can bring about the unity of
human reason. Where modern philosophers pretend to discover the truth by their
own reasoning and to found the unity of man on a sensationalistic basis, in
scholasticism it is the contemporaneous presence of pre-existent truth and human
reasoning, of body and soul, that produces legitimate knowledge. By analogy, one
can claim — as Ventura did —that in social and political order the unity derives from
the substantial union of state and Church ("unio substantialis inter Ecclesiam et
Statum")110.
Needless to say, Ventura's reading of Thomas Aquinas is highly disputable111.
But that is not the point here. The point is rather to note the ideological aim of
rejecting the secularization of the state and the secularization of knowledge by
appealing to the authoritative thought of Aquinas. By appropriating Scholastic
thought, the "counter-revolutionary encyclopedia" took a most important step; the
original irrationalist response was indeed replaced by an omni-comprehensive
scheme, a well-structured system of knowledge where conceptual tools could be
found to deal with any kind of matter and problem. The general orientation — total
opposition to modern thought, political liberalism and social reformism— was to
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remain unaltered112. One of the crucial moves is to define human reason as a merely
"explicative" —as opposed to "creative", "investigative"— faculty. This is an
exemplary case of a mixture of a Traditionalist theme (the weakness of human
reason) and a Thomistic one (that of human reason as a "mirror" of external reality).
Ventura himself made clear, in another context, the improvements offered by Neo-
Scholasticism with respect to French Traditionalism; among them, the definition of
human being,as given above, to replace Bonald's definition; and the epistemological
doctrine of Thomism to replace Maistre's innate ideas. Ventura thought that the
foundation of certainty provided by Lamennais (common sense) is indeed the same
thing as Thomism, but he considered the latter a more solid and profound doctrine.
In the end, Ventura said, scholasticism is the system upon which the principle of
authority so well presented by Traditionalists can be philosophically founded,
providing a definitive confutation of the possibility for the "private sense" (i.e. the
individual reason) to know something with certainty113.
Scholasticism provided Ventura with a solution for the pressing problem of the
substantial unity of state and Church, human reason and reality, thus enabling him
to refute ab initio any dangerous social or epistemological autonomy and any
possible subversive use of reason. It also gave an important impression of
continuity with the previous tradition of the Catholic Church. At the Second
Vatican Council (1870), Neo-Scholasticism was to be recognized as the official
philosophy of the Catholic Church. The theory of common sense was to gradually
disappear as an autonomous doctrine about certainty, particularly after the Pontiff
condemned Lamennais (1832) —as the French abbe was turning his doctrine into
an instrument to subvert the authority of Rome. However, the major point of
Lamennais's position remained crucial to Neo-Scholasticism —namely the negation
of any "inquisitive" capacity of reason and its characterization in terms of
explicative and deductive capacity with regard to revealed truths. According to
Neo-Scholasticism, the assent of reason to "primary truths" is immediate and
intuitive. It is not just an act of faith, of respect for authority, but "an act due to
nature, which imposes those truths, without any proof, to any healthy intellect, as it
lets any healthy eye see daylight without the mediation of another light to make it
visible"114.
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In Ventura's Encyclopedia we find also important traces of another component of
this more advanced form of Reactionary Catholicism: the work of Karl Ludwig von
Haller on the science of the state115. Haller's book was carefully studied by Ventura,
and his conversion to Catholicism was also proudly advertised. We do not need to
delve into Haller's theory here: only to note that his main aim was to refute any
contractualist foundation of the state. To this extent Haller did not employ the
religious and philosophical arguments of Traditionalism; rather he kept his analysis
at a very specific and empirical level, deducing "scientifically" from observations
his authoritarian conception of power, where sovereignty is sanctioned by the
superiority of certain individuals over others. In Italy, Haller was presented by
reactionaries as a martyr of science and religion, as a proof of the fact that
Catholicism did not conflict with science, and that a scientific theory of power
supports the necessity of Catholicism as a stabilizing factor. This reference to Haller,
together with the re-discovery of Aquinas, reveals the concern for "scientific forms"
of knowledge among Reactionary Catholic authors. And it is indeed time to
concentrate precisely on the position of scientific knowledge in the context of the
anti-encyclopedia of Reactionary Catholicism.
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Chapter Five
The Knowledge of Reaction:
Philosophy, Science and Mathematics
5.1 Reactionary Philosophy in Naples
The reactionary turn of the Neapolitan government between 1791 and 1793, and its
new alliance with the counter-revolutionary powers was followed by a re¬
orientation of the cultural and educational policy. The emerging reactionary
component of the Neapolitan Church was then charged —after years of anti-
ecclesiastic policy— with taking full control of the system of education. This
momentous event could not leave contemporary philosophical production
unaffected. In fact, the turn from sensationalism and ideology to forms of eclectic
scholastic philosophy was sudden and dramatic. As we have seen, forms of
sensationalism surviving with Delfico and his school, were to be revived under the
French occupation; but the point is that after 1794 they were decidedly minoritarian.
With the suppression of unorthodox private studios and academies, and
particularly after "the year of the crusade against culture" (1796), the reactionary
intellectual block of the RUN extended its control over Neapolitan intellectual life.
The change of intellectual atmosphere from the age of reformism to that of reaction,
has been described as "disconcerting": by 1800 "the old Neapolitan cultural
environment, that of Genovesi, Grimaldi, Filangieri, Pagano, and Galanti, of the
Lessons on Trade and of the Science of Legislation, is completely unrecognizable"1.
From 1797 the RUN was the responsibility of monsignor Agostino Gervasio (an
ultra-conservative ecclesiastic) and Vecchione (the admirer of Canosa). In Autumn
1799, after the fall of the Neapolitan Republic, their duty was precisely that of
"eradicating the dangerous ideas which caused so many disasters". In line with
213
contemporary Reactionary Catholicism, religion was brought to the center of
education, as the only remedy against political subversion. In 1804, to reinforce this
trend, the Jesuits were re-admitted to Naples, thanks to the diplomatic action of
Vecchione. They were then charged with important didactic duties. The second
restoration of the Bourbons (1815, after Joachim Murat's defeat and execution)
followed a very similar pattern. Through the action of a special commission,
Catholicism was put once again at the center of the educational system. Among the
members of the commission were Vecchione and a group of Catholic intellectuals:
Giuseppe Capocasale, Domenico Cotugno, and Nicola Fergola. Around 1821,
reaction reached its political and cultural apogee, with Canosa at the Ministry of
Police, Ventura directing the Ecclesiastic Encyclopedia, the establishment of a
Committee for Public Education, presided over by the Archbishop of Naples, and of
special commissions charged with controlling the "moral conduct" of teachers.
Meanwhile, in 1816, a chair of Truth of Christian Religion had been created in the
RUN, and the chair of Ideology had been replaced by that of Logic and
Metaphysics2.
This last change was indeed representative of the new philosophical culture
which was an expression of the power-bloc formed by the Crown and the Church.
Philosophical texts of the "official" reactionary culture were invariably based on the
late scholastic tradition, and on the systematization of knowledge accomplished by
the rationalist philosopher Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Wolff's system was based
on the priority of metaphysics over any other form of knowledge, and it was indeed
a typical example of the "old way" of doing philosophy criticized by the reformers
and the Jacobins (and a polemical target of Gennaro Cestari). In the Wolffian system
formal logic was introduced as preparatory to metaphysics; from metaphysics one
moves to the theoretical problems of ontology, cosmology, "empirical" psychology,
"rational" psychology, and natural theology; and from here to the practical
problems of moral philosophy, natural law, ethics, and politics. The system was
strongly unitary, tied up in the laces of a few all-pervading metaphysical principles
(and, as Cestari noticed, it worked in an essentially circular way). One should notice
that there is no separation between theology and metaphysics or religion and
politics, and this was what attracted the reactionary philosophers.
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Using the textbooks of the late dogmatic rationalism, such as those by Christian
Wolff and by his followers Sigismund Storchenau, Friedrich Baumaister, and Paul
Mako, the Neapolitan reactionary intelligentsia articulated a curriculum of
philosophical studies which suited the new reactionary politics3. In 1804, in his
opening speech from the new chair of Logic and Metaphysics, Capocasale
addressed the audience by explaining that no scientific investigation is possible, in
any area of knowledge, without the previous support of metaphysics4. In fact, this
was the complete reversal of the claims of the reformers. Capocasale's ontology was
based on the principle of non-contradiction, which holds for every necessary and
contingent truth; a consequence of this principle is that reality is structured
according to the most harmonic and teleological order, which emerges particularly
in cosmology, whose duty it is to highlight the great cosmic chain of being, the
universal and uninterrupted connection (in Latin: ordo) of entities5. But the "order"
of the world is still not enough in itself. The crucial step was that of showing the
necessary link between such a universal order (proved ontologically) and the action
of a supreme intelligent causal principle which is the end of this teleological chain.
The same basic scheme was present in every production of reactionary philosophy
in the first three decades of the century. Key points were the necessity of
metaphysical foundations for the sciences, the link between ontology and
cosmology, the teleological universal chain of beings, whose ordered, proportioned
and harmonic disposition reflects God's wisdom6.
Neapolitan authors in this trend also took into account the important results of
the strong sensationalistic and ideological trend which came down from Genovesi to
the early nineteenth century. The dogmatic treatment of metaphysics did not
compromise at all the possibility of accepting empiricist claims when it came to the
investigation of reality. Locke, Condillac, Genovesi, Newton were indeed portrayed
as models in philosophy, and Capocasale was also the author of a text of Newtonian
physics. Empirical researches were easily framed within this metaphysical system,
and thus absorbed into the unitary harmony of the system, which was a teleological
harmony, depending ultimately on the dogmas of Christian religion. So, for
instance, one could investigate the empirical origin of ideas, but this did not affect
the metaphysical questions of the existence and immortality of the soul; much of the
ideological production could be recycled in the new metaphysical perspective7. What
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could not be absorbed was the idea of the "activity" of matter (present in Lauberg
and in other ideologists). Reactionary philosophers invariably described matter as
inert, passive, only possessing the force which is communicated to it from external
causes or which is given to it (praeter essentiam) from God's will. It should also be
noted that, in spite of the possibility of grasping the basic (formal) ontological
principles, man cannot "penetrate all the mysteries" and "the most hidden essences
and causes" which are in nature; this pretension only produces an ambitious
metaphysics, rich in chimeras and human inventions: it is indeed the metaphysics
of the philosoplies8. The real and useful metaphysics "confines itself to the right
limits given by nature to human intellect", it is "satisfied with considering the
effects of ignored causes, it follows experience and the evidence provided by
nature"9. The ultimate constitutive principles of reality —essence, forces, causes,
substances— are out of the reach of human understanding. We can only know the
phenomenal properties of beings, that is their "nominal essence", not their real —
metaphysical— essence (which would include the nature of their constitutive
elements, the cause of their being connected, and the nature of the forces acting on
them). This excludes themes such as the body-soul relation from the field of
legitimate philosophical investigation, and puts them among the insoluble
mysteries. This form of phenomenalism and moderate skepticism was far from
damaging religious dogmas, of course. For instance, the fact that man cannot know
the real nature of the soul-body relation did not clash with the proof of the
immateriality of the soul, which was obtained on the basis of metaphysical
principles10. The limitations of human understanding, the unknowable character of
the metaphysical essences of natural phenomena simply draw attention to the need
for an omniscient and omnipotent being. I believe that here a crucial connection
with the contemporary evolution of theological thought towards Neo-Scholasticism
emerges. Human reason can only ascertain metaphysical and religious truths, it
cannot pretend to penetrate them, i.e. to investigate them gnoseologically. The
capacities of human reason seem to be limited to that of the "recognition" of truths
and of the "deduction" of other truths from them. As for Reactionary Catholic
authors, so for reactionary philosophers human reason had no autonomous creative
capacities.
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The metaphysical part of the Wolffian systems of the Restoration age was
immediately linked to the practical philosophical disciplines of ethics, law,
economy, pedagogy, and politics. Every possible practical question had already a
solution provided by the founding metaphysical system. So, for instance, from the
basic ontological principle of non-contradiction it follows that in ethics, as in
physics, contradiction is evil (it is for spirit "what a crippling is for the body"11).
And "here is the cognitive principle, the first line of the natural code, which is
necessarily true, certain, constant, immutable, evident and adequate; from which all
duties and rights of man and citizen must be correctly deduced"12. The laws of
moral and political order cannot but be part of the unitary system of laws ruling the
universe, which is an organic and ordered whole. They enjoy the same
metaphysical necessity. In the ethico-practical treatises of these philosophers, from
the Catechism and the Universal Code of Capocasale (1792-93) onwards, a series of
duties is deduced from the particular position of man in the system of the universe.
The result is the eulogy of a prudent ethic, characterized by respect for the present
moral and political order, by the proper exercise of human faculties, and by
maintaining one's proper place in the great chain of beings. To behave otherwise
would lead an individual to break the natural order, and be "in contradiction with
himself"13.
To sum up, the whole practical sphere of human life was deprived of any
autonomy, and subtracted to the control of the individual. Ethics, law, pedagogy,
politics, and economics were seen as mere articulations of a single fundamental
body of metaphysically founded norms. Critical thinking and the discussion of the
present state of society were ruled out ab initio. Man does not enter society as a
citizen but burdened by a charge of duties. One sees how this matches with the
absolutist conception of power which triumphed in the Neapolitan Restoration:
authority was the legitimate criterion for "moral evidence"; furthermore, the
practical disciplines were based on an omni-comprehensive system of norms which
left no room for critique. The "real philosopher" we are told, is "the man who does
not investigate inconsiderately with senses what must be investigated with reason;
does not discuss with reason what must be discussed with testimonial; he is able to
ignore what is not given to know; he knows how to limit his research, to doubt
where doubt is reasonable, to accept the known truth, to be subject to infallible
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authority: he is the man who prefers to follow the truth with the common people,
rather than falsity with the so-called philosopher"14.
As in contemporary theological thought, in this academic philosophy the
legitimate usage of individual reason was limited and pre-structured; while the
innocent "common people" emerged as the repository of an original wisdom.
Culture and science detached themselves from political debate, political events
being "mysterious"; so that we had better "leave our destinies in the hands of the
one who controls the fate of men"15. The grounding of society in religion is
inevitable: "religion is like a strict chain which links everywhere one man to the
others, one citizen to the others, the subject to his prince, and makes us observe the
law"16. In the same spirit, Capocasale offered an argument to prove the
reasonability of political intolerance, which was grounded on a paternalistic and
authoritarian conception of power, apparently derived from Haller, whose
Restoration of Political Science was published in Naples in 1826-2817. And with the
recognition of the influence of Haller on the "official" philosophers of the
restoration, and their organic relation with the basic tenets of Reactionary
Catholicism, we can move to the more specifically scientific component of the
movement.
5.2 Reactionary Catholicism and the Natural Sciences
Some of the philosophers and ecclesiastics cited in the previous paragraphs as
exponents of the related positions of Reactionary Catholicism, Neo-Scholasticism
and reactionary philosophy showed no deep interest in the natural and
mathematical sciences per se. Mannheim claimed indeed that counter-revolutionary
conservative thought was hostile to the spirit of the natural sciences, and to
mathematics in particular, due to the general opposition to the encyclopedic
knowledge of the "moderns", where natural and exact sciences play a crucial role.
In fact, modern quantitative sciences are often criticised in the writings of
Neapolitan Reactionary Catholics. Nevertheless, it is a main point of this study that
such expressions of complete refusal to recognize the results of modern science
were not representative of the whole reactionary movement. A very interesting
form of empiricism was indeed elaborated by some scientifically trained
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ecclesiastics in collaboration with a lively school of mathematics which began to
make its name in Naples around the mid-1780s, under the guidance of Nicola
Fergola. Let us approach this position through the writings of a well-known
Reactionary Catholic clergyman: the Oratorian Francesco Colangelo (1769-1836),
Bishop of Castellamare and Minister of Public Education.
Colangelo entered the Oratory in 1783; at that time, as we have seen, the place
was the see of an anti-encyclopedic academy, and the battle against the modern
secularized and reformist culture was intense. He became the librarian of the
famous Oratorian Library, which allowed him to deepen his knowledge of the
classical and patristic literature (significantly, his favorite author was the anti-
intellectual Tacitus). Since the revolutionary period he had contacts with a group
of Neapolitan men of science and literati, and he was in correspondence with a
number of other Reactionary Catholic thinkers active in France and Italy (among
them Gerdil and Spedalieri). One of the first presentations of his political ideas
were his reflections upon the Neapolitan Revolution, published in 1799 and
dedicated to the Queen18. Directly responsible for the "disorders and crimes" of the
revolution has been, according to Colangelo, the "pernicious system" of Rousseau,
diffused in Naples by Genovesi, Filangieri, and Pagano. They were to be
considered the fathers of a revolution which "assaulted the thrones, outraged the
altars, and upset nature itself"19. In 1820 Ferdinando I pressed for Colangelo to be
created bishop and, in 1824, he was appointed minister of public education. His
conduct was so criticized by liberal opponents as well as fellow reactionaries, that
he was forced to resign in 1831, the king placing him in control of the Royal
Printing-Office. Allegedly, most of his attention was devoted to the investigation of
the moral conduct and the private life of professors, while the educational system
was left in a state of abandonment20. During his life he was indeed the symbol of
the Neapolitan reactionary clergy —together with Archbishop Celestino Cocle,
private confessor of the king— and he was, with Canosa one of the most hated
symbols of reaction in liberal literature.
Colangelo was interested in science, philosophy and history, as his rich output
testifies21. Unlike other reactionary ecclesiastics, Colangelo studied with interest the
relations between religion and the mathematical and empirical sciences. In 1804 he
published a most interesting book titled The Irreligious Freedom of Thought, Enemy of
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Scientific Progress, where he accomplished a paradoxical reversion of the reformist
conception, according to which the autonomy of the sciences from metaphysics was
essential to their progress22. Terms like "philosophy" and "wisdom", Colangelo
wrote, have always indicated that kind of knowledge which, using the
contemplation of nature as a ladder, allows man to reach his Creator, and to
"descend" from this vision to his duties towards God and towards society (as from
the knowledge of God one can logically deduce the knowledge of man and of
society). As the reader may suspect, here is another version of the philosophic
perennis argument. This original "science of God" was the core of Greek philosophy
— of Platonism particularly — and stated clearly that reason is a gift of the divinity,
and it had to be employed not simply to reach material improvements (a goal we
share with animals), but especially to recognize the existence of the Creator of the
universe. This recognition took place through the contemplation of "speaking
nature". Consequently, the science which dealt with God was the noblest, and the
most fundamental one; whereas the other sciences constituted the "ladder" and
were instrumental to its enhancements. So far so good, for Colangelo, but when it
came to "the modern philosophers", things changed dramaticallv. In the modern
age the very term "philosophy" has been abused to mean the "horrible enterprise of
banishing the necessary Being from the World"; of abolishing any distinction
between vice and virtue — the latter being reduced to pleasure and utility
(obviously he refers to a sensationalistic foundation of morals); of striking at the
values of honesty, decency, fidelity, loyalty. This is what has been called named
"the progress of human knowledge". The whole "spiritual science" of the ancients,
together with the Christian Revelation have been rejected as "old prejudices". But
the social and political consequences of the modern, atheistic theory of knowledge
are violence and destruction (and here he referred explicitly to Haller). Not
surprisingly, Colangelo saw a basic element of moral corruption behind the whole
modern philosophy. By attacking religion, these atheists aimed to free themselves
from all those links and limitations which are "natural" to man —and which are
naturally recognized by any virtuous person. In fact, according to Colangelo, the
principles inspired by religion and those obtained by the use of reason must
eventually coincide, given that nature and revelation are simply two different
manifestations of God. It is personal interest that makes men deny the basic natural
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values; "if men had some interest in doing it, they would doubt even Euclid's
Elements'"23. In Greece and Rome, moral corruption had lead the way to atheism
("the plague of Epicureism"), which in turn caused the ruin of society. Similarly, in
the eighteenth century, the much praised "freedom of philosophizing" was nothing
else than a "license of scepticism". Modern philosophers merely repeat the ancient
arguments of skeptics, cynics, Epicureans, and other philosophical sects which
attacked the idea of God, upon which "the great systems of the past" were
grounded (i.e. Plato and Aristotle)24. A series of quotes from Diderot, Voltaire,
Helvetius, Robinet, Lamettrie, and Buffon are then presented by Colangelo to make
clear that, no matter what they say, the moderns "want the world to be formed only
by natural forces, without any immediate action of the Divinity"; and that their
systems have the same value as the "childish tales of the ancient" (as Cicero defines
Lucretius's atomistic system)25. In spite of their "freedom" moderns "had not been
able to create a truly new philosophical system, or at least an argument to defend
atheism": in fact both their arguments and doctrines are from the ancient pagan
culture. For example, they maintained, following Epicurus and Lucretius, the
existence of atoms and the idea that "motion is essential to matter"; and by doing
this, "they threw God down from His own throne, and sat themselves on it"26.
Interestingly, Colangelo observed that modern philosophers have transferred on to
matter "all those attributes which should be referred to God"27. But their atomistic
doctrine is simply fallacious, as experience shows that matter "is indifferent" to
motion, that it is "brute" and "without free-will". But let us concede this point, he
says, this will still not be enough to explain the system of the universe: "let us mix
the letters of the alphabet and throw them on a table: will we obtain the Iliad, in this
way?"28. On the basis of the principle that "an effect cannot contain more than was
in its own cause", Colangelo concludes that "an unintelligent and disordered cause
cannot generate such a wonderful order [of the universe]"29. Moreover, if matter is
"the mother of everything", why we do not observe the creation of any new animal
species? In a following argument, Colangelo presented the "system of the universe"
as an enormous chain of "contingent beings"30. No one of these beings contains in
itself its own "internal reason". Now, the error of many philosophers is to postulate
an infinite number of links for this chain. Instead, it is more natural to think of one
"hand" which sustains the chain. It is clear where the series of arguments presented
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by Colangelo was pointing: matter contains no self-organizing principle; the
universe and "intelligent man" cannot be the product of chance; the regressus ad
infinitum of causes is logically faulty. Everything converges towards a providential
and teleological vision of the physical universe (to which the pars construens of
Colangelo's book is devoted). Other typical Reactionary Catholic arguments of the
book are the connection between deism and universal skepticism, and the
pragmatic conception of religion as instrumentum regni. What distinguishes
Christianity from the philosophical systems is that it is not "a system of
metaphysics", as it can be grounded on matters-of-fact.
It was convenient to religion, which aims to protect society, to be grounded on
the same kind of evidence which supports society itself. What is this kind of
evidence? The factual kind. On the basis of facts we recognize the authority of
the Sovereign, of the magistrate, of the various Superiors who have authority
over us, and we recognize the links of blood with our relatives. Similarly our
rights, fortune, and hopes rest on facts.31
In a similar way, our duties towards God are founded on facts. This is what
differentiates Christianity from the innumerable erroneous philosophies which
followed one another as "different fashions". The evidence supporting Christianity
is provided both by certain empirical facts and certain basic intuitive principles.
The facts are the historical reports by the evangelists. Why should we trust Caesar's
De Bello Gallico and not trust them? Colangelo inserted a long digression to make
clear the historical basis for the history of Christ, quoting largely the pagan
"enemies", whose evidence is considered more important than that of the
Christian apologists. In discussing the problem of historical evidence, Colangelo
faces the question of miracles, a widely debated issue, strictly connected with the
question of the general laws of the universe32. Here is how Colangelo assessed the
question:
A miracle is a temporary suspension of the physical order [...]. The Author of
nature doesn't contradict his own laws when he suspends them, nor does He
change his own decrees, because the Supreme Intelligence not only disposed
the ordinary laws of nature, but He also disposed the possibility of
suspension.33
Miracles are possible because God rules the universe like "an absolute master", not
like "a mechanical agent"34. The "deists" who deny the historical evidence of
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religion and the possibility of miracles are bringing a form of radical skepticism
not only into history (why believe Caesar and not the Gospel?), but also into the
sciences, as they undermine the principle of trusting those who accomplished
experimental experiences in the past. On the contrary, Christian doctrine is a
"friend of the sciences", because it shares those very principles which are at the
basis of good sciences35. Among those principles is the awareness of the existence
of God, and of his absolute dominion (imperio) over nature. Colangelo shows how
this principle was present in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz,
and Newton. Their philosophical writings, in spite of all the "superficial"
differences, share a common process of "ascension" from the empirical ground to a
necessary causa prima, and the rejection of the role of chance in the constitution of
the universe. In particular, Colangelo stresses that "there is not any other
hypothesis which submits the machine of the universe to the power of God in such
a perfect way as the Newtonian one"36. He praises the Principia Matliematica, —and
also the introduction provided by Roger Cotes to the 1723 edition— because there
is proved the existence of a "non-mechanical force" (forza immeccanica) which
pervades the whole universe; and he is pleased to quote the well-known sentence:
"et hi omnes motus regnlares originem non habent ex causis mechanicis"37. Quite
traditionally, Colangelo divides phenomena into two different classes: those
produced by secondary causes (like pendulum oscillations), and those
independent from secondary causes (such as the motion of a body in a vacuum).
Physicists have to research on the first kind of phenomena (as Newton did
studying the motion of planet), whereas the second kind of phenomena can only
be understood by making reference to the Causa Prima38. In an interesting note,
Colangelo remarks that both Newton and MacLaurin were convinced believers,
and he argues that mathematics is not intrinsically dangerous to religion. To this
extent he quotes Father Antonio Valsecchi (1708-1791).
I would like to entirely report a very Wise Dissertation, which has been given
to me by Signor Giordano Riccati39, a nobleman from Treviso who is well-
known in the Republic of Letters. He composed it to combat a paradox put
about by an Italian Gazette: the study of Mathematics favors unbelief. He shows
that the fundamental points of our Religion, that is to say, the existence of
God, the temporal creation of Matter, the origin and the system of the
Universe, and other similar truths, can be proved with evidence by means of
mathematical theories, which he properly manages. So that the same
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[mathematical] principles destroy the Materialist's irreligiosity. Given that, he
concludes, the study of mathematics is far from favoring unbelief, as
Libertines maintain, or as some not too wise men fear. On the contrary, they
can be utilized as a light to know and to prepare arguments to defend
Religion.40
Colangelo goes on describing how the Wolffian philosophical system yields
necessarily the recognition of a wise Creator of the universe (not surprisingly he
favored Wolff in metaphysics). But all this uniformity, he says, can hardly surprise
us. In fact, all the great philosophical systems are founded on an eternal,
immutable principle (P): "the effect presupposes the cause, and the quality of the
effect determines the quality of the cause"41. Only the specific methods to prove the
existence of God can change through history. In a similar way,
geometrical truths have remained always the same, given that they are
founded on eternally true axioms; they are equally evident following either
the methods of the ancients or the modern methods.42
How could the Christian doctrine be an enemy of the sciences? In fact, "true
sciences bend their honored brows in front of Religion", because the principle
which is fundamental in their investigations, is also the principle by which we can
prove the existence of God. In Colangelo's teleological perspective nature appears
to its contemplators as a "sort of pyramid, whose breadth diminishes as its height
increases"43. The philosopher-contemplator "ascends from one phenomenon to the
next, as from one step to the next, until he finally reaches the last stone, that is to
say the Will and the Power of the One who rules the whole construction".
Which method should be preferred in the scientific investigation of nature?
"Not that by which one is immediately pushed up to the middle of the pyramid,
because this would only confuse ideas"; if it is true that natura nonfacit saltus, even
the observer has to proceed step by step. One has to proceed "from simple ideas to
the composed ones", so that what is known could be employed as a step to reach
the unknown. In doing this, the contemplator "follows the path of nature". This
inductive procedure is, in fact, common to the investigation of the natural
philosopher, of the metaphysician, and of the historian. If we show that it can even
be used to defend the Christian doctrine, then the accordance between religion and
science will be proved once more.
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Actually —asks Colangelo— what did the Fathers of the Church teach us? First
of all they ask us to "stop for a while, and to contemplate Nature, and the beauty of
the heavens, which are decorated [ornati] by so many stars completing perpetually
constant revolutions"44. Then, they invite us to ascend from the harmony and the
evident teleological nature of phenomena towards the reason of this order; a
reason which is not chance (a "voce senza idea", a word without any real referent),
but a wise First Cause. Euler, says Colangelo, reached this conclusion starting from
the simple contemplation of the human eye45. The First Cause can also be reached
by observing the functioning of the "thinking principle" (human intellect) which is
in every man and whose teleological function is plainly clear to Colangelo.
Through this observation man realizes that he is the "monarch of the universe",
that he is free, and that he has a will. Moreover, the man conscious of his thinking
principle is immediately conscious of his heterogeneity with respect to matter.
Matter is "extended, divisible, malleable, impenetrable, inert" whereas thought is
"simple, unitary, active". Colangelo continues by showing how the Fathers of the
Church proved the principal religious truths by applying the principle (P). Among
other things, the principle (P) is used to prove the system of punishments and
prizes in the after-life, and the immortality of soul. Finally, Colangelo applies (P) to
the historical fact of the Revelation.
What is the point of this rather complex apologetic text? In his rhetorical and
quotation-burdened way, Colangelo is showing the reader that the same basic
principle can be used to acquire knowledge about empirical reality and super¬
natural reality. But he is also showing that, in spite of this fundamental unity of
human knowledge, every branch of knowledge has its own specific methodology
and its own specific way of arguing; and that, as for the Wolffian metaphysicians,
in different branches of knowledge human reason can rely on different "kinds of
certainty". The certainty of the exact sciences, which refers to intuitive or proved
truths is one thing. The certainty one can have when dealing with empirical facts is
another thing. The divide is sharp and insuperable: any attempt to know with
mathematical certainty the facts and laws of the moral sphere is doomed to remain
unfulfilled. Quoting his Latin copy of Aristotle's Metaphysics, Colangelo can
authoritatively claim that "certitudo mathematica non in omnibus rebus querenda
est"46. Much of the present philosophical confusion about mathematics and its
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legitimate applications, Colangelo argues, derives from overlooking the essential
difference between mathematical "form" and the "content" of mathematics. The
essence of a proof is indeed to be distinguished from its "geometrical form", which
is a mere "bark covering the mathematical truths".
Even in mathematics, those principles which are employed to prove that a
given figure is a circle, cannot be employed to prove that a given figure is a
square. In fact, they have to change according to the nature of the thing.47
Certainty in mathematics derives from the very nature of the mathematical truths
(which are intuitive), not from the method employed to reach them. And,
accordingly no methodology should be given absolute priority over the other, as
different fields require different heuristic and demonstrative methods. The
confusion between form and substance made many eighteenth century
philosophers ("sophists disguised as geometers") introduce mathematics even "in
those subjects which were not apt to receive it", by mean of a misleading and
purely exterior apparatus of "propositions, axioms, corollaries". Then, in a crucial
passage, Colangelo refers to some of these non-mathematizable fields:
medicine, law, and history cannot be subdued to mathematics and to rigorous
proofs. In these sciences we have to proceed by means of probability,
conjectures and approximation to the truth.48
The geometer who mathematizes these sciences does not recognize their
essentially different "nature", which depends on their different foundations, and
ultimately on the "[ontological] relationships between beings". The point is that
one cannot mathematically prove empirical truths, and conversely one cannot
empirically prove mathematical truths. And the reason for that, is that the nature
of the ideas we deal with in mathematics is a "clear and distinct" one. This is what
allows the reasoning to proceed with great clarity and rigor. On the other hand,
when dealing with empirical reality, all the philosopher can do is to try to
"penetrate the darkness of the uncertain phenomena, to make conjectures, and to
risk predictions".
The last chapter of Colangelo's book is devoted to showing that —contrary to
the general impression— the progress of the sciences is advantageous for religion.
Indeed, the more natural sciences discover the harmonious order of the world, the
more religion is reinforced. Particularly after the invention of the calculus, one can
226
really say, with the prophet, that " the Heavens tell the glory of God"49. Any
branch of the natural sciences proves the existence of the Eternal Geometer, from
astronomy to the discovery of the nutritional system of plants, or the constitution
of the "animal machines". The discoveries of the modern sciences produce in fact
ecstasy and wonder in the "observing philosopher" (il filosofo osservatore), and are
powerful weapons to fight the atheist. The act of contemplation is described in
mystical terms: the contemplator of nature experiences a "scientific extasis", he
feels the "genial enthusiasm of his reason", which "measures the oceans and
counts the stars, while he quietly promenades on the globe".
Significant use is made by Colangelo of the work of the well-known Neapolitan
anatomist Domenico Cotugno, his personal friend. Among the important (read:
anti-materialistic) consequences of recent anatomical discoveries, Colangelo cites:
the confutation of the theory of a "common sensory" located in the brain, in which
all nerves would converge; the reaffirmation of the "organicistic" conception of the
body (against the materialistic idea of the body as the product of a casual
encounter of atoms); the establishment of a non-material force producing
voluntary acts (i.e. human will). Far from being dangerous to religion, "good"
modern science is a rich source of arguments against atheism and materialism. Of
course there are boundaries beyond which the methods of scientific investigation
are useless. One should never forget, for instance, that religion "is part of a
completely different order of truths and arguments"50.
Colangelo's book is constructed to give the reader the impression that the
modern, encyclopedic tradition is not only scientifically erroneous and religiously
heretical (the two things coincide), but that, in fact, it never existed. What happened
in the late eighteenth century was nothing but a pale reproduction of the original
battle between the representatives of the philosophia perennis, the "religious
philosophy" (Plato and Aristotle) and the atheistic "sects" of the atomists, the
skeptics, and the cynics, who attacked reason and religion. In philosophy, nihil novi
sub solis, but the eternal struggle of religious man against atheists. In the erudite-
historical work of Colangelo we find the same striking features already seen in the
contemporary political writings of Reactionary Catholic authors. Firstly, even
when presenting Newtonian theories he quotes largely from the patristic literature;
and when attacking the moderns he compares them to the Hellenistic schools, or to
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anti-Christian authors such as Celsus and Julian the Apostate. The immediate goal
is to show that it is always the ancient debate which is going on, and that the
haughty moderns, with all their feeling different from their predecessors (think of
Cestari when he says that it is completely useless to look at Greek science, as it was
essentially different from modern science, and his general attack against history),
have said nothing really new. This is analogous, in philosophy and science, to the
strategy of denying the possibility of any real social and political change by
showing that "naturally" society tends to take a certain specific form, and that the
French Revolution was nothing more than a temporarily, contingent disturbance in
the eternal order of things. But there is another related goal which can be served by
such strategy, and this is to bring the debate onto a plane where a response from
the opponent cannot be seriously expected. This was precisely the strategy adopted
in the patristic-based socio-political writings of the Reactionary Catholic authors
grouped in the Neapolitan academy which met at the Oratory.
Colangelo had enough historical sensibility to allow, in the frame of this
immutable picture, the temporary presence of periods of advancement and of
decadence, both in art (produced by individual imagination), and in the sciences
(where tradition is important, given that they are produced by "the purest and
more spiritual part of intellect"51). Interestingly, among the causes for scientific
decadence Colangelo pointed to the scant attention paid to experience, and the
inclination to produce "abstract", "metaphysical" systems of the world (the
exemplary case being Descartes'), "which are games of the human intellect", and
which do not correspond to nature. This opposition between empirical, inductive
procedures on the one hand, and abstract reasoning and the "spirit of system" on
the other is, in the end, the basis for the announced "friendship" of Christian
religion and modern empirical science. Indeed, not only does Christian faith
prevent us from wasting our time in following the "old and childish speculations"
(like the invention of materialistic cosmogonies), but it also teaches us to be
virtuous, humble, and to keep our passions under control (as passions "are the
enemies of our effort to climb the mount of knowledge, source of every earthly
joy"52). Conversely, atheism would necessarily destroy the very basis of the
sciences, as Colangelo reduced it to a form of self-destroying skepticism (remember
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the argument of Caesar and the Gospel), whereas Christian religion, to defend
itself, uses precisely the most recent results of the sciences.
As an appendix to his voluminous book, Colangelo inserted a letter written to
him by Nicola Fergola. We are informed that "this illustrious geometer, whom I am
proud to have had as friend and maestro", kindly revised parts of Colangelo's book,
and undertook to write this short apologetic piece, where "he shows how sublime
sciences lead to religion", something which "he is also proving with his exemplary
Christian behavior"53. It was 1804, and recent events had indeed made very clear
who was for the king and for religion. The letter provides us with important
evidence of the collaboration between this erudite ecclesiastic coming from the
anti-encyclopedic tradition of the Neapolitan Oratory, and the leader of the most
renowned school of mathematics in town.
In Colangelo's 1804 book one finds a position which I suggest we call
"apologetic empiricism"54. In order to define better this position, it is necessary to
look at least at another of Colangelo's many books: an apology for Galileo Galilei,
titled: Galileo as a Guide for the Young Student. The date of publication is significant:
1815, i.e. at the moment of the second Bourbon restoration, when Canosa was
given the Ministry of Police and cultural reaction ravaged the institutions of the
kingdom. The book was dedicated to Nicola Fergola, "the second Galileo". Galileo
is chosen as an example for the young because he was — at the same time — a true
Christian and a sagacious investigator of nature. The aim of the book is to explain
why, in spite of the great quantity of new instruments, machines and mathematical
techniques, modern philosophers of nature have accomplished very few important
discoveries, after the age of Galileo and Newton. "Euler, Riccati, d'Alembert, La
Grange [Lagrange] and others have wisely written on Mechanics; but can they be
named law-givers of motion like Galileo, Ugenio [Huygens] and Newton?"55. Of
course they can't, according to Colangelo. In fact, not only is it the case that "the
progress of mixed mathematics has not been proportional to the quantity of new
instruments", but also, as a consequence of the new mass of conceptual tools, "the
contemplation of nature has been oppressed by a quantity of analytic formulas, tire
great part of which, are not part of it"56. Colangelo is here literally quoting from a
textbook of Newtonian physics published by Fergola in 1792-93, where it was
argued that the impressive development of eighteenth century calculus has
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"covered" nature with artificial formulas making more difficult the empirical
observation of phenomena57. It is thus necessary, according to Colangelo, to go
back to the original source of modern science, to Galileo, in order to individuate
those methodological principles which guided his scientific work, so as to
understand how, "without any knowledge of the mysterious arcana of analysis, he
could surprise the penetralia of nature"58. The principles Colangelo is looking for
are those which "regulated the spirit" of Galileo during his investigations, so that
young students understand what it means to have "the rare and sublime
prerogative of the contemplator". The introduction also contains an interesting
comparison between the political and the scientific dimension:
Political states need, every now and then, to be brought back to their original
principles. The same holds for the sciences in the different nations, given that
every product of man contains in itself the sign of fragility and decadence,
which is proper to its author.59
But if, in politics, the return to the original tradition can be accomplished by some
accord between the nations, in the case of science "to recall men to the ancient
order" needs the appeal to the example of some great man, to "awake the sleeping
spirits, and to bring them back on the right way". As the Congress in Vienna
planned the return to order in politics, so Colangelo planned the return to order in
science, which must consist in the restoration of the "right way" of studying
nature, i.e. "not by making violence on nature, but by following its inclinations"60.
Galileo's life is apologetically reconstructed. "Nauseated by the Peripatetic
Philosophy", he maintained "that wise and careful freedom of philosophizing
which was the principle of all his discoveries"61. Having read Colangelo's 1804
book, we already know that the true "freedom of philosophizing" is not the
skeptical and sterile attitude of modern thinkers, but the refusal to take for granted
one or the other of the abstract "systems of the world" invented by philosophers.
In this sense, the best example of freedom of philosophizing is the Newtonian
"hypotheses non fingo", as a prelude to a strictly empirical study of nature.
Colangelo emphasizes the importance of Euclidean geometry in the education of
the young Galileo, quoting largely from Viviani's biography62. Geometry provided
him with the right way of arguing and drawing conclusions, much more than all
the other "logics and philosophies". About education in general, Colangelo
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opposes the idea of the equality of the intellects. Any mind has its own abilities,
and "the equality of intellectual forces" is just "a dream". Trying to teach the "art
of geometry" to a mind not naturally predisposed to receive it, is a case of violence
against nature: it can produce only weak or negative effects63. An entire chapter
(the second) is devoted to "the respect due to Euclid's Elements", which presents to
the pupil "the naked, beautiful, simple and ordered truth"64. In fact, all the great
geometers praised this work, whereas, presently, many people who "call
themselves geometers", look down on the Greek geometer, who is accused of being
"prolix and tedious". Galileo is the best weapon to reply to those pseudo-
geometers. In the chapter on Galileo's religious feelings (the third), which
concludes the biographical reconstruction, Colangelo quotes from the Dialogo, to
show Galileo's "profound respect for the infinite Majesty and for the universal
Providence of God"65. "You can then concretely see" concludes Colangelo, "that it
is possible to be a sublime philosopher without getting misled by the insanity of
the so called free thinkers"66.
The remaining part of the book is then devoted to the exposition of "the canons
to philosophize on nature, which are derived from Galileo's work". Among them,
Colangelo put the following:
- One shouldn't create in his own mind the "system of the natural laws", and then
pretend to find them in nature. In fact, God created nature in the first place, "and
then human discourse, which makes it possible to understand (not without a great
effort) some of its secrets"67. The one who forgets this (the "philosopher in libris")
cannot reach the true knowledge of phenomena and of their laws.
- In spite of the advancements in the study of nature, "men will never know the
intimate essence of things"; they will never entirely comprehend the order and the
many laws of the universe. Galileo never tried to build a cosmogony.
- "What escapes our understanding must not be condemned as useless or badly
disposed by nature". For example, why are there incommensurable proportions in
nature? Why are stars in the sky not symmetrically disposed? The error here
consists in applying the limited capacities of human reason to the inscrutable
action of God.
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- The opinions of the ancient philosophers have not to be immediately refuted, but
"must be rigorously tested", i.e. we have to check if they correspond to natural
phenomena.
- We must give up our beliefs if actual experience, or certain clear arguments, can
prove their falsity.
Given these very general principles, Colangelo moves to a series of specific
canons for the empirical investigation of nature, like the method of the
"supposition of the fact": one takes for granted certain assumptions, and then one
checks if they are consistent with the observations (this method is clearly the
empirical version of the geometrical method adopted in Fergola's school). But we
have the right to suppose that something is the case only if there exists some
supporting evidence; otherwise the supposition is simply "poetry", and in the
investigation of nature there is no place for poetry. Another canon states the
difference between geometrical and empirical investigations: "the true Method to
progress in the science of Nature, is the inductive one"; according to it, one moves
from phenomena to the discovery of their causes. Another states that "final causes
must not be excluded in the investigation of nature", and to this extent, Fergola is
quoted:
the laws of natural phenomena can be investigated by the analyst in two
ways: the way of the efficient causes and the way of the final causes. In the
first case, it will be sufficient to consider the values of the forces, their effects,
and extract the laws of motion. In the case of final cause, we will calculate the
quantity of action of the mobile, and we will employ the maxima et minima
method.68
A last canon states that "observation and experience have to precede calculations;
great caution is indeed required to subdue the laws of Nature derived from
phenomena to geometrical rigor"69. Of course, as Galileo said, "the great book of
nature is written in mathematical language", but the same Galileo "traced the
border between physics and mathematics, and recognized the preeminence of the
first over the second one". The point is that the "imperfections of nature are
powerful in contaminating the very pure mathematical proofs"70. In this case,
Galileo's procedure, according to Colangelo, was the following:
he kept his eye fixed upon nature, following its lines, its triangles, its circles
by means of complete and exhaustive observations and experiments. He
232
considered exactly all their features, and with great naturalness he grafted
geometry on them. He did this in a way which made it almost impossible to
distinguish whether it is the Geometer or the Observer who speaks: so linked
Nature and Geometry proceed.71
Colangelo goes on (chapter six) presenting and commenting on some aphorisms on
nature from Galileo (for instance: "nature does much with little"). Then he praises
Galileo's writing style: it was precise, clean, rigorous, but also ornate and elegant,
in the tradition of the Latin and Italian classic literature. On the contrary,
Colangelo complains, many modern texts of mathematics are deeply obscure:
"some of those who study mathematics believe, erroneously, that they have only to
contemplate abstract truths, and then to apply them to the science of nature; so
they think they are not obliged to express their thought with a decent propriety of
language"72. Colangelo then emphasizes the attachment of Galileo's pupils to their
maestro (chapter eight), and the solid structure of his school. Interestingly enough,
in Colangelo's historical reconstruction — where the Church is the natural ally of
modern science— Galileo was obstructed by "contemporary philosophers", who
supported an abstract philosophy and had no consideration for experience.
Students are recommended to read the original works of Galileo, and to continue
his work, but always paying attention "to maintain pure the Catholic belief"73. A
good example of working in the path of Galileo is provided by the Neapolitan
Alfonso Borelli74, a true "Catholic scientist", who provided further evidence for the
argument that "the contemplation of Nature is the stairway to the Creator for
anyone who is not a useless burden to society, virtue and science", and that "the
mysteries by which Nature covers itself concur to bring our intellect to faith"75. The
book closes with a quotation from Galileo: "geometry teaches modesty to
philosophers, and diminishes their arrogance by showing how few the proved
truths are, and how one should always proceed very carefully in drawing those
conclusions, which cannot be certain but only probable [verosimili]"76.
5.3 Ventura on Fergola as "Spiritual Mathematician"
In 1824 Fergola died "turning his eyes to the beloved image of the Virgin". His body
was transported from the house facing the Church of the Oratorians to the baroque
church of the Theatin Fathers, Saint Paul's, where he was buried. The funeral has
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been described as a sumptuous ceremony, attended by a number of ecclesiastic and
secular personalities, and by the whole faculty of the RUN. The funeral oration was
given by a famous speaker, and the leader of the Reactionary Catholic movement in
Italy: Gioacchino Ventura. In his speech Ventura aimed "to promote those
principles of order which, in the strange circumstances we live in, are the real needs
of the soul, and the only hope for society, which is threatened by total
dissolution"77. In particular, Ventura aimed to show "the secret affinities between
religion and mathematics, their relations, and the reciprocal advantages of their
cooperation"78. He aims to reply to both those who believe that religion is the
enemy of the sciences, and those who consider sciences dangerous for the true faith.
Secular and religious knowledge can indeed be unified with reciprocal advantage,
as it clearly emerges from the work of Fergola, "great mathematician, philosopher,
jurist, but overall great Christian"79. In fact, the attempts "to secularize science", i.e.
to separate science from religion, have only "degraded, humiliated, and deprived
science of every solidity, nobility and utility", as "only what is true can produce
what is noble and useful"80. Fergola was the living proof that scientific knowledge
can be acquired only via the practice of religious virtues such as purity, humility,
and moderation. On the contrary, moral vices weaken human reason, and
"materialize" it; as "what corrupts affections, also obscures reason, and what
deprives the heart of its virtues, also distracts the spirit from science"81. Fergola, like
Thomas Aquinas, realized that prayer and self-purification are the way to erudition;
and his reason, "once freed from the weight of senses, developed and became
nobler". Thanks to this "purification", Ventura remarks, "mathematics began to
shine with a new light among us". The other cardinal virtue for science is humility.
Pride is "the plague of the modern young": they believe they know everything as
soon as they get out from the college just because they have done a little algebra.
Mathematicians are particularly inclined to the sin of pride, because their discipline
"is the only one that can be said to be a human creation, and no one is more suitable
to inspire the cult of reason", according to which cult, the mathematician "doesn't
respect the limit of human reason, the mysteries of nature, those of religion, and he
pretends to subdue everything to the rigor of his calculations, including feelings"82.
Not Fergola, though, as "in vain [the French] tried to make him accept honors,
decorations, titles, [...]: nothing flattered him", and if others accepted those
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"profaned crosses" and "prostituted insignia", Fergola "remained what he was"83.
The praise of Fergola's religious virtues and their constitutive role in shaping his
scientific production is placed in the usual context of the "philosophical plot"; what
is interesting is that Ventura refers to the specific role played by the mathematical
sciences in the plot. The tone is apocalyptic: "in these last days of the world", the
evil use of science "has been fatal". "The sciences have ruined man and then they
have ruined society"; in particular, "among the sciences it is mathematics which
took the most erroneous and deplorable path". Mathematical sciences "have in fact
played a central role in the plan elaborated by philosophers to attack Christianity",
as "being less known to common people they could better surprise and deceive
them". So that
square and compass became deadly weapons in the hands of irreligion and
pride; they have broken any restraint, they have unchained all the passions,
and in so doing they have eroded the foundations of religion and order.84
What Fergola has understood, unlike men such as d'Alembert, Condorcet, Lalande,
and Laplace85, is that "there are different kinds [ordini] of truth, and then different
means to acquire knowledge"86. What they tried to accomplish was to illegitimately
turn mathematics into a "universal science, the key and the fundament of every other
form of knowledge"; they thought that "there wasn't anything certain but what
could be reduced to geometrical theorems". Every dogma, Ventura continued, from
the immortality of the soul, to its spirituality, to the distinction between good and
evil, has been rejected as a prejudice "just because they cannot be proved by means
of lines, angles, circles and squares"87. Every branch of knowledge "has been
algebraized, including human feelings". Fergola, on the contrary, following the path
of men like Newton, Leibniz, Pascal, Cassini, and Torricelli, "considered human
reason simply as an instrument to investigate earthly matters, and he chose a very
different guide when it came to the heavenly truths, where he recognized indeed
the presence of a superior reason". Fergola who, "the more he rose in his scientific
career, the humbler he became in religious matters".
The point, says Ventura, is that in the seventeenth century mathematics was an
"intellectual science", which was able to lift man up towards his Lord. But the
following was a century of "irreligion and disbelief", and the "furiously cultivated"
mathematics was reduced to a "material science", practised by the "miserable, cold,
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haughty, resolute, algebraists", whose reason had been "degraded and sterilized by
atheism", and who "only looked towards the Earth, being themselves —as a great
thinker of our age said88— mere geometrical machines, which execute complicated
operations, not unlike Pascal's machine"89. So, if Newton, Leibniz, Pascal, and the
others of the seventeenth century were "great mathematicians", the philosophes were
merely "skilled calculators". The first recognized in the heavens the traces of the
"powerful hand" of the creator, and they "never operated on numbers and figures
without going back to the Eternal Geometer of Plato, the Prime Motor of Aristotle", so
that "through the circle and the triangle they recognized the Lord". The second,
"only saw lines and curves in the universe", "cold formulas" being their only
interest. "A+B=C captured all their attention, and in their minds no interest for
truth was left, nor virtues in their hearts". Unlike their predecessors, "through the
circle and the square they couldn't see anything other than matter, and behind the
matter, they found only nothingness".
Thus, if in the past (the mythic past of the philosophia perennis, of course) the two
terms "mathematician" and "atheist" were plainly contradictory, today they are
generally considered synonymous. Not for Fergola though, who intensified his
Catholic devotion "in those very days when religion was considered a mere
prejudice", with the explicit goal of "divinizing science", against the dominant
secularizing trend. In fact, "in his mathematical writings one always finds,
wherever it is least expected, some defense of the [Christian] truth so that, without
realizing it, one is elevated from the earthly science to the heavenly one, from man
to God"90. Continuing with his elaboration of Chateaubriand's notion of "material"
and "spiritual" science, Ventura remarked how the "materialistic century", with its
reductionistic trend, on the one side condemned all the "speculative and
intellectual" sciences, and exalted the empirical ones; on the other side it used
mathematics "to diffuse error and insurrection", transforming it into a sort of new
religion. "In fact" remarked Ventura, "these mathematicians were successful in
founding their own new religion, whose choirs were oaths, whose sacrifices were
massacres, whose divinity was a prostitute, the goddess reason, whose priests were
Condorcet, Robespierre, Marat and Danton"91.
Fergola proved that religion does not oppose the development of mathematics:
"it is simply a question of passing from the contemplation of the magnitudes of God
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to procure His glory". Fergola was both a Christian and. a wise man, and he was
wise because he was Christian. Ventura concluded his speech exhorting the
professors assembled in the church to punish those proud spirits who want to
surpass the natural limits of human reason: "don't let those who introduce anarchy
and disorder into literature, attack religion, and in this way introduce disorder even
in the state"; with the "Christian man" would indeed disappear even the "good,
wise, pacific citizen" 92
We have been approaching the figure of Fergola through the use made by
Colangelo and Ventura of his work. Was this use "betraying" Fergola's original
intentions? Apart from the lack of mathematical competence and the overly
polemical tone (both of which are particularly evident in Ventura), I believe that the
reactionary ecclesiastics got the fundamental goals of Fergola's work right. Unlike
Franco Palladino, I do not believe that Fergola simply found himself in the middle
of an ideological battle of which he became unwillingly a part93. What we have
found in bits and pieces in the writings of these ecclesiastics are indeed parts of a
unitary system of thought where empirical sciences and mathematics are shaped by
a fundamental apologetic aim. As it was for Lauberg, Fergola's biography has been
artificially split by historians: on the one side one has Fergola the mathematician, on
the other Fergola the devout Catholic and legitimist professor who sat in a number
of counter-revolutionary special commissions charged with restoring order in the
sector of education. Once again, our aim is to make sense of his mathematical work
by looking also at his religious and political beliefs.
5.4 Fergola: Reason, Nature and Mathematics
The lectures and writings of Nicola Fergola were the main resource for those
Reactionary Catholic authors who were interested in epistemological problems and
in the relations between human reason, science and mathematics. Whether it was
an erudite scholar like Colangelo, a secular politician like Canosa, or a religious
activist like Ventura, they all seem to refer to the conceptual framework elaborated
by Fergola when it came to science and mathematics. Of course Fergola himself
was not working in the void, as he relied on much of the material we have been
presenting so far, which included the intransigent and anti-modern tradition of the
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Neapolitan Oratory, the post-Wolffian metaphysical philosophy, and more recent
forms of counter-revolutionary though. His original and important contribution
was to revive the study of mathematics in Naples, being careful in shaping this
revival accordingly to an anti-encyclopedic system of knowledge. To make this
point clear, let us begin by considering his textbook of natural philosophy.
Between 1792 and 1793, Fergola was officially asked by the authorities to
publish his lectures on natural philosophy94. The two-volume textbook, written for
the pupils of the College of the Saviour, was extremely successful, and enjoyed a
particular fortune among Reactionary Catholic authors. The title was Lectures on the
Mathematical Principles of the Natural Philosophy of Sir Isaac Newton, but in fact the
text included much more than that, and it was extended to the latest developments
of eighteenth century mechanics. The first volume was devoted to mechanics, the
second to statics and to the science of fluids. Amodeo praised this work ("a jewel")
for its clarity and for its substantial historical notes: every issue is indeed
introduced through its historical genesis (which was very unusual at that time),
and the various contributions are accurately presented and weighted. The starting
point is usually a passage from Newton's text, but then Fergola gave evidence of
his wide erudition by quoting the relevant work done in the last century up to
Lagrange's Mechanics (1788), which is often praised95. Lauberg and Giordano are
also praised at same point, which made Amodeo believe that the anti-Lagrangian
spirit of Fergola's school was just an historical misinterpretation96. In fact, the
question is somewhat subtler than that. What these references prove is that Fergola
was very competent in contemporary analytical mechanics, so that he could not
overlook the relevance of Lagrange's work. That Fergola was deeply interested in
studying eighteenth century analysis has been recently confirmed by the study of
his unpublished lectures and treatises now at the National Library of Naples97.
These eight volumes of manuscript material include —among other things— the
following items: introductory remarks to infinitesimal calculus (1805-1810ca);
treatises of differential and integral calculus (1788-1807ca); a treatise on series; a
treatise on variation calculus (1795-98ca); elements of algebra (1800-1807ca). Such
an interest in "analysis" in the founder and leader of the most combative synthetic
school of geometry of his time is certainly striking. The historians who first
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that Fergola's teaching was somehow misunderstood and betrayed by his own
pupils: after all Fergola was not that bigot and backward geometer they thought he
was. In my opinion the choice between a Fergola ignorant and backward, and a
Fergola "modern" but misunderstood, is false and misleading. The fact is that
Fergola was competent in the various branches of modern analysis. This is not too
surprising because, as we'll see, his mathematical education had been similar to
that of Neapolitan supporters of analysis. But, is this interest in analysis in conflict
with the emphasis upon geometrical problem-solving methods? I believe the right
answer is "no".
Fergola's treatises of analysis were written and re-elaborated between the 1780s
and the 1810s. The treatises were written for didactic purposes, but through them
Fergola was also pursuing a clear foundationalist, "Euclidean" program. "The first
geometers" he wrote "who discovered Infinitesimal Analysis and those who
extended their research, did not care to clarify its principles as they should have in
order to make of it a truly fruitful Science"98. Practical success was not enough for
Fergola to ground the calculus, or to make it "a science". He aimed to provide the
calculus with the same kind of rigor enjoyed by classical geometry, avoiding any
reference to induction, empirical truths and to practical applications.
"Rigorization" then meant to "purify" this branch of mathematics and rid it of the
presence of empirical considerations. This purification seems to be pursued in
different ways; as if Fergola were essaying different solutions for this crucial
problem. On the one hand he tried to ground as much of calculus as he could on
geometrical intuition (so he revived Newton's theory of fluxions; he provided a
geometrical definition of infinitesimal; and so on). On the other hand, he tried to
give a "Euclidean form" to the algebraic-symbolic calculus of Euler and Lagrange,
which he sees as eventually irreducible to geometry, as it is not grounded on
geometrical intuition, but rather on algebraic reasoning. Fergola seems to think of
it as of a "method" which allows the manipulation of symbolic expressions for
discrete magnitudes (whereas geometry deals with continuous magnitudes). An
epistemological divide separates this symbolic method from the evident
knowledge provided by geometrical intuition. In order to give a Euclidean form to
"symbolic calculus", Fergola presented axioms and definitions, plus certain laws
to be employed to prove rigorously its theorems, in order to transform "their
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concatenation into an ordered system". From a series of useful techniques the
calculus should then become a unitary and self-contained branch of pure
mathematics (dealing with a certain kind of magnitudes —the discrete ones).
Fergola was deeply interested in these topics during the 1780s. The fact that he
never published these works is probably due to his judging his results
unsatisfactory. In the end he had not been able to provide a coherent and all-
inclusive alternative foundation of analysis to oppose to the algebraicized
conception of analysis defended by the Lagrangians. Since the 1810s, the harsh
controversy with the analytic school contributed to shift further the interest of
Fergola and his pupils towards pure geometry.
Let us now go back to the textbook of mechanics. It is crucial to grasp what —
according to Fergola— are the relations between mathematical knowledge and
reality. We have already pointed out a first feature of the book: its unusually
detailed historical apparatus. A second feature is the geometrical form of the text,
as Fergola bled, whenever possible to offer geometrical proofs of mechanical
truths. About the contents, the crucial notion in Fergola's mechanics is that of
"force". It is interesting to compare his treatment with that of Lauberg in his 1789
essay on mechanics. Where Lauberg rejected the study of the "nature" of forces as
unessential and metaphysical, limiting his interest to the their measurable effects,
Fergola wrote that "the aggregation of the forces has been placed in the elements of
matter by Nature", so that "it is the soul which informs the immense mass of the
universe, and gives life to it". Consequently, the study of forces "is not a vain or
despicable effort, but truly a way to essay the laws of the Universe, and the deep
wisdom of He who rules and sustains it". The fact that we —"mortals"— cannot
penetrate the intimate nature of the forces acting on matter, is due to our
limitations, but this nature itself is far from being "irrelevant". All we can do is "to
spy some of the relations" among forces, and thanks to this observation "to find
the principles of mechanics and static"99. The knowledge of the real essence of
phenomena such as the transmission of motion or the composition of forces, will
always remain "mysteries" for philosophers as for the ignorant people. At the end
of the inexplicable chain of "moving powers" (such as muscles, elasticity,
gravitation,...), which we can only try to describe, there is "the Hand of the Living
God", the ultimate "moving power" of the universe "which one day threw out the
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planets and the comets, and nowadays nourishes their declining motions"100.
Galileo, considered as the "Father of the Contemplators of Nature" discovered the
basic laws of motion, which are "mechanical truths" and then contingent, as they
could have been different. They didn't emerge from matter itself, but rather "an
extraneous Being prescribed them, choosing those which would maintain natural
motions with a minimal action". In fact, "the stupid and inert chance cannot be the
Great Geometer of Nature", as there is an indefinite number of contemporaneous
motions in the universe, which means an indefinite number of problems of maxima
and minima to be solved contemporaneously. So, following Maupertuis, Fergola,
made an explicitly apologetic use of the principle of minimum action, which is
presented as "the more powerful argument against atheism"101. Towards the end of
the textbook, Fergola presented four interesting "canons to guide the geometer in
the Contemplation of Nature":
1) "Geometry and Analysis have to be the Handmaids of Nature, not their
Masters". Fergola explains that mathematical formalism, when improperly used by
philosophers, covers the real "data" offered by nature. That is to say, the
mathematization of reality has to be carefully accomplished, without forcing the
world of experience into extraneous mathematical forms. "This abuse" makes
theories of nature closer to the "world of abstractions" than to the real world.
2) "Contemplation of Nature must not be oppressed by that set of analytic formulas
which are mostly extraneous to Nature itself". The previous canon told us that
mathematics, when abused, covers nature with its own artificial apparatus. Now we
realize that the responsible for this progressive occultation of nature are in fact the
"analytic formulas". This "canon" was quoted literally by Colangelo, who
attributed it to the Galileian tradition. Fergola continued:
The excessively metaphysical minds are used to looking at Nature through
the systems they themselves invented; and the great calculators often get lost
in their considerations about formulas which are hardly part of Nature: so
that many physico-mathematical treatises are purely analytical exercises. But
the ancient Italian Geometers and foreigners such as the great Newton,
Varignonio, D. Bernoulli, Lambert and others, avoided such an error.
3) The third canon defends the notion of "final cause" in physics, which of course
is central to Fergola's providential view of the universe. "The Analyst desiring to
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be a faithful interpreter of Nature, must make practice in deriving the laws of the
natural phenomena from both their efficient and their final causes".
4) "The Analyst must make practice in the method of finding the laws of natural
phenomena on the basis of observation". This was indeed the path taken by
Newton himself, when "with the [help of] Geometrical Science he spied the
motions inside resistant media, and he was able to elaborate those theories
presented in the second book of the Principia"102.
In the end, Fergola's textbook was an up-to-date and clearly written treatise of
rational mechanics and theory of machines; and, crucial to its success, it presented
this material in a theoretical framework which was greatly appreciated in the
rapidly growing area of Reactionary Catholic thought. Describing Colangelo's
work, I have referred to "apologetic empiricism", as characterized by its opposition
to the eighteenth century "systems of the world", where the whole universe was
explained on the basis of certain metaphysical principles (atoms and the void, for
instance), using as its main explanatory instrument mathematical formalism — as if
it was a legitimate instrument per se. Apologetic empiricism defines itself in
opposition to the "spirit of system" and to the artificial worlds of metaphysical
mathematicians. It defines itself in opposition to "the spirit of analysis". The wise
contemplator must let nature speak for itself, without imposing his artificial
symbolic language on it. He knows humans cannot fully understand the universe,
and they can only glimpse a few principles and discover some of its laws. But this
empirical knowledge is essentially fallible, based on induction and conjectures. It is
far from enjoying the certainty of mathematical truths. The trick of system-makers
is precisely that of giving mathematical form to their statements, so that they can
pretend their empirical statements are absolutely certain. I call this form of
sceptical empiricism "apologetic", because its moderately skeptical content served
an apologetic goal.
We have already seen how it works in Colangelo; let us see now how Fergola
himself linked philosophy of nature, mathematics and religion. This is indeed the
subject of a rather peculiar (and not too organic) text written by Fergola around
1804, and published by Flauti under the title Theory of Miracles (1839)103. The book
has not been considered relevant by those who have studied Fergola's scientific
productions so far. In fact, it deserves attention because it contains important
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material about Fergola's epistemological views. The work originated with
Colangelo, who asked Fergola to accomplish "one of the many proofs which
decisively prove the existence of God, obtained from the sublime contemplation of
nature, and supported by the light offered by Sublime Analysis [calculus] and
Geometry"104. Fergola's letter of reply contained significant passages:
When I see the eternal splendor of stars, the harmony of their motions, and
the beneficent positions they have relatively to us, I see the right [hand] of the
Lord, who maintains this Universe, which He created out of nothing. But even
remaining on our planet, and looking at the three Kingdoms of Nature, how
many things I admire! The seeds of plants and animals accomplishing their
admirable function, fecunded by Nature. And in every seed is hidden an
infinite series of decreasing seeds, all of them endowed with the same virtue
and the same mechanism. And this makes me say to the hardest and most
impudent atheist: Look, you who extinguished your intellectual light not to
see the Lord, you have to recognize Him in the Universe.105
Anti-atomism and the conception of a providential, active divinity, are the two
pillars of Fergola's natural philosophy. Flauti engaged his son, Giovanni, to edit the
first edition of the book. Starting from some Leibnizian reflexions106, Giovanni in his
preface argued for the possibility of miracles, and for their central role in
Christianity. The point is that the Lord, who created the universe from nothingness,
and established the laws of nature, can certainly intervene again to make
extraordinary phenomena possible. One knows that this is possible, but the
modality of his action —like the "real" functioning of nature in general— is
inscrutable by humans. One cannot know how miracles are performed (by
suspending the laws of nature? by changing them? by modifying the substances?).
Consequently, human reason must simply accept their reality, without questioning
their nature107. A good example of the apologetic style of Reactionary Catholicism,
where the truths of religion are not proved through rational arguments, but instead
authoritatively communicated to the believers against their rational inclination, as
human reason is too weak an instrument to investigate such matters and, more
importantly, because it is not legitimate to do so. The argumentation is reminiscent
of much patristic literature (beginning with Tertullianus's "credo quia absurdum");
it is no accident that patristic literature was a favorite source for Reactionary
Catholics. As we have seen, human reason is conceived by them as essentially
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passive, non creative; it can mirror and recognize metaphysical truths once they are
revealed, but it cannot reach them autonomously, nor prove or disprove them.
Fergola's text on miracles follows the same lines. Originally, we are told, the
Lord imposed his laws on everything, including human actions. Men could
recognize the divine laws only through Revelation, and miracles were the essential
instruments to support the message of the Revelation. They are in fact the
foundations of our religious belief. Some philosophers hied to deny the very
possibility of miracles, but "they can hardly be said to be philosophers", as the wise
man contemplating "the book of nature, where are clearly signed the eternal laws
and the admirable order" of the universe, understands that all this is in itself "a
continuous miracle". Also a miracle is his own "semi-divine mind", which has to be
employed not against its creator, but to recognize His greatness. A miracle, Fergola
said, is "a phenomenon which cannot be naturally explained". Any other definition
is logically contradictory and many, such as Spinoza's, are clearly blasphemous108.
The argument on miracles is based on the important assumption that there is no
"absolute necessity" in nature (remember that laws of motion were presented as
contingent in the textbook of mechanics). More precisely: there is no absolute
necessity in our knowledge of nature. This is a central point, in Fergola's natural
philosophy:
if all the phenomena were absolutely necessary and immutable, the physical
truths would have the same mathematical certainty as the geometrical ones;
thus cosmology, physics and all the natural sciences should be similar to
geometry and arithmetic, and their proposition should descend directly from
the non-contradiction principle. But the three laws of nature proposed by
Newton and by other deep physicists as axioms of dynamics, descend from
the principle of sufficient reason, and no philosopher could derive them from
the principle of non-contradiction. Then, all natural truths are contingent.109
The imprint of the Wolffian metaphysical perspective is unmistakable: the whole of
mathematics is (ideally) derivable from the logical principle of non-contradiction,
while empirical, contingent truths derive from the principle of sufficient reason110.
The connection between metaphysical and empirical knowledge is essential and all-
pervasive, and it makes knowledge an essentially unitary phenomenon: unified by
the teleological perspective. Yet unified does not mean non-hierarchically
structured: the division in metaphysical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, and
empirical knowledge is clear, in Fergola as in the Wolffian philosophers such as
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Capocasale (who, by the way, got his chair at the RUN thanks to the increasingly
powerful Fergola). And what was this if not a recovery of the original threefold
partition of human knowledge operated by Thomas Aquinas? Thirty years before
the official rediscovery of Thomism and scholastic philosophy by Ventura and the
Roman theologians, Fergola used Aquinas to provide a solid — hierarchical —
structure for his own conception of human knowledge. The fact that Fergola's
fideistic perspective is very far from Aquinas's rationalistic enterprise is not directly
relevant here. Fergola's fideism emerges when he moves to the famous question of
the vis viva111. Fergola argued that the total quantity of vis viva in the universe is not
constant. He recognized that he was contradicting some of his favorite authors,
such as Johann Bernoulli and Christian Wolff, who argued for the stability of the
universe on the basis of the principle that in corpore nulla vis oritur, perit,
variationemque subit nisi per conflictum. But that any variation in the forces is
reducible to some "conflict" is clearly false to the fiercely anti-mechanist Fergola.
Counter-examples are the variation of forces acting on a comet gravitating around
the sun; the "muscular forces" acting in animals (caused by a material "fluid"
whose action is originated by an immaterial principle); the electrical and magnetic
forces of attraction; and, likewise, many other innumerable forces "hidden in the
universe". These are clearly not "forces of contact \forze d'urto]". Then Fergola
argued that the overall quantity of force is actually decreasing in the universe,
which means that "nature cannot sustain itself", and the stability of the universe
implies a continuous infusion of new forces ex nihilo, operated by God. Obviously
the main reference for this point is Newton, "who discovered the true laws of
nature", and argued for the necessary action of "the hand of God". Fergola adopted
in full Newton's fideistic definition of God as the one who omnia regit, non ut anima
mundi, sed ut universorum Dominus, et propter dominium suum Dominus Deus
Travxo.tpaxop id est Imperator universalis, dici solet [...]. Deus sine dominio, providentia et
rationibus finalibus non esset nisi natura, aut fatum. Fergola commented: "the Lord
rules the heavens and nature like a sovereign. He didn't write the destinies of things
like constitutional laws of the universe, to which being Himself subject. He is not
the god of the Stoics, quid scripsit fata, sed sequitur qui semeljussit et semper paret"lu.
In a similar way Father Ventura, in his speech occasioned by the death of the
intransigent Pope Pius VII, criticized the "erroneous philosophy" which argues for
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the kings being subjected to the will of the multitude (by means of the concession of
constitutions), transforming them into "temporary representatives of the people"
with no "superior" investiture. With the remarkable insight which characterized
some Reactionary Catholic writings on society, Ventura noted in the same speech
that philosophers aimed to banish "the monarchies from society as well as God
from the universe". In fact, the non-constitutional, absolute nature of God's power
had been very clearly stated by his maestro Fergola. One should note how the
apparently secondary topic of miracles was in fact one of those crucial issues where
theological, political and empirical considerations converged. The absolute power
of God is defended by appealing to the contingent nature of empirical laws, and it is
used as a legitimating model for the power of the sovereign. If God himself does not
rule the universe "as a constitutional king", then King Ferdinando I was legitimate
in abolishing the 1812 Constitution of Sicily113. The epistemological side of this
argument goes like this: there cannot be absolute certainty about empirical matters;
in the study of nature one can only rely on induction and this knowledge will be
always probable and conjectural —it can only enjoy some degree of "moral"
certainty. The same holds for the sciences of politics and society. These are not
sciences like the mathematical ones; and it is not a question of degree of certainty:
the certainty they can rely on is essentially different. Knowledge can be acquired in
these sciences not through the application of mathematics (as claimed by the
Jacobins), but rather through the study of previous experiences, of the specific
political tradition of our country, and through the acceptance of the principle of
authority (which is metaphysically grounded). Fergola provided a battery of
scientific and mathematical arguments for limiting the use of mathematical
reasoning to very specific areas of knowledge, de-legitimizing its use in the "moral
sciences". And this in the 1790s, precisely when they were most needed by counter¬
revolutionary authors. Needless to say, Fergola's scientific production was perfectly
in line with the French Traditionalist and Reactionary Catholic strategy of showing,
through philosophy and history, the essentially passive and limited working of
individual reason.
Let us go back to Fergola's remarks on science and religion. He emphasizes the
difference between "physical necessity" and "absolute necessity" (which coincide
with what others called "moral" and "mathematical" necessity)114. The first is
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hypothetical, depending on our ability to make inductive prevision about natural
phenomena; this is what is broken by miracles. The consequence is that miracles do
not break any absolute necessity, but only a hypothetical one. When discussing the
nature of miracles, Fergola remarked that the ways in which nature "really" works
are simply ignored by humans. "Who has understood how the gravitational force
works?" he asked, " or the transfer of motion from one body to the other? [...] Thus,
to investigate the way in which the omnipotence of God produces a miracle, is an
insane and rash enterprise". Other interesting fragments regard the impossibility of
"proving" the mysteries of religion; and the pride of atheist physicians, "who
believe they are the only philosophers of the micro-cosmos [the human body]", and
reject any possibility of supernatural intervention.
This series of aphorisms is followed by a short essay — an "apologetic speech" —
in defense of Saint January's miracle. The work was directed against "the atheist
and the deist". In fact, because of its popularity, this specific miracle had been
critically analyzed by a number of French philosophes —including Voltaire— and,
later, it had been attacked and "de-mystified" by Neapolitan Jacobins (namely by
some of Lauberg's students). During the eighteenth century, the miracle, which
allegedly takes place yearly in the Cathedral of Naples, had become the symbol of
the superstitious religiosity of the Southerners. Fergola went to the Cathedral, made
a series of observations and took notes. The results were the following: the
miraculous liquefaction of the blood took place in very different climatic conditions;
which rules out all the "natural explanations" based on such factors as temperature,
pressure and so on. When it comes to the positive argument in support of the
miracle, Fergola, very interestingly, adopted a strategy which was to be most
important in the texts of the French Traditionalists and of Reactionary Catholic
authors. When dealing with moral truths, Fergola argues, human beings can be
suspicious and skeptical only until a certain point; if we do not limit in some way our
inclination to be skeptical, than "every moral certainty would be suspended, and as
a result society would be destroyed"115. The one who looks for absolute certainty
outside mathematics —and relies only on individual reason— is a danger to society.
At some point our questions must end: and this is where authority and tradition
begin.
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The book is closed by some "thoughts about philosophy and religion", extracted
from Fergola's manuscripts. Here Fergola returned to the separation between pure
mathematics, where absolute certainty is attainable by human reason, and the
"physical-mathematical sciences", the mixed mathematics, where we can only rely
on degrees of probability. This depends on the fact that in the natural sciences we
employ mathematical symbolism, but only starting from hypotheses which are not
themselves certain. And the more complex is the object of a science, the more we
have to rely on hypotheses. Other aphorisms hinge on the nature of the "primitive
forces" of the universe, which will always remain completely unknown to the
deepest philosophers. The limitations of human reason also recur in the aphorisms.
The fact that even in Euclid and Archimedes one can find uncertain principles (like
the postulate of parallels) shows that "there is no certainty in human knowledge".
At the same time, Fergola defends the sciences from the ignorant critics that in
every age have attacked them without any real comprehension of them (he referred
to the Phvrronists). In his notes about "a plan for a proof of the existence of God",
Fergola compares different cosmological hypotheses taken from the history of
philosophy. He criticizes the Cartesian, the Leibnizian, and especially the Epicurean
— materialistic— one. From empirical observation we know that the universe has
been created by an "excellent geometer", and this cannot certainly be "blind
chance". The fight against the atheist-materialist continues over themes such as the
relation between mind and body, which to Fergola means the relation between
spiritual soul and material body. To him, the greatest blasphemy is precisely
reducing thoughts to matter and motion. Atheists, Fergola wrote, "consider feelings
like motions"115. In reality, Fergola says, the body "cannot infuse any new virtue in
the spirit". Spiritual phenomena (which include intellectual activity) cannot be
explained by physics and physiology. The clash with the flourishing Neapolitan
ideological tradition could not be neater. Fergola concluded by noting that a
(negative) answer to the old problem of whether a society of atheists could ever
exist has been finally provided by the most recent historical events.
These forgotten and unsystematic remarks are also the only place where Fergola
explicitly provides hints about his own version of the structure of knowledge. We
can sum up our previous remarks while trying to present such a structure. Human
beings have three cognitive faculties: they know through their faith, through their
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intellect or through their senses. Correspondingly, the realm of human knowledge
divides into three main branches: religious knowledge, mathematical knowledge,
and empirical knowledge. Each branch —here is the crucial point— enjoys different
epistemological criteria, and in each branch a different kind of certainty can be
obtained. The aim of the reformers and of the Jacobins was precisely the abolition of
such a dis-homogeneity in epistemological criteria and methods through the
expulsion of supernatural knowledge from the realm of legitimate knowledge.
Fergola's structure is a reaction, on a new and consolidated basis, against this
attempt to secularize knowledge117.
So, in the first and fundamental branch, that of religion, the legitimate source of
knowledge is the authority of the Church (which derives directly from God) and of
its tradition. Individual reason cannot be permitted to put dogmas in question.
Applying human reasoning to such issues is making a fundamental conceptual
error. The second branch, mathematics, is where reason can legitimately exercise its
function, and it can indeed reach here its highest achievements. The "art of
geometrical discovery" is defined by Fergola as "the most beautiful dianoethic
virtue", which, in scholastic terms, means intellectual virtue. Still, one should note
that Fergola has in mind a sui generis conception of human reason. The highest
achievements are obtained in geometry; here the evidence of the relation among
certain specific figures forces human reason to assent to certain propositions about
those figures118. Geometrical truths are indeed the very paradigm of evidence and
clarity. One sees them; the knowledge about them is immediate, as it is not-mediated
by any form of symbolic knowledge. The acquisition of geometrical knowledge is
always associated with visual metaphors and with the act of looking at the figures.
Solving a problem is seeing how to analyze it, i.e. how to reduce it to simpler
geometrical constructions. Proving a theorem is seeing that certain relations among
figures hold. It is impossible to think of geometry without figures —but the
Lagrangians, Lauberg and later Padula were suggesting precisely this. As we know,
figures and constructions are crucial to Fergola and his school, as geometrical
reasoning can only happen by looking at figures. Any use of symbolic methods, like
algebra, must in the end reduce to something that is visible in figures. The
boundaries of the science of geometry are traced by Fergola on the basis of this
epistemological limitation of geometrical reasoning. As it emerges clearly from both
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his published and unpublished material, Fergola thought of the symbolic reasoning
of algebra as being essentially different from geometrical reasoning. Now we see
this is because of the kind of non-mediated evidence enjoyed by geometrical truths.
This evidence is qualitatively different —superior, in fact— with respect to the
evidence enjoyed by truths discovered by means of forms of symbolic knowledge.
In symbolic knowledge, algebra for instance, evidence is mediated by the
instrumental apparatus made up by an alphabet of signs plus the formal rules to
manipulate these signs. Evidence is somehow "hidden", it remains there —beyond
the symbolic dimension. In fact, Fergola has always praised the power of algebra
and calculus as heuristic methods, as methods to discover geometrical truths, but he
has also stressed that these findings have to be somehow confirmed by geometrical
intuition, which can be done through the unusual and typically Fergolian
techniques of translation of symbols into geometrical magnitudes. We have seen
this approach in the first part of this study; now we can see which kind of
epistemological conception brought Fergola to this particular approach to
geometry, and mathematics in general. In his typical pre-Kantian and pre-modern
axiomatic approach, Fergola saw the science of geometry as the result of an
operation of intellectual abstraction of "pure forms" from the contemplation of
empirical reality. The relations among these forms enjoy a necessary nature and
they are known by the geometer with absolute evidence. How does human reason
work in geometrical reasoning? Its working is essentially passive: firstly, it abstracts
forms from the contemplation of nature (but what is this if not a refined form of
"mirroring"?); secondly it sees with evidence the relations among abstract forms
(but such an evidence is in things themselves). Reason "discovers" geometrical
truths in the sense that it recognizes geometrical truths. The essentially passive
nature of such a process of discovery is continuously underlined by the all-
pervasive visual metaphors. Even the immediate, intuitive recognition of
geometrical truths, as opposed to other forms of non-intuitive reasoning, support
the argument of a non-creative contribution of reason to geometric discovery.
Though, geometry is where human reason can achieve "its highest results", it is the
art of discovering geometrical truths which is the "most beautiful intellectual
virtue". By contrast, when calculating the values of a certain function, human
reason is not seeing anything, it is not mirroring anything; algebraic language is
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artificial, it is a human invention, it is a creation of human reason. Here is the point, I
believe. Human reason works at its best when it reflects, through intuition, the
order of a supernatural reality. But when human reason tries to create an order by
itself (such as tire "analytic order"), then nothing good can be expected out of this
blasphemous act of pride (as "creation" is only for God). Where should the
objectivity and certainty of algebraic reasoning come from? They could only come
from human reason itself, but we know how weak and impotent human reason is
(it is "a trembling light in the darkness"). It can hardly recognize truth when it sees
it, how could it create true knowledge out of nothing? Now we can better
understand some of the obscure claims contained in Ventura's eulogy of Fergola.
They were not purely rhetorical statements: Fergola saw God behind triangles and
circles, whereas the haughty algebraists saw the nothingness behind their formulas.
The geometrical knowledge of Fergola was grounded on his intuition-vision-
recognition of divine truths; the algebraic knowledge of the analytics has been
created out of their own minds, it is not grounded on anything real.
We can finally move to the third branch of knowledge, the empirical and moral
sciences. If faith is a "much nobler" faculty than intellect, the achievements of
intellect can only be palely resembled by those of the senses. The most spiritual part
of human reason works at its best when dealing with pure geometrical entities,
because of the evident nature of their properties. When it comes to empirical
matters reason has to deal with much more complex situations, where the
components of facts are indefinite, and their properties are mostly unknowable to
human beings. No wonder that geometrical reasoning is inadequate to acquire
knowledge about empirical reality; other forms of reasoning, such as induction or
probabilistic considerations seem to work much better here. Of course the
methodological change yields epistemological consequences, as leaving geometrical
analysis behind one also leaves certainty behind. Human knowledge about
empirical reality can only be conjectural; the divide from geometrical knowledge is
not of degree, but of kind. In the empirical sciences there are variations of the
degree of certainty: physical sciences are partially mathematizable, as their objects
are relatively simple and abstract; moral sciences are much less like that, and the
sciences of politics and society are completely non-mathematical, as their objects are
indefinite and very complex. In a more metaphysical language, like that used by
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Fergola, Colangelo and Ventura, one could say that while pure mathematics
(geometry and geometrizable calculus) is a "pure", a "spiritual" science —as it is
knowledge acquired by intellect alone— mixed mathematics, where mathematical
formalism is applied to make sense of physical phenomena are "material sciences",
because knowledge is acquired by mixing mathematical reasoning with empirical
considerations, i.e. with "matter". This can help us to understand other obscure
passages where Colangelo and Ventura accused the philosophes of "materializing"
mathematics, whereas Fergola always made it a "spiritual" science. The distinction
concerns the objectivity of knowledge (certainty vs. probability), its epistemological
features (intuition vs. calculation), and its moral connotations. Moral indeed, as
using mathematical reasoning improperly, as the philosophes and the Neapolitan
Jacobins clearly did when they extended their calculations to morals and society, is
deeply immoral. Firstly it is a sign of the most blasphemous haughtiness, as
individual —secularized— human reason is thought to be powerful enough to
explain the working of the entire universe without the support of religion and
authority; secondly it breaks the natural boundaries of knowledge, as empirical
knowledge is no field for the use of pure intellect. About the boundary-breaking,
one can note a passage where Flauti condemned the work of the Neapolitan
analityc geometers by saying that theirs was only "hybrid progress". The deeply
negative moral connotation of the Greek term "hy'bris" (which in the classical
literature meant precisely the blasphemous action of breaking a natural-divine
order of things) was here used with an emphasis which could not escape the
classically-educated members of his school. Fergola, according to his biographers,
was the "pure" mathematician who restored science in Naples. Pure was his devout
and semi-monastic life; and pure was his science and his mathematics. The virtues
of faith (humility and detachment from material things) simply made his scientific
knowledge greater and deeper, showing that only a truly Christian can be a truly
scientist.
When describing the Jacobin structure of knowledge, I referred to Cestari's
epistemological work. I was wondering where an explicit representation of the
Reactionary Catholic structure of knowledge could be found when I visited the
famous Library of the Neapolitan Oratory. And the best representation was
precisely there, in the middle of the Rococo ceiling of the great reading-room. It is a
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fresco of the first half of the eighteenth century, when the Library was restored and
its anti-modern activity began. It is clearly a "Triumph of Faith", a rather common
subject of the period, and I would suggest that its model was possibly the well-
known fresco painted by Francesco Solimena (1657-1747) in San Domenico
Maggiore. But, unlike Solimena's and many others', this is not a triumph of faith
against heresy. Instead, as it clearly appears from the allegories, it is a triumph of
faith over scientific error.
Surrounded by the portraits of the most illustrious Oratorian scholars is an oval.
This contains a vertical representation of knowledge which contains a spiral
movement from top (God) to bottom (Error). Let us follow it:
1- top, right: behind a cloud is the throne of the unknowable God. We know he
exists, even if we cannot see him; i.e. our reason is too weak to understand his
nature. Angels testifies of his presence: we know about him through
testimony (authority, tradition), not through reason.
2- slightly below, left: allegoric representation of Faith. It is an aged woman with
a severe expression; on her left shoulder is a great wooden cross, in her right
hand a golden chalice. She is stretching her left arm in the direction of a group
of contemplating figures.
3- slightly below, right: group of seven allegoric figures. From their symbols it is
clear that they are the sciences (golden circle, lamp, mirror) and the virtues
(silver shield, water, scale);
4- below, inferior part of the oval: group of four allegoric figures. They are the
continents, to signify the entirety of creation. In the middle of them an angel
strikes some giants who fall to the ground.
Once having identified the allegories, the meaning of the representation is quite
straightforward. Faith receive its truth from God himself; in turn it enlightens the
sciences and the virtues. They are of no value if not guided by faith. The whole
world receives civilization and progress from the sciences and the virtues provided
they are enlightened by faith; the angel of God attacks error and put it to flight, by
means of true science (golden projectiles, probably arrows).
Not as masterfully executed as Solimena's fresco, the Oratorian fresco was
painted by lesser known artists, and the creator of the design is unknown119.
Nevertheless, it is an important document in the history of knowledge, as nothing
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could better express the structure of scientific knowledge which was shared by the
scholars who worked against the secularization of the sciences in late eighteenth
and early nineteenth century Naples.
5.5 Other Adherents to Apologetic Empiricism
Fergola's school was the main center of elaboration of anti-modern scientific
thought in Naples. Its mathematical practice and theory was shaped on the basis of
the anti-modern structure of knowledge adopted by Reactionary Catholics.
However, Fergola was not alone in supporting what we called "apologetic
empiricism". I do not refer here to the metaphysical philosophers of the RUN, such
as Capocasale, who wrote texts of Newtonian physics which were inspired by
Fergola's textbook during the period 1790s-1830s. I refer instead to some devout —
but secular— natural philosophers and physicians who worked in the framework
of apologetic empiricism since the 1770s and 1780s, contemporaneously with and
independently of Fergola. This fact strengthens our hypothesis of a mobilization of
devout and loyalist men of science against the secularization of knowledge and
society.
A couple of cases provide evidence for the existence of this "other science",
which was not linked to reformist, egalitarian, and democratic programs, much less
to revolutionary ones. My goal is twofold: to substantiate with further historical
material what has been said about the theoretical features of apologetic empiricism;
and to provide historical evidence for the diffusion of this anti-modern conception
of science, which has never been recognized as such by historians of Neapolitan
culture. The idea that in 1799 scientists and physicians defended en masse the cause
of freedom and democracy has been maintained, with some reason, by nineteenth
century liberal historiography, and it has been accepted uncritically up to now. In
fact, there was an important part of the Neapolitan scientific intelligentsia which
disagreed with the reformist-revolutionary goals, and whose scientific work was
relevant to the elaboration of Reactionary Catholicism.
The first case is that of Domenico Cotugno (1736-1822), the most famous
physician in late eighteenth-century Naples. His work is best analyzed by
contrasting it with that of Domenico Cirillo (1739-1799), the physician whose work
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inspired the reformer's "epistemological unification" of the human and physico-
mathematical sciences and the secularization of knowledge. Even the most recent
historiography does not hesitate to place Cotugno's work side by side with that of
his friend and colleague Cirillo. The fact that Cirillo ended up hanged in Piazza
Mercato in 1799, whereas in the same year Cotugno was in Palermo with the royal
family and was to die a very rich man in 1822, is explained by a mere difference of
temperament. Ferrone places Fergola in the conceptual area of the reformist front,
only noting that he was unusually devout; similarly Cotugno is placed together
with the many reformist-Jacobin physicians, only noting that his should be
regarded as a case of "Catholic Enlightenment". This classification seems to me
extremely confusing. If Cotugno and Fergola can be classified as exponents of a so-
called "Catholic Enlightenment", than it becomes difficult to see what was not
Enlightenment. The rationale behind this classification seems the following: men
and women of science were on the side of Enlightenment. Once again it is
Mannheim's position, which has been internalized by many historians of thought:
their hidden assumption is that those scientists whose value was widely recognized
in Naples and abroad couldn't be working against Enlightenment. If some
philosopher and scientist was committed to political reaction, this must have been
some unproductive and pedantic figure, a la Capocasale, whose scientific work was
certainly distorted and biased. A presupposition which clearly derives from the a
priori assumption that Enlightenment scientists were not biased in their production
of scientific knowledge.
Cirillo, favorite scientist of Pagano and Filangieri, correspondent of Voltaire,
d'Alembert, Diderot and Rousseau, had introduced the works of Linneus and
Lavoisier in Naples. Through the conceptual framework of Lavoisier's chemistry he
had studied vegetal physiology; he had also claimed that it was possible to
experimentally ground morals upon human physiology. Through his work, he
showed how religious belief should remain extraneous to scientific research and
political activity, liis last public duty was in the Legislative Committee of the
Neapolitan Republic, and this cost him his life. Cotugno's career was parallel to
Cirillo's. They were almost the same age, they studied in Naples in the 1750s with
Genovesi, and they entered the university in the 1760s. They worked at the
Ospedale degli Incurabili, the greatest hospital in town. They both became
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renowned for their experimental ability in the field of, respectively, human
anatomy and biology. Cotugno held the chair of Anatomy from 1766 to 1818; and
thanks to his personal success the chair became a "primary chair". He was a
pensioner of the RAS since 1779, and later its president (1808-1817); he was also
Rector of the RUN and physician of the royal family. The author of a recent study
remarked that Cotugno "remained always extraneous to active politics and he
professed a neutral and a-philosophical conception of scientific knowledge"120. His
most important works were a study in the physiology of the auditory organ, and
one physiological and clinical study on sciatica121. In the first one, Cotugno
provided an extremely minute description of the vestibule, the semicircular canals
and the cochlea of the osseous labyrinth of the internal ear, on which basis he
claimed that the labyrinth was entirely occupied by fluid. This went against the
common assumption that there was air in it: according to the traditional view, fluid
was not capable of transmitting sound-waves122. Cotugno provided in fact a new
theory of resonance and hearing, grounded on his morphological observations. A
lively debate arose from the diffusion of Cotugno's discovery, as most European
physiologists —including the much respected Albrecht von Haller (1708-1777) —
rejected his observational data. Only in 1863 was the phenomenon of hearing
consistently grounded on the dynamics of labyrinthine fluid by Hermann Ludwig
von Helmholtz (1821-1894)123. The same spirit of observation is to be found in the
microscopic study of the sciatic nerve — the first indeed, and in his later studies on
the nature and diffusion of smallpox and pulmonary tuberculosis. Every research,
according to Cotugno, must depend primarily on the observation of the human
body. Medicine not being an exact science, can only be grounded on observation
and experience. Cotugno exploited Genovesi's anti-metaphysical arguments to
make his point about the need for empirical research and for avoiding the abuse of
reason. The Genovesian resonance and the remarkable scientific achievements have
been enough to place Cotugno in the tradition of Neapolitan Enlightenment. But the
essentially apologetic nature of his boundary-tracing strategy emerges clearly as
soon as we look at his epistemological works. In his speech On the Spirit ofMedicine,
read in 1772 at the Ospedale degli Incurabili, Cotugno addressed the young
entering the profession. Medicine is "a very difficult art", but knowing "its spirit"
can make it much easier to keep the right direction in its practice. Remember that
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talking of "the spirit of analysis" was very common among French philosoplies in
those very years. What is "the spirit of medicine", then? "Medicine" Cotugno said,
"is not a science, it is mere empirical knowledge [cognizione]"; it is not "a human
invention", instead it "derives from facts": nature itself "dictated its precepts".
Medicine is "an art taught by Nature only. This teacher wants to be heard, not
overcome; it wants to be known, not understood". Nature must be observed with
"pure eyes"; "there are no masters in medicine", but nature. The object of medicine
is the human body, "a marvelous piece of work" whose delicate and complex
harmony is often affected by external factors. Since antiquity, treatments for
diseases were grounded on instinct, trials and errors, and analogies. This pragmatic
heuristic should still be the basis of medicine, which is an essentially inductive and
fallible practice. The physician should never think he has reached the truth, nor can
he extend his remedies on the basis of unlimited analogic reasoning, as "Nature is
so free and masterful in its productions, that at each step it wants to be known in its
particular objects, and it has employed a specific law and specific dispositions in
every one of its productions. It seems almost that it wanted to show us its great
power"124. Consequently, it is not enough to examine some of its productions to
judge about any other. Cotugno notes differences and draws epistemological
boundaries where others had seen the possibility of generalization and laws, and
the universal application of analytic reasoning. Applying the heuristic methods of
exact sciences to medicine is instead erroneous and damaging. The early —purely
empirical— practice of medicine was, in more recent times, subjugated by the
"despotic rule" of reason. The philosophers, the self-declared "priests of Reason",
picked up the results of the previous experiences, the "pure truths", and put them
under the "yoke" of reason. One began to hear about "disputes" and "causes", and
as a consequence of these "metaphysical errors", medicine became more obscure
and less useful. "The unhappy epoch of medicine began when, leaving to the
common people the study of the effects of nature, men became interested in the
study of causes". Since then, "one began to hear about systems, and in an art where
only particular laws are employable to make sense of particular cases, one heard of
general laws", which were extraneous to its nature125. The good physician regards
as more important "diligence in observing, than subtlety in understanding". In
Cotugno the return to the ancients meant precisely a return to a practical,
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observational medicine, to the spirit of Hippocratic medicine. Cotugno's anti-
intellectualism found its expression in statements such as: "what is the point of
debating so much when this is not needed? Medicine needs facts, not words"; or the
examples of admirable peasants observing nature to treat themselves and their
families, as opposed to "the subtle metaphysical physician". Only goal of medicine
is treating diseases and reducing pain; it provides us with no certain knowledge
about the infinitely complex "human machine". Certainly, reason is the faculty
which allows us "to perfect our cognition", but "it should know its own limits". It
cannot know the first causes, and "it cannot reach by synthesis their effects" (i.e. no
deductive knowledge is possible about nature). Medical knowledge must be limited
to "facts", i.e. the effects of those "first causes" which will always escape human
reason; "we cannot know about causes: our knowledge can only be about
phenomena". Human reason can be legitimately used "to know, to examine, to
confront, to calculate physical effects". The jump from the chain of effects to causes
is beyond its capacity. Medicine, as stated by Hippocrates, only admits purely
empirical knowledge: its "spirit" is that of being a matter-of-fact knowledge126. And
this is why anatomy, the true description of the structure of human body, is the
basis of medicine, and physiology, the knowledge of the "motions" of the organs
(whose harmony must be maintained) can only be founded on anatomy.
In another speech at the RUN (1778), Cotugno treated of the way to prepare the
spirit for scientific investigation127. "Wisdom" is to Cotugno a virtue, perfected
through education and custom, which allows humans to know and follow truth, as
it includes both erudition and practical action. So he can claim that "the safety of
the state is in the wisdom of its citizens", as it provides a safe guidance to practical
life. "It is clear that doctrine does not yield wisdom if it is not conjunct with virtue";
more precisely doctrine without virtue is dangerous, as "human reason tends by
nature to abuse its forces if customs do not restrain it". A state where sciences are
flourishing but customs are corrupted cannot be safe: "how can we have civil
tranquillity without honesty, faith, continence, truth?" Moral integrity and intellect
reinforce each other and progress together, the sciences being "the eye of society",
and its collective memory.
Truth is difficult to access though, and the human spirit (animo umano) needs a
special training to recognize it: this is provided by "meditation". Spirit is described
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by Cotugno as a celestial element imprisoned in the human machine, the body, as if
it were "in the fog". Recognition of truth demands a great effort, which Cotugno
describes as articulated in "attention" and "meditation", where the spirit
concentrates on itself, and detaches itself from the body. Bodily abstraction proves
crucial, as the control of sensible pleasure is necessary to the recognition of truth.
This has been given to guide man to the investigation of the universe (pleasure of
observing the sky, or the varied earthly phenomena), but human spirit easily
becomes a slave of these pleasures and does not accomplish the second, crucial step:
to recognize the existence and attributes of the "author of the universe" from
phenomena. "The images of objects we obtain through the senses are like seeds
deposited in our spirit to fecundate it and to let it accomplish its goal, which is to
know God and the utility of the existing beings". Cotugno described the practice of
meditation as the observation and confrontation of "mental images", which are
stored in "the very sensible fibers of the brain". The spirit not trained in meditation
will be easy prey for passions during adult life, as passions emerge from the lack of
intellectual control on these fantastic images and their resulting disorder.
Meditation produces the excitement of specific brain fibers, which "enlighten" the
specific ideas to be contemplated. The spirit receives the images, compares them,
and deduces consequences from of them (i.e. proper, active reasoning). This
controlled intellectual activity, and the subordination of fantasy to intellect, causes
positive material effects on the brain, which strengthens and perfects it. Cotugno
made a number of empirical observations on the activity of the brain in humans and
animals, and he concluded that during meditation the influx of blood is limited, and
the global excitement of cerebral fibers is diminished: this physiological state
correspond to the activity of the brain being in full control of the superior spiritual
component. Cotugno wanted his students to practice constantly meditation as, in
fact, "human nature has reached such a state of depravation that the body, born to
obey, contrasts the rule (imperio) of the spirit, and often reduces it to a shaming
slavery"; only a correct and effective education of the young can restore the lost
equilibrium. "Civil education will form the morals, literary education will produce
the doctrine: if they do not proceed together, everything is doomed".
The speech, re-printed in 1786 and 1834, sums up the epistemological ideas of
Cotugno; it also sheds light on his choice of certain specific fields of investigation
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such as brain activity, sensory organs and nervous system. The very episode of his
description of the labyrinthine fluid, and of his new theory of hearing, could
probably be fruitfully investigated by connecting it to its ideas about the
"vibration" of semi-fluid brain fibers when excited128. Among his basic
philosophical points are: the epistemological limitations of human reason, the rigid
duality of spirit and matter and the supremacy of the spiritual over the material, a
teleological conception of the human body, a crucial role for final causes in
empirical explanation, a providential view of the universe, the eulogy of "wisdom"
(a holistic form of religious-moral-intellectual knowledge), which implies the
rejection of the secularization of knowledge, which is indeed a unitary body whose
parts are functional to the elevation of man to God. About scientific practice, we
find suspicion towards philosophical systems, and a phenomenal conception of
empirical reality, a methodological empiricism: "pure" observation of nature
without a priori theoretical commitments. But we already know that this extreme
empiricism is far from being contradictory to the metaphysical dimension just
highlighted: they are instead perfectly complementary, as they were for Colangelo,
for Fergola and for Capocasale. By the criteria we have been defining in this study,
Cotugno's work in medicine cannot be assimilated to that of Cirillo or of other
reformist-revolutionary physicians; it was instead functionally and structurally
analogous to that of other devout anti-modern scientists.
Lastly, I will offer some remarks on the work of the natural philosopher
Giuseppe Saverio Poli (1746-1825) whose name was well known in Naples at the
turn of the century. After obtaining a degree in medicine from the prestigious
University of Padua in 1770, Poli exercised the medical profession in his native
town of Molfetta (Apulia), but he soon devoted himself to the study of the natural
sciences. From 1776 he held the chair of history and geography at the Military
Academy of Naples129, while giving courses of experimental physics to the students
of medicine at the Hospital of the Incurables. He later became professor of
experimental physics at the RUN, and Director of the Military Academy. His name
figures among those of the founding members of the RAS where, in the 1780s, he
read memoirs about his experiences on electricity. Like Cotugno, Poli enjoyed the
trust of King Ferdinando. This resulted in his being chosen to be the tutor for Prince
Francesco, and in the generous support for his scientific travels and for the
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acquisition of scientific instruments. In fact Poli traveled all over Europe to meet
famous scientists and to familiarize himself with their research and their didactic
methods. Particularly important were his contacts with the British and French
"physicist-electricians", as he called them, and with Benjamin Franklin, whose
theory of electricity he defended in Naples. Fie was a member of the Royal Society
of London, the Academy of Philadelphia, and a number of Italian academies
including those of Siena, Turin, and Bologna. Thanks to the support of the Crown,
Poli was able to promote the study of the sciences in Naples with provisions such as
the opening of the Royal Bourbon Library to scholars, the foundation of the
Botanical Garden of Naples, and the donation to the Museum of Natural History of
a number of rare pieces (some of which he had bought from James Cook130). Poli's
main work is a monumental study on Mediterranean crustaceans and mollusks,
published in two magnificent folio volumes and enriched with over sixty copper¬
plates131. He presented for the first time a complete classification of this branch of
zoology, articulating and completing Linneus' scheme. Through his meticulous
observations Poli was able to describe the morphology and the functioning of the
organs of these animals, and he is credited with a number of relevant discoveries.
No historical work has been done on Poli, in spite of the fact that his research
and memoirs, published between the 1772 and 1805, were well known in Naples. In
particular, his textbook of experimental physics was the most successful and widely
used in the kingdom for at least thirty years132. It was firstly published in 1787, and I
have consulted the sixth edition, published in 1822, where the author claimed that
his five previous editions, plus some others edited in Naples and abroad, all "went
rapidly out of print". In fact, most of the lecturers of philosophy teaching in
Neapolitan private and public schools between the 1790s and 1820s used Poli as a
textbook133. Why was it so popular? For a start, the book was written by an
enthusiastic and refined experimenter, not by some tedious metaphysician such as
Capocasale; at the same time, it was more intuitive and elementary than Fergola's
mechanics, which was specifically designed for students of mathematics. But one
should also note that Poli's textbook presented a very peculiar feature for an
eighteenth century book of experimental physics: it does not contain one single
mathematical formula. Which is not to say that it was out dated; the sixth edition
contained "remarkable additions" where the most recent experimental results
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described in the acts of various academies during the 1790s were presented to the
student in plain Italian and with the aid of figures. This unusually long textbook
(five volumes) covered a number of phenomena and disciplines: matter, motion,
cosmography, mechanics, hydraulics, air, gases, sound, water, caloric, light; the
lion's share (more than three hundred pages) being left to Poli's favorite topic,
electricity, which included the phenomena of magnetism and Galvanism. For each
natural phenomenon an account of current competing theoretical explanations was
provided, highlighting their respective advantages and deficiencies (no space was
given to the history of science and to the ideas of the ancients). Then Poli described
accurately those experiments from which the properties of the phenomenon had
been best clarified. His account of the debates over the nature and properties of
electricity, from the Nollet-Franklin-Symmer controversy to the more recent
Galvani-Volta controversy over "animal electricity" is worthy of remark134. Poli
claimed that, on the basis of the described experiments —he himself had been
experimenting on electricity since his years in Padua135— he is inclined to follow
Franklin's theory of electricity; and in general he cautiously defended a view
according to which the "electrical fluid" produced by electrical machines was an
analogous phenomenon to magnetic and Galvanic fluids136.
A physician himself, Poli gave space to the medical applications of electricity
and magnetism, which were also the objects of some of his academic memoirs.
While dismissing Mesmer as a "charlatan", he defended the use of electrical
machines to treat specific pathologies related to the difficult circulation of the
"internal bodily fluids", as he attributed to electricity specific fluid properties.
Interestingly, while describing the "noble contention" between Volta and Galvani,
Poli remembered an experience made by his friend Domenico Cotugno, who well
before Galvani's experiment with the frog, had written about receiving an electric
discharge during the vivisection of a mouse137. Poli himself repeated all of Galvani's
experiments on frogs as soon as he received their description from Bologna138. Note
that, when describing an experiment, Poli gave also precise information about the
cost of the necessary devices and the shops in Naples, Paris or London where they
could be ordered. From such a sketch of Poli's life and interests, there emerges the
figure of an enthusiastic experimenter, entirely devoted to observation and data
collection, reluctant to take any sort of theoretical commitment, and with no interest
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whatsoever in the turbulent political life of the period. This was also the way in
which he liked to present himself and his work; and this is the way in which he is
described today in the biographical notes139. In fact, unlike Fergola, he was not the
typical devout and legitimist reactionary intellectual. Nevertheless, I suggest that
his own experimental approach to science was just another version of that general
attitude towards knowledge, reason and science that we called have "apologetic
empiricism".
Let us begin with the remarks made by two of his friends, on the occasion of his
death. Note that they both were exponents of the reactionary rationalist philosophy,
which was dominant in the 1820s. Giampaolo observed that, before turning
decidedly to the natural sciences, Poli had deeply studied logic and metaphysics,
which included the "analysis of sensations"; but he did not commit the same error
as the ideologists, i.e. he never pretended "to know everything": to Poli the analysis
of human sensations was just the first step to reach the knowledge of the creator of
the universe140. Giampaolo also remarked that he favored the studies of physics as
that is "where one admires most closely the wisdom of God"; but in fact he never
stopped the study of theology, which in his mind was the supreme science, where
"the real design of creation and the immortal destiny of man are unveiled"141.
Giampaolo recognized the subtle apologetic dimension of the major work on
mollusks: indeed it showed how "providential nature operates constantly and
uniformly for the good of beings", and through "which steps nature advances
towards animal perfection, and which are the common and different features [with
respects to other animals]"142. The apologetic dimension is then recognized in other
productions, like the textbook of physics and a long poem on the harmony of the
universe. Note that in this unusual poem —where "the celestial bodies" are
represented as "announcing the sublimity and glory of the divine Omnipotent"143 —
Poli had embraced Fontenelle's argument for the infinity of inhabited worlds as the
most conform to the infinite power of God144. Also, Poli took the immense distances
of the fixed stars from Earth as a good example of those "rocks against which
human curiosity and pride crash"; "the most effective and reliable means by which
astronomers calculate the magnitude and distances of planets, their most perfect
instruments, their deepest and admirable calculations, are of no value with regard
to stars"145. Note also the date: 1805, i.e. the period of the most effective reactionary
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policy: the poem was in fact an interesting point of contact between scientific
knowledge, religious apology and political apology (Ferdinando is "the great and
clement monarch, rich in spiritual virtue and elevate qualities"146). Having said that,
I believe that not very many readers went through all the hundreds of pages of this
deadly boring poem.
Descriptions of Poli's life followed a cliche common to other Catholic scientists
(including Fergola). Giampaolo wrote that he was "modest, reserved", he remained
celibate —"in peace", he disliked honors and richness, and finally "he was not in
the number of the base accomplices of the secular corruption"147. Gatti remarked
that the young Poli "resisted the flatteries of Naples"148; that in his lectures "he used
to take any occasion to defend religion and morals"149; that in his textbook "he
invited the reader to admire in nature the adorable hand of the creator [...], and the
ends of his eternal mind"150. One could argue these authors were simply using
Poli's work for apologetic purposes. I believe, on the contrary, that the apologetic
dimension intrinsic to Poli's works cannot be overestimated. Of course, this did not
prevent Poli from being an excellent zoologist, the contrary indeed: his interest in
discovering the gradual teleological "ascension" of nature from the simplest form of
life to the most complex ones made him look for a series of intermediate organs and
functions which had never been observed in mollusks before. The general idea
which gave sense and unity to his research has been represented in an engraving
enclosed in one of the eulogies151: on the background of the Gulf of Naples, a
pyramid is represented which is grounded on a terrain covered by mollusks and
ends up pointing somewhere among the clouds (and we know what is behind
them); on the ground are also other emblems, which recall us of Poli's many
practical and cultural interests (book, globe, parchment, scythe, ancient coins and
vases —of which he was a renowned collector). Allegoric figures (Atlas and Janus,
apparently) stand for human empirical knowledge which is grounded on facts. The
distich under Poli's bust states that he discovered many hidden natural phenomena
which clearly point at the supreme being. Mollusks are the first brick of the
teleological pyramid of knowledge, in which also the other various interests found
their ultimate meaning.
In fact, Poli was not only the man who had proven the existence of God through
mollusks, but he was also part of the restricted professorial elite which re-designed
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public education at the moment of the "return to the order", in Autumn 1799.
Called by the king to enter a special commission for the reform of the university
(together with three ministers and monsignor Gervasio) Poli wrote the 1805
university reform, which was approved by four representatives of the professorial
order (among them Domenico Cotugno and Francesco Rossi). According to this
reform, the didactic backbone ("primary chairs") was formed by three theological
chairs, two chairs of law (one being feudal law), three of medicine (anatomy and
Hippocratic, and practical medicine), plus the chairs of experimental physics and
mathematics. Monsignor Gervasio, nominated Prefect of the RUN was in charge of
approving the content of the lectures, which had to be published before being
taught152 (a provision in defense of Catholicity which was explicitly supported by
Fergola153). Choice ecclesiastics should ensure that in the many private institutes of
higher education "good doctrines" were taught (to this extent Jesuits had been
called back in the kingdom in 1804)154.
As for Fergola and Cotugno, Poli's support to the "return to order" policy went
beyond his manifestations of political legitimism and religious orthodoxy. The very
content of his scientific practice was indeed functional for the reinforcement of that
reactionary system of knowledge we have been describing in this part of the study.
Poli's extremely empirical approach to scientific knowledge and his self-limitation
to remarks upon phenomena are yet another version of apologetic empiricism, in
this case applied to experimental physics and zoology. A few remarks on his
influential physics textbook will clarify this point. Poli's perspective is clear since
the initial quote from Lactantius, a father of the Church: "human wisdom" (hominis
sapientia) is not "knowing everything", but rather an equilibrate mixture of
knowledge and ignorance: scientia cum ignoratione conjuncta, et temperata. Note that
the awareness of deep human ignorance has the healthy function of "moderating"
(;temperata) the pretensions of scientific knowledge. And in fact a strictly
phenomenal approach is all Poli recommended to his students, the rest being
regarded as useless and dangerous metaphysical reasoning. In describing the
properties of phenomena, Poli said he "paid special attention to distinguish
between proven truths and hypothetical truths, which are grounded on mere
conjectures", stressing that on most questions about nature we are in "the darkness
of uncertainty". What should emerge is, according to Poli, "the prodigious
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simplicity and economy by which the general System of the Universe is ruled", so
that from few basic principles a number of different and complex effects derive;
which tells the contemplator of nature of "an infinite and inscrutable Wisdom"155.
An argument which closely resembles Fergola's apologetic interpretation of the
principle of minimal action. About the peculiarly a-mathematical form of the book,
Poli remarked that he "avoided algebraic demonstrations" —which would make
the text much shorter— because he wanted to be fruitfully read by all students,
including those studying medicine156. Poli's biographers put great emphasis on the
didactic advantages of his textbook: "a book for everyone" remarked Serafino
Gatti157; while Giampaolo, in a speech at the Royal Academy, said Poli's textbook
signalled a truly didactic "revolution"158. Such emphasis on the purely didactic
rationale should be critically analyzed though. In fact, Fergola and his pupils often
justified their rejection of purely analytic textbooks of geometry because of their
alleged obscurity and difficulty; but we have seen how much deeper were the
reasons for their rejection. Of course the didactic function of a text like Poli's
mattered in the choice of the most appropriate form; but still the choice could have
been different. Remember that to scientists such as Lauberg and Giordano the
easiest and most natural way of thinking was precisely the analytic-algebraic one,
and that they had planned an entire curriculum in mathematics and physics based
on the exclusive use of the analytic method. Clearly, Poli's refusal to introduce
mathematical formalism was the correct didactic choice only if a specific conception
of scientific and mathematical knowledge was taken for granted. Such a view can
be sketched as follows.
Physics, "the science of nature", studies everything sensible in "the great theater
of the universe". It discovers and classifies the properties of "material substances",
without trying to explain the real working of nature or the real essences of
phenomena, both of which escapes our senses. "A physicist does not look for other
natural truths than those suggested by facts" — wrote Poli about matter — he should
not try "to discover through his imagination which are the first components of
bodies, and if they can be [infinitely] divided; as such a research, which surpasses
the capacities of our intellect, wastes our time and effort only to leave us in an
insuperable obscurity". "The goal of the good physicist is not to form the world, but
only to examine phenomena, and the laws by which they are ruled"159. Our
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ignorance does not preclude us from recognizing that the universe is a unitary,
organic and harmonic structure, a "chain of created beings depending on each
other", diversity and contrast only emerge in our imperfect knowledge.
Interestingly Poli put among the primary properties of matter that of being
completely inert and passive, so that he can later introduce the various kinds of
forces acting in the universe ("affinities and attractions") as clearly disposed by "a
sovereign wisdom" whose goal is to maintain the universal harmony160. Like
Fergola, Poli declared that the physicist is "completely ignorant about the real
nature of force"161. In fact, Poli extended this remark to each topic treated in his
textbook (from "matter", to "force", to the "transmission of motion", to the "electric
fluid"). "Many philosophers got tired trying to explain the nature of motion", but
"no one will ever reach this goal"; about the force of gravity, "it is reasonable to
suppose that it has been impressed upon bodies by the infinite wisdom of the
Creator to make them work for his high ends"; similarly the faculty of transmitting
motion can be thought of as given to bodies by the same wisdom, and operating "in
a way that escapes the human mind". The structural impossibility of the human
mind grasping the real nature of sensible things is indeed the object of a biblical
quotation which Poli described as "an eternal truth"162. When dealing with caloric,
Poli remarks that what is important is "not the ambition to discover its essence, but
only the acquisition of the idea which is nearest to truth"163. If the physicist can
investigate only natural phenomena, then "the different opinions of philosophers"
over their essences "should be regarded as purely imaginary". Examples are
Descartes' definition of matter as essentially extended, or Gassendi's definition of
matter as essentially solid. It is quite another thing to say that matter is "inert", as
this property is simply derived from experience164.
Many errors in natural philosophy, Poli said, derive from confusing the "abstract
dimension" with the concrete one: Descartes thought of extension of the essence of
matter precisely because he confused "the idea of physical body with that of
mathematical body"; similarly one can easily provide a mathematical proof that
matter is infinitely divisible, but this proves nothing about physical objects: to
believe the contrary is to mistake abstract objects with concrete objects, mathematics
with physics, pure knowledge with material knowledge and, ultimately, (pure)
intellect with (material) senses. So, if the indefinite divisibility of matter can be
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defended this has to be done on the basis of experience, not of mathematics. This is
why Poli —who clearly disliked atomism— listed a number of phenomena where
matter is divided "in a number of parts so great to defeat the most lively
imagination" to support, on empirical grounds, the hypothesis of its infinite
divisibility165. Here is the crucial distinction he referred to in his preface: students
should grasp the hiatus existing between mathematical certainty and physical
certainty, which are essentially different in nature. Physical certainty derives from
observation and means that something is very likely to be the case, but this
knowledge is essentially fallible and revisable —which mathematical knowledge is
not, as it derives from the intellect observing eternal relations among abstract
entities. So that Poli can tell his students: "leave aside the abstract dimension, which
is the object of mathematics; do not follow the flight of imagination, which leaves
you in uncertainty; observe instead what nature and art [technical devices] really
offer about each specific issue" (note the metaphor of the "flight of imagination",
favored by Fergola's school)166. Which means: always "stick to true, clear,
indubitable facts, as they are the only source of human empirical knowledge
[cognizioni]"167. Science is a noble and useful activity, Poli wrote, "but be careful not
to become haughty, and not to assume an ultimate tone when giving your opinion
on the hidden causes. Be impartial, do not follow novelty just because it is seducing,
and be cautious in adopting hypothetical theories, which are simply the product of
philosophers' minds". Theories can be admired, "but do not be ashamed of
declaring your ignorance about what has been excluded from investigation by the
Author of nature". Poli offered his textbook as an example of studying nature
without taking for granted the products of "others' capricious imagination", but
rather "following the trustful guidance of experience"168.
One can now see why the didactic goal of the textbook can only partially explain
the a-mathematical choice. This was also determined by a fundamental distrust in
the capacity of mathematics to contribute to our understanding of empirical reality. It
seems to me that the relevant point here is the link between such notions as
"individual imagination", "abstraction", "mathematics", "fiction", and the way
they are opposed to "common sense", "experience", "physics", "trustful
description"169. Further material on this point can be found in a couple of inaugural
speeches Poli gave at the Hospital and at the Military Academy170. Here Poli
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introduced the science of physics as the study of "the infinite series of bodies
contained in the universe", which "convinces the human spirit of the necessity of
the existence of a Supreme being, and of an infinite Wisdom who extracts from
matter that great variety and that admirable order of opaque, transparent and
luminous bodies through the prescription of simple laws, which He freely
follows"171. We already know about the theological and political significance of the
adjective "freely" here, and we will not return to it. Rather, note that Poli insisted
on nature speaking to both intellect and feelings ("spirit and heart"), so that the
more one deepens his knowledge and becomes "a trustful observer of natural
phenomena", the more he knows about "his necessary duties", which are duties
towards God and towards society. Poli pointed out the reason for the decline of the
studies of nature "in many parts of Italy": this is the attitude of many contemplators
of nature "to attribute to some new finding a much greater value and extension"
than one legitimately should. The supreme task of the teacher is then that of
"parting what is hypothetical from what is certain", and to teach only those
doctrines "which are immediate consequences deduced by facts"172. This is what
distinguishes modern physics from Aristotelian physics —which was obscure,
speculative, useless; and this is what distinguishes, nowadays, good experimental
physics from the creation of artificial "systems", which are productions of human
"imagination" (fantasia)173. To sum up: if imagination plays a role in pure
mathematics (where it constructs the artificial techniques of algebra and calculus), it
certainly has no positive function in the empirical sciences. This is because
empirical sciences, which include physics, provide us with knowledge derived from
the senses, not from pure intellect; it is a knowledge about matters of fact, not about
abstract, pure truths. The "creative" part of human reason is to be banished from
physics, where only observation, experiments, and cautious processes of induction
(always specifically oriented) must be followed. Giampaolo grasped correctly Poli's
ideas about the danger of a mathematical treatment of experimental physics: Poli,
he wrote "stripped as much as possible this science from the language of geometry
and algebra, which often create confusion with their technicalities"174.
Poli traced a neat boundary between mathematics and the empirical sciences,
and has provided completely a-mathematical methods and criteria for them. His
original passion of electricity can be possibly explained by the apparently non-
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mathematical nature of this phenomenon (we are referring to the 1780s-1790s).
Mathematics can —to some extent— be used in physics (he said he could have
written a textbook rich in algebraic formulas) but it does not provide us with a
better understanding of natural phenomena (he simply said that it would have been
"shorter"). The foundation of physical certainty must rest ultimately in sensible
perception. Like Fergola, Poli was reacting to the rapid expansion of the empire of
analysis over the empirical sciences with a boundary-drawing strategy based on a
specific conception of human knowledge and human faculties. Accordingly, human
reason is an essentially passive faculty, able to recognize certain features of abstract
and empirical reality, and to reason on them. As soon as it tries to construct, to
invent ("to form the universe"), errors become unavoidable. Only the awareness of
the hierarchy of the different kinds of knowledge, each one with its own legitimate
methods, plus the support of Christian revelation yields good science. The fact that
Poli's most significant works appeared in the 1780s and 1790s shows once again
how crucial this period was to the constitution of a unitary cultural reaction against
the "spirit of analysis".
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Chapter Six
The Synthetic School, or
Mathematics as Contemplation of Truth
Fergola began explicitly to refer to the need for re-discovering pure Greek geometry
in a memoir read at the RAS in 1786. It was the first public presentation of his
"Euclidean program", which concerned not only geometry but any other branch of
mathematics. As we have seen, the expansion of the "empire of analysis" had been
contrasted since the 1770s by scientists such as Cotugno and Poli, who questioned
its being a reliable cognitive instrument in the natural and moral sciences. Fergola
effectively contrasted the penetration of the "analytic spirit" in pure mathematics as
well; and to this extent he provided an alternative —geometrical— foundation for
mathematics. This foundational theory legitimized his boundary-drawing strategy
regarding the possibility of applying mathematics to the empirical world. Indeed,
historians Chasles and Carnot recognized the priority of Fergola's school in the
restitution to pure geometry of its "dignity", through the rediscovery of "Greek
purity" —a program which was to become important in France and Germany
during the 1820s. In this last part of the present study, we shall go back to the
original mathematical controversy from which we started, providing a more
complete presentation of its causes, its dynamics, and its eventual closure.
6.1 Nicola Fergola and the Geometrical Turn of Neapolitan Mathematics
Fergola's life is presented by his biographers, as an exemplary one1. Born into a
middle-class family in 1753 —his father was a bureaucrat— Fergola studied Greek
and Latin literature at a Jesuit college until the expulsion of the Society from the
Kingdom (1767). In college, he was trained in fencing, music and singing, and — we
are told— he excelled in each of them. Then something similar to a conversion
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happened, which put an end to his "worthless days" and to his "religious
indifference" (note the analogy with Canosa's autobiographical notes)2. From then
onwards, the only interests of the young man were to be religion and science; in fact
his pupils and admirers claimed that Fergola had restored mathematics in Naples
after decades of decline. In particular, Fergola was remembered for restoring the
pure and elegant way in which mathematics was practiced by the ancients. "Purity"
seems to be the main feature of both his religious faith and his mathematical work.
If his life was characterized by an "angelic, heavenly purity"3, an almost non-
human purity was also attributed to his synthetic geometrical methods. The models
for his purity were in the past. In religion, it was the simple faith of early
Christianity and the pure doctrine of the patristic literature, that is to say the spirit
of "the golden age of religion"4. In mathematics it was the purely synthetic method
of the Greek geometers and its developments due to Christian mathematicians of
the seventeenth century, that is to say, the highest achievement of the human
intellect. Both these choices were far from obvious to a Neapolitan mathematician of
the 1780s.
After the expulsion of the Jesuits and the closure of their colleges, Fergola
studied mathematics with Giuseppe Marzucco and Marcello Cecere at the College
of the Saviour, a new royal college of higher education which replaced the Jesuit
Collegio Massimo. We are told that Fergola experienced in this way the low level of
mathematical teaching which was provided by colleges at that time (Fergola's
biographers did not mention that Marzucco had published a piece of work
containing applications of integral and differential calculus). Apparently, Fergola
was deeply touched by the exposition of a Euclidean theorem by Marcello Cecere,
professor of Synthetic Mathematics. The episode is presented by his pupil Telesio,
an Oratorian priest, as a sort of mystical illumination: "the light of the geometrical
truths hit the young man [...], and he suddenly saw the art, the art by which the
great Geometer [Euclid] received his Elements, and so he grasped the high
principles of geometrical invention"5. Apart from this highly symbolic episode,
biographers remark that Fergola's education in higher mathematics was mostly self-
taught. But following biographers too closely on this point could be misleading, as
their goal is obviously that of highlighting the uniqueness of the figure of Fergola,
and his radical break with the previous tradition. In fact Fergola's philosophical and
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scientific education was a rather standard one. For a start, he frequented the palaces
of the "enlightened" philo-French aristocracy of the 1770s. In particular, he could
access the private library of Domenico Berio Marquis of Salza, as he tutored his son
Francesco; the library was unique in Naples, as it was rich in modern scientific texts
and it contained collections of the acts of many European academies6. Moreover
Fergola had been taught at the private studio of Vito Caravelli where, as we have
seen, good mathematical education was provided, including integral and
differential calculus7.
While privately studying mathematics, Fergola completed his university studies
of law and metaphysics, to which he had been originally addressed by the family.
In his studies of law, Fergola had as a guide Giuseppe Cirillo (professor of Roman
Law), while in metaphysics, we are told that Fergola studied deeply the works of
Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688), Christian Wolff, and the early Genovesi, whom he
greatly admired. In mathematics, Fergola studied Newton, the Bernoullis, Euler,
Brook Taylor (1685-1731), and many other "geometers and analysts, considered
equally as solemn teachers"8. Telesio provide us with a list of mathematical
textbooks available to the young Fergola and, apart from the works by the brothers
di Martino, Telesio remarked that they were extremely unsatisfactory9: around the
young Fergola Telesio saw only "the desert".
If we now go back to the information we have collected about the training of the
"Jacobin mathematicians", we see that most of them had originally been trained in
law at the RUN; and that most of them had studied mathematics with Vito
Caravelli either at the Military Academy or privately. In fact, the young Fergola
knew and appreciated men like abbe Pacifico and he entered the RAS in 1779
thanks to the support of Caravelli, precisely as Filippis did in the same year. A
critical reading of the biographies simply reinforce the impression that Fergola went
through a normal scientific education, which included differential and integral
calculus, and their application to mechanics.
In the late 1770s Fergola began to teach mathematics privately; in 1779 he began
lecturing on philosophy at the College of the Savior. In the same year he read a
paper at the RAS; it seems that in this piece of work —which is currently lost—
Fergola presented and solved two geometrical problems through the application of
integral calculus10. Interestingly, in 1779 Fergola also edited a textbook based on
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Genovesi's lectures on experimental physics, to be used as textbook at the College
of the Savior11. The book was dedicated to Domenico Berio the owner of the library
where Fergola had been studying for years. In his preface Fergola praised, in the
style of Genovesi, the utility of the study of physics for agriculture, medicine and
for many other activities of everyday life. He also suggested that the observation of
physical nature provide the foundation for morals12. Nevertheless, Fergola's
reading of Genovesi is already different from that of the reformers, as he stressed
the link between physics and theology ("nulli rei tarn est necessaria Physica quam
Theologiae studium"); he supported a teleological and providential vision of the
physical universe13; and he provided an account of the history of physics which
reminds one closely of the doctrine of the philosophia perennis, linking in one single
scientific tradition the Greeks and Wolff14. Through his particular reading of
Genovesi, Fergola was placing himself in the tradition of the post-Wolffian
rationalistic philosophy which had always been present at the RUN and which was
to be suddenly revived in the 1790s by reactionary authors. The studies of law, in
particular, were embedded in this sort of metaphysics, and this was the critical
target of the reformers like Filangieri and Pagano, who had learned a very different
lesson from Genovesi: that of the battle against metaphysics, of the "civil
philosophy", and of the need for administrative and economic reforms. Although
moving from the same maestro, Fergola and the reformers were in fact taking
opposite indications out of his complex work. That metaphysical-theological system
which proved old-fashioned and unbearable to the young aristocrat Filangieri and
to the provincial landowner Filippis, was regarded as highly promising by the
young teacher of mathematics Fergola. His inclination for metaphysics and his
intransigent Catholicity are already clear in 1779. How did they affect his work as a
mathematician? The question is rather interesting, as there is no evidence that
Fergola had a different training in mathematics with respect to his fellows who later
would incline for analysis —and for revolution. And indeed his first productions
can be seen as part of that interest in the calculus by which we have previously
characterized the reformist decade of the 1780s.
In 1780 Fergola read a second paper at the RAS, about certain optical problems15.
Again integral and differential calculus were employed, this time to make sense of
certain physical phenomena. In a third memoir, read in 1783 Fergola provided a
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solution for the problem of calculating the areas of certain spiral surfaces (volte a
spira), which was directly related to important architectural applications16. The RAS
had asked for a solution of this problem, as the "traditional method" for squaring
spiral surfaces used by architects was suspect. In his work Fergola showed how "to
quadrate, with the aid of geometry and calculus" this kind of surfaces; and he also
provided a generalization for his solution. He proved that the traditional — purely
geometrical— method was faulty as it was based on erroneous assumptions, and
that integral calculus was indeed needed. But in the same paper Fergola praised a
professor from the University of Salerno for having provided a purely geometrical
proof for a certain theorem he had previously solved with integral calculus, and he
saw this result as "confirming" his calculations17.
The first work in which Fergola openly declared that he wanted to rescue ancient
geometrical methods from obscurity is dated 178618. It was another memoir
presented to the RAS, and it consisted of a series of geometrical problems solved
with "a new method". Fergola praised the introduction of analysis into geometry
carried out by Descartes; this new "heuristic art" had been indeed the source of
great progress in problem-solving during the eighteenth century. But, he noted, it is
despicable that the purely geometrical methods of the ancients have been
completely neglected, so that "now they are uncultivated and derelict"19. On the
basis of what has previously been shown in this study, we can argue that Fergola
was perfectly consistent in his claims, as what he praised was a use of analysis
which could be (in principle) reduced to pure geometrical reasoning. His worries
about analysis were foundational ones, the only possible foundation being to his
eyes pure geometry. So he could easily agree that the introduction of analytic
methods in geometry yielded a rich new heuristic method; but he could not refrain
from criticizing those analysts who — embracing the spirit of analysis — thought that
analysis was a legitimate way of reasoning on its own, and that pure geometry was a
mere relic of the past, good at most for primary schools. To balance what he saw as
a dangerous "diversion from geometry", in his 1786 memoir Fergola showed how a
series of problems "of site and position" could be easily solved through the use of a
purely geometrical method of reduction (of one problem into another equivalent
problem) which Fergola called the "principle of conversion". Fergola looked for a
high level of generality in his claims, and he showed that all problems of "site and
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position" can be grouped in three main classes, providing a specific problem-
solving method for each one of them. This quest for the higher generality of
problem-solving methods was typical of Fergola's productions, possibly because
this was the only way in which he thought synthetic methods could eventually
return to the center of geometrical practice.
Anyway, in three years his interest had moved from the practical applications of
integral calculus to the geometrical solution of a family of problems which had no
interest but for historical reasons (and, by the way, which were considered as the
most difficult to be solved through pure analysis). Fergola's 1786 memoir was
followed by the memoir of a student of his private school, Annibale Giordano, aged
seventeen. Giordano was the son of a physician who was employed by the court in
Naples, and by the family of the Prince d'Ottaviano, to which the statesman Luigi
de' Medici belonged20. Extremely precocious in his studies of Latin, Greek and
history, he was brought by his father to Naples around 1783, to study mathematics
with Fergola. In his memoir Giordano applied Fergola's "principle of conversion"
to a number of "problems of site". Through the principle, the problems were
transformed in more treatable ones, "their nature remaining the same"; then
Giordano solved them "with the geometrical analysis of the ancients". Another
series of problems was presented by Fergola in 1787; he remarked that his method
had proved to be extremely useful, and that it was based on the truth of certain
lemmas discovered by "meditating on the nature of the geometrical problem" —
truths which "would hardly appear in the network of an analytic calculus, no
matter how well executed it is"21. Fergola also informed the RAS of the brilliant
solution provided by Giordano to the well-known "problem of Cramer". Solutions
for this plane geometry problem had been previously provided by Cramer,
Castillon, Euler, Lagrange, Lexell, and Fuss. Fergola had directed Giordano to
Pappus' collection in order to find some lemma that could facilitate the solution of
the problem, and make it more elegant. In fact, Giordano provided a purely
geometric solution which was considered, by the cultivators of synthesis, much
more elegant than Castillon's one. The solution was inserted by Antonio Maria
Lorgna in the acts of the Italian Academy (or Societa dei XL)22, and it was later cited
by Michel Chasles23 and Lazare Carnot24 as a good example of pure Greek-like
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synthesis. A revised version of the memoir was re-edited to open the collection of
works by members of Fergola's school published in 181125.
In 1786, the popularity of his school growing thanks to the enfant prodige
Giordano, Fergola applied for a place of "pensioner" at the RAS. In his application
Fergola presented himself as the one "who, first among the Neapolitan
mathematicians applied the integral calculus, so sublime in being managed, to the
Science of Nature"26. He was refused the place, which went to an unremarkable
lecturer of mathematics at the Military Academy27. Indeed, it seems that during the
1780s Fergola's school did not enjoy the favor of the reformist intelligentsia, nor did
it attract the interest of civil authorities. Instead, Fergola's geometrical approach to
mathematics had to face criticisms, as it looked old-fashioned and inadequate to
those inclined to follow "the spirit of analysis". A couple of specific episodes
testifies to these criticisms. We said Fergola presented a memoir on optics at the
RAS, in 1780. Biographers agree that the memoir was openly criticized by an
eminent figure, a Cavaliere, who maintained that such difficult questions should be
treated with the purely analytic methods of the French mathematicians28. This
Cavaliere, who "depreciated the Neapolitan name", "had been living in Turin,
London and Paris, and here he had frequented d'Alembert, Diderot, Condorcet, and
Voltaire". Which unmistakably lead us to Marquis Domenico Caracciolo29, a
protagonist of the reformist period. We saw that the former ambassador and future
Prime Minister Caracciolo had invited Lagrange to join the Academy in 1781, and
now we see that he was also explicitly critical of Fergola's methods. Caracciolo, a
former pupil of Genovesi, was a skeptical and anti-ecclesiastic thinker, who thought
that "a well organized state" should keep religion detached from education. His
political action had been devoted to free the Kingdom of Naples from any link with
Rome and to fight the jurisdiction and the political power of the feudal aristocracy.
Furthermore, in line with the reformist plans, he supported the construction of new
roads, the increment and liberalization of trade, and the preparation of a modern
land register. Back from Paris in 1780, he found that Naples was on the wrong track
in its scientific and mathematical development. Significantly, when he died in 1789,
he was planning a radical reform of the university, on the model of the University
of Pisa.30 A second episode is related to the Neapolitan sojourn of some French
officers lead by General Francois Pommereul, to support the reform of the artillery
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of the Bourbon army (1787). Some of them decided to attend the lectures at
Fergola's school, to assess the preparation of the students. Telesio tell us that the
French presented some geometrical problems for solution (called "taction
problems", or "problems of contacts", as they treat the relations between certain
given straight lines and certain given circles). Annibale Giordano, Stefano Forte and
Felice Giannattasio three of the oldest and brightest students, solved the problems
"with classical elegance" to the pleased surprise of the French, who asked for some
copies of Fergola's lectures31.
1789 was an important year in our story. As the intellectual atmosphere began to
change, a redistribution of chairs took place at the College of the Savior. Fergola left
philosophy and was appointed to his first mathematical chair: Analytic
Mathematics and Mathematical Physics, with a remarkably improved wage (240
ducats against 36). A new season began for Fergola's school of mathematics, now
firmly entrenched into an official institution of higher education. The letter of
appointment, dated 2 November 1789 began like this:
The King, being persuaded that the virtues and the good behavior of his
subjects is made natural through teaching, prepared a new plan for the
education of the young studying at the College of the Savior; so that the
Neapolitan nation could be improved both in its customes and in its spiritual
knowledge.
Now, "considering his deep works and his reputation in the field", Fergola was
given the chair32. In the same year, Fergola was also successful in obtaining for his
favorite pupil Giordano a chair of mathematics at the Military Academy. Another
young chemist and mathematician had applied for the post, but was excluded from
the competition: his name was Carlo Lauberg. Behind Lauberg's exclusion was a
manoeuvre of the now influential Fergola, who later wrote: "when I proposed to
our Military Academy D. Annibale Giordano, I let France and Northern Italy
knowing that a great geometer was teaching among us. And, by excluding him
from the competition, I freed the Academy from D. C. L. [Don Carlo Lauberg], great
villainous". Amodeo and Croce explained Fergola's hate for Lauberg by referring to
his being an unfrocked and married priest; but this is incorrect if one refer to 1789,
as at that time Lauberg was still a scolopian priest33. Also in 1789, Giordano became
external examiner at the Naval Academy, and entered the RAS as resident member.
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In 1791 Fergola published his lectures on conic sections34. Telesio said his
maestro judged the textbook on conics available at the time inadequate; so, for
instance, Fergola thought that de La Hire, in his synthetic textbook, used too many
"external" (i.e. non-geometrical) devices, including "tortuous" pieces of algebraic
analysis and truths from mechanics or optics35. The book was put together by
Fergola with the contribution of Felice Giannattasio, who prepared an historical
introduction to the topic — which included the last developments of the eighteenth
century, with Simpson, Euler, de l'Hopital and Cramer— and made the drawings.
The presentation of the geometrical properties of the three curves is clearly inspired
by Apollonius, and it is accomplished with "Euclidean rigor". This work was to
remain the textbook of Fergola's school for decades, and it was used in colleges all
over the kingdom. Fergola also published the textbook Analytic Treatise of Conic
Sections (1814), where he showed the principal properties of the curves by means of
Cartesian analysis, "so that the young, while learning these truths, get used to
reason correctly and elegantly with both Methods; and one also learns how to
convert properly the one into the other"36. Finally, he published the Analytic Treatise
of Geometrical Loci (1818), dealing with the famous problem of the four straight lines
as it was formulated by Pappus37. These last two textbooks are most representative
of that sort of Cartesian analysis favored by Fergola. If Apollonius was the model
for the pure geometrical methods, Descartes was the guide when it came to the
"proper analytic method", which, as we have seen, was a mixed method where
pure geometrical reasoning is partially replaced by algebraic calculations —made
via the choice of specific and opportune systems of coordinates — provided that the
results of such calculations are immediately re-transformed in geometrical terms
through the use of specific techniques such as the "construction of equations". The
1814 treatise — remarkable for its methodological uniformity — is clearly designed to
show the superiority of the Cartesian method over the purely algebraic one. The
criticisms against pure algebraic method found their extreme expression in Flauti's
introductory note to the second edition of the treatise (1828). As for the topic of the
1818 treatise, it had been chosen by Descartes himself to prove the power of his new
methods. Fergola presented interesting results in Cartesian geometry: a solution for
the problem of finding which position two systems of coordinates should take so
that certain specific relations hold between the two couples of coordinates of the
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same point on the curve; and a (typically Fergolian) method to draw a "geometrical
locus" when its equation is known; some considerations about solving problems of
third and fourth degree by reducing them to the search of those points which are
common to two conics. Finally, other technical aspects of the graphic solution for
solid and hypersolid problems were considered.
Fergola's course on conics was followed, in the curriculum, by his lectures on the
"heuristic art", the general method for discovering geometrical truths. The lectures
about heuristic art remained in manuscript until 1842, when Flauti published part
of them in response to Padula's critical remarks38. Among the central issues of this
piece of work are the nature of geometrical problems, the connections between data
and solutions, the "geometrical analysis" of the Greeks, and the Cartesian method.
The main goal is to reconstruct the allegedly lost heuristic methods of the Greeks,
i.e. the canons of their geometrical analysis. Let us remember that the steps were: 1-
supposition of the fact; 2-consequences; 3-reduction of the problem to another
problem whose solution is known; 4-geometrical composition, which includes
construction and final proof. Let us also remember that if the first three steps are
replaced by algebraic analysis, the fourth step must be taken by a conversion of the
algebraic expressions to geometrical magnitudes, and of equations to geometrical
proportions, as only after the construction and proof can a problem be considered
as solved. Also note that "a proof is said to be elegant if it makes us accept a
proposed truth through easy and clear ways", and that "geometrical wisdom is to
prove with the greatest elegance the proposed truths". In these lectures Fergola also
codified those new techniques he and Giordano had refined to improve the efficacy
of pure geometrical analysis (as in their "synthetic" memoirs of 1786 and 1787).
Fergola called them the "principle of conversion" and the "transfer principle", and
their main function was to reduce geometrical problems to a few basic "types"
which could be solved through the application of the same method.
In 1792, as the first volume of his mechanics was published, Fergola was offered
a vacant chair of mechanics at the Military Academy. Again, the king asked for
Fergola to be offered the place39; but Fergola —already charged with a number of
official duties and still running his private school — had to decline. The 1790s saw
Fergola's school grow in popularity and prestige; in these "happy days"40 students
arrived in number from the provinces to study with the maestro, and in fact every
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noteworthy mathematician of the following generation had some training at the
school. They were "brilliant years for the mathematical sciences" wrote Telesio41,
who remembers, among the disciples, Luigi de Ruggiero —later professor of
mechanics at the university — Ippolito Berarducci, Nicola Adami, and the statesman
Nicola Intonti, Secretary of State and Minister of Police. One must conclude that the
cultural reaction that ravaged the capital since 1796, the arrests and the books
burning we described earlier, spared Fergola and his pupils. Instead, they clearly
enjoyed the favor of the Crown and of the now influential ecclesiastic authorities.
A remarkable episode shook the school in its early days though. Annibale
Giordano, Fergola's most brilliant pupil during the period 1783-1790, eventually
decided to abandon his maestro's way. In 1789 Giordano had entered the Military
Academy as lecturer in mathematics, and here he met Carlo Lauberg, temporary
lecturer of chemistry. Around 1790 Giordano was still in touch with Fergola, as he
revised an early version of the textbook on mechanics, published in 1792; but at the
same time he joined Lauberg's private school as a teaching-assistant. Giordano was
21 and Lauberg 27 when they began giving regular lectures in mathematics and
chemistry at Lauberg's house, in Vico dei Giganti. In 1792 they opened the famous
private studio of chemistry and mathematics in Piazza Santa Caterina, and by that
time it seems that Giordano was no longer collaborating with his old school. In his
work the elegant Greek-like solution of ancient geometrical problems had been
replaced by a more ambitious scientific (and political) program: the universal
application of analytical thinking to reality. Interestingly Telesio wrote a short essay
in order to attack a couple of Giordano's apologetic biographies published in France
in 1836, the year of his death. He ridiculed the passages where the Jacobin
mathematicians were portrayed as restorers of science in a country where "truth
and science were suspect and persecuted", and a despotic government aimed "to
put thoughts in chains"42. Telesio concluded: "as everyone can understand, Naples
suffered a great misadventure, as young men of high ingenuity did not trust and
follow with docility the voices of the wisest persons". Anyway, "with regard to
Fergola's school" the "loss" of Giordano was "more than compensated" by the
doctrine and behavior of the other pupils, men such as Giuseppe Scorza and
Vincenzo Flauti —who was rich in "talent, and not only for mathematics"— for
whom "the government had always the highest esteem"43. About the mathematical
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practice of Fergola's pupils, since the late 1790s it was more and more concentrated
on pure, Greek-like geometry. Fergola's "Euclidean program" in analysis was not
pursued by his students, in spite of his teaching higher mathematics until 1812. The
same quest for generality, typical of Fergola's earlier geometrical works, was lost in
the following research, as his students concentrated precisely on very specific
problems, whose significance was mainly historical. Nevertheless, this is not to say
that the pupils misunderstood and distorted their maestro; as I tried to show,
Fergola's research program was already fundamentally opposed to the analytic one.
Fergola's pupils radicalized the geometrical perspective, and they manifested an
unprecedented hate for the practice of analysis (we saw Flauti's judgments on
analysis when replying to Padula; another example is Telesio, who compared
purely analytic geometry to a "curse"44).
The 1799 revolution had important consequences for the institutionalization of
the school. Contrarily to many other men and women of science, Fergola and his
pupils remained extraneous to the republican experience. "The noble school was
gloriously advancing on his path" remarked Telesio, "when the devastating storm
which rose in Paris in 1789 finally reached Naples in 1799"45. Fergola continued his
lectures at the College of the Savior until it was closed down and transformed in a
military hospital. Then he retired to a country house on the hill of Capodimonte, a
"solitary and sunny place", far from "the noise of the town"46. In November 1799
the restored government re-opened the university, which had been sacked and
close down by Cardinal Ruffo's Holy Faith Army. New professors had been
"opportunely chosen" by the king himself47. In fact, eighteen professors were
missing, seven being killed defending the republic and eleven arrested. The
Reactionary Catholic monsignor Agostino Gervasio, Major Chaplain, was
nominated Prefetto dei Regi Studi, i.e. principal of the university, in charge for
controlling the contents of the lectures. The chair of Economy and Trade (which
was of Genovesi, and later of the Jacobin Troiano Odazi) and that of Feudal Law
were given to members of the government. The plan of the Crown was that of
"promoting true and sound knowledge", and "extirpating the dangerous doctrines
which have caused so much ruin and destruction", by means of "the promotion of
true culture and by avoiding the moral corruption of the young"48. Monsignor
Gervasio proposed a project of reform for public education, as he considered the
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university "very much infected". The proposal was violently repressive —it
included the abolition of many university chairs and of primary and secondary
schools, so that young students were to immediately enter the schools annexed to
religious seminars. This and other similar projects were discussed until Cotugno
and Poli were finally asked to prepare a specific project of reform for the university
(1805)49. What was most needed were "reliable" professors. Early in 1800 Marzucco
died, leaving a crucial chair of mathematics vacant (Sublime Mathematics, i.e.
higher mathematics). The choice was straightforward: in March 1800 a royal
dispatch was sent to Fergola, portrayed by Telesio as still immersed in his "high
speculations" in Capodimonte. The dispatch began like this:
The King, having been informed of the excellent capacities and solid
knowledge of V.S. [your person], and of your conserving a loyal attachment to
the R[oyal] Crown, decided to nominate you professor for the chair of
Sublime Mathematics...50
Fergola accepted the professorship, but he went rarely to town, preferring to work
in his quiet house at Capodimonte; a substitute, appointed by monsignor Gervasio,
often gave lectures in his place51. In fact, Fergola was working on the metaphysical
and theological aspects of his mathematical work. For Fergola, as for other
Reactionary Catholic authors, the post-revolutionary years were devoted to a deep
reflection about the role of religion in the general structure of knowledge and in the
defense of traditional society (think of Colangelo's 1804 book on religion and the
sciences, or of Canosa's political-religious works of 1804-05). The result was the
essay on miracles, that on Saint January and the aphorisms on philosophy and
theology, most of which were published by Flauti in 1839. In 1804, Fergola
exchanged letters with Colangelo; the erudite Librarian of the Oratory asked the
mathematician to provide a mathematical argument to support the existence of
God, to contribute to the great battle against atheism and rebellion. Fergola, as we
have seen, replied with enthusiasm. Also in 1804, Fergola was invited by the Pontiff
Pius VII to enter the Academy of Catholic Religion, specifically established in 1801
to fight the secularization of knowledge52. By that time, Fergola's fervent faith and
his ascetic style of living had become proverbial in Naples; his biographers reported
a number of anecdotes which underline his religious virtues. We are told that he
was on a strictly vegetarian diet; that he walked, every Saturday, from
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Capodimonte to a very far sanctuary, dedicated to the Holy Virgin, for whom he
had a particular devotion; that he took part in popular processions, often inflicting
on himself supplementary punishments, such as cilice and chains; that he didn't
hesitate to mix with the most humble people to listen to predicants; that he never
entered the Royal Gallery of Art, because of the nudity of the statues. Finally, that
he practiced life-long chastity53. In fact, every theological and moral virtue is
represented in such anecdotes on Fergola. It is also clear that he practiced with
intensity all those forms of external devotion which were recommended by the
counter-revolutionary "missions" of the early nineteenth century.
Meanwhile, Fergola being out of town, his students Giannattasio and Flauti had
taken over his private studio (which is what they called most properly "our
school"). In addition, appointments began to be generously offered to Fergola's
young students. In 1802, Giuseppe de Sangro54, aged 27, was appointed to a chair at
the newly established Military School, which replaced the Military Academy whose
members had been deeply involved in the revolutionary events. In 1803 Felice
Giannattasio was also called to the Military School, to take the chair of Sublime
Mathematics. In the same year Vincenzo Flauti, aged 21, was appointed the newly
established chair of Synthetic Mathematics at the university; the royal dispatch
read: "H.M. the King wanted to give an example, rewarding in this young man both
knowledge and perfect morality"55. After 1800, members of Fergola's school were in
fact charged with controlling mathematical teaching and research in the RUN and
in the Military School, i.e. the most prestigious institutes of higher education. Theirs
could now be properly called the "Neapolitan school of geometry".
6.2 A Collection of Synthetic Works (1811)
Most representative of the productions of the school in the early nineteenth century
was the collection of memoirs edited by Flauti and Giannattasio in 1811 under the
title Mathematical Pamphlets of Fergola's School56. The publication had a clear didactic
function; it should also be "a model" for the future publications of the RAS. Once
again, the superiority of Cartesian analysis was claimed over Lagrangian analysis,
and the use of graphic methods in problem-solving was highly recommended. The
memoirs were introduced by a preface by the editors (possibly Flauti and
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Giannattasio), where "the real goal of mathematical disciplines" was individuated
in "guiding the spirit in the sublime art of inventing, which proves the celestial
origin of human reason"57. Only when human spirit reaches this "maturity", can it
to continue on the path of the ancient geometer-inventors, which is the way of
geometrical analysis. The young Neapolitan geometers proudly linked their practice
to those pre-Platonic geometers of the Pythagorean school who were active in
Southern Italy in the fourth century BC. It was for "national glory" that they were
taking on —after a long period of oblivion—this original tradition in the art of
inventing, the heuristic art, rediscovered by Fergola. At the same time the
pamphlets replied to those who said that Fergola ignored the developments of
analysis: he "has promoted the study of modern analysis", and he knew "the secret
of informing analysis with the spirit of synthesis, without altering its nature; so that
he presented the theories [of analysis] with the method and the demonstrative rigor
proper to the geometrical writings of Euclid and Apollonius"58. The collection was
opened by a revised and generalized version of the synthetic solution provided by
Giordano for Cramer's problem. This paradigmatic solution had succeeded where
"algebraic analysis was impotent"59; Giordano aimed indeed to show, very
straightforwardly, "how, in many cases, synthesis overcomes analysis", which is
actually done by opposing his elegant solution — obtained through the application
of a lemma by Pappus— to the "complex" analytic solution provided by Lagrange.
The target are those who presently "depreciate geometry" (ignoring that it is in fact
"the common mother [of geometrical and algebraic analysis]") and those who only
cultivate the methods of modern analysis, without caring about properly
geometrizing". Only by granting equal dignity to the "two wings" (i.e. the two
methods) can mathematicians obtain important results in pure mathematics and in
their application to nature60. In Giordano's solution the editors found the print of
the "Greek genius"61; Castillon's solution is said to be "heavier and less elegant" as
more lemmas and more constructions were required62; Lagrange's solution, in spite
of containing "certain sublime analytic flights", ended up in equations whose
construction proved extremely difficult: but "this was a shortcoming of the
[analytic] art, not of the great man"63. Note that (purely algebraic) analytic
reasoning is compared with a spectacular flight, as opposed to the slow but safe
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proceeding of geometrical reasoning; groundless rapidity versus sound, certain
progression; imagination versus truth.
A different solution for a generalized version of Cramer's problem is presented
in a memoir by Giuseppe Scorza. He used a Euclidean porism "discovered" by the
Scottish geometers Robert Simpson and Matthew Stewart —"who emulated the
Greek accuracy"— in order to solve "an entire family of difficult problems". The
editors warned the reader not to be mislead by the simplicity of Giordano's and
Scorza's synthetic solutions —i.e. not to mistake the clarity of their reasoning with
the facility of their discovery. The art of inventing is in fact the most difficult
achievement of the human intellect64.
Other famous geometrical problems were treated in the collection. Stefano Forte
provided a synthetic solution for "the problem of Wallis' cylindroid", i.e. a problem
concerning the properties of the solid obtained by the rotation of a hyperbola
around its secondary axes65. The problem of the cylindroid can be derived from
Archimede's treatment of conoids and spheroids, and it was studied by Wallis and
by Antoine Parent (1666-1716); d'Alembert had asked the readers of the En.cycloped.ie
to solve a version of this problem. The problem had been solved with analysis: the
Barnabite father Gregorio Fontana (1735-1803), well-known mathematician from the
University of Pavia, solved it by means of differential and integral calculus66. Forte
sketched Fontana's procedure, then he solved it through algebra and geometrical
analysis (he did not miss the opportunity to remember that "Greek culture has been
entirely transmitted through hereditary succession" to present-day Italian
geometers67). The same problem is then solved with Cartesian analysis by
Giannattasio, and synthetically by Flauti, who used certain theorems by Viviani
("the Italian Apollonious") and achieved the construction of an analytic solution for
the same problem. Eight years later, in 1819, a new geometrical solution was to be
published by Giuseppe Sangro in the Acts of the RAS, together with Fergola's own
contribution, which consisted in a solution to a more general version of the
problem. This problem appeared a last time in a 1839 memoir by Flauti, where he
synthetically proved a series of propositions about the quadrature of the cylindroid
originally found in Bonaventura Cavalieri.
Excerpts treating the problems "of the inclinations" from Fergola's unpublished
Heuristic Art were also inserted. A series of problems was solved through the
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geometrical method of the "loci", which consists in the following steps: 1) the
solution of the problem is reduced to the determination of a single point; 2)
eliminating one condition for this point, in order to determine the locus of the
infinite number of positions it can consequently assume; 3) to determine one
intersection between two such loci. In this way a number of different solid and
hypersolid problems could be reduced to that of determining the intersections
between certain circles and certain straight lines. For certain families of problems
this was in fact the most commendable method of solution, as analysis would
provide "impracticable and horrible results"68. "Two coordinate analysis, which
certain modern analysts are so proud of" is nothing but the "Cartesian method
freed from synthesis", so that "data and questions of a geometrical problem" reduce
to analytic values, "manipulated" under certain conditions to reach the final
equation. This can be sometimes "useful", but in the specific case of the problems
"of site" it does not help the geometer, as synthesis is the only "light of the sites"69.
One of the problems, wrote Fergola, "is particularly famous among us, because it
consolidated the superiority of our methods with respect to those of the two co¬
ordinate analytic geometry"70. Fergola referred to an episode which happened in
1807, when "a professor from Northern Italy" visited Naples and criticized the
"Greek geometrizing" of the school. Scorza proposed then a very simple problem
for the "stranger" to solve: the result was a complex analytic solution, valid only for
certain cases; at this point Scorza could proudly present his own solution, "executed
with few passages of synthesis, in our own way" 71. Fergola presented the synthetic,
purely analytic and Cartesian solutions, "to clearly see which method is most
valid". The difficult and "uncertain" construction of the final equation is presented
as the crucial deficiency of the purely analytic method. Conversely, following "our
geometrical method" or the Cartesian one, the problem is solved "in few passages
of rigorous synthesis, with higher generality, certainty, and evidence". In the purely
analytic method "one lacks the method to fix the most opportune directed lines
[coordinates]", and "this essential shortcoming is the cause of monstrous analytic
solutions"72. When the geometer renounces reasoning on geometrical figures and
lets his intellect fly analytically, results can only be "monstruous". Later on, the
authority of Newton is used to support the crucial role of geometrical constructions
in problem-solving73. Fergola also argued for the purely intellectual nature of
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geometrical reasoning, and for the need of eliminating any empirical component
from it. "The operations prescribed in geometry have to be executed by the mind,
not by the hand" he wrote; geometrical instruments, such as compass and rule,
have not to be taken as criteria for our reasoning, as they are too limited and
empirical: "table geometry", which is based on instruments, "is not a science any
more, but an art". The "Euclidean spirit ask for reasoning on magnitudes without
interposing any manual operation"74.
The editors also included excerpts from Fergola's lectures on Sublime Analysis.
The topic is the reduction of rational functions to simple fractions. "Among the
various topics contained in the summing methods of the modern geometers, no one
is more elegant and complete than the integration of rational functions", Fergola
began75. In order to accomplish the integration, the functions must be properly
resolved into "convenient" elements, and this is "the most difficult part" of the
whole process. Fergola referred to Euler's treatment of the topic, which he found
unsatisfactory, as it lacked both rigor and clarity. The memoir is a good example of
Fergola's "Euclidean program" in analysis: he tried to present Euler's results in a
Euclidean form, and to provide a sound proof for them. "Euler's theories" wrote
Fregola, "are presented with Ramistic method", instead they "should be reduced to
a didactic Euclidean system". The calculations should be "elegant", "easily
understandable", and freed from imaginary magnitudes, circular functions and
other "difficult operations". So Fergola replaced certain "speculative principles" he
had found in Euler with "intuitive" ones, relevant to the specific question under
consideration. According to Fergola, the "light" of speculative principles is weaker
because they have to differently apply to a number of objects76; Euler was more
interested "in the generality of his solutions than in the way to obtain them"77, but
"the great generality of an argument is not a desirable thing if it causes difficulties
in the solution of the most simple cases". It is instead "more convenient to have
precise and clear rules" to treat the common cases and from them move clearly to
the more general.
The overly polemic tone of the geometrical memoirs and the presence of
Fergola's analytic work tell us that the time of the unchallenged control of
mathematical practice in the kingdom was near to an end. At many points the
editors refer to unnamed Neapolitan geometers who depreciated synthesis and
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cultivated pure analysis "furiously". No traces were left of Lauberg's school, of
course, and it was no question of a single foreigner, as in the 1807 episode. Who,
then, were the new analytics? Before answering this question, let us conclude our
presentation of the most relevant results of Fergola's school.
6.3 Other Themes and Problems from the Synthetic School
A few other results and names should be mentioned in order to complete our
presentation of the research pursued in the synthetic school. Fergola remained
active until 1818, when his health greatly declined. In 1809 he published a memoir
on the problems of contacts, whose original solutions — provided by Apollonius —
are lost78. Following the examples of Viete and Newton, Fergola presented his own
purely synthetic solving method, which consisted in reducing all the problems of
this kind to a single lemma, which he proved. Note that these were the problems
synthetically solved by Giordano, Forte and Giannattasio when the French officers
of General Pommereuil visited the school in 1786. Scorza was to provide a different
synthetic solution, which was considered as the most similar to the original practice
of the Greek geometer.
In 1819, the Acts of the RAS included Fergola's considerations on the "Ptolemaic
theorem", which expresses a metric relation between four points which are on the
same circle. The theorem is relevant for trigonometry, provided that one holds a
geometric conception of this discipline. Indeed, the progressive move of
trigonometry from pure geometry to analytic geometry during the seventeenth and
eighteenth century had deprived the theorem of its previous relevance. Fergola
rescued the theorem and deduced a number of new corollaries from it, as it was "a
good source of geometrical principles" which in turn can be "translated into
algebraic signs" so that "they manifest many truths relative to the circular
functions"79. These results were employed in two following memoirs, one of which
regarded the reconstruction of Cotes' proof of the "cyclometric theorem", whereas
in 1839 a posthumous memoir by Fergola on elliptic transcendent functions was
published, where Cartesian geometrical methods were employed to calculate the
differential of an arch of the ellipse80. "Kepler's problem" also attracted Fergola's
interest81. In one of its versions, the problem asks for dividing a semi-ellipse
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according to a given ratio using a straight line passing through one of the foci,
Fergola provided an approximate analytic solution for it, followed by an exact
geometrical construction.
One of the most remarkable aspects of the work of Fergola's pupils was their
research in the history of mathematics. It is agreed that the famous work by
Montucla on the history of mathematics contained some erroneous attributions,
particularly about the pre-Platonic period; but his authoritative reconstruction of
Greek geometry was fully accepted by historians up to the 1830s82. Some of
Fergola's students disagreed, though. Giannattasio, in his historical introduction to
Fergola's Conic Sections (1810) pointed out the importance of Aristeus the Elder, and
dated his activity earlier than had Montucla, who considered him a Platonic
mathematician. Further investigations in the history of conic sections were pursued
by Ferdinando de Luca (1783-1869), who had studied with Scorza and Fergola
between 1807 and 1811 and had taught geometry, trigonometry, astronomy and
geodesy at the Military School83. After years of research, Luca published an
historical study titled Memoir to claim back to the Italian School the entire ancient
geometry (1845)84. Luca pointed out a series of historical errors, due to following
acritically the misleading indications of Eudemus, a disciple of Aristotle, who
attributed to Plato a great number of geometrical discoveries. On the contrary, Luca
attributed to members of the Pythagorean school (in which he included Menecmus
and Aristeus the Elder) the invention of the methods of geometrical analysis, and
the priority in the study of conic sections and geometrical loci. Doubtless the book
was highly original and his historical reconstruction was substantially correct, in
spite of Luca grounding his conclusions on a very dubious interpretation of a
passage form Iamblicus's De Vita Pythagorica. It should also be noted that Luca
pushed his point so far as to make Plato a mere plagiarist, and he also stated that
Pythagoras birthplace was not the island of Samos, but the village of Samos, in
Calabria —a thesis he found in Thomas Aquinas85. Luca's reconstruction of a
remote "Italian wisdom" originated in the Pythagorean school was not so peculiar
at it might seem. The doctrine of the ancient Italian wisdom had emerged as part of
a wider reconstruction of Italian cultural identity during the fifteen century. The
myth had found favour among the erudites of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, and was organic to the more general doctrine of the philosophia perennis,
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whose the mystically-inclined Pythagorean school was an essential element. Since
1789, political events gave new life to the myth which was employed to support
revolutionary and egalitarian ideology (Marechal) as well as moderate and neo-
Guelf positions (Cuoco). When Luca published his book, the myth was an
important part of the conservative ideology shared by Italian Catholic middle-
classes86. Luca published other works in history and geography, and an essay in the
methodology of the history of science.
As part of the historical work of the school one should also mention the editions
of Euclid's Elements edited by Flauti and Scorza. Flauti's editions of Euclid were
dedicated to King Ferdinando I, who had granted the adoption of the text in every
college of the kingdom, a privilege confirmed by the succeeding sovereigns. This
assured Flauti, among other things, remarkable earnings: so that the eleventh
edition could be printed in "the private-printing office of Prof. Flauti". It firstly
appeared in 1810, and in 1857 the twenty-second edition went into print. In his
preliminary discourse, Flauti described the work of the Greek, Arab and European
glossers of Euclid, the Renaissance editions, the British editions, up to the much
appreciated 1756 edition by Robert Simpson, "great practitioner and promoter of
the geometry of the ancients"87. By contrast, the judgment on the French edition by
Peyrard (1814) is very negative, he did not distinguish the real Euclidean parts from
the spurious ones. Indeed, Flauti's aim is precisely that of "purifying" the Elements,
according to the view, first expressed by Simpson, that the weaknesses found in the
book cannot be attributed to Euclid, but rather to "some ancient editor of the
Elements, misguided by the ambitious desire of innovation"88. Flauti thought of
improving Simpson's work when he was charged by a special commission (of
which Fergola was part) to prepare a textbook of elementary geometry for the
colleges of the kingdom. Flauti also remarked that when he worked on his first
edition of the Elements, "these had been largely abandoned in school, even in Italy,
in favour of much less geometrically oriented institutions"89 (it was 1810, the
moment of the highest penetration of French analytic textbooks of geometry). One
should note that a proof for the famous fifth postulate (the worst of Euclidean
blemishes) had been introduced by Flauti in the sixth edition, to be suppressed in
the eleventh. In this edition Flauti also inserted material from Archimedes On the
Sphere and the Cylinder, which he had originally edited in 180490. Flauti remarked
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that "a chair whose professor would explain and comment only on the works by
Archimedes would be a great chair of mathematics even in our days. Every branch
of these sciences would indeed be considered: geometrical invention, theory of
curves, theory of series, research on infinitesimal analysis, general mechanics"91. It
was in fact a good portrait of the teaching of his own maestro.
Scorza, not fully satisfied by Flauti's work, published his edition of Euclid's
Elements in 1828, under the traditional title Vindication of Euclid92. Scorza aimed to
emend Euclid of all the well-known errors and deficiencies, which he thought
should be attributed to later interpolations. Some of his arguments have been
considered as convincing to Loria93, but his total defence of Euclid and his
condemnation of everyone, modern or ancient, who disagreed with his definitions
and his methods, reaches extreme and paradoxical points. What about the fifth
postulate then? According to Scorza, it cannot be argued that the "very accurate
Euclid" assumed this proposition as a postulate, given that he had previously
provided a proof for a very similar proposition (proposition 28); it is then
reasonable to assume that Euclid considered it as a lemma whose proof had not
survived94. Consequently Scorza presented two possible proofs, where the problem
is in fact moved rather than solved95; later he presented a third solution based on
the method of limits, which was approved by the RAS in 1839, the year of the
contest with the analytics96. Scorza's Euclid is also interesting for the didactic views
it contains. Euclid's "admirable order" (i.e. progression from the more simple to the
more complex, according to the "natural" sequence: point, line, surface, solid) is
taken as paradigmatic, and opposed to the geometrical textbooks "of the moderns",
where this "natural and proper order" is "perturbed", as they move from the
general to the particular and not vice-versa (but "it is easier to conceive a point than
an entire solid" he observed). Scorza argued that such inversion derives from a
mistaking mathematics with empirical sciences: "here is not a question of
discovering definitions by analyzing natural bodies" but rather "to dispose the
truths according to the most natural way". Saying that a geometrical solid is more
easily conceivable than points and lines is to mistake mathematics with empirical
reality: a geometrical solid is not a physical body, and our senses are not enough to
study its properties, otherwise these "very noble sciences" would "loose all their
value", which consists in their being grounded "on the evidence and certainty of
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proof", not "on the testimonial of senses" (as physics is). And indeed Euclid
"considers everything in abstract, avoiding mixing extraneous ideas [with
mathematics]"97. The purity of mathematics, the science of abstract quantity, is
defended fiercely by Scorza; being pure "they can be truly learned and taught, as
their principles are stable, and their proofs are certain and evident"98. Interestingly,
when clarifying some epistemological point, such as our knowledge of geometrical
axioms —which are proposition so clear that their truth is immediately grasped
"by the light of intellect"99— Scorza, like Luca, made use of Thomas Aquinas. He
also rejected any "mechanical" consideration (of which he found many in the
"moderns") as polluting the purity of geometry: "it would ground this science on
the testimonial of senses", whereas it "must be completely abstract, only grounded
on the evidence of reason"100.
In Flauti's biographical note we read that Scorza was born in Calabria in 1781,
and that he had reached Naples in 1795 to study medicine101. His uncle, "a most
respectable ecclesiastic" addressed him to the study of philosophy with the
"excellent maestro Capocasale"102 and of elementary geometry with Marcello
Cecere; in the early years of 1800 Scorza entered Fergola's private studio, to study
higher mathematics. He obtained his degree in medicine but he never exercised the
profession, as he began to teach in Fergola's studio. Here he had been trained in
higher geometry, algebraic analysis and general mechanics, but his favorite topic
was the "divination" of the lost methods of geometrical analysis. His most relevant
work was indeed a long memoir on Greek geometrical analysis titled Divination of
the Geometrical Analysis of the Ancients, Which is the Method Used in the Greek School to
Solve Problems (1825)103. It consisted of three main parts: the historical reconstruction
of the method; the divination of Apollonius' solution of the four-straight lines
problem; and the application of the re-discovered method to a number of other
classical problems. Significantly, Scorza included a problem on triangular pyramids
which had been famously treated in Lagrange's analytic memoir of 1773. Also in
1825, Luca Maresca, professor at the Naval Academy and former student of Fergola,
published another "divination" of Greek analytic methods, providing what he
thought could be Apollonius' original solution to the problems of contacts104.
"Everyone knows how strong was the piety and religious faith of Fergola" Flauti
wrote, "and how he always transmitted it to its disciples together with science, by
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means of his example and of his excellent teaching"105. Now, Scorza was apparently
the one who best responded to Fergola's religious teaching: "in the middle of so
many vicissitudes, he always conducted a most exemplary life, dividing equally his
day between Christian practices, teaching, and research". Scorza, "man of God, and
of Mathematics"106.
Problems over triangular pyramids were also treated by Flauti (1819), who
explicitly opposed his solutions to Lagrange's ones107. What emerges is, once again,
the irreconcilable views of the synthetics and of the Lagrangians over the real goal
of geometry (i.e. specific problems versus description of very general properties of
families of figures). In 1825, one of the problems treated by Lagrange and Flauti was
re-considered, in different terms, by Francesco Bruno (1790circa-1862), another
champion of "the methods of the ancients"108. This work was considered by Loria
"one of the best products of the Neapolitan School"109; and in 1826 Jean Hachette
(1769-1834) provided analytical solutions precisely for the problems solved in this
memoir. Flauti read Hachette's memoir at the RAS, and triumphantly commented:
Here is a single geometrical problem on which valid mathematicians worked
for over seventy years, and which provided matter for important discussions,
greatly enhancing the art of problem-solving; not only because of the variety
of solutions discovered with both methods, but also because of the rules
established.110
In 1824 Bruno, professor at the Naval Academy since 1817, had published what
remains one of the finest Greek-like pieces of synthetic geometry produced by
Fergola's school111. He provided solutions for a group of problems originated from
considerations such as "trace a straight line passing through a given point and
cutting a given parabola to obtain a given segment"; among the solid problems
derived is Archimedes' problem about dividing a sphere according to a given ratio
by means of a plane. Bruno judged his synthetic solutions particularly elegant
because he employed "loci whose description and determination is the easiest
possible one", and which can be directly extracted from the data of the problem,
avoiding the use of "the usual solid loci" which make the solution "less natural"
and imply the risk of betraying the original nature of the problem. The composition
of the problem is made through the intersection of a parabola with a circle, easily
determinable in the same figure used for the solution112. In a letter enclosed in the
memoir, Flauti eulogized the "exactitude and rigor of Greek geometrizing", and
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accused "modern methods" of "rendering the learning of mathematics available to
everyone". On the contrary, "in the Greek schools the way to geometrical invention
was long and difficult, so that only a few managed to complete it"113.
In 1827 Vincenzo degli Uberti (1791-1877), a captain of the Body of Military
Engineers and professor of fortification at the Military School since 1825, published
a memoir claiming priority over the solutions contained in Bruno 1824114. Not
particularly relevant in itself, the memoir is an interesting insight into the activity of
Fergola's school around 1809-1811 —when Uberti was a student at the Military
School. It is also a rare testimonial of the influence of synthetic teaching upon
young officers. Uberti wrote that, with Giannattasio and Sangro as professors, many
became convinced synthetic problem-solvers, "so that in the corridors of the college
and among the desks of the classrooms, we only meditate about synthetic
solutions"115. Quite importantly, Uberti included Tucci, future leader of the analytic
school, among his fellow students, providing evidence for Tucci's synthetic
background116.
Through Flauti we also know about the oldest of Fergola's disciples, abbe Felice
Giannattasio. Son of a provincial landowner, Giannattasio came to Naples to enter
the Church. He studied philosophy and mathematics, and as early as 1778 he began
to study with Fergola. Flauti attributed to Giannattasio the merit of convincing the
reluctant Fergola to publish his works, including the 1791 Conic Sections and the
1792-93 textbook of mechanics; and they would have published much more "if the
political circumstances of those times" had not "perturbed our own happiness, and
the improvements of all kinds that were taking place among us"117. Giannattasio
obtained the chair of Sublime Mathematics at the Military School in 1802. In 1812 he
obtained the chair of Sublime Synthesis at the RUN. He had been a member of the
RAS since 1811. Apart from his collaboration with Fergola, Giannattasio worked on
Wallis's cylindroid (see the 1811 collection), and published a memoir on "the
quadrature of the hyperbole" (1819), where he used the method of limits, which he
attributed to Archimedes (but in fact can be first found in Huygens). He was "a
most respectable and exemplary ecclesiastic", and he "always avoided politics and
parties", which to Flauti was "a virtue".
We can conclude with some remarks over Flauti himself. During his sixty-year
long career Flauti obtained innumerable duties and honors from the Bourbons, he
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sat in important commissions for the control of public education, and he produced a
large number of publications. Only the fall of the dynasty, in 1860, made it possible
for his enemies to put him out of Neapolitan scientific life118. Flauti began teaching
in Fergola's private studio around 1798; and he directed it with Giannattasio from
1801. In 1803 he was offered the specially created chair of Synthetic Mathematics at
the university; in 1806 he moved to Algebra and Descriptive Geometry; in 1812 he
replaced Fergola as professor of Sublime Analysis. In 1818 he was also nominated
"first professor of mathematics" at the Royal College of Naples, teaching conic
sections, sublime calculus, and mechanics. In 1822, after years of difficult work, he
opened the University Library, of which he was director. In 1827 he was a member
of the commission to reduce the number of university chairs. Since 1829 he was in
the powerful Committee of Public Education (Giunta di Pubblica Istruzione), whose
president was monsignor Francesco Colangelo. He often examined the candidates
of the Military School, the Naval Academy, and other colleges all over the kingdom.
In 1823 he was teaching descriptive geometry at the Military School. In 1808 he
entered the RAS, of which he was secretary from 1817 to 1860. In 1829 he was
knighted (Cavaliere) by King Francesco I. Significantly, in 1821 Flauti was declared a
honorary member of the Academy of the Sciences of Modena, at the time the center
of Reactionary Catholic thought. He also joined, among others, the academies of
Copenaghen (1817), Berlin (1829), and Bologna (1845). He was personally in charge
of the reform of the Naval Academy in 1817, and of the revision of the project of
reform of weights and measures (1837). In addition to what we have already said,
the following works should be signalled. In 1801 he translated and annotated a
textbook on differential calculus by Etienne Bezout (1730-1783) for his private
teaching. In 1807 he published a textbook of descriptive geometry for the School of
Engineering and Artillery (which had replaced the Military Academy in 1801)119.
The book was printed in Rome at the expense of the Neapolitan government, and it
is indeed historically relevant, as it was the first Italian textbook of descriptive
geometry120. The text followed the basic structure of Monge's textbook, but Flauti
Hied to make the proofs of the theorems more simple and "elegant", and to show
more clearly "the geometrical nexus which links all the truths presented to the
reader". In fact, Flauti's enthusiasm for the new branch of mathematics is easily
understood as we recognize his attempt to make descriptive geometry a mere
303
extension of pure geometry. The "uncertain and difficult techniques" elaborated by
artists and architects in the previous centuries, we are told, are now —thanks to
Monge— given generality and certainty by connection with solid geometry. They
need precision and logical connections, as they are "a branch of general
geometry"121. To this extent, the "analysis of the moderns" is useless, because it
provides no method to solve the problems "of locus and position" —a category
under which fall all the problems studied by descriptive geometry. Synthesis must
then be revived, so that "this method, which had been abandoned with great
damage for mathematics after the application of algebra to it, again shows its
importance". Descriptive geometry is "entirely included in the geometry of the
ancients", so it deserves "to be treated with the same rigor of Euclid's Elements"122.
Flauti acknowledged the affinity between "modern analysis" and descriptive
geometry, and the possibility of translating the problems in analytical terms;
nevertheless "the analysis of the ancients is more proper than that of the moderns to
solve these locus problems"123. In 1815 Flauti published a second book of
descriptive geometry, titled Plane and Solid Locus Geometry124. This was Flauti's most
famous book, and copies can be found in many Italian public libraries. The book is
much more original in its form and content than the 1807 textbook. A historian of
descriptive geometry has recently noted that, with respect to the 1807 one, this book
presented "innovations of form and style which unfortunately made its reading
difficult"125. The point is well made, and I would seek to explain it in the following
way: Flauti wrote his book as he thought a Greek geometer would write it.
Remember that the 1807 text was the result of the compromise with the French
occupying government (i.e. with French textbooks); at that stage the purely
geometrical reduction of descriptive geometry is more a program than actually
performed. In 1815, with the return of the Bourbon, Flauti was free to approach the
matter, which he had by then taught for ten years, in a Greek-like synthetic way, in
the best tradition of Fergola's school. The result was the strange 1815 book, which
diverged remarkably from contemporary Italian and French treatises on descriptive
geometry. Consider the contents: the methods of descriptive geometry, defined as
the science which determines figures in space, are presented after the "analogous"
methods used to determine figures in plane geometry, and followed by their
application to a number of problems of solid geometry. Descriptive geometry is
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indeed considered as a natural complement of ancient solid geometry, as it provides
practical methods to construct the theoretical solutions of its problems. Among the
problems considered are the ones traditionally treated in the school, such as those
about Wallis's cylindroid and about triangular pyramids. The last five chapters
provide a compendium of Fergola's Geometrical Invention, chiefly the methods of
conversion and transfer, plus their application to particular problems. Descriptive
geometry is in fact reduced to a branch of solid geometry, and so absorbed in the
practice of Fergola's school as a useful source of constructive techniques whose
primary goal is the application to the solutions of problems of pure geometry. Only
secondarily are such techniques of interest to applied sciences. Flauti chose very
convincing examples to state his point, such as the construction of the solution for
the famous problem of Archytas, which was praised by Chasles and Allman in their
histories of geometry126. Loria himself advised teachers to use Flauti's book to find
good applications of the procedures of descriptive geometry to pure geometry, as
an alternative to the usual problems in applied mathematics127. Also the overall
form of the book is Greek-like, from the terminology ("superfici plectoidi" instead
of "superfici rigate", for instance) to the form in which problems are presented. The
common usage was that of stating a problem in the form of a proposition asking for
the construction of a figure satisfying certain conditions to be performed. Flauti
preferred instead to put them in the form of the Greek "data" ("givens"), i.e.
propositions where the position of one or more entities described is not determined.
A "given" is then "proved" when one shows that the determination is in fact
implicitly given in the original proposition, of which it is a necessary consequence.
Any problem can clearly be presented as a datum to be proved. Considering such
peculiarities in the form and content of the book, it is no wonder that, compared to
the 1807 elements and to contemporary textbooks of descriptive geometry, the
results seemed particularly "obscure".
The case of descriptive geometry is emblematic of the original re-elaboration of
contemporary mathematical knowledge made by members of Fergola's school.
Flauti knew the new discipline through French books; he saw in it a source of useful
techniques to construct the solutions of geometrical problems and, at the same time,
a rare opportunity for synthesis to claim its role back in mathematical research. In
1807 the new French government introduced the discipline in universities and in
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the newly founded technical schools for training architects and engineers; it was the
only synthetic part of a wholly analytic curriculum. The space for a collaboration
with Flauti was open; the 1807 textbook was very much the result of such a
compromise: the language and structure are those of Monge; but Flauti showed
now the "Euclidean program" of the school could be extended to this discipline as
well. This is actuated in 1815, when compromise with the practically and
analytically oriented French curriculum was no longer necessary. According to this
interpretation, the particular adoption of descriptive geometry by Flauti — like the
adoption of algebraic analysis by Fergola in the 1780s and 1790s— cannot be
explained by referring to his "ignorance" of French mathematics, or to his being
somehow "backward"; I rather claim that members of the school selected and re¬
shaped parts of modern mathematics so as to suit their own scientific program. In
the specific case of descriptive geometry, the "receptivity" of the synthetics brought
Naples temporarily ahead of Northern Italian centers of mathematical research,
(where the Lagrangian and analytical approach to mathematics was dominant).
About Flauti's remaining works, note that he published a Course of Geometry
(1810) for the colleges of the kingdom which was reprinted (at least) twenty
times128; also repeatedly printed were his treatise of trigonometry and his algebra
(1819)129. The first was a valuable synthetic textbook of plane and solid
trigonometry, based —not surprisingly— on the application of the Ptolemaic
theorem; spherical geometry was here presented as the necessary premise to
spherical trigonometry. Flauti's claim that any trigonometric formula must be
translated "into words" can be puzzling, but we know that intuitive perspicuity
was a necessary property of geometrical truths in Fergola's school.
In 1840, after the contest and the polemical exchange with Padula, Flauti began
the publication of some significant works of the school, including some
unpublished geometrical treatises by Fergola. He never managed to publish the
analytic treatises of his maestro; instead, in the crucial year 1839, Flauti published a
collection of Fergola's writings on religion, adding his own proof of the spirituality
of the soul.
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6.4 Flauti on Public Education and the Didactic of Mathematics
There are a couple of further works by Flauti which deserve particular attention:
those relative to the system of public education, and to the didactic of mathematics.
Note that these works were both published in the early twenties, i.e. the moment of
the highest influence of the Reactionary Catholic intellectuals upon the Neapolitan
government, and upon the Neapolitan culture in general. As we have seen Flauti
was charged with important choices about the mathematical curricula of university,
military colleges and secondary schools. The ideas guiding his choices were initially
presented in his Project for the Reform of Public Education in the Kingdom of Naples
(1820)130. His meditations on public education are grounded in "direct experience",
and on factual knowledge of teaching material and of the institutions of education,
Flauti claimed. If a reform must be made, this is to be grounded on experience, not
on "vain speculations", i.e. "on the beautiful systems elaborated in recent years [the
French period], which have increased ignorance instead of instruction"131. Flauti is
hostile to the very idea of public education which, he says, "was unknown to the
world until fifty years ago". Only "the very modern men", whose main feature is
their wide but superficial knowledge could think of "legislating" over the entirety
of human knowledge. The result of this ambitious program has been the
"disappearance of the depth of education, which has been reduced to a mere strata
of paint", and in the future "this evil will only be increasing". This was how Flauti
reacted to the changes in education after the French experience (1806-1815) and the
moderate government of Medici (1815-1820). And here was the remedy he offered,
"according to my —possibly strange— way of thinking"132. Flauti polemically
recognised the anachronistic aspect of his opposition to "the ideas of the century".
The point is that in 1820 the related counter-revolutionary battles of men like Flauti
(in public education), Ventura (in the Church) and Canosa (in politics) could still be
won, as very concrete interests were supporting their ideas. The prospect of reform
presented by Flauti had one major characteristic: it perfectly fitted the system of
knowledge elaborated by Reactionary Catholic philosophers. Its aim was to restore
traditional pre-encyclopedic curricula and methods of teaching. The crucial fact that
Flauti, like every other reactionary author, was largely re-inventing such a
"tradition" never emerged, of course. Flauti seems to refer to some idyllic pre-
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Revolutionary world, which he in many points evoked by using the expression
"fifty years ago".
Let see how his prospect was organic to the Reactionary culture. First of all the
notion of education was given a very wide connotation, meaning the whole process
the young must go through to become "honest and good citizens"133. The primary
goal of public education is indeed a moral one. It follows that it is meaningless to
separate the transmission of scientific knowledge from that of religion and of the
morals. And it is precisely "the moral corruption of our days" that is the greatest
obstacle to the good working of public education134. Moral corruption begins very
early, as the young child is detached from his family to be educated (remember
Leopardi's successful opposition to "corrupting" nurseries). Children must remain
with their own family at least until they are eight years old, as family is "the first
origin of virtue", the attachment of a child to the family being the original model for
the attachment of a citizen to monarchy and divinity. The example of parents is the
first and most natural form of education: moral and religious truths would be
taught in vain if this example was lacking. The state must intervene to reduce moral
corruption and to spread the reading of the Gospel in the family, as it is the source
"of the more perfect morals". Bishops should use "every possible means" to
"supervise" parents in their teaching children "religious doctrines"135. On this basis
elementary education can operate, by teaching eight-years old children to write, to
read, and some arithmetic. Writing and reading should be done on texts from the
Old Testament, so that children learn, through enjoyable tales, the history of their
religion and the precepts of the most perfect morals. The choice of teachers must be
left to local authorities, "the government avoiding intervening in any way" — this
passage should be noted, as it opposes the centralization and bureaucratization of
teaching accomplished by the French government in the Neapolitan kingdom136.
Twelve-year old children should then be offered ("not forced") entry to the College
(liceo), where a "universal" education is provided, regardless the specific profession
the child is wanting to enter. The college's curriculum must include Greek, Latin
and Italian literature, history and geography, logic and metaphysics, pure geometry
and trigonometry, algebra and analytic geometry, experimental physics and
chemistry. Private schools should be granted their rights (Flauti eulogized the Jesuit
colleges as example of high-standard private schools137). Anyway secondary
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education is not necessary for the good of the state, as "being ignorant does not
cause moral corruption". The eighteen-year old student willing to continue study
can then enter either a "special school" or university. "Special schools" are of three
kinds, each one training for a specific profession: notary and barrister; physician
and surgeon; civil architect. The medical school should return to the Hospital of the
Incurables, which in the past produced "a most respectable medical class".
Describing the chairs which should be established in each school, Flauti wrote
ironically of "the recent progresses of the human spirit", and remarked:
Enlightenment and modern civilization made many educated people, but
very few wise people; the extension of knowledge is indeed inversely
proportional to its depth, and we will finally reach an epoch where everyone
will equally know nothing.138
For this study is significant the description of the Special School for Civil Architects.
Its chairs should have been: geodesy; sublime analysis; mechanics; geometry of site
and its applications; civil and hydraulic architecture; constructions. The knowledge
of civil engineers should have been essentially geometrical, and their science is
conceived as geometry applied to constructions. Flauti attributed to local authorities
the right to train their own land-surveyors, without sending them to the special
school in Naples139. In 1820 this was a very meaningful statement to make, as the
debate over the competencies of the central government was intense. Theological
colleges are out of the competence of the state. Flauti then moved to the ideal
structure for the university, whose main goal is to produce professors for the
colleges and special schools. "The university, including every branch of human
knowledge, must be divided into the following faculties: Theology; Law; Medicine;
Mathematics and Natural History; Literature and Philosophy". The print of
reactionary philosophy is clear on such a hierarchy of faculties, which reflects a
hierarchy of knowledge based on the dominant and pervasive presence of religious
and metaphysical knowledge. Flauti's project echoed in many ways Poli's 1805
project, whose full actualization had been prevented by the French occupation of
the kingdom in 1806: three theological chairs on top of a pyramid (Holy Scripture,
History of the Councils, Dogmatic Theology), four chairs of law, seven of practical
medicine, surgery and anatomy, two chairs of pure mathematics (sublime analysis
and sublime synthesis), one of mechanics, one of experimental physics, and then
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chemistry, botany, zoology, mineralogy, and astronomy. Flauti advised professors
always to make clear to students the connection between their discipline and the
others; and to "never detach the history of a discipline from its presentation", as
past treatments of a certain matter are essential part of our present knowledge of
it140. Among the duties of professors was also the indication of those books which
are "dangerous" to students. As method of assessment Flauti criticised the recent
introduction of oral presentations (conferenze) and defended what in fact was
Fergola's own method: to propose specific questions for the student to deepen and
solve, in the form of a scientific essay. Flauti described the hierarchical structure of
the professorial group, and the path an academic career should normally follow.
Ffis point is clearly to oppose the progressive bureaucratization of the academic
profession, the assimilation of professors to other groups of civil servants. A
passage about the present "deterioration" of university is worth quoting:
Until twenty-five years ago this country had only two classes of people, the
wise and the ignorant; then the concourse for professorship provided the
university with excellent professors, as only about ten well-practiced
professors turned up, whom the people already knew and respected because
of the number of their very good pupils.141
"Since this line of demarcation has been eliminated" Flauti continued, "everybody
who has studied the elements of a science is believed to be a wise man" and a
crowd of candidates appear for every competition. Often the new professors have
no experience of teaching at all. Flauti's reference to Fergola's school is clear
enough. Flauti concluded with a detailed treatment of the military schools: military
college and academy (curricula for officers, and for members of the Corp of
Engineers and Artillery) and naval academy. Mathematical training seems
analogous to that of civil architects, the basis being sublime geometry and its
"practical applications".
We can now leave the Project to look at a more specific essay: Dissertation on the
Method in Mathematics, the Way to Order the Elements of These Sciences, and to Teach
Them (1822)142. This will help us to conclude our description of the synthetic school
during the 1820s-1830s, and to integrate the school in the changing institutional and
cultural panorama of the period. The tone of the essay, originally a series of
memoirs read at the RAS, is overly polemical. Flauti attacked those who have only a
superficial knowledge of mathematics and yet write textbooks of these sciences; he
310
talked of "some military", clearly officers of the Engineering Corp, and of teachers
who have not produced valuable students. These are people who know "this
science only by means of those few applications needed in the trivial exercise of
their profession", and who pretend "to teach only that bit which is useful for such a
purpose", holding that "everyone should learn as much as he likes of parts such as
the elements of geometry". "I have heard plentiful of stories from this class of
people" he continues, "about the fact that we Mathematicians want, with our
method, to create wise people and not professionals"; the essay was designed to
make things clear.
The historical introduction presented a reconstruction of the history of
mathematics which is already familiar: Renaissance of Mathematics based on the
rediscovery of Greek texts; Italian algebraists and geometers, Galileo, Descartes,
Newton ("who perfected the methods of approximation of the Greek school"143),
and the long list of seventeenth-century mathematicians; but the result of such a
flourishing of mathematics was the beginning of their "decadence", which dates
from the eighteenth century. More and more people studied these sciences, and
they were inserted in many university and professional curricula as secondary
disciplines: for the first time in history "they were not the exclusive patrimony of
those who pursued them for passion". This was not progress, it was indeed the
contrary. "Learning these sciences is now easy", but the very methods which made
it easy are corrupting the original purity of mathematics: "the bad teaching
methods, the variety of research, the difficulty of choosing the most proper method
to treat each question, are very great obstacles to the progress of human spirit, as
they make it difficult to see with a single look what has been done". Another
despicable condition "of our time" is that
no one remains in the limits of that part of knowledge which he cultivates,
and where only he can be useful and distinguished; on the contrary,
everybody tries to mix up with matters he doesn't know, or knows
superficially, as instrumental to his profession: and this happens very easily in
the mathematical sciences, as they have so many branches a single man
cannot understand all of them at the same time, in spite of their being
originated from a single trunk.144
No single man, especially today, can truly "know" more than a couple of the many
branches of the mathematical sciences, each one having its own methods, goals and
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problems. In the following Flauti treated the "real meaning" of the term "method"
in mathematics. It is worth going briefly through this once again. Flauti was
convinced that Greek geometers "greatly surpassed the moderns" in problem-
solving. Their methods were geometrical analysis (which discovers the "essence" of
the geometrical truth in question) and synthesis (which proves the discovered
truth). Extremely skilled in the use of these methods, "they extended their art to the
solution of problems of whatever nature" (i.e., of whatever grade). What is most
important is that they never stopped at the analysis of the problem, "a monstrosity
which can be observed in the very modern works of analytic geometry"145. Flauti
described their analysis, which could be either simple —directly solving the
problem in question, or by loci —reducing the problem to that of finding the
intersection(s) of certain curves. To learn these methods, the accurate study of the
ancients is essential. It is opposed to modern mathematics, "which is losing its
[geometrical] nature", and is being reduced to "a science of words"; whereas, as we
know, pure geometry has to be a "perspicuous", "intuitive", a-linguistic science. A
science of words can only produce discursive knowledge, which is necessarily the
result of human "reasoning", not of the act of perception-recognition of the human
intellect. The result of the confusion between these two essentially different
activities, and of the two different kinds of knowledge produced by them, is that
"one believes oneself able to solve problems just because he writes a few formulas
on a piece of paper"146. The very fact that the proper method of mathematics was
never an issue before the seventeenth century is a clear sign to Flauti that the
ancients and the geometers of the Renaissance belonged to one and the same
tradition, which was complete and perfect in itself. Since Descartes the choice
between the ancient and the modern method began to be discussed, but leaving
undisputed the necessity for the construction of the solution. The analytic treatment
of the curves and of the geometrical loci were two of the positive results of the
application of the new algebraic method to geometry, as masterfully shown in
Euler's works. Infinitesimal methods were the highest and most original point
reached by the moderns, and these were in fact "the real modern methods". All the
following purely analytic research made the learning of these methods and their
application easier, but it did not add new "methods" worth their name. The term
"method" has always meant "a system of scientific principles which proves fruitful
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in mathematical discovery"; it is only recently that it has been "abused" to mean
"the manipulation and application of formulas" 147. The great extension of
mathematical studies made it possible "to lose sight of the origin to which one
should continuously return", particularly "in the branch of algebraic-analytical
geometry". Here Flauti referred mainly to "the illustrious Lagrange, whose name
will always be uttered with great respect in the history of mathematics for his
sublime genius and for the analytic methods he invented, but whose works should
not be taken as a model"148. In fact, Lagrange's "method consists in defining
through the deepest abstraction the geometrical properties of the points satisfying
the problem, without using the figure at all, and without referring such properties
to the correspondent loci algebraically expressed". One who knows the art of
problem-solving must be "surprised" by this "very abstract path", this product of
the mind of a "sublime analyst" which is —in fact— "useless to science"149. The
discovery of the point, the combination of the loci's equations and the construction
of the final equation, prove to be very difficult, as they are conducted "in absence of
light". So that what Lagrange leaves to the reader as a matter of mere calculation is
precisely the essential part of the solution to Flauti, and it is certainly not a matter of
mere calculation to his own eyes. Note again the metaphor of light, to stress the
intuitive, a-linguistic, intellectual nature of geometrical reasoning as opposed to the
mechanical nature of the purely analytic method; ultimately it reduces to providing
a list of "equations of condition" to describe the properties of particular lines or
surfaces under study, and to combine them according to mechanical rules. Here is
how "analytic geometry has been reduced to a simple lot of letters, symbols and
formulas"150. Flauti concluded by addressing the supporters of the analytic method
in textbooks: "their mathematical knowledge begins where it should end up, so that
they are without foundation, tottering". He made a pessimistic forecast:
"mathematics will decay because nowadays everybody believes they know it after
having studied its elementary parts" and because so many pretend to be "reformers
of the teaching methods, destroying the good tradition and replacing it with false
systems and bad textbooks"151. Flauti's essay on methods in mathematics was
followed, in the same publication, by an essay on the proper order to present the
pupils with the elements of mathematics. The duty of the author of elementary
textbooks is most difficult and should not be underestimated, as one must define
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the concepts with "exactitude and precision"; order the matter "with rigorous
method"; and present the whole field as a "picture", where everything must be
captured "at a glance", "from the first to the last ring, without missing any
intermediary one"152. On top of this, the authors of textbooks must be able to single
out every time the most elegant solution among the many possible ones for a
problem. No surprise that "in twenty-two centuries the geometrical part of
mathematics had only one perfect institution, Euclid's Elements"153. The goal of
geometrical textbooks must be "transmitting the art of invention" ("science par
excellence"), with rigour and order. To this extent, one must doubtless begin with the
elements of geometry presented according to the method of the ancients, that is to
say: "the first book a pupil must have in his hands, if he wants to start with the
right step, is Euclid's Elements"-, "this system has been followed with great success
by the schools in Italy, England and Germany, and if recently some on the continent
abandoned it, this only resulted in confirming the uselessness of any, even minimal,
change". Even those schools where only elementary geometry is taught should
adopt Euclid, as it has the healthy result of "making the spirit used to precision and
rigor", supplying to the training usually provided by that part of logic which deals
with method154. Rigorous synthetic method must be integrated with a gradual
stimulation of "the spirit of research" in the pupil, through exercises which provide
generalizations and simple applications of geometrical truths ("invention must be
reached gradually"155). After this stage, geometrical knowledge must be
"consolidated" through research in pure geometry, ordinarily the theory of conics.
The properties of conic sections must be presented synthetically, showing the
immediate link with the elements. The student can now move to Euclid's Book of
Data, and to Archimedes' and Pappus' passages on the solution of the loci, and to
the works of modern cultivators of pure geometry, in order to be trained in
problem-solving (this part being also covered by Fergola's Geometrical Invention). In
the end, any branch of geometry must be treated according to the method of the
ancients. On the other hand the teacher must show where modern analysis can be
useful, and how it should be used (and again the metaphor of "the two wings"
which, after such a panegyric on the synthetic method, seems rather out of place).
The goal of the training is the "proper use" of each of the two methods, which is
indeed "the main art of the mathematician", and which ultimately consists in using
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the support of algebra only when geometrical analysis proves extremely difficult.
Cartesian analysis must be taught as "the true method", the "basis" of the
application of algebra to geometry; Lagrangian analysis must also be taught, but
"clearly showing how limited its use must be"156. About the teaching of "algebraic
calculus", Flauti shows little interest, and his ideas are a pale reflection of Fergola's
old ones (looking at his Algebra, it seems that Flauti's direct knowledge of analysis
did not go beyond Lagrange). FFe prevented the teacher from using those textbooks
where the theory of the calculus was presented without the necessary rigour, and
on the basis of examples rather than proofs. Flauti concludes with mechanics, which
should follow higher ("sublime") analysis in the curriculum. Mechanics shouldn't
be taught only in the form of "pure and very abstract formulas, as if mechanics
would abhor geometry"; instead its geometrical nature should be clearly shown.
Geometry is in fact the "trustworthy interpreter of nature", which provided us with
"the true laws of the world"; with respect to that, algebraic calculus only refined the
fundamental discoveries of geometry. Consequently, Flauti rejected those textbooks
which are "overly abstract", as —note this passage —"mechanics is not an abstract
science, it must be used for empirical applications; and even if nature is ruled by
general laws, the particular elements to be considered in each case are practically
infinite, and it is impossible to understand all of them in a single calculation"157. The
polemical referent is again this time implicitly, Lagrange, whose mechanics is
accused of being so abstract that the "descent from his sublime considerations to the
fact" is hard enterprise for the average mathematician. Again, we have the
metaphor of the entirely human "analytic flight" as opposed to the concrete
geometrical intuition. And, as in his trigonometry, Flauti despised those who
present the truths of mechanics in the form of formulas from the very beginning,
"without accompanying them with the corresponding statement"158. Formulas are
to be preferred only when the mechanical truth includes a large number of different
elements (which confirm that Flauti admitted algebra only as an economic tool). At
this stage the student can be taught special courses relative to the professions
(engineers, architects), "without damaging science itself", as we are only dealing
with applications. The reader may wonder how technical schools could possibly
damage "science itself". This is crystal clear to Flauti: through promoting "special
textbooks" and differentiated courses of mathematics for their own students. "What
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does this specialty consist in?" Flauti asks; and he replies that one cannot abandon
the rigor of proof, the elegance of solutions, or the evident connection between
propositions; on the other hand one cannot abandon any part of the curriculum
without "breaking the entire chain [of truths], and destroying the method itself".
Strange and meaningless research it is that aims to prepare special institutions
of mathematics, as if there was more than one way to properly learn them,
and as if the principles of a science could be differently known according to
personal taste.159
The reactionary sees boundaries falling apart, the corruption of the sciences and of
morals, and the decline of true knowledge until its final disappearance amongst the
profane crowd (the new class of the haughty pseudo-intellectuals). In the early
1820s, men like Ventura, Canosa and Flauti were fighting their anti-modern battle
against powerful enemies. It was no longer 1799. We have already described the
battle supported by The Ecclesiastic Encyclopaedia, which was theological (for
Lammenais against Gallicanism and the "diplomatic" line), political (for the hard¬
liner conservatives against moderates and liberals), and cultural (for the pre¬
eminence of a specific structure of knowledge). Now, what is left is to reconstruct
the mathematical knowledge of Flauti's adversaries. Indeed, although he named no
names here, everything suggests that there was, by 1820, a real opposition to the
plans of the synthetic school160.
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Chapter Seven
The Analytic School, or
Mathematics as Universal Language
7.1 Administrative Reforms under the French Government (1806-1815)
Fergola's school had only benefited from the outcome of the ephemeral 1799
Revolution. Things went rather differently when a French Army led by General
Andre Massena occupied the kingdom, in February 1806. The period of the
uncontested control of the school over mathematical teaching and research, these
"very happy days" in Telesio's words, finally came to an end. The Bourbons,
accompanied by Canosa and other loyalist aristocrats, fled to Palermo where, with
the support of the British fleet, they organized a network of clandestine resistance
against the French. But, this time, the arrival of the French was hardly opposed by
Neapolitans: the situation had changed since 1799, and an attempt to renew Ruffo's
crusade failed badly. The point is that the blindly reactionary policy of the First
Restoration (1799-1806) had failed to satisfy any of the relevant social groups,
detaching them further from the Crown. Very schematically, it should be
remembered that the aristocracy had been annihilated as a political force; and that
the populace of Naples and the peasants of the province, key factors in the 1799
counter-revolutionary campaign, had been disappointed by the first restoration as
the revision of the feudal and fiscal systems —promised to the "crusaders"—had
not been accomplished. On the other hand, bourgeois landlords and urban middle-
classes generally welcomed the French, and they were to be the backbone of the
new "modern" state. Around 1803, the intensification of phenomena such as
brigandage and liberal-patriotic conspiracies signaled the generalized
dissatisfaction; significant was the fact that Massena's entrance into the town was
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accompanied by a cheering crowd. In March 1806 Joseph Bonaparte, brother of
Napoleon, was proclaimed "King of the Two Sicilies", and Neapolitan "citizens"
attended the ceremony with enthusiasm. Joseph formed a government composed of
French officers and members of illustrious philo-French aristocratic families. A
consultative chamber, the Consiglio di Stato, was also constituted, where the majority
was Neapolitan. The new administration gave space to a number of ex-Jacobins,
bourgeois landowners and aristocrats; a group whose common denominator was
the reference to the late eighteenth century social and economic reformism. Joseph
himself, being a former student at the University of Pisa, shared this philosophical
culture. The personality who most characterized the life of the new kingdom was
that of Joachim Murat, who was crowned in 1808, as Joseph left Naples to become
King of Spain. Joachim, a former cavalry commander and brother-in-law of the
emperor, gradually excluded the French elements from both government and
administration, and provided the kingdom with an high degree of autonomy from
Paris. After 1811 every civil servant had to be a Neapolitan citizen.
The general project of the French kings was an ambitious one. The primary goal
was to make the administrative structure similar to that of the Cisalpine Republic
(settled in Northern Italy, with Milan as its capital). The task consisted in
transforming a highly fragmented feudal society into a centralized administrative
state, whose instrument was an efficient and specialized class of civil servants. The
French knew where to look for support: the landed middle classes1. Wisely, the
project was linked to the pre-existing local tradition of reformism, which provided
the French with the support of important sectors of culture. In fact, as we have seen,
the idea of designing a new political setting, based on the landed middle classes,
was a well known element in the teaching of Genovesi's school, and it was also the
goal of the 1799 "revolutionaries". The first step towards a general redistribution of
wealth was the destruction of the feudal-communal system of land, and its
replacement with a "full-property" system. In 1806, this suddenly became a reality.
Every town and every land was to be ruled according to the common law; baronial
jurisdiction on feudal lands (and relative earnings, as Canosa knew too well) were
abolished together with feudal tributes and services2. In general, feudal lands were
divided between barons (or ecclesiastical orders) and communes, whereas the sale
of common lands was supposed to create a consistent class of land-owning
323
peasants. In fact, things went rather differently, as properties tended to concentrate
in the hands of a small number of landowners (bourgeois or ex-feudatories), who
were able to influence local administrations. As a result, the great properties
remained almost untouched, and they were also freed from feudal duties towards
to king, and from legal ties such as inalienability. Similarly, few profited from the
from the suppression of land-owning monasteries (1807-1809). On the other hand,
conditions of life for the peasants worsened, as they lost their rights upon
communal land without benefiting from their sale. As for the other reforms, the
juridical system was renewed by introducing the Napoleonic civil code and a new
penal code. The ancient and privileged Neapolitan tribunals were abolished, and a
new network of provincial tribunals was created. The reform of finance was
centered on the tax system, which was simplified; work to accomplish a modern
cadastre was also started.
Needless to say, these reforms hit very precise and consolidated interests. The
barons, the high clergy and the lawyers of the capital, who had been opposing
Neapolitan reformism for half a century, were on the forefront of the resistance. The
crucial alliance between barons and Neapolitan tribunals against local communities
and central government emerged clearly in their common defence of the ancien
regime institutions. According to the historian de Martino, "it was the forensic order
which made the greatest resistance to the diffusion of the reformist culture"3.
Powerful lawyers and law scholars took the defense of the feudal system as the only
"real basis of a monarchy"4, in a more radical and effective way than barons
themselves did. Their attempts to paralyze the new administration were
continuous. Such a conflict between executive and juridical power happened at all
different levels, down until the opposition between local authorities and justices of
the peace. "In fact" de Martino wrote, "even if these contrasts appeared in formal or
procedural terms, they hid a precise political value, and important contents for the
economical life of the communities, and for the immediate interests involved"5. On
the other hand, reforms offered new possibilities of social and economical
advancement to members of the provincial bourgeoisie. A great number of
employees were needed for the new local institutions (both administrative and
juridical), and important public works were opened, especially road building, to
facilitate internal communication (and the movement of troops). The new
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bureaucratic machine absorbed Neapolitan "progressive" intellectuals. De Martino
remarked:
The procedures defined by the law in every detail, the clear rules, the
guarantees offered to the order of the landowners, the renewed structures of
power and, with them, the enlargement of the personnel and the
opportunities of accomplishing fast careers founded on merit and not on
fortune, as indicated by great part of the eighteenth century literature, created
that large social consensus which, in spite of the great difficulties of financial,
military and social nature, enabled the achievement of positive results, which
will be admitted also by the opponents at the moment of the Restoration.6
We will refer to the overall project of reform with the term "modernization". This
was clearly centered on the new administrative system which, according to the
French constitution "of the year VIII" (when the Consulate replaced the Directoire),
was extremely centralized. Its core was the Ministry of the Interior, a new
institution which unified different powers, previously entrusted to separate organs
(mostly juridical ones, such as the Tribunale della Sommaria)7. The introduction of
this minister was extremely significant, as it derived from the rigorous separation
between civil administration (linked to the executive power) and the administration
of justice. It was precisely the very active Minister of the Interior Giuseppe Zurlo
who was to attract most of the criticisms from the reactionary side.
From 1806, the country was divided into provinces, districts, and communes; the
elementary component was the communal council, composed by local landlords
and professionals, who expressed the interests of the local community. The
province was ruled by an intendente, who depended directly on the Minister of the
Interior. Through this vertical structure the provincial bourgeoisie could actively
participate in the exercise of the political power, even if in the context of a
centralized and absolutist system, where civil administration was in fact very much
an instrument to control society. Most of the new intendenti had taken part in the
administration of the 1799 Republic; others were military officers. They had all to
face great problems in accomplishing their work. If on the one hand "provincial
society, at the beginning of the XIX century had reached a remarkable level of civil
development, particularly in certain economically advanced areas", on the other
hand brigandage (now supported by the Bourbons), clerical propaganda, and the
reluctance of many local administrations to collaborate with the intendenti had
disruptive effects on the activity the new administration8. "In reality" de Martino
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wrote, "resistance of the peripheral apparatus during the transfer of powers was
strong and extended, and it left deep traces in the history of the country"9.
However, the most urgent reforms were accomplished by 1809. Interestingly
enough, in 1808 the government had decided to enlarge the basis of the passive
electorate for local administrations: from "landowners" only, to artisans and
professionals ("practitioners of the liberal arts"); a move which was aimed to link
the government to the economically active groups, and to solve the great problem
of the lack of personnel for the new bureaucracy.
Reaction against "modernization" proved to be stronger than expected. As we
know, it was not only the interests of barons, lawyers and the Church which were
threatened by reforms, but those of many members of the local administrations, and
of merchants and financiers who were building their own fortunes precisely on the
complex economic system of the country. Recurrent themes of the reactionary
propaganda were those of the excessive bureaucratization of the new
administration, which was portrayed as detached from the concrete reality of the
country, and guided by abstract norms (for instance, equal distribution of land),
even in situations which cannot, by their nature, be ruled according to general laws.
Abstractness was also seen in the re-definition of the borders of the provinces,
which ignored both local history and local traditions. Fierce criticisms were raised
against the centralized, "vertical" structure of the new administration, which
tended to suffocate local autonomy, and to compromise the autarchic economy of
rural communities (presented by reactionaries as examples of perfect social setting).
The myth of the "organic" nature of the feudal-communal setting, constituted by
the harmonic composition of orders and guilds, emerged vigorously in the early
nineteenth century, directly opposed to the "mechanic" and atomized modern
society which was described as a mere aggregate of individuals10. Finally, the
separation between juridical power and executive power, which deprived the
barons of their own feudal jurisdictions, and the old tribunals of their
administrative role, was said to compromise power, whose nature is essentially
indivisible.
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7.2. Reforms in Public Education
The new government immediately showed a particular regard for scientific
education. As early as June 1806, a "Royal Society to Encourage the Natural and
Economic Sciences" was created by Colonel Augusto Ricci, with the goal of
"promoting public and private economy, agriculture, arts, wealth, and prosperity in
this part of Italy, by means of mathematics, chemistry, natural history, medicine,
and veterinary science"11. Significantly, the first meeting of the society took place in
the palace of the Ministry of the Interior. The most renowned Neapolitan men of
science were invited to attend, including Fergola and Cotugno. Fergola, nominated
a member in July 1807, refused the offer, allegedly for health reasons. Flauti was
called to participate in 1808. The society, renamed "Royal Institute for the
Encouragement of the Natural Sciences in Naples" (1810), was charged to give
prizes to those citizens whose discoveries had proved useful to improve agriculture,
breeding, and manufacturing. The institute published its own periodical (Journal of
Economy and Agriculture) and its own acts (no traces of memoirs on mathematics,
though). The minister of the interior also created the Royal Society of Naples (1808)
to replace the old RAS. The society was not very active, as is proved by the fact that
the first volume of its acts was published only in 1819, after the Bourbon
restoration. This contains important memoirs read by Fergola , Flauti, de Sangro,
Giannattasio, and Scorza; the Mathematical Class of the Royal Society was in fact
controlled by members of Fergola's school (members in 1811 were: Fergola, Flauti,
Sangro, de Ruggiero, Giannattasio and Colonel Vito Piscitelli, director of the
fortifications of the kingdom).
An overall reform of public education was begun with the approval of the
Organic Decree for Public Education (1811), according to which education was
divided into three cycles (primary, secondary, higher), and put under the direct
control of the Ministry of the Interior (i.e., very significantly, it was taken away
from the Ministry of Ecclesiastic Affairs). Primary schools were created in every
town and village, and at least two secondary schools (collegi or licei) were created in
every province, one for boys and one for girls. There were already three thousand
free primary schools in 1814. Together with Italian and Latin grammar, pupils were
taught arithmetic, good manners, catechism and "practical agriculture"12. In 1814
there were also eleven colleges (eight collegi and three licei), whose teaching was
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centered on Latin, Greek, Mathematics, and Philosophy. A reform plan for the
university was ready as early as October 1806, and was characterized by the
reduction of theological chairs (four chairs abolished out of seven, including Texts
of Thomas Aquinas), to the advantage of the scientific ones13. Among others, the
chairs of Rhetoric, Latin Literature, Latin Language, and General History were
abolished. A prefect, nominated by the king, administered the university together
with a council, an administrator and a secretary (i.e. the Major Chaplain lost his
authority over the university). Debates on the structure of the university continued
in the following years; in 1808 some chairs were added, and in 1811, with the
Organic Decree, the university was reformed again14. In the end, one must
recognize that the action of the government was not very radical in reforming the
university: a generic encouragement to scientific disciplines was offered, leaving in
place the old academic establishment, which included powerful professors and
their well-entrenched schools. It is also clear that the Royal Society was conceived
more as a parade of names then as an effective center of research. The fact is that the
French government had decided to bypass rather than radically reform universities
and academies; the real instruments of its power were the newly established
technical schools, military and civil, whose curricula were designed ex novo, in
order to suit the needs of a modern administrative monarchy. Consider that a first
project of reform of public education, signed by Vincenzo Cuoco, had been rejected
by the government in 180915. Now, comparing it with the organic decree of 1811, a
main difference emerges: Cuoco had left the teaching of mathematical and physical
sciences to the university, charging the new "special schools" with further courses
of specialization (not too differently from Flauti's 1820 project); note that Cuoco
explicitly manifested his preference for the didactic methods of Fergola's school16.
The approved project was inspired instead by the system already adopted in the
French Empire, with which it shared "the same unity of principles and actions"17.
According to this system, the curricula of military and civil engineers had to be
completely detached from university teaching.
The new government began by reforming the Corps of Military Engineers and
the Royal Military Academy, which was re-opened in 1806 under the name of the
"Military School"18. In 1811 the name changed again to the "Polytechnic and
Military School". Reforms were directed by General Jacques Campredon and
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General Giuseppe Parisi, the last being the reformer of military education in the
1780s, and a protector of Carlo Lauberg. Courses at the Polytechnic School lasted
four years, and mathematical teaching included analytic geometry, descriptive
geometry and mechanics; chemistry design and literature were also taught. The
goal of the school was twofold: on the one hand to train the officers of the army; on
the other to prepare students to enter the more advanced "facultative schools"
(where they specialized in one of the following branches: civil engineering, military
engineering, artillery, geography, maritime constructions). The direction of the
school was entrusted to General Costanzo, who ordered professors to publish their
own lectures; as a result, under the collective title Course of Mathematics, twelve
essays appeared between 1813 and 1815: Arithmetic, Algebra, Plane Geometry,
Solid Geometry, Two-Coordinate Analysis, Plane Trigonometry, Three-Coordinate
Analysis , Differential and Integral Calculus, Mechanics (I. Static and Dynamics; II.
Hydrostatic and Hydrodynamics), Descriptive Geometry, Mathematical
Geography19. The textbooks of three-coordinate analysis and calculus were written
by Ottavio Colecchi, a Dominican monk who cultivated analysis with unusual
fervor, and who had been teaching at the Polytechnic School since 1812. Unlike in
the older institutions, at the Polytechnic School new teachers were hired who were
not linked to Fergola's school, or were explicitly hostile to his geometric conception
of mathematics, as in the case of Colecchi, or of a secondary professor of Mechanics,
Francesco Tucci. Since 1811 those who explicitly rejected the synthetic approach had
concentrated in the newly founded School of Application for the Corps of the
Engineers of Bridges and Roads. In its classrooms the purely algebraic conception of
mathematics made its triumphal return to Naples, seventeen years after the
suppression of Lauberg's private studio.
To be properly accomplished, the French reforms required the constitution of an
efficient corps of engineers to realize the essential infrastructures. Without them, a
"modern" administration of the country was not even thinkable. First of all, the
entire road system needed to be rationalized and increased. To this extent, the
minister of the interior created, in November 1808, the Royal Corps of Engineers of
Bridges and Roads (Corpo Reale degli Ingegneri di Ponti e Strade), possibly the most
important institution created during the French occupation20. A French General of
the Military Engineering Corps, Jacques de Campredon (1761-1837)21, prepared a
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plan for the new institution, based on the Napoleonic decree which, in 1804, had
reformed the analogous French corps22. The plan, approved in 1809, divided the
territory into "divisions", each one entrusted to an inspector (3); each division was
divided into "departments", entrusted to the chiefs-engineer (6); into each
department, the ordinary engineers were responsible for the particular woks (8),
and were assisted by the supplementary engineers (6). At the moment of the
constitution of the Corps, the 23 engineers were chosen by Campredon (most were
civil architects); but it was planned that a specific school should be established to
provide well-trained personnel. The School of Application was opened in 1811, and
it was to provide, after a four-year course, "aspirant engineers" to be inserted at the
lowest level of the rigid hierarchical structure of the Corps. It was also stated that
engineers should reside in their department, and that they were under the authority
of the intendente, which strictly linked their activity to the executive power. In 1814,
the School licensed the first class of "aspirant engineers".
Protected and generously financed by the government, the School became almost
immediately a serious threat to the prestige of the university (where, previously,
civil architects took some courses and their final degree). Professorial wages were
superior at the School, and the number of pupils grew decidedly when only the
engineers of the Corps were given the qualification of "expert" by Neapolitan
tribunals. The School of Application was, from the beginning, a primary center of
scientific education and research. As Amodeo remarks, it continued and
strengthened the scientific tradition of the Military Academy, and it "had valuable
professors, desiring to introduce into Naples those modern analytical studies
which, in the university, after Fergola's retirement, were neglected"23. Candidates
were selected on the basis of an exam which included: arithmetic, geometry,
trigonometry, calculus, analytical geometry, design, French, and Latin24. Those
accepted had to face a curriculum centered on mathematics and its applications.
Interestingly, Director Campredon asked the professors to achieve "two main
[didactic] goals: 1. instruction depending on what the pupil can perform with his
own hands must be preferred to instruction received from lectures and books; 2. the
presentation of principles and general methods must be —whenever possible —
followed by examples of applications"25. Professors should also show clearly the
links among different disciplines, and harmoniously integrate the various parts of
330
the curriculum. The innovative didactic methods of the School of Application is
worth some comment. It was in many ways analogous to the method of the Swiss
Johann Pestalozzi (1746-1827), which had been designed specifically for primary
education, and which attributed to the child an active role in the process of
education (to the horror of Reactionary Catholics, who considered these schools a
source of individualism and rebellion). The philosophical view according to which
the essential goal of the sciences is their employment in acting upon empirical
reality was reflected in the didactic of the School of Application. It was the
continuous verification of the "functioning" of mathematical formalism in technical
application with provided it with its sense and justification. The links among
disciplines stressed the boundless field of application of mathematics to reality.
Machines made their appearance as crucial didactic instruments: in the courses of
Physics, Experimental Chemistry and Mineralogy, the two-hour lesson was indeed
divided in one hour of lecturing and one hour of "manipulation of machines and
repetition of experiments"26. Like in Rousseau's Emile, to which much of this
didactic seems indebted, the student should "not have geographic maps only in his
head", but instead he should "know well what is represented, and have a clear idea
of the art of constructing [maps]". Interesting examples of the new didactic
methodology were, for instance, the course of mechanics, with its integration of
theory and application, or the didactic methodology of Luigi Malesci, professor of
Civil Architecture. Malesci presented his program in the form of an "analytic table",
where the subject is progressively divided into its elementary constituents. Malesci
remarked: "all the matters presented in the table can be taught in two years, as it is
not necessary to insist on details but rather to show the most general and essential
principles", which will be "the basis" for the future works of the students. Malesci
wanted to transmit to his students what Padula was to define as "the spirit of the
analytic method" 27.
From a later document (1836), we can reconstruct the curriculum of the school.
Students admitted to the School entered the "first class", a two year course where
"the principal occupation and the great part of the time is dedicated to the
mathematical disciplines"28. The following courses were given: Architectural
Design, Landscape, and Topography; Mechanics and Hydraulics applied to
factories, machines, hydraulic works; Descriptive Geometry, and its applications to
331
shadows, perspective, and stone-cutting; Geodesy. Successively, students entered
the "second class" a biennium devoted to applications, which included courses in:
Applications of Mechanics to Constructions and Machines; Lavori di terra (
constructions, roads, banks); Lavori di legname (roofs, bridges, dikes); Structure of
walls and vaults; Masonry bridges, maritime constructions; Architectural machines
to move weights, machines to drain; Lavori di ferro (in particular, suspended
bridges); Art of projecting; Applied chemistry (with laboratory); Agronomy (with
laboratory). Among the textbooks: Navier's mechanics, appositely reprinted in
Naples; Venturoli's Elements (mechanics and hydraulics); and Monge's treatise on
descriptive geometry. At the end of the courses, students faced their final exam;
those best ranked were offered entry to the Corps of Engineers. Subjects treated in
the one-week long final exam were: Mechanics (two problems29); Descriptive
Geometry (two problems30); Applied Mechanics (two problems); Constructions (one
problem); Agronomy(one problem31); Chemistry (two problems32); Architecture (a
project, to be completed in the following week33).
Carlo Afan de Rivera (1779-1852), Director of the Corps of the Engineers from
1824 to 1852 and the most eminent figure among the supporters of the
modernization of the country stated that the School of Application was crucial as
for the first time the study of the sciences and considerations of economic policy
were closely related. "Our scientists" he wrote, "are afraid of being degraded by
getting close to the workshops, and to guide the practice with their theory; so they
neglect to apply the sciences to the arts". Instead in his lucid plan of development,
which included land restitution, new manufactures, and the construction of new
roads and harbors, Rivera concretely showed how much could be achieved by
"science applied to the administration of the state"34.
7.3 Modernization and the Spirit of Analysis
The French interlude provided a concrete opportunity to reform the feudal-
communal system of land, as well as the juridical and legislative system. But such
reforms could not be implemented in the absence of a corps of well-trained civil
servants, administrators, and engineers. Following the French model, it was
thought that technical schools devoted to this purpose should include mathematical
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analysis, as a crucial element of their curricula. This is how, around 1810, a new and
influential school of analytic mathematics settled in Naples. Among the new
institutional spaces opened by the government for analytic teaching and research
was an important journal, which offered space to the economic, political and
scientific contributions of many survivors of the 1799 administration. The journal,
significantly titled The Analytic Library (1810-1823), had a difficult life, as
contributors' ideas were often at odds with those of influential members of the
traditional academic establishment35. Already in 1811, the Analytic Library was
temporarily closed down, following the pressure of the RAS on the government: in
one of the first articles Fergola and his school had been harshly criticized by Ottavio
Colecchi. In 1812 the journal re-opened thanks to the support of Matteo Galdi, a
former student of Lauberg and an ex-Jacobin himself, who was Minister of Public
Education in the French government; publication continued until 1814, under the
title Analytic Library of Education and Public Utility. Other numbers appeared
between 1816 and 1823 when, during the reactionary decade of the 1820s, it was
finally forced to close down for good. The tradition of the Analytic Library was
revived ten years later by a journal titled The Progress of Sciences and Arts (1832-
1846), which defended the cause of modernization of the country, the School of
Application and, more specifically, the cause of analysis against Flauti and the late
representatives of Fergola's school, offering remarkable space to Ottavio Colecchi36.
The spirit of the Analytic Library emerged clearly from the essay which opens the
first number, titled "Short Philosophical Memoir on the Generation and the
Advancement of Sciences and Arts"37. The editors began with praising human
reason: it will not possibly clear up all of the "darkness which surrounds us", but it
will let us know the fundamental principles of reality, and this means that human
reason "is much greater than its detractors think"38. "Physics" we are told, "was
born with the first sensations" of the human being; whereas mathematics makes its
appearance only at a rather advanced stage of civilization, as its highly abstract
nature makes it less natural to human beings. But yet there is continuity between
physics, mathematics and the other sciences; there is nothing like the "essential"
opposition between pure mathematics and empirical sciences ("mixed
mathematics"), which is crucial to the entire conception of the synthetic school, and
which legitimated and shaped its own problem-solving methods. On the contrary,
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because of this extreme abstractness, mathematics cannot be divided into pure
and mixed. If Mechanics deals with motion, Geometry deals with extension,
and Algebra with quantity; so that matter cannot be detached from the most
sublime contemplations.39
Having read the writings of the synthetics, one can argue that the reference to
"contemplation" and materiality had been chosen with a clear target in mind,
namely Fergola's school; that there exists a link between contemplative "sublime
mathematics" and empirical, material considerations is precisely what Fergola and
his students had always denied. The aim of the editors becomes even clearer in the
following, where themes from Lauberg and Giordano are echoed:
doesn't every human art tend to let us know the extension, nature and
quantity of things? Does Physics have a different goal from Mathematics?
And do Politics and the Morals have a different goal? Then, every human
investigation contributes to the construction of a Universal Mathematics, and
all our knowledge is limited to mathematics. We don't have to be dazzled by
the magnificent names which have been improperly given to substances. I see
an art which makes me able to determine the quality, the nature, and the
quantity of objects, considering them in their more simple aspects.
According to this reconstruction, the individual mind (the great enemy of
contemporary theological and political conservatism) produces the "sublime arts"
(the higher sciences), by discovering the universal laws out of "naked experience",
under the pressure of elementary needs. The knowledge of universal laws of nature
is discovered exclusively to be employed to satisfy the material needs of mankind.
"The distinction between physical and moral laws, mechanical and animal laws"
depends on our considering their "superficial" aspects; essentially, they are simply
different manifestations of a the "same, single, universal, irreducible law, which is
always variable in its effects, but always uniform in its principles". Lucretius'
materialist poem is cited to make clear the point: "Semper motus connectitur omnis
/ Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo; / Nec declinando facunt primordia
motus / Principium quoddam quae fati foedera rumpat"40. The quote from
Lucretius soon proves to be more than a mere rhetorical ornament, as truths of the
moral sciences are explicitly reduced to the theory of motion. Privileged sources are
the French encyclopedistes and the ideologists (d'Alembert and Tracy particularly): a
clear connection with the still lively Neapolitan ideologism of Delfico, Borrelli and
Bozzelli, whose writing enjoyed a remarkable success under the French regime. The
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cultural framework of the editors of the Analytic Library should appear quite clearly
once it is added that they described religion as the transformation into "mysterious
substances" of what is simply explainable as the action of matter. As we have
described the conception of knowledge, science and mathematics of Neapolitan
reformers, Jacobins and ideologists, we will not insist on the point here. But it is
noteworthy how the essential features of this conception returned, under the
protection of the French government, in the pages of the Analytic Library, in what
was a point-to-point confrontation with the dominant philosophical and scientific
paradigm. In particular, note the opposition of a methodologically unitary vision of
human knowledge to the rigid disciplinary boundaries which characterized the
reactionary, teleological system, and the rejection of Fergola's epistemological
distinction between pure and applied mathematics.
The first numbers of the Analytic Library are an interesting source of material
concerning the revival of the "analytic spirit" in Naples around 1810. Thus we find,
for instance, the announcements of the Italian translation of the French book Traite
du calcul conjectural, ou art de reasonner sur les choses futures et inconnues, by Parisot,
which made the text available "to readers of every class". The book contained
applications of mathematics (probability calculus) to physics, metaphysics, and
political economy. Commenting on a book by Jean-Louis Boucharlat, professor at
the Ecole Polytechnique41, the editors praised the fecundity of the application of
algebra to geometry, and they argued for the reduction of geometry to algebra. A
detailed report about the attribution of the "decennial prizes" in Paris in 1809 was
published in the second number of the journal42. The winner for "Geometry and
Analysis" was Lagrange, with his Theory of Functions43, "which provides a solid
[algebraic] basis for the calculus", whereas a particular mention went to Sylvestre
Lacroix, whose purely analytic textbook of calculus "contributed more than any
other to the new direction given to the didactic of the mathematical sciences"44. The
winner for Philosophy was Jean-Frangois de Saint-Lambert (1716-1803), with an
essay (Catechisme universel) where he argued for the possibility of reducing the
principles of morals to the natural constitution of the human being, and claimed
that morals themselves have to be the object of a proper science. The overall
impression given by the memoirs of the Analytic Library is well captured by one of
its many anonymous contributors, who wrote: "everything announces the near fall
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of the Republic of Letters, and the universal monarchy of the exact and natural
sciences".
The new series of the Analytic Library (now Analytic Library of Education and
Public Utility) edited under the protection of Matteo Galdi, was opened by another
very interesting epistemological essay on the "advancements of human spirit"45.
The general assumption was that "all ideas are linked to each other, so that human
knowledge appears as a single object, the only variable depending on the point of
view from which it is considered"46. The knowledge of the physicist, the
mathematician, the ideologist, the moralist, the legislator, and the physiologist
support and enlighten each other, in a way which does not present a stable
hierarchical order. Relations among different branches of knowledge are presented
by an analysis of "modes", "means" and "objects" of human knowledge. As for the
"modes", we read that human knowledge is not obtained through a "rude" and
"passive" empiricism, but through experience plus reason, as it has been shown by
the "philosophy of experience", which "frees man from the chains of empiricism,
and provides him with deduction and the method of generalization"47. Models, to
this extent, are Epicurus, Locke and Kant (the editors seem to know Kant's
philosophy mainly through French translations). As for the "means" to acquire
knowledge, we read that all human faculties have to be contemporaneously
employed. The segregation of faculties and their specific use to acquire specific
knowledge, i.e. the basis of the Reactionary Catholic system of knowledge, and the
theoretical justification for apologetic empiricism, are decidedly rejected. Senses
and imagination have to mix in order to produce good science. "Philosophy", we
are told, "must not limit itself to the spectacle of nature, and to the dry enumeration
of the parts which compound it; all its efforts are fruitless if for each phenomenon
one does not look for its productive causes". "Let us concede human genius the
right to freely proceed then", and if the mathematician must certainly contemplate
"intellectual truths", he should not disregard "the illusions of imagination", as
"only the concurrency of all the faculties of human spirit provide us with the
complete means of knowledge". As for the objects of knowledge, we read that
"philosophy is the science of the principles of the relations among things", and
looking for a philosophia prima, i.e. an aggregate of indubitable, absolutely certain
principles, "will always be an erroneous direction to take"48. Note that, in some
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previous remarks, the possibility of reconstructing a body of original pre-Greek
knowledge (i.e. the Christian philosophia perennis) had been decidedly ruled out on
historiographic grounds49. One can only talk of first philosophy referring to the
"analysis of our cognitive means", which is accomplished by following the
ideological schemes of Tracy and Cabanis, and by introducing Kant's criticism.
Tracy's division of philosophy into ideology, grammar, and logic is adopted, with
ideology being the study of our sensible perceptions and the "foundation of every
other science", as every intellectual function is a mere "function" of perception; the
relation between the moral and the physical spheres is strict, and its modality is that
presented by Cabanis50. Grammar is the study of human systems of signs: "artificial
signs are necessary to the formation of most of our ideas" the editors argue, so that
through grammar one can investigate the very processes of generation of our ideas.
Logic studies "the procedures of our intelligence", after the fashion of Locke,
Condillac, and the ideologists. The traditional view where logic is "the mere art of
deducing consequences from otherwise known principles", is replaced by the new
field of transcendental studies51.
A description of the more recent results in every branch of knowledge is then
offered, with the explicit intent of showing "how everything is related to everything
else in the system of human knowledge, so that pieces of knowledge which seem
very different can take reciprocal advantage from enlightening each other"52.
Morals are not grounded on a divine revelation, but instead on truly universal
principles grounded in the eternal nature of human beings (Filangieri and Pagano
are cited); its laws emanated from individual human reason, and are related to the
"organization" of our being (our needs, our feelings). Economics "depends entirely
on morals"53; "it has been argued that administrators only need good-sense and
matter-of-fact knowledge" (think of the reactionary literature), "but what is this
good sense, after all?" and "what are facts without connections?"; the old view was
simply meant to charge "a restricted number of people" with the administration of
the state54. In reality, "economic truths" are "necessary consequences of the nature
of things", and as such they are knowable by everybody. The link with Neapolitan
reformism is evident and the names of Genovesi, Caracciolo, Grimaldi, Palmieri,
and Delfico are explicitly mentioned. Their common goal was to transform
economy from "an aggregate of empirical observations" into a "science"
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characterised by "connections between ideas, universal principles, and certain
deductions"55. The science of legislation has to be equally based on human nature,
and it should be designed as a single, general and abstract set of norms, banning the
various ancient legislative systems. Much space is devoted to the physical sciences,
which include natural sciences as well as those branches, like astronomy and
mechanics, where in these days "the solution of problems depends more on the
perfection of analysis than on the exactness of observation"56. Laplace's Mechanique
Celeste and Lagrange's mechanics are taken as paradigms in this area of knowledge.
Quoting Laplace, the editors argued for the necessity to integrate empirical
observation with the efforts of the human imagination ("the flights of human
reason" Flauti would say): the mere collection of facts would produce a "sterile
nomenclature", not a science. It is "higher mathematics" applied to "the results of
experience that can perfect the work of physics by expressing through calculus the
universal laws of nature"57. Analysis is not an imperfect, artificial, external
apparatus which can "cover" nature, but the only instrument to capture with
precision the true universal laws. The two-hundred page essay ended up by
reporting the latest achievements of analysis. Geometry was defined as "an entirely
human creation", and a Kantian account was provided for the certainty of its truths,
mixed with an ideological reconstruction of the processes through which we obtain
the idea of "extension" out of experience. "As a consequence" the editors say,
"preference should be certainly given to analytic methods, and the excellence of the
method of projections should be recognized by everyone". And indeed, "how easy
the task in coordinate geometry is!" Application of algebra to the theory of curves is
"one of the most fruitful connections ever made in science"58. As for the calculus, it
has finally found its sound foundations in algebra, thanks to Lagrange, so that its
rigour is now "not inferior to that of the ancient demonstrations"59. The science of
calculus is certain and "applies to everything"; the "languages" that it uses are
"useful scientific instruments"; and ultimately, it is part of that "universal grammar,
which provides it —as any other part of our knowledge— with its own certainty".
Those who claim that the new methods are uncertain are not only wrong, but they
are also "hindering the progress of science"60. It was very much a revival of late
eighteenth century sensationalist ideology, with the insertion of themes from
Kantian criticism. Kant could indeed be used to complete and improve the
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transcendental analysis of human understanding which had interested Genovesi
and the French and Neapolitan ideologists. In such a theoretical framework,
Neapolitan intellectuals supporting the modernization of the country could, once
again, group together and exercise their pressure on a well-disposed government.
7.4 Ottavio Colecchi: Analysis, Kant and Liberalism
Colecchi's 1810 memoir in the Analytic Library showed once again to the Neapolitan
public the subversive potential of mathematics. For the first time since 1794,
mathematics as practiced in Fergola's school was openly criticized. The attack hit —
at once — a problem-solving method, a conception of mathematics, a conception of
knowledge, and the hierarchical relation between religion and science. The memoir
earned Colecchi a secondary chair at the Polytechnic School, but also the hate of the
synthetics and a number of enemies, particularly among the ecclesiastics, who were
to take their revenge at the return of the Bourbon.
Colecchi was born in the province of Abruzzi in 1773, and in 1794 he had entered
the Dominican order. He obtained a doctorate in theology, and only afterwards
devoted himself to mathematics and philosophy. In 1809, as monastic orders were
suppressed, Colecchi became a secular priest, but he possibly kept on wearing his
black and white Dominican frock, as this is how he was portrayed later in his life.
By 1809 Colecchi was "a very famous predicant", and he had already given proofs
of his temperament, as we are informed that in 1807 his cell had been searched for
hidden weapons61. In 1810 Colecchi was in Naples, where an abstract of a Latin
work of his on vis viva appeared, and an essay on fractional functions (both in the
Analytic Library). The essay contained an explicit attack against recent works of
Fergola's school, and particularly Fergola's memoir on fractional functions.
Colecchi seemed to be well informed about recent developments in infinitesimal
calculus in Northern Italy and France, and he accused the synthetic school of hardly
making any original contribution to the field. Telesio himself tells us that the very
publication of the 1811 synthetic collection was accomplished in response to
increasing criticisms, in order to prove that modern analysis was not unknown in
Fergola's school. Now, Colecchi was saying that the collection had only made
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things worse for the synthetics and for their famous maestro. A passage is worth
quoting in its entirety:
I fear that Euclid, with his great power, could cause mathematics the same
damage Aristotle caused to philosophy. I agree that we must respect the
father of geometry, and every other ancient geometer; but the exaggerated
deference to synthesis, the servile attachment to the ancient constructions can
indeed damage the progress of these sciences. In fact, it seems that the
damage is becoming evident: while in France Laplace writes the Mecanique
Celeste and the Exposition du Systeme du Monde; Monge writes the Geometrie
Descriptive and the Analise Geometrique; Puissant writes the Geodesie and the
Recueil de diverses propositions where, by means of the method of coordinates,
he solves the hardest problems with a simplicity and an elegance without
comparison; while in France and in Northern Italy these and other valuable
men write such immortal works, here in Naples one discusses about the
"problems of contacts", and a new property of the triangle; or about the
method of inscribing a triangle in a circle whose sides pass through three
given points; and one writes with didactic rigor a memoir on fractional
functions and their reduction to partial functions, enriching these and other
similar jokes with scholia and notes.
Colecchi continued declaring that he was looking forward to the publication of the
Heuristic Art of Fergola's, as this work "will let the foreign countries know that even
in Naples mathematics is cultivated, repairing the unfavorable impression which
could be given by the already published works, which never exceeded mediocrity".
Colecchi's ironical remarks were welcomed by the editors of the journal, who
encouraged him to continue his research, showing that mathematics was profitably
studied even "far from the capital". In 1811 Colecchi was invited to join the new
Societa Pontaniana, where he read a memoir on the principle of minimal action. In
1812 Colecchi published a second mathematical memoir in the Analytic Library62,
and he became secondary professor of Sublime Calculus at the Polytechnic School;
note that this topic had been previously taught to military officers by members of
Fergola's school. Colecchi declared that he used to teach calculus "with the new
method of the analytic functions"63. In 1814 his textbooks of analytic geometry and
differential and integral calculus were published by the Polytechnic School.
With Colecchi's teaching, made possible by the editors of the Analytic Library, the
Neapolitan analytic school was born to its difficult life. Links with the previous
analytic tradition of the 1790s were many, and not only at the level of ideas. So, for
instance, directing the Topographical Office —which was related to the Corps of
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Engineers, we find Ferdinando Visconti (1772-1845), a former Jacobin conspirator
who had studied mathematics with Annibale Giordano. He, like many other ex-
Jacobins, had re-entered Naples in 1806, to be offered a place in the French
administration. And with ex-Jacobins came French and North Italian analytic
textbooks: the "invasion" denounced by Flauti. To the eyes of Fergola's pupils it
was no time for compromise, and the strongest resistance was organized. It is again
Telesio who tells us about the episode of a North Italian professor who reached
Naples in 1807 hoping to get a place from the French government, as he was a
convinced analytic. He visited Fergola's school, where he was offered a
demonstration of the "Greek-like" ability by the pupils, in a contest which seems to
be a prelude to the disfida of 183964. In its own way, this apologetic narration tell us
something important: the school, after a decade of easy life felt attacked by the
educational policy of the new government, by the new foreign textbooks that now
freely entered the kingdom, and by "strangers", who took posts away from the
pupils of the once omnipotent Fergola. Indeed, the reform of public education
directed by the former Jacobin Matteo Galdi was following the theoretical
indications provided by authors such as abbe Cestari. If this program had been
completed, mathematics as taught by the synthetics would be pushed out of public
institutions. Murat's suicidal campaign in Northern Italy, and his summary
execution by a Bourbon platoon (1815) prevented this from being the case.
Let us continue to follow Colecchi through this complex period of Neapolitan
history. In 1816 he asked for a promotion to a primary chair, but this was refused by
the restored Bourbon government. Disappointed, Collecchi left his post that very
year and went to Rome, accepting the invitation of the Dominican order to teach
theology at their college. Through the Dominican order Colecchi then went to Saint
Petersburg, where he taught philosophy and tutored the children of Tzar Nicholas I.
In 1818 his name was among those of the members of the Imperial Academy of
Sciences of Saint Petersburg. Colecchi was back in the kingdom in 1819, employed
as professor at the Royal College of Aquila, in Abruzzo. We already know about the
reactionary turn which followed the constitutional government of 1820-21; Colecchi
was one of its many victims. In fact he was not suspected (as some biographers
seem to believe) of directly participating in the liberal insurrection; his dismissal
was rather based on "philosophical" reasons. The intransigent bishop of Aquila and
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the provincial intendente — Canosa in person— considered his teaching dangerous
for public order: "Colecchi" reported the bishop to the special tribunal in Naples,
"has shown a decided inclination for the pestiferous and abominable philosophy of
Gante [Kant], which is subversive of all morals". Canosa reported that Colecchi had
on one occasion spoken so "to offend the decency and the purity of morals", and
that "the one who diffuses such free principles in religious matters is not
apprprpiate to teach the youth"65. Colecchi was fired, and for a while he taught
privately in the province. Only in 1831 was he authorized to teach mathematics in
Naples at a private studio. In 1833 his name was among the candidates for a chair of
Descriptive Geometry at the Military School; but Reactionary Catholics being still
politically strong at that time, and Francesco Colangelo being minister of education,
his possibilities of success were low: indeed the old accusation of atheism was
remembered, and his application rejected. On that occasion, Colangelo
substantiated his report by attributing to Colecchi the claim that the existence of
God could not be proved, neither a priori nor through the contemplation of nature.
To the bishop and to the police this meant that, even without being a liberal
conspirator (carbonaro), Colecchi "thought as such". His way of thinking was judged
"deranged and perilous", contrary to reason and "to the arguments of the
apologists of the Christian revelation". This "monstrous absurdity" defended by
Colecchi confirmed suspicions about his "incredulity" and made him "very
pernicious to the youth, particularly in a military institution". His "irreligious
thought" and his arguing for "liberal principles" was confirmed again by the
bishop of Aquila, self-proclaimed defender of "religion and the throne". Colecchi
was relegated to the margin of scientific life because of his "immorality" and
alleged atheism, which were linked to his Kantianism. In fact Colecchi had been a
sensationalist, follower of Locke and Condillac until around 1818. During his
travels back from Russia, he had sojourned in Germany where he could study
Kant's original works: he was among the first Italians to read Kant in German and
to master Kantian criticism. His monstrous error was, essentially, the same as the
philosopher-reformers and of the Jacobin intellectuals: the secularization of
knowledge, and the adoption of methodological individualism. During the 1830s
Colecchi, strictly controlled by Bourbon police66, wrote much of his philosophical
work, and some other mathematical memoirs. In 1843 he collected these essays in a
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three-volume book, but the publication was interrupted by the intervention of
censorship. Probably dating from this period there are a couple of anonymous
satirical sonnets where Colecchi is defined as a "haughty mathematician", an
"apostate", "ambitious", and as atheist as Epicurus and Rousseau. One sonnet
concluded: "where is your science? / Where is that necessary basis of honor and
piety?/ There is no knowledge in this world without God!"67.
The accusation of atheism raised against Colecchi in 1821, in 1833, and again in
1843 —when the publication of his major work was interrupted by religious
authority, has been presented by historians as a calumny launched by his
"enemies" (i.e. exponents of Reactionary Catholic clergy). In support of this
"minimalist" interpretation, material attesting Colecchi's faith has been also
provided. The point is that one can certainly believe in the sincerity of Colecchi's
faith without accepting such a superficial reconstruction of this important episode.
If the accusation of atheism was possibly false, the reasons for the conflict between
the Christianity of Colecchi and that defended by Reactionary Catholics were
instead very real and deep ones. It was not a question of a single episode, but of the
entire philosophical and scientific activity of Colecchi. Colecchi was, since 1810, the
most representative exponent of the analytic approach to mathematics in Naples,
well-known also outside the restricted mathematical community. His authority
among young students of philosophy made him most dangerous to those who
opposed his ideas. In the first phase of his career, the most "mathematical" one,
Colecchi defended analysis against Fergola and his school; the philosophical
grounds of this defense were philosophical sensationalism, ideology and the belief
that human reason is self-sufficient to make sense of empirical reality, i.e. to
discover the true laws of nature and to provide rational laws for society. Like abbe
Cestari and the Jacobin priests before him, Colecchi never rejected his faith, but he
rigidly separated the sphere of personal religious belief from that of objective
knowledge, where individual reason is sovereign. In the end, Colecchi's
mathematical practice and his political liberalism were both founded on one and
the same philosophical perspective, which he shared with the editors of the Analytic
Library. Now, I suggest that also Colecchi's interest in Kantian criticism can be
explained by referring to the same unitary perspective: criticism provided him with
powerful intellectual resources to strengthen his own views on the role of human
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reason in the construction of knowledge and society. More precisely, criticism
provided Colecchi with what seemed to be more effective arguments to support the
thesis of the autonomy and self-sufficiency of reason, replacing the old-fashioned
(in the 1830s) ideological analysis of human understanding. The Neapolitan
philosopher Colecchi attacked in his writing was the anti-Kantian Pasquale
Galluppi (1770-1846)68, a protege of the ultra-conservative politician Giuseppe Ceva
Grimaldi; significantly, Galluppi was preferred to Colecchi for a chair in philosophy
at the RUN. Galluppi in philosophy and Fergola's school in mathematics: with such
enemies, no wonder that Colecchi's academic life was all but simple.
The philosophical-theological interpretation of the attacks against Colecchi is
also supported by the contents of an essay which appeared in 1844, in a periodical
entitled Science and faith (Religious, scientific, literary and artistic collection, which shows
how human knowledge supports Catholic religion). The periodical, founded in 1841 by
the ecclesiastic Gaetano Sanseverino (1811-1865)69, was the official expression of the
new-born Neapolitan Neo-Scholasticism, and the first periodical of its kind in
Italy70. Contributions concentrated on the crucial topic of current theological debate:
the relations between individual reason, revealed religion and the structure of
society. The goal of the periodical was to continue, with renewed intellectual
resources, the anti-modern campaign of early Reactionary Catholicism. As the
publication of Colecchi's complete philosophical works was interrupted, the editors
of Science and faith pointed out his "metaphysical and moral" errors to their public.
They replied in this way to "those journals" (i.e. The progress) which had "greatly
praised" the first two volumes of the work, and had suggest its reading "to the
educated youth"71. The editors did not delve into Colecchi's version of
Kantianism72; instead they remarked —correctly— that the basics of Kant's theory
of knowledge were fully accepted by Colecchi, so that he concluded that every
sound science must be grounded on synthetic a priori judgements. This, they said,
is precisely what "our illustrious fellow-citizen Galluppi [...] has always fought [...]
making it impossible for Kantianism to consolidate its positions in Italy" (Galluppi
is defined as "a philosopher dear to every sincere Catholic")73. The editors note that,
according to Colecchi, the notions of space, time, substance, and cause are not
obtained from experience as "they are proper to the thinking subject", and that they
are sufficient (Colecchi rejected Kantian categories) for the synthesis of sensible
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intuitions. Furthermore, the three "absolute ideas" of myself, world and God are
introduced as a need of reason itself, something it admits in order to build its
system of knowledge, but they have no reality apart from that. The editors
recognized in Colecchi the same fundamental error they had already discovered in
Kant: according to his theory of knowledge individual reason is autonomous and
self-sufficient in its construction of the entire edifice of knowledge; it is the ground
of natural laws as it is the ground of moral laws, so that "moral laws do not depend
on God, but instead the existence of God is deduced by the existence of moral
laws"; God himself is a concept, an "idea" without any real referent. And about the
soul, one cannot know anything about its immateriality and immortality. In fact,
Colecchi defined human reason as "autonomous and legislative"74. Particular
attention is given to the conception of moral laws, as Colecchi sees them followed
spontaneously by human beings, whereas the editors stressed that they are
essentially "commands". These are seen as "most grave and fatal errors", common
in different ways to "German rationalists" a la Kant and to "French
progressionists"75. According to the editors, Colecchi had proved to be an enemy of
the "restoration of Italian and Catholic philosophy", and he was most dangerous
because "he is so renowned, which makes us fear that his errors are very
detrimental for studious youth". Backed by Reactionary Catholic clergy, by the time
of the attack on Colecchi, Sanseverino had successfully transformed the Thomistic
theory of knowledge in the official response of Neapolitan Church to secularized
scientific knowledge. In 1846 Sanseverino founded the Academy of Thomistic
Philosophy; he also began to teach Logic and Metaphysics at the Archiepiscopal
College. Meanwhile, in 1839, the old Archiepiscopal Academy had re-opened under
the aegis of the Scholastic methodology. Here we see a Neo-Scholasticism
flourishing which was to have important consequence on Catholic culture world¬
wide. The cultural and political implications of this early Neo-Scholasticism are
clear enough; let us just note that Sanseverino wrote to defend the thesis that "the
relation of the sovereign with his subjects are similar to the relations of God with
the world, and of soul with the body"76. The weakness of individual reason was
weakness in front of God, in front of political authority, in front of nature; political
dissent and pro-constitutional manifestations were no more legitimate than the
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moral "monstrosities" of Kantianism, or the imaginary constructions of the haughty
analytic mathematician.
We can now conclude our remarks on Colecchi. Between 1836 and 1840 Colecchi
published eleven memoirs in The progress. He treated the philosophical question of
analysis and synthesis (in a Kantian framework), the "laws of thought", the process
of mathematical induction, the moral laws, the philosophy of Victor Cousin, and the
mathematical question of the properties of a certain geometrical surface (which he
investigated through descriptive geometry). Through the use of Kantian
transcendentalism Colecchi had dissolved the opposition of analysis and synthesis
as it had been presented by the synthetic school. Interestingly, Colecchi also argued
that the principle of mathematical induction was as a safe and rigorous way to
reach mathematical truths (it yields "necessary consequences", like any other
principle employed in mathematical proofs), so that it can be used in analytic
research77. Meanwhile, Colecchi did not conceal his inclination for liberal ideas, and
it was a fact that many among his students were implicated in political trials before
and after the upheaval of 1848. His visits to the political prisoners at the fortress of
Castelnuovo were later described as crucial to the morale of Neapolitan liberals78.
Colecchi died in 1847, and his funeral was the occasion for a political demonstration
of liberal students.
7.5 Other Members of the Analytic School
Colecchi was not alone in his battle. On the philosophical side he was soon joined
by liberally-oriented students of German transcendentalism (Hegel was rapidly
becoming popular in Naples); in mathematics his analytic views were brought to
success by the engineer-mathematicians of the special schools. Among the early
well-known analytically inclined teachers were Salvatore de Angelis (1789-1850)
and Francesco Paolo Tucci (1790-1875). They both taught at the School of
Application, and they also ran a private studio of mathematics, which attracted
around two-hundred students in the 1820s, and which can be considered the core of
the analytic school. The studio "employed books and ideas arriving from abroad,
and it followed the new scientific methods, leaving the ancient forms to embrace
the modern ones, so that it was the antithesis of the school of Flauti, Giannattasio,
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and Scorza"79. I have not found any printed works by Angelis, but his didactic
ability was highly regarded among the following generations of engineers-
mathematicians. He taught at the Military School from 1815 and, in 1819, he began
to teach also at the School of Application (Applied Mathematics, using as textbook
the analytic mechanics by Venturoli). He was member of the Accademia Pontaniana
and, later, he entered the RAS. He edited and wrote the notes for an edition of the
Algebra by Lacroix, a textbook favored by analytics. More is known about the work
of Tucci, who had been studying at Fergola's private studio between 1808 and 1811.
Amodeo made an interesting remark on the young Tucci:
The strong group of Fergola's pupils, led by Flauti, that is to say the synthetics,
never mentioned Tucci as one of them, but we have found evidence of his
attending Fergola's evening meetings, together with Flauti, Scorza and others.
Thus, we can conclude that, more than other of Fergola's pupils, he was
induced by his temperament to leave synthesis for modern analysis; as early
as 1812 he had indeed manifested his inclination for Lagrange's analytic
geometry.80
This episode, which reminds us of Giordano's "betrayal" in 1790, can possibly help
us to make sense of two memoirs Tucci published in 1812, which seem to point in
opposite directions. One was a synthetic solution for a problem which Lagrange
thought was very difficult to solve through pure geometry, and it was addressed to
"the estimators of the geometry of the ancients"81. In the second, Tucci chose a
classical locus problem — that of the four spheres — which since Montucla had been
defined as one where the application of modern analysis was particularly difficult,
and solved it a la Lagrange82. Tucci offered a solution "deduced from the basic
principles of the method of the coordinates", which permitted a "complete
examination" of all the possible cases and the extension of the solution to analogous
cases such as that of three circles. In 1812 Tucci also read a synthetic memoir at the
Societa Pontaniana, where he provided a solution to some problems relative to conic
curves and to the surfaces originated by their rotation83. In this memoir, he showed
he was able to master the techniques of geometrical analysis, as should be expected
from a pupil of Fergola, but at the same time he accomplished a very subtle apology
for algebraic analytic methods, as he provided in footnotes the relative analytic
solutions, which are said to be simpler and very general (applicable to any kind of
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curve); so that the reader is forced to conclude that the analysis of the ancients can
be an interesting and beautiful exercise whose result are, nevertheless, very limited.
And when it came to provide solutions for the different possible cases, Tucci chose
only a few of them, because to provide a complete solution would mean "to solve
ten different problems". In his conclusion Tucci noted that "to complete the theory
of the planes tangent to the surfaces generated by the rotation of conic curves
around their primary axes" a certain very general problem should be solved, but
this would be impossible to solve according to the methods of the ancients as its
degree is superior to the fourth (whereas an analytic solution is presented in
footnote).
The publications and the memoir enabled Tucci to received his first
appointments by the French government in 1813. They were at the Polytechnic
School and at the Military School (of which he was later to become director). In 1818
Tucci published an essay entitled "The problems of the circle and the three points
solved with analytic method and generalized to the other conic curves"; it was, once
again, the old problem of Cramer. After the brilliant synthetic solution provided by
Giordano, the problem had been treated by other members of Fergola's school and
by the French Carnot and Luhilier. In 1810 a very simple analytic solution had been
presented by Gergonne in the first volume of his Annales des Mathematicjues, and six
years later he generalized it to the case of the parabola. In 1817 Poncelet replied that
analysis could not provide solutions whose elegance and simplicity was superior to
those provided by purely geometrical methods, giving rise to an intense
controversy over geometrical methods in France which presented many analogies
with the Neapolitan one. Poncelet defended the use of geometrical methods which
never lose of sight the particular figure; whereas Gergonne praised the generality of
solutions provided by purely analytic methods. The exchanges of the French debate
were read with interest in Naples84; and Tucci's essay of 1818 was indeed a version
of Gergonne's solution to the problem of Cramer.
In 1823 Tucci published an memoir where he analytically solved a problem
concerning triangular pyramids whose ancient synthetic solution had been recently
"divinised" by Scorza85. In this piece, dedicated to the students of the Military
School and of the School of Application, Tucci argued that the elegance of algebraic
reasoning was not inferior to that of synthetic reasoning. In 1823 Tucci also read an
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important analytic memoir at the RAS, but it was not selected for publication in the
acts of the academy (monopolized by Flauti and his colleagues), and it was
eventually published as an independent opuscule in 182585. In 1832 he published a
major work on the properties of spiral surfaces, whose practical applications were
relevant in architecture87. In 1843 Tucci published his course of differential and
integral calculus given at the Military School, which seems to follow the lectures by
Claude Navier (1785-1836)88; in the same year he was finally admitted at RAS,
where he replaced Scorza, who had died. At the RAS he presented a number of
analytic memoirs, often in response to questions raised by analytic mathematicians
from Northern Italy; and in 1846 he edited the translation of the Treatise of
Descriptive Geometry by Charles Leroy (1780-1854)89. In 1855 Tucci became professor
at the University of Naples, where he continued his activity well beyond the fall of
the kingdom.
In the 1820s, the course of mathematics offered at the private studio of de
Angelis and Tucci lasted three years. During the first year students were taught
Plane and Solid Geometry, Arithmetic, and Algebra (up to second degree
equations) by de Angelis; in the second year they studied Complements of Algebra,
Calculus (Tucci), Trigonometry, Two and Three Coordinate Analysis, (de Angelis).
The last year was devoted to applied mathematics, and main subjects were
Mechanics (de Angelis), Complements of Calculus, Descriptive Geometry (Tucci).
De Angelis offered a complementary course in Hydraulics, using the analytic
textbook by Venturoli; other textbooks used at the studio were the arithmetic by
Amante; the geometry by Legendre; the analytic geometry, algebra and calculus by
Lacroix, which was later replaced with the calculus by Navier and finally by that of
Tucci; the mechanics by Venturoli, and the descriptive geometry by Leroy. About
one hundred students entered the first class every year (against around thirty
entering Fergola's studio); among them were Fortunato Padula and Giuseppe
Battaglini, who studied at the studio to prepare for the examination of admission to
the School of Application. After the death of Angelis, Battaglini taught at the studio;
meanwhile other studios were strengthening the analytic tradition, with such
young teachers as Padula and d1Andrea. Interestingly Amodeo remarked that these
studios, centering their teaching on calculus, mechanics, and applied mathematics
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damaged the progress of mathematics in Naples, as "they prevented great minds
from applying to higher studies", i.e. pure mathematics90.
In addition to the School of Application and to the private studios, the Military
School was a center of diffusion of the analytic approach. Tucci was director of the
institute during the last years of the Kingdom, whereas Padula taught Rational
Mechanics. Teachers from the college played an active role during the 1848 liberal
insurrection and in the ranks of the constitutional government, so that they were
expelled by the Bourbons in 1849. Among them were interesting figures of liberal
and patriotic mathematicians such as Carlo d'Andrea (1802-1885), who had been
privately teaching Superior Algebra since 1827, and had a chair at the School of
Application since 1829 (Hydraulic Architecture, then Applied Mechanics). Andrea
published his lectures of mechanics and theory of machines (1836), and textbooks of
arithmetic and algebra. Also expelled in 1849 was Carlo Rocco, who wrote a
textbook of geometry (Catechismo di matematiche) whose interesting historical
introduction presents the works of Maurolico, Desargues, Pascal, Borrelli, noting
what was "modern" in them, and claiming that the superstitious respect for the
ancients was retarding the progress of mathematics. Mathematicians like Andrea
and Rocco, professors in the technical schools, teaching applied mathematics,
sustaining liberal ideas in politics, and favorable to the process of unification of the
Italian nation under a constitutional monarchy, were the indeed typical figures of
supporters of the analytic trend. Also suspended was Ernesto Capocci (1798-1864),
"fierce political antagonist of Flauti"91, and Director of the Astronomical
Observatory of Naples, who had hosted in his house meetings of Neapolitan
liberals. His assistants Antonio Nobile (1794-1863) and Giuseppe Battaglini (1826-
1894) were also suspended. They were all re-instated and given posts at the
university after the fall of the Bourbon monarchy. Among those of the "third
generation of analytics" were many former pupils of Padula: Vincenzo Janni (1819-
1891), professor of algebra at the Naval Academy from 1844 and patriot fighter
during 1848; Camillo Zocchi (1817-1850) engineer and translator of Legendre's
geometry and Lacroix's trigonometry (1841 and 1840 respectively); and Raffaele
Rubirii (1817-1890), who had studied at the School of Application and was teaching
calculus and mathematical physics in the Royal College of Lecce when, in 1849, he
was fired for political reasons. In 1851 Rubini wrote a textbook of analytic geometry
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dedicated to his maestro Padula and, in 1861 with the fall of the Bourbons, he was
called to teach mechanics at the university, and he was charged with writing new
textbooks for the secondary schools, as the monopoly of Flauti's books had been
finally abolished. Lastly, let us consider the case of Achille Sannia (1822-1892),
pupil of Angelis and Tucci and engineer of the Corp of Bridges and Roads. He
perfected his mathematical studies with Andrea, and in 1853 he was teaching three-
coordinate geometry at the School of Application; in 1856 he opened a successful
private studio (subjects taught were: arithmetic, algebra, trigonometry, analytic
geometry at two and three coordinate, infinitesimal calculus, descriptive geometry,
and rational mechanics). He was known to the police since 1848 as a "republican,
and one able to harangue the people"; and indeed he conspired in favor of the
unification of the kingdom to the Italian state. After 1860 he was responsible for
public education in Naples, director of the School of Application (1863), and was an
eminent Italian mathematician for twenty years.
7.6 The Engineer and his Enemies: Ideology of Progress versus
Conservative Utopia
Like other contemporary cultural and artistic phenomena, the controversy over
geometrical methods can be properly understood only against the background of
the momentous social process which we called the "modernization" of the country.
Such a process, which had been suddenly accelerated by the administrative reforms
of the French government, continued under the restored Bourbons, in spite of the
resistance offered by important sectors of Neapolitan society. The 1820s and 1830s
saw an intense clash between the party of the moderns and a fierce conservative
reaction. By the 1840s, the political relevance of the Reactionary Catholic option had
definitely faded, as had certain other cultural phenomena which had accompanied
its rise, such as the synthetic school of geometry or the School of Posillipo, an
artistic movement which had renewed landscape painting in Naples.
In 1815, the restoration of the Bourbons maintained much of the centralized
structure of the state, as it suited the absolutist ambitions of the Crown.
Furthermore, from Vienna there were clear indications about the necessity of
maintaining at their place most of the personnel of the French administration. Prime
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Minister Luigi de' Medici was the symbol of the so-called "politica dell'amalgama"
(1815-1820), contested by Canosa and his ultra-reactionary fellows. However there
were institutions which were so intrinsically representative of the French spirit
which could not remain untouched: first of all the School of Application and the
Polytechnic School. The Corps of Bridges and Roads and its School were both
abolished in 1817, to be replaced by a General Directory of Bridges and Roads (with
no school annexed), which largely restored the pre-1806 situation92. The new
institution was characterized by the suppression of the professional figure of the
inspector, by a drastic reduction of the personnel (from sixty-nine engineers to
fifteen), and by the precarious juridical condition of the engineer —as civil
engineers could be employed with short-term contracts, with no guarantees about
the continuity of their job. The function of the Corps was reduced to that of
controlling single public works, the administration of funds and the general control
being appointed to the Provincial Deputations for Public Works. The Bourbon
reforms hit the autonomy and the efficiency of the Body; they also diminished the
distinctive expertise of its members by eliminating the School and employing
external elements with temporary contracts. Note also that the real decisions were
not taken any more by the Corps and the Minister of Interior, but by the "provincial
deputation", which was an expression of the interests of local elites. The Corps was
in fact the battlefield for the fight between the supporters of a strong central
government and those of the intermediate bodies. No figure was more
representative of the central government than the engineer of bridges and roads,
who planned new public works without considering the opinion of local
authorities. Around 1817, after years of centralizing action, the pendulum had
shifted in favor of local elites, slowing down the entire process of modernization. In
the Bourbon plans the Direction should be a flexible instrument to solve different
problems one after the other, depending on the contingent financial situation, the
idea of a unifying plan of public works for the entire kingdom being put aside. "The
omnipresent role assigned to the director" it has been remarked, "would have
hardly promoted a dynamic and active program"93.
Already in 1818 it was evident that a School of Application was in fact needed.
The new institution differed from the previous one by its elite character, the
payment of a monthly fee being introduced. Furthermore, the economic treatment
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of the engineers had worsened and their social position was markedly diminished.
Under the French, the figure of the engineer had been attributed social prestige and
economical benefits, so that "the engineer had become, even in the south [of Italy],
an official whose dignity was equal to that of the officials with a traditional
rhetorical-juridical culture, and his job assumed a stable nature and a primary
relevance for the national interests"94. Conversely, the Bourbon administration
tended to undermine the authority and the autonomy of these "technicians".
The necessity to return to the original autonomy and professionalism of the
Corps was upheld with energy by Carlo Afan de Rivera, who became Director of
the Corps in 1824. His ideas were partially accepted in the important 1826 reform,
which provided stability and order to the institution and restored its special school.
Nevertheless, it has been rightly pointed out that "the Corps, because of its atypical
nature, could not find a stable position in the framework of the Bourbon
bureaucracy". On the other hand I believe it is misleading to say that the isolation of
the Corps in the context of Bourbon administration made evident "the limits of the
awareness with which the ruling classes of the south faced problems of
modernization"95. As the resistance to late eighteenth century economic and
administrative reformism could not simply be attributed to the "ignorance" of
peasants and government, so the resistance to early nineteenth-century
modernization cannot be attributed to some lack of awareness of the ruling classes.
In the first case, we noted that very concrete interests were pressing for the
maintenance of the feudal-communal systems, and against innovations such as
those introduced by Domenico Grimaldi. In the second case, we can rely on the
work of social historian Paul Davies, who has shown how the restricted financial
and commercial community of the capital had changed during the French period,
so that during the restoration age a new group of wealthy investors had complete
control over the underdeveloped economy of the kingdom. Convincingly, Davis
argued that the backward conditions of the provincial countryside, which was still
in a semi-feudal condition, were the very thing which allowed these investors safe
and conspicuous earnings. The Bourbons themselves were chronically indebted to
Neapolitan bankers, so that a decided impulse in the direction of modernization
could hardly be expected from the Crown. The interests of these "entrepreneurs of
backwardness", cumulated with the feudal reaction, and with the opposition of
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local elites to handing their power over to the central government, constituted a
serious obstacle for supporters of modernization (mostly professionals, bourgeois
landowners, military officers, and ex-members of the French administration).
Traces of the pressure to close down the School of Application are numerous. We
know, for instance, from an article in The Progress, that in 1835 Rivera had organized
a public exhibition of models and projects to show the skills acquired by the
students96. The anonymous correspondent of The Progress did not simply defend the
School, but he also accomplished an interesting apology for the figure of the
engineer-civil servant97. Engineering, we are told, derives from the tendency to
satisfy our natural needs but it needs substantial support for the government, given
that "there doesn't exist any other profession which needs, besides talent and study,
books and machines that a private individual can hardly afford"98. After presenting
the structure of the courses and the principal textbooks, the author reported on "the
public demonstration" which took place between the 6th and 13th of March 1835,
where students presented their projects to "a very distinguished and competent
audience". There were projects for new harbors, new prisons and suspension
bridges. Students also gave conferences on problems of mechanics, hydraulic and
descriptive geometry. The real reasons for this demonstration of competence were
only touched upon by the author, when he wrote, referring to the curriculum of the
School, that
the acquisition of so much knowledge in so short a period of time could
appear improbable to some people; so the illustrious General Director,
following a deliberation of S.E. the Minister of Finance, has been forced, this
year, to provide a clear and public demonstration.99
Pressure on the minister of Finance, who controlled the School during the
Restoration age, had been so strong that nothing less than a public demonstration of
competence and efficiency had to be organized by Rivera. However, the author
concluded with a note of optimism: "These intelligent and educated minds will
produce marvelous products, which will make our country not inferior to the most
educated and richest regions of Europe"100.
If Rivera was the authoritative defender of a centralized and rational planning of
public works, Giuseppe Ceva Grimaldi, Marquis of Pietracatella (1777-1862), soon
became the voice of the conservative opposition. We already met Ceva Grimaldi as
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protector of the anti-Kantian philosopher Galluppi; now we can add that he was an
important men of state, who represented at the highest political level the ideas of
the Reactionary Catholic movement. He had received a solid classical education at a
religious college, which is evident in his translations of Ovid and Horatius, and in
his erudite-rhetorical way of writing, at odds with Rivera's streamlined style. In
charge of administrating the feudal possessions of the family, he kept a low profile
under the 1799 republic, while in 1800 he was a member of the commission for the
re-ordering of public education. Retired to private life during the French period,
Grimaldi began his political career in 1815, when the restored king nominated him
intendente. He administered the most crucial provinces, at a moment when liberal
conspiracies were increasing, agreeing with the repressive views of Canosa. A book
of his, worth mentioning here, was Reflections on the Police (1817), where Grimaldi
proved to be a scrupulous reader of Beccaria, Helvetius, Montesquieu and Voltaire,
even if his arguments were decidedly reactionary, as he ultimately charged police
with directing the "public spirit" towards the return to "the old way of thinking".
After the constitutional insurrection of 1820, Grimaldi's career advanced rapidly
until he reached the ministry of the interior and of public education in 1830. His
political action was mainly devoted to decreasing the pressure on the lowest classes
by means of paternalistic decisions such as the lowering of the prices of wheat; he
never thought of a general reform of Neapolitan economy, and he rather
complained about the abolition of the medieval guilds, which offered protection to
workers, and blamed entrepreneurs for the worsening of their conditions of life101.
About his action in education, we can remember that in 1831 he gave the chair of
Logic and Metaphysics to Galluppi, who had not even taken part in the contest;
and that he opposed the 1838 project of reform, arguing that elementary education
and colleges should be simply given to the religious orders. Grimaldi was then
president of the Consulta Generale del Regno, an important administrative and
juridical organ at the time of the clash with Rivera. In 1840 he became prime
minister, giving a repressive character to the action of the government. He left
politics when in 1848, the revolution ravaging Naples, King Ferdinando II decided
to concede the constitution.
In the debate between Rivera and Grimaldi, the essence of the centralizing
reforms was at stake. The Corps was obviously a crucial point, as it was designed
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to be a powerful instrument to subtract the effective control of the territory to
provincial local elites. Reading his pamphlets, it looks as if Grimaldi suspected that
the Corps could, through its autonomy from the rest of the administration, threaten
the authority of the government, possibly by supporting liberal activity. The liberal
orientation of the majority of the engineers is a fact; nevertheless it seems to me
that there was a deeper menace which Grimaldi, implicitly, wanted to neutralize,
and this was precisely the opposite one, as it was the excessive fidelity of the Corps
to the state, but the state which had been theorized by the French, and which was
defended by Rivera102. Restoring the Corps in its original form would be, for
Grimaldi, another step in the direction of this model of the state103.
Opposite parties had their respective manifestos. In 1832 Rivera collected some
previous studies on political economy and some ambitious technical projects and
published them under the title Considerations about the Means to Revalue the Gifts
Given by Nature to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies104. In 1839 Grimaldi published his
major work on the way to accomplish public works, which was a direct response to
Rivera: Considerations on the Public Works in the Continental Kingdom from the Normans
until Our Days 105. From their very titles, the two works show that they belong to
opposite conceptual frameworks. Rivera stressed the wealth of natural resources
available in the territory of the kingdom, giving no importance whatsoever to their
previous forms of exploitation: he was convinced that nothing useful could be
derived from studying the economic and technological practices of the past, as they
were not guided by truly scientific principles. Rivera was confident that only the
power of modern applied sciences, together with natural resources, could transform
the kingdom into a modern nation. Grimaldi's considerations, on the contrary, focus
upon the long tradition of public works of the previous dynasties. Grimaldi went
back to the Norman domination of Naples, in the early Middle Ages, aiming to
prove that a local and solid tradition in public works had always existed, and that
all that had to be done was to follow the track of the ancestors, whose wisdom was
not inferior to the knowledge provided by modern science. Historical perspective is
essential to both books, but Rivera saw the present as the starting point, the
moment in which, for the first time, a scientific vision of the world was put to work
in political and economic life; whereas Grimaldi saw the present as the product of a
historical process from which social and political institutions received their
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legitimization and authority. Grimaldi found laughable the idea that "our
civilization began at the time of the institution of the Corps of Bridges and
Roads"106. The impression is that his arguments tend to make evident an essential
homogeneity between the present administration and the present social setting with
the previous ones, deleting even the memory of the revolutionary upheaval and of
the French period. It has been remarked that Grimaldi's narrative provided the
reader with a sense of powerless contemplation of an immutable order, so that "in
the restored monotony of the flowing of time, it is impossible to distinguish
between present and future", and the future is something "towards which it is
impossible to project themselves, it being merely an emanation of the past, and the
action of men being marginal in it; men are in fact mere administrators of a reality
which cannot be planned and modified"107. One should also note the structural
analogy between such an argument and the Reactionary Catholic doctrine of the
impossibility of accomplishing any truly innovative change in scientific or
theological knowledge (which was related to the doctrine of philosophia perennis).
Philosophers cannot really escape the choice between supporting the theological-
philosophical tradition or attacking it with the arguments of skeptics and cynics;
administrators cannot really escape the choice between defending the status quo or
destroying it according to the revolutionary principles. In both cases things will
naturally tend to return to their natural setting.
It has been remarked that the clash between Rivera and Grimaldi was not
between two alternative projects of development, as "the use of concepts is so
radically different as to result in reciprocal incomprehensibility"108. I believe,
however, that defining the opposite socio-economic views as "reciprocally
incomprehensible" could be rather misleading. It is true that to Rivera's technical
plans Grimaldi did not oppose different technical plans, but rather a series of
erudite political and historical reflections exclusively based on literary sources. It is
also quite true to say that this purely literary matrix made Grimaldi produce a
description of the past and present state of the kingdom which was "more a
sentimental than a real one"; so that, for instance, "in his reconstruction of the past
every canal of the kingdom was navigable, and every road was practicable". On the
basis of such a highly ideological description of the past, Grimaldi could
confidently argue for the superiority of the administrative institution which had
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preceded the Corps of Engineers, which could in turn be accused of being too
complex and expensive. "Is it really necessary" Grimaldi asked, "to have an
exclusive, privileged Corps of engineers charged with the direction of public
works?"109. The answer was, of course, negative. According to Grimaldi, the works
should be accomplished by engineers chosen by the provinces. The general
argument consisted in keeping at a minimum level the volume of public works, and
in leaving to the local communities the responsibility for their direction.
Interestingly Grimaldi remarked that the construction of railroads should be
avoided because, if they can be "advantageous for trade", they can also be
"advantageous for the enemy" in case of military invasion110. This argument
matched well with the protest of some local governments against the construction
of railroads in the provinces, as they would drain the poorest regions of their
population. "Only the future" Grimaldi wrote, "will clarify all the moral and
political consequences deriving from such a radical change in the system of
communications; but some wise men have already doubts, and foresee dangers"111.
About the plan to give the construction of new roads to specialized companies,
which would be authorized to charge tolls, Grimaldi is ironical: this would be a real
"industrial feudalism" he said. Such are the results of lassez-faire principle, which
seems to "triumph over all the old customs and privileges"112. Grimaldi concludes:
"if someone would consider us too attached to the old things, we would reply:
finding in them some good advice, and returning to them, it is not as mad as it was
the idea of entirely condemning them"113. What does emerge from reading Grimaldi
versus Rivera is the opposition between two models of society, and this is why I
believe that talking of incommensurability is inappropriate. The two adversaries
saw themselves as threatening each other precisely because they recognized all too
well their reciprocal support for such very different models. Every apparently
minor, "technical" point (i.e., the number of the engineers, or the title of a textbook
of mathematics) was debated with a vehemence that can only be justified by
referring to the clear recognition of the opposite underlying social projects. If the
concept of incommensurability somehow enters this story, it is with a very different
function: not as an explanatory category but rather as a rhetorical weapon wisely
used by the actors themselves. Consider Rivera: the legitimization for his dismissal
of the traditional administrative system and of the way public works were
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traditionally accomplished was found in the unprecedented scientific awareness of
the new elite of the engineers. Their knowledge was what separated them from the
rest of the administrators and the rest of society; and this knowledge was based on
the universal language of mathematics. In two words, its was based on the
acquisition of the "analytic spirit", as Padula stated so clearly in the very years of
the controversy over the Corps. Rivera was using knowledge to single out a group
of "experts" who must be guaranteed the monopoly over public works: their
rigidly hierarchical and almost military organization will do the rest, with the final
result of an effective control of the territory by the central government. Once one
has recognized this use of knowledge as legitimating control over previously
autonomous areas, one can also see the modern argument about "lack of
competencies" in all its ideological significance. Rivera's general strategy consisted
in shifting the decision-taking moment to a very "technical" level. Decisions about
public works were taken by chief engineers, and the reasoning leading to their
decisions was presented as essentially mathematical. This means that the decision
process was shifted to a level which was no longer accessible to the members of
local administrations and to old-fashioned politicians: they had no role to play in
planning the new society (exclusion from the relevant administrative decisions was
the issue most commonly raised in the complaints that local administrations sent to
the king in 1820). The new knowledge of the engineers, which was essentially
knowledge of the analytic language, legitimated them to take full control of the
once highly fragmented Neapolitan territory. Not only the sciences had been
unified thanks to analysis: the country was as well. The defensive strategy adopted
by Grimaldi consisted in eliminating the institutional peculiarities of the Corps,
reducing it to a mere branch of administration; this could only be done by de¬
mystifying the dangerous knowledge of the engineers, by showing they were not
the owners of a superior expertise. In fact, if Grimaldi's idyllic description of the
pre-Revolutionary conditions of the kingdom contained mythological elements, no
less mythological was Rivera's description of an idyllic society founded on the land¬
owning bourgeoisie, ruled by a strongly centralized government and directed by
selected groups of experts whose word is ultimate on every question. Grimaldi, for
instance, remarked that the necessary technical ability to build roads and bridges
was certainly not found only in the Corps: many Neapolitan artisans and masons
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were skilled enough to provide the provinces with a wide choice when it came to
accomplishing works on their territory (Grimaldi argued indeed for the need of
breaking the monopoly of the Corps, referring to the British and the American
systems of administration). About the School of Application, Grimaldi proposed to
make it "public", that is to open it to everyone, and "not restricted to a few
initiated" (he also thought that there were too many professors and too few
students) 114. The "initiated" were those students selected by the difficult entrance
exam based, as we have seen, on the knowledge of analysis. It is not difficult to
imagine where ultra-conservatives like Grimaldi looked in order to find cultural
resources to put in question the legitimacy of the mathematical knowledge of the
engineers: an entire battery of arguments was ready-made in the writings of the
synthetic school. In turn, the controversy over the figure of the engineer fuelled
further the controversy over geometrical methods. The 1839 contest would be
hardly understandable without seeing its relevance for the anti-engineers
campaign. But, in the end, for the synthetic school it was more a last blaze than a
return to the scientific scene. Contested as it was, the modernization process was
advancing in the kingdom, and 1840 saw the very significant reform of the
Neapolitan system of weights and measures. We can conclude with some remarks
over this specific controversy.
In Spring 1840, while Flauti was completing his critical comment of Padula's
response to the geometrical contest, the modern party concluded its victorious
battle over the rationalization and unification of the measuring system, whose
tables of reduction were published by Rivera himself115. Previous attempts to unify
Neapolitan measures and weights had been made in the reformist period (1780s)
but we have seen — through the example of Gallipoli's oil merchants— which kind
of interests were entrenched in the discrepancies among the different systems in
use. The French government itself had been able only to plan a reform, which was
never actuated. It was precisely Rivera and his men who managed to achieve this
goal, after a twenty-year campaign (the first plan of reform was dated 1817). A
decisive step had been the proposal presented at the RAS by Visconti in 1828; which
convinced Rivera to introduce —for the use of the Body and of its School— a new
system based on the decimal progression (1830). The system was limited to surface
measures, and its terminology was the old one, based on the Neapolitan palm. A
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decimal system was easier, stated Rivera "and we cannot understand how low
people could be more inclined to calculate in what is, in fact, a more difficult
way"116. A commission, which included Visconti, proposed to extend the use of
Rivera's system to the entire society. The Consulta Generale del Regno, the
administrative organ responsible for such a decision, rejected the proposal in 1837;
its president, at that time, was Grimaldi, who defended his decision by publishing a
book where the Corps and its School were portrayed as a drain on public finance,
and their expertise in matter of weights and measures was explicitly questioned
(1838)117. The story becomes even more interesting when one finds out that in the
same period, a negative judgement over the project of reform was given in a
memoir read at the Accademia Pontaniana by Ferdinando de Luca, eminent member
of the synthetic school and historian of mathematics. This started a polemical
exchange between Visconti and Luca, who eventually published a complete version
of his criticism in 1839118. Meanwhile, in 1838, Rivera had intervened defending
Visconti with an extremely well-documented monograph on measure systems. As
for Grimaldi, he restated his point in his main book on public works published in
1839. In 1838, Grimaldi's Considerations on the Reform of Weights and Measures, was
edited by Flauti himself, who added an introductory essay of his own, and a rich
apparatus of notes119. Grimaldi had in the university professor a powerful ally, who
could authoritatively confirm the "scientific" side of his accusations against the
unifying methods proposed by Visconti, balancing the support of Rivera and his
engineers on the other side. In September 1837, Flauti read with "incredible avidity"
a copy of an essay Grimaldi sent to him as it was printed, and wrote him an
enthusiastic letter120. Flauti was confident that Grimaldi would clarify "the real
sense" of the question, as he was convinced that "this matter is within the
competence of the wise economists, and not of mathematicians, as it is commonly
believed". The boundary-drawing strategy of the synthetic school (pure
mathematics/empirical sciences) is here employed to de-legitimize the knowledge
of the engineers, and their autonomous action. According to Flauti, mathematicians
only began to illegitimately deal with the problem "when a furious freedom, aiming
to renew the human race, tried to destroy every ancient costume and habit". In that
"very unhappy period" a new system of measures was introduced together with
innovations such as a new calendar or the decimal division of the circle ("pernicious
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to the progress of trigonometry"). Only the metric system survived, but just as a
system for scientists. After such a failure, how can it possibly be thought of
introducing such a system to the whole of society? It would "change inveterate
laws and customs, yielding disorder and confusion among the trading countries";
and Flauti can bring the Roman empire as an example of effective integration of a
number of different systems. And indeed, we are told, one of "the good principles
of the difficult art of ruling a country" is precisely that "great novelties are always
dangerous". In particular "the decimal system, which is excellent for the purposes
of calculation", is not equally suitable "for daily trade": intellectual abstractions are
out of place when it comes to the empirical world. What is commendable in pure
mathematics is not necessarily the best choice for practical purposes, where
empirical conditions have to be taken into account. Flauti described this as "an
underdetermined problem", and Visconti presented one of many possible solutions,
which is certainly not "the most proper", as it is too far from tradition. Consider the
fact that, at that time, not only various systems were in use in the kingdom, but that
the same unit of measure could differ sensibly. One of the reasons for this quite
typical ancien regime state of things was the disparity of conditions presented by the
Neapolitan territory. So, for instance, traditional surface measures were related to
the time or the number of people necessary to work the land. Clearly the units used
in the plans and those used in the mountainous regions of the interior could differ.
But similar discrepancies, Flauti observed, "have never caused, to my knowledge,
any harm to landowners or to the government". Flauti concluded his letter
declaring that he "perfectly agree with V.E. that there is no need for altering our
measures", that this alteration could be "dangerous"; and that "if we want to give
some useful and decorous task to our mathematicians" this should be limited to the
exact definition of the Neapolitan palm (without questioning its suitability for
practical uses). In his essay, Flauti explained that Grimaldi defended precisely
"those ideas that I have always had about this matter"121. Flauti also claimed that
his criticism of Visconti's plan went back to 1828, when he firstly reported
negatively to the RAS. And it seems that in the RAS, which Flauti now described as
a "battlefield", a shift of power took place between 1828 and 1838 that had isolated
Flauti, to the advantage of Visconti and his "mob" of "young and inexpert
collaborators" (the first analytics who were entering the institution). Flauti said he
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wanted "no responsibility" for what was published in the acts since the early 1830s
(he clearly did not have a complete control any more). Visconti emerges from
Flauti's remarks as the one who mostly defended the analytics in the RAS; which
also make sense of Visconti's stand against inserting memoirs of pure mathematics
in the acts122. As for Flauti, he had managed to exclude Visconti's 1828 memoir from
the publication in the acts, but in the following years he could not effectively
oppose the work of the commission on the problem of measures, of which Visconti
was part.
Flauti praised the action of Grimaldi as president of the Consulta: decisions
about the administration of society must indeed be taken "not by means of
mathematical abstractions, that are beautiful but limited to the field of intellect, but
looking at the public interest"123. Visconti should know how much difference there
is between the abstract solution to a question, and its concrete solution —
particularly after "his own fatal experiences" Flauti remarked ironically, referring to
Visconti's Jacobin past, and to his dismissal following his support to the 1820-21
constitutional government124. Flauti's essay offered a historical reconstruction of the
"very ancient origin" of the Neapolitan system, showing how it was elaborated in
the "happy epoch when men had faith in their own customs, and they did not think
of asking scholars to establish their system of measures and weights"125. And this
wisdom of the common people consisted in varying the unit of measure according
to the different places and uses, as Flauti showed with examples. Similarly Grimaldi
had argued that "the people always has the monopoly of good sense", and its
resistance to modification should be taken by the government as a command. I
think there is no need to insist further on the overall meaning of this controversy,
except to note that the "conservatives" were soon defeated, as a law of April 1840
introduced a decimal system based on the palm in the continental part of the
kingdom. Times were changing, and the "new men" were now defiant, in the
scientific academies as well as in the local councils. In 1848 they were to prove their
political determination, and their widespread social support.
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7.7 The Closure of the Controversy
It is now time to return to our starting point, the 1839 mathematical contest, and to
conclude our long story. As the production of Fergola's school in the 1780s and
1790s cannot be properly understood without referring to the contemporary "spirit
of analysis" and to its inextricable political dimension, so the historical and Greek¬
like memoires of the synthetic school published after 1810 make full sense only
when contrasted with the beliefs and the practice of the engineers of the analytic
school. At the institutional level we have seen that the controversy opposed,
roughly, the RUN and the Naval Academy to the Military College and the School of
Application. We have also seen that supporters of analytic methods, who welcomed
the criticism of Colecchi directed against Fergola's school, were more likely to be
engineers involved in the process of modernization of the country. To them
Fergola's school was an enormous obstacle to the introduction of French textbooks
and analytic expertise into the kingdom. Conversely, the admirers of Greek rigor
and neatness saw in the French production the hybridization and corruption of
pure mathematics. Synthetics rejected the idea that mathematics can legitimize
plans of social reform; the engineers founded their scientific activity on that very
idea, as the Jacobins had done before them.
The liberal clergyman Luca de Samuele Cagnazzi (1764-1852) described the
controversy over geometrical methods in a remarkably balanced essay, published in
the Analytic Library in 1812126. He was concerned with the didactic aspect of the
analytic-synthetic controversy. He noted that algebra, originally used only to treat
discrete quantities, was applied by moderns to continuous quantities as well: this
originated modern analysis, which is not just "a mere calculus", but a "precise
language" to treat "relations among quantities in a universal way"127. Given that
geometrical analysis was slow and very demanding in terms of memory and
concentration, it was inadequate "to treat very complex questions". Instead, the
"new language" reduced "geometrical reasoning to the form of algebraic calculus,
i.e. of a mechanism, which does not need attention to things, but only manipulation
of symbols"128. On the other hand he recognized that in synthetic reasoning the
"connection between ideas" is "luminous", as it results from both a sound method
("a mechanism of method") and the "specific and very clear" relations between
them, from which results a sort of intellectual "satisfaction"; whereas algebraic
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reasoning produces its results on the basis of only the mechanism of method, so that
they are "acceptable only because one trusts such a mechanism", which we "do not
distinctly recognize"129. Consequently, "it is a deformity to introduce the youth to
the mechanism of infinitesimal calculus, differential and integral, through abstract
ideas and far from synthesis, as they would act as automata, without knowing the
reason for each formula, and without knowing how to apply them to mixed
mathematics and to practice"130. Cagnazzi complained about the division of
mathematicians in opposite "parties", and suggested that both synthesis and
analysis should be used at different stages of the curriculum. The party of the
"enlightening" synthesis and that of the powerful and "mechanical" analysis were
not to follow his recommendations. On the contrary in the 1810s, 1820s and 1830s
the controversy remained extremely lively, fueled by the historical and social
factors pointed out above. When finally Padula replied to Flauti in 1839, it was to
close the exchange, proclaiming the failure of the Fergolian program, and the
anachronistic, "useless" nature of Flauti's research. It is a fact that from the early
1840s, with Nicola Trudi moving to the analytic area of research, the synthetic
school seemed to have exhausted its forces. When the seventh Congress of Italian
Scientists took place in Naples in 1845, it was the analytics who represented Naples
to the eyes of the foreigners; and when Steiner and Jacobi came to Naples, they
visited the members of the analytic school (1844)131. Only the inertia of the Bourbon
university system kept Flauti, Bruno and their surviving colleagues at their places
until 1860, well after their last significant scientific contributions.
Four years after Padula's reply, in 1843, a study of Fergola's school was written
where this was already presented as a phenomenon worthy of being historically
investigated, but which had no more scientific relevance. The author, Bernardo
Scotti-Galletta, re-presented in a systematic way Padula's crucial criticisms of Flauti,
offering what has remained the standard view on the synthetic school of Naples.
Scotti's reconstruction contains errors, such as when he claimed that Fergola
disliked modern analysis because he did not understand it, but also remarkable
insights, as when he recognized that to Fergola algebra and geometry were "two
heterogeneous sciences", so that algebra could "alter the purity" of geometry, and
"bastardize the rigorous geometry of the ancients" 132. But in reality, Scotti argued,
"algebra simply makes geometry speak its own language". Indeed, geometry was to
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the ancients "a mute Goddess", only understood by few devotes, whereas today,
thanks to Descartes and Lagrange, "it speaks with algebraic language, a language
easily understandable by everybody"133. Scotti also noted that Fergola's school
denied the reality of the remarkable advancements of the last fifty years, and
"maintained that mathematics is gradually declining"134. His book is precisely
devoted to showing the recent advancements of mathematics, the erroneous
resistance of Fergola's school against analysis, and the lack of understanding of
Fergola and his pupils of modern methods. In fact, all Scotti proved was, once
again, that Fergola attributed an essential superiority to geometrical intuition with
respect to analytic procedures135. Then Scotti compared synthesis and analysis with
respect to their application to mechanics, and argued for the convenience of
analysis even in those areas where synthesis could be used, in the theory of
projectiles for instance. Scotti wrote down a few pages of theorems of this theory
from Fergola and, side by side, he inserted the "equivalent" analytic version: the
concision of the latter is evident. But one could remark that the "qualitative"
definitions offered by Fergola are hardly equivalent to the "abstract numbers"
proudly exhibited by Scotti (as in the case of the notion of "velocity" for instance,
which to Fergola is something which needs to be understood before determining its
value136). Moreover, note the structure of his argument: pure mathematics has to be
studied exclusively as preparation for mixed mathematics; and analysis (being more
convenient for treating many difficult areas of mechanics) should be preferred to
synthesis from the very beginning of education137. He was glossing what in fact was
the curriculum of the School of Application. After a long series of specific criticisms
raised to passages from works by Flauti and Scorza, Scotti concluded on the
historical role of the synthetic school; significantly, he used the past tense.
The much praised Neapolitan Synthetic School, which was proud to follow
the path of the ancients, was exclusively devoted to Scholastic abstractions. If
one makes a catalogue of the productions of Fergola and his school, he will
find only historical works, translations, and questions of pure mathematics of
no interest whatsoever. The young at the time of Fergola lost the best years of
their lives working on ancient problems, or on uninteresting problems of pure
mathematics, instead of studying pure mathematics as a way to learn the
mixed ones, and to apply them to practical needs, as the young do nowadays.
And when they modified some ancient solution, or solved some new
problem, they thought of themselves as worthy of the name of Geometers.138
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In the 1840s the "operative" image of mathematics defended by the Neapolitan
engineers could finally claim its victory over the last remains of the synthetic image,
defended by increasingly isolated university professors. Scotti provided the first
complete reconstruction of the last fifty years of mathematics in Naples according to
the analytic image, making it part of the more general progress of mathematics in
Europe. Going back to the first part of this study, one find precisely in Padula the
best expression of that generation of young engineer-mathematicians to whom "the
primary goal of mathematics is application", as Scotti said.
The eventual decline of the synthetic school, its incapacity to attract and keep
young students (recall Trudi moving to analysis), can be related to the
contemporary disappearance of Reactionary Catholicism as a real political option,
to the isolation of its philosophical supporters (the reactionary, apologetic
tradition), and to the re-orientation of the landed middle-classes in a decidedly anti-
Bourbon, liberal and patriotic direction. Born as complementary to a specific
reactionary conception of human reason and of its limits, the synthetic school
declined with the vanishing of the formidable reactionary block which had re¬
shaped Neapolitan society and culture between 1790 and 1830.
Notes to chapter seven
1 The country should not be judged "ni par la noblesse ni par le peuple", wrote a counselor of
King Joseph; it is only "dans Vordre moyen que se conserve le depot des lumieres" (quoted in de
Martino, La nascita delle intendenze, pp.30-31). De Martino comments; "To point at the middle
class as the depositary of modern culture, meant to exalt, in the eyes of the king, the good
disposition of that relevant portion of society which, since a long time, had welcomed the
essential traits of the French model (the so-called administrative monarchy); it was also the
way to individuate the social basis indispensable to build the new constitutional and
administrative setting, the privileged addressee of the code civil".
2 The law also contained less radical parts/'Essentially, the law eliminated in a radical way
the baronial privileges which still were limitating the personal freedom and the liberty of
work and industry; but it conserved certain rights and special jurisdictions, and attributed
them to the comuni, which should pay to the barons the equivalent to the previous earning".
Even the tithes, as well as many "territorial rights", were maintained (Candeloro, Storia
dell'Italia moderna, p.331).
3 De Martino, La nascita delle intendenze, p.361.




7 The Minister of the Interior, through a rigid hierarchical system, could stricdy control the
entire peripheral personnel. It also exercised its control on the administration of the comuni,
of prisons, hospitals, hospices, public works, on agriculture, trade, manufacturing, and
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Conclusions
I began to work on this study with some basic goals in mind. Firstly, I wanted to
reconstruct a specific mathematical controversy which, apart from a couple of
works dating from to the late nineteenth century, had never been an object of study.
Surprisingly, the very memory of Fergola's synthetic school and of its battle against
modern analysis was lost in the second half of the century, so that in 1892 the
historian Gino Loria declared that he came to know about the school only through
the references contained in the history of geometry by Michel Chasles (1837). The
reasons of such a lack of memory are very much linked to the cultural politics of the
new unified Italian nation, and go beyond the limits of the present study. What is
relevant here is the permanence of a historiographic judgment about the overall
production of the school as merely backward and as such not worthy being
investigated. This is indeed the opinion of the authors of recent histories of Italian
science. The historical reconstruction presented in this study aimed to challenge this
judgment, and to call into question precisely that backwardness which is usually
assumed as an explanatory concept in itself. I concluded that Fergola and his school
were not a relic of the past, but a new anti-modern response to the "spirit of
analysis" and to its cultural project. Certainly the synthetics, not unlike Maistre and
the political reactionaries, constructed their own identity as one linked to an ancient
tradition, but historians should handle such ideological self images with caution.
This brings me to another series of considerations, regarding my specific
interpretation of the controversy. In the end, it should be clear that if there was a
tradition in which to work in order to revive Neapolitan mathematics in the 1780s it
was the analytic tradition. The fact that no strong schools of mathematics existed in
Naples, and that French books were freely circulating in the kingdom were
conditions for a rapid diffusion of the purely analytic approach. In this context,
looking at the ancients was not a straightforward choice for Fergola, a young
mathematician who admired Genovesi, frequented the enlightened intelligentsia,
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the library of Marquis Berio, and who had studied with Caravelli, author of the first
treatise of integral and differential calculus ever published in Naples. This
convinced me that his "geometrical" choice was grounded on some basic
disagreement on the very nature of mathematics, and this has turned out to be the
case. Indeed we have seen the sort of intuitive, non-mechanical and fundamentally
non-creative conception of mathematics that legitimized the synthetic practice of
problem-solving. But at this stage, one cannot escape the deep cultural and social
meaning of this conception of mathematics, and the fact that it emerged precisely
when reformist and revolutionary claims were being grounded on the alternative
purely analytic conception, according to which analysis was the universal language
of reason, and its applicability was virtually unlimited. The discovery of the
network of the Neapolitan reactionary intelligentsia, which included well-known
scientists such as Fergola, together with politicians, ecclesiastics and literati,
strengthened my conviction about the anti-modern and reactionary aim of the
scientific production of the synthetic school.
The interpretation of Fergola and his pupils as privileged because Bourbon
loyalists and orthodox Catholics, should be integrated with considerations on how
the cognitive content of their scientific work was shaped to reinforce the reactionary
Catholic fight against the revolution and, later, against what we called the
"modernization" of society. In fact, the interpretation provided in this study only
works if one agrees with attributing a causal relevance to cultural and social factors
upon scientific production. I believe this study makes a strong point in favor of such
a hypothesis. In particular, it should be noted that in our story certain
mathematicians changed their beliefs about the proper problem-solving method
and about the nature of mathematics during their lives. Now, this was never
detached from changes in their beliefs about the political and social setting of the
kingdom. So the young Fergola, a Genovesian student interested in the practical
application of mathematics and in economic reforms, began by working on calculus
and its applications; then, in correspondence with the strengthening of his religious
and political conservatism, he gave birth to the purely geometrical Euclidean
project. In the case of Giordano things went the other way around: from being a
brilliant enfant prodige of Fergola's school, whose Greek-like style was admired in
Naples and abroad, he became a strenuous defender of the analytic approach as his
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radical political ideas took shape. In the following phase of the controversy, we
have seen members of the synthetic school move to the analytic field, such as Tucci
and Trudi, whose liberal ideas were well known. This stories do indeed support the
hypothesis of a causal effect of more general orientations upon scientific beliefs.
Indeed, these are cases where, in presence of a common education and
mathematical training, the only relevant discriminatory factors seem to be precisely
the political and religious orientations of the actors. In this respect, the present
study brings further historical material to strengthen the tenets of that stream of
sociohistorical analyses which are inspired by the theoretical assumptions of the
sociology of scientific knowledge.
With respect to the more specific debate in the historiography of mathematics
about the interpretation of the changes in the mathematical practice of the early
nineteenth century, the present study suggests a new perspective. Previous "social"
interpretations, such as that which related the birth of pure mathematics to the
professionalisation of research in Prussia (possibly one of the most convincing),
seem to be less fruitful in the reconstruction of the Neapolitan case. This tells us of
the importance of carefully considering the local conditions of each case-study, and
of the variable nature of the resources which can be employed by social historians
in constructing their interpretations. The most convincing interpretation for the
Neapolitan case appears to be one which privileges the causal role of Reactionary
Catholic thought upon scientific production and didactic. This certainly does not
exclude the action of other causal elements such as processes of professionalisation;
they are simply less relevant. New investigations should explore the presence of
such causal factors as have emerged in the case of Naples. It would be interesting to
know the role played by forms of conservative thought upon mathematical practice
in other European countries. There are reasons to believe that at least in certain
cases, such as Cauchy's project of the "rigorization of calculus", this ideological
factor played a primary role. That the unprecedented need of providing "sound
foundations" for mathematics, and the equally unprecedented stress on the
fundamental role of "pure mathematics", could be interpreted in the light of the
contemporary emergence of radical forms of conservative thought all over Europe,
is a fascinating hypothesis worthy of further investigation.
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A few words about the generality of the present findings. One might wonder
whether the present interpretation holds at least for the wider Italian context.
Which is to say: is it the case that elsewhere in Italy mathematicians involved in the
Reactionary Catholic network favored purely synthetic methods and planned to
provide geometrical foundations for the entirety of mathematics? Well, very simply
this is not the case. The algebraist Paolo Ruffirii (1765-1822), from the Ducat of
Modena, was, like Fergola, a member of the Academy of Catholic Religion, and he
contributed to the Reactionary Catholic journal of father Baraldi. He provided not
only the well-known proof of the impossibility of solving by radicals equations of
degree superior to the fourth (1799), but also a proof of the spirituality of the soul.
The devout and conservative side of this loyalist professor — one of the very few to
refuse the oath to the Napoleonic government— has never been studied, let alone
linked to his mathematical practice. But in fact this was decidedly "analytical", if
we continue to adopt the Neapolitan criteria. Now, I believe that the consideration
of Reactionary Catholic mathematicians such as Ruffini, or the Milanese Gabrio
Piola, only strengthen our interpretation of the Neapolitan case. Consider the
following. I argued that rising Reactionary Catholic thought had a causal role in
shaping the theory and practice of the synthetic school in Naples. But of course this
causal factor acted upon a pre-existing tradition of mathematical teaching and
research. The peculiarity of Naples, in this respect, was the absence of full-time
specialists devoted to advanced research in mathematics; good teachers were active
at the military schools, but they were entirely absorbed by their (practically
oriented) teaching duties; whereas at the RUN only elements of geometry and
algebra were taught, mostly to students of medicine and law. In this context, where
the penetration of eighteenth-century analysis had been extremely limited, the
return to the Greek models and to synthesis was a viable option to a "restorer of
science" such as Fergola. In Northern Italy things were very different. The French
analytic research and its applications to empirical sciences had long since
penetrated the universities and the academies, where advanced research was done,
particularly in hydraulic applications (due to the technical problems related to the
complex system of irrigation of the Po Valley). In this context, in the 1790s, the
proposal of a geometrical conception of mathematics and of the priority of synthetic
methods over analytic ones was simply not a viable option for men like Ruffini and
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Piola. Nevertheless, their scientific production pursued equally apologetic aims: we
find very clearly stated the separation between pure and applied mathematics, and
the ontological and epistemological superiority of the first over the second. As in
Naples, the weakness of human reason in empirical (scientific and political)
questions was opposed to its "sublime" working in the ethereal field of pure
mathematics, the only portion of knowledge where absolute certainty is reachable
by human beings. Only, in Northern Italy pure geometry was replaced with pure
analysis as the most proper "spiritual" discipline, i.e. the field of action of pure
intellect as opposed to any practice which include the polluting presence of
"matter". This legitimized a boundary-drawing strategy whose effects upon
didactic and research were comparable with those in Naples. And, through the
North-Italian case, we can also see more clearly along which lines an extension of
the present study could reconstruct the action of reactionary thought upon
mathematical knowledge in cases such as those of Cauchy, a devote Catholic, a
Bourbon loyalist and the most famous cultivator of pure mathematics of the period,
or of the German "purists".
I would like to conclude with a few remarks upon the more general theme of
the production of scientific knowledge "in a conservative culture". I have already
suggested that such a theme has not been given much space in the historiography of
science. In this study, I have shown that, at the turn of the nineteenth century, a
specific form of conservative thought had momentous effects upon the production
of scientific knowledge. In the same way as contemporary pieces of art, or
contemporary theological and philosophical works, every piece of scientific
research produced in Naples at that time tells us of the battle for the modernization
of the country. In the case of mathematics, the causal action of conservative goals is
recognizable in the emergence of such crucial themes as the perspicuity of
geometrical knowledge, its intuitive nature, and its absolute certainty —which
derives from its being a mere mirroring of a transcendent state of things. Coherently
with these assumptions, mathematical practice was portrayed as essentially "local",
and specific methods for solving problems and proving theorems were taken to be
valid only in restricted areas of mathematics. There was nothing like a "universal
method" in mathematics, let alone in science. Mathematics was rather a "motley of
techniques", whose ultimate foundation and legitimization was provided by non-
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linguistic geometrical intuition. Mathematical techniques were not only considered
unreliable when applied to solve empirical problems outside mathematics, but
within mathematics itself specific methods had only a limited range of application.
This image of mathematics, and the correspondent practice and didactic, were
clearly connected to the specific conception of human reason which was at the core
of the entire anti-modern reaction of early nineteenth-century intransigent
Catholicism. According to this conception, human reason could only be properly
used within narrow and pre-defined spheres of investigation, and its functioning
was essentially passive, consisting in a mere "recognition" of truths (intuition is
invariably portrayed as the act of "seeing" by means of the intellect). Such an image
of reason was initially constructed using the theoretical material provided by the
works of the early Reactionary Catholicism (characterized by a new, anti-
intellectual apologetic style, based on the re-elaboration of patristic literature) and
by French Traditionalism. At a later stage (around the 1820s), a revised version of
the Thomistic theory of knowledge was chosen as the main basis for the new Neo-
Scholastic current, which was born in Naples, and which soon became dominant in
Catholic theology worldwide. The boundaries of human reason were in this way
legitimated by an authoritative and fully orthodox tradition.
The picture is not complete if it does not include the "modern" image of
knowledge which was the target of this cultural reaction. As I have shown, it was
an image mainly derived from the traditions of French sensationalism and of
ideology, opportunely re-elaborated by Neapolitan reformers and by Neapolitan
Jacobins. As in the case of conservative thinkers and politicians, I have found that
the consideration given by historians to reformist and Jacobin sociopolitical thought
is not enough to fully assess their historical significance. Their scientific productions
must also be taken into account. In particular, we have seen that in the case of
Lauberg and of his students, mathematical research was far from being a mere
"cover" for conspiratorial activity, as it is generally argued. In Lauberg's school, as
in Fergola's school, mathematical knowledge was clearly shaped by social and
political goals. Similarly, in the later phase of the controversy, the civil engineers of
Rivera rescued the analytic image of mathematics in view of its utility for their
liberal and reformist goals. The mathematical research and teaching of the analytics
was grounded upon an image of human reason which knew no limits for the
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application of its creative faculty. Algebraic reasoning was conceived as the
universal language of reason, and its application to the solution of any sort of
problems inside and outside mathematics was seen as just a matter of time.
Consequently, their problem-solving practice was based on the adoption of very
general methods, regardless of the specific field to which they were employed. The
results received their legitimization not from the non-linguistic intuition, but from
the analytic style of reasoning itself, which was seen as the highest form of
rationality. That every individual, with a little practice, could become a good
problem-solver, was simply nonsense to the synthetics; as was the claim that
mathematical methods could be fruitfully employed outside mathematics. These
views were strenuously opposed by Flauti and the other disciples of Fergola, who
resisted any change in university curricula as well as in the social and cultural
settings of the kingdom.
Finally, I have shown how Reactionary Catholicism not only shaped
mathematical knowledge, but also other branches of scientific knowledge. The
experimental activity of natural philosophers such as Poli, and of anatomists such
as Cotugno, is indeed best understood by placing them in their proper cultural
dimension, which was that of the Catholic reaction, and of political loyalism. In
their works, as in Fergola's textbook of physics, I have identified a form of
"apologetic empiricism", which is strictly connected with the rigid division
between pure and mixed mathematics defended by Fergola's school. Both
apologetic empiricism and the synthetic image of mathematics are grounded in the
conservative image of individual reason, according to which reason is unable to
transcend the empirical dimension, and to achieve certain knowledge about
empirical matter-of facts. In the empirical sciences, as in the case of mathematics,
conservative thinkers stressed the boundaries and the differences between different
methodologies. Generalization and formalization of "local" empirical knowledge
were portrayed as dangerous procedures, often leading to mistakes. The use of
mathematics in the empirical sciences was reduced to a minimum, and it was made
clear that natural and social realities cannot be "understood"; human knowledge of
them was seen as necessarily fallible and hypothetical.
The impact of forms of conservative skepticism upon the practice of science at
the beginning of the early nineteenth century was probably much more significant
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than is usually believed. Furthermore, most of the cultural resources employed by
nineteenth and twentieth-century forms of conservative thought were elaborated
precisely at that time. Irrationalist, anti-intellectual and anti-modern conceptions of
knowledge were to return frequently to themes such as the limits of mathematical
knowledge, the risks connected to the mathematisation of reality, and to the





'• Data ( Fig. I.) la parabola KI£ , il diametro AIx e in esso i[
punto A , e data la retta BQ; eandurre la retta AMU in modo che
incliTiate le rette MP, UQ sotto un medesimo angolo data al diametro
Ax, sia la parte PQ che intercettano sulla BQ, uguale ad una data
retta.
Condotta per A la AR che faccia col diametro Ax 1' angolo RAx
uguale al dato, si prendano per assi coordinati le rette Ax, AR : sia
la tangente applicata alia parabola in D parailela ad AR ; echiamando
«, P le coordinate del punto D , op ii parametro deila parabola
corrispondente al diametro che passa per D, e t, u. le coordinate del
punto M , le equazioni deila parabola e della AMN saranno
(y-P)2-= apO—*)••-• (l), (2),
dalle quali eliminando y, avremo
u'x' — a ( put + pd ) x + t> (*'+apx) = o.





y — ax -j- b
sia 1' equazione della BQ , si rileva cne , dinotando con x , xJ le
ascisse de' punti P e Q, e con c il coseno deii angolo degli assi,
PQ = (F—x) v'tT"" ~r -ca■ • • • (5) ; (*)
dunque poiche i punti P e Q hanno le stesse ascisse de' punti M
U, chiamando ad la data retta, otterremo 1' equazione
r ^ v 1 + a'-t-aca — d ,
che unita all'equazione
C U—?? = 2p( t—») (!'),
la quale si deduce dalla (l) osservando che il punto t, u (**) ap-
partiene alia parabola, serve a deterininare t, u. Facciamo per sem-
plicita di calcolo
4 =
(*) Difatti per le note regole dell' anaiisi a due coordinate e chiaro che se
y:y' sono le ordinate degli stessi puuti P e Q3.si ha
PQ = \{x'—x)' +(/—»)* + xc{xl-x){y—y) :
d' altronde essendo i punti P e Q sulla retta BO risulta
y — ax 4- b, yl = a xJ -f- b
donde y1— y = a ( x{—x ), il quale valove sosutuito in quello di PQ da imme-
y'——v
diatamente 1' equazione (3). Avendosi pure x1—x= - e evidente che la
detta distanza puo essere espressa dalla formola
V—v
—V I q-a" -j-2ca.
a
(**) Per brevita in vece di dire il punto che ha per coordinate t ed tr. di-
remo serapre il punto t. u : ed e da notarsi che nomineremo prima 1' ascissa .
e poi l1 ordinata.
ed eliminando u1 dalle due equazioni precedenti risulta
( t -j- 2 d' )( j2u -j- pt—p%—apx ) -L-d'(p*+2p%)=io (4),
e la curva espressa da questa equazione, che come e chiaro e una
iperbola, incontra la parabola ne: punti 31.
2. Per costruire questa curva osserviamo che mancando il termine
in ur uno degli asintoti e parallelo all' asse delle y , quindi cam-
biando 1' origine e il solo asse delle ascisse, si potrebbe determinare
la vera posizione dcgli asintoti; ma sara piu breve determinarli os¬
servando che se immaginiamo due rette date dall'equazioni
t -f- 2 d'= y, £ u+pt—p1— 2 px = ?'
y e y essendo due costanti qualunque , combinando queste equa¬
zioni con quella deila curva ne risulta un! equazione di primo
•grado , e che per conseguenza Je rette suddette incontrando la curva
in un sol punto sono paralleie agii asintoti; e poiche quandoy =o,
o y' = o il punto d' incontro si trova a distanza inllnita dall' ori¬
gine , saranno
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t -j- 2 d' = o , U 4- pt — /31 — 2 px=o
1' equazioni degli asintoti. Qaeste equazioni si costruiscono colla mas-
sima faciita. Difatti dall' equazione (5), ponendo x = o , x' = —2 d'j
si riieva che ia retta espressa dall'equazione
t = — 2d'
taglia sulla BQ una parte uguale a
— 2.(1' y iaz -2ac = —2cl,
e che percio se BG = 2d, ia CO sara un' asintoto : quanto al-
1' aitra equazione si ponga u = 0 , e si avra t =-—• ma nel-
1' equazione (i;) ponendo u = 0, si ha t = .11 = -—, dunque
presa IG = IA, per G passera i'as in to to , e poiche la tangente IH
ha per equazione 2/3 u -f-2p t = (32-}-2px , sara ad IH parallelo. As-
segnati in tal modo gli asinioti, resta a trovare un punto dell'iper-
hola , a fine di descriverla ; ora avendosi dall' equazione (4) per
t =0, 2$ u -r 2p t = 3 sara H quesio panto, e reste-
ra cost tutto determinato.
Composizione del problema.
Fatto I'angolo xAR uguale ai dato: si prenda IG uguaie ad IA.
BC uguale alia retta data, e si tiri alia tangente IH la parailela GO.
L'iperboia ehe passando per H ha per asintoti OG ed OR incontra
la parabola ne' punti cereati.
5. Siccome nel prendere la distanza PQ potevasi adottare il se¬
gno + avanti il radicale dell' equazione (5) , anche 1a d' neil' equa¬
zione (4) potrebbe essere affetta dal segno 4~, Jo che cambia so 1-
tanto la direzione della CO cbe invece di passare per G , quando
si prendesse il segno — passerebbe per C': quindi pare che risol-
vendo il problema due iperbole differenti, ne sieno otto Ie soiuzio-
ni • ma e chiaro che di queste iperbole una passa pe: punti At 1'al-
tra pe'punti iN. Difatti allorche tra 1' equazioni (1) e (2) abbiamo
eliminata la y , 1'equazione ottenuta in x7 non considerando il punto
t7 u appartenente alia parabola, ci dimostra che
2 t y pz f- -f- 2p &ut — zpxur
ur
e la differenza delle ascisse; t, u essendo le coordinate di un panto
qualunque della AAliN , e quiridi dovra essere
£ V p~ t1 -r^p put — 2px ur t
ur a '' *vl/"
Questa equazione essendo liberata dal radicale e divisa per si
nduce ad un7 equazione di quarto grado rispetto ad j : quindi
dara quattro vaiori per - , e sostituendoli neli' equazione (2) del
n. 1 si conosceranno le quattro posizioni , che algebricamente par-
Iando , puo avere la AMN or avendosi dalla detta equazioiie
z-—-=o , e chiaro che moltiplicando le quattro equazioni che si ot-
tengono nel modo or indicato, si otterra un' equazione che ditferisce
dalia (1) pel solo cambiamento di x . y in t, u , e quindi se si
cercasse di costruire 1' equazione (l)> invece di una linea del quarto
ordine si avrebbero quattro rette. Ed e da notarsi , che in generale
qualunque sia il grado di un'equazione fra due varianiii, purche
sia omogenea rappresenta sempre tante rette che passano per
1' origine per quanto e il numero che ne indica il grado. Per-
tanto volendo costruire le rette date dall'equazione (1), possiamo cer-
care ove incontrano una data retta , e le ascisse 0 le ordinate de' punti
d'incontro verranno date da un' equazione di quarto grado. che si po-
tra come e no to costruire adoprando la stessa parabola data ed il
cerchio. Prendiamo per la retta arbitraria quelia espressa dall'equa-
zione
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l'equazione trovata piu sopra diverra
8c*xps \ iGc+p^d'*/ XP
( kept —J = ■
e ponendo
avremo 1' equazione
u~ -f- a c ul —
^ = 2p« 00 r
4c^p+d'*
3*
che sommata colla precedente da
2
i - / , 2 c*xpl\ 4c*p*d,%+ r-2^+-^— (o)
equazione appartenente ad un cerchio. .Ma ia (2) indica la para¬
bola data se prendiamo D* per asse delle t, e D& per asse delle u;
dunque rispetto a' medesimi assi dobbiamo costruire 1' equazione (5).
Cio posto allorche u = o si ba dall'equazione (5) £=+ yt—^
e percio se DT e questo vaiore per T deve passare il cerchio: inol-
tre e facile il rilevare dall' equazioue del cerchio riferito a coordi¬
nate obblique, che il suo centro si determina prendendo su gli assi
delle x e delle y due parti uguali alle meta de' coeilicienti di x
ed y a prirno grado col] segno cambiato, ed elevando agli assi me-
desimi due perpendicolari ; onde essendo nullo nelF equazione (5)
il coelliciente di t, presa ME =p -{- pP > sara ^ ^ centro (*).
Quindi poiche il cerchio che ha F per centro e passa per T nel caso
indicato dalla figura incontra la parabola in due soli punti, i va-
Iori di t saranno due reali e due immaginari; de' primi poi DL e
positivo , DL' negativo , e per conseguenza se dl e la retta del-
• CP
d
e le rette Al, Al' saranno le rette cercate.
1' equazione u= — , bisognera prendere dl = DL , e dl' = DL',
(*) Possiamo anche assicurarci diversamente che F e il centro del cerchio ap¬
partenente all' equazioue (3), difatti essendo t — -h - ° ? — il cerchio dovra
passare anche pel puuto T' posto alia stessa distauza di T da D, e la DF per-
pendicolare alia corda XT' nel suo puuto di mezzo deve passare pel centro :
del pari mettendo t = 0 nell1 equazioue (2) si ha
. /* :c*xp" \ 4 c*p* d'1
—'
ed i valori di u sono le ascisse de' punti ove la Du iucoutra il cerchio , e poi¬
che la quantit'a p . e la semisomma delle radici di questa equazione,
indichera essa i'ascissa del punto di mezzo della corda intercetta nel cerchio, e
quiudi la EF anche : assa pel centro.
Resta ora a vedere. come debbausi costruire i valori di DE, DT,
ed Ad: a tale oggetto si rifletta che dall' equazione (1, 1) (*) si
rileva che la tangente applicata alia parabola in un punio qualun-
que aJ , (2' ; ha per equazione rispetto agli assi Ax , AR
r* 1
onde se vogliamo che questa retta sia perpendicolare ad Ax, cioe




f3' — (2 = — cp , e quindi x' — a =
Siegue da cio che se I' e il vertice principale della parabola
I'S' —~ > ed essendo /32 = 2p. SI, sara
nT? lc*'xp* 2 I'S1.aDE = ^ + -^=p+-^~,
cioe uguale al semiparametro piu la quarta proporzionale dopo SI,
I'S' ed il doppio di AS. Simiimente avremo DT = ^ d —
zd'.S'V
———
j cioe quarta proporzionale in ordine ad SI, S' I' , ed Ac :
finalmente essendo la Ad = > si potra ugual-
mente costruire , e si vede che la costruzione non cessa di essere
sufficientemente semplice; e quindi e da preferirsi alia precedente,
perche non si adopra altra curva da descriversi per assegnazione di
punti oltre della parabola data.
(*) A questo modo intendiamo indicare Y equazione (1) trovata nel §. 1 , e
si noti che porremo sempre prima il numero che dinota F equazione, poi il nu-
me^^l paragrafo nel quale si trova.
4. Ritornando ora alia soluzione data nel n.° a e da notarsi che
quando /9 = o 1'equazione della IH divenendo apt = (31 -f- ap*,
ci dimostra che e paraiJeia ad AR, e che il punto H e inassegna-
bile; raa in qnesta medesima ipotesi 1'equazione (4,1) si cangia nei-
r aitra
? — 2 ( a — d')t — 2ad' =o
ovvero
t = * — dJ i ;Y »" 4- du
e si vede che 1' iperbola si trasforma in due reite parallele ad AR:
essendo AC = 2d' apparisce come si possa in questo caso costruire
facilmente 1' equazione trovata (*).
Merita particolare attenzione il caso nel quale AR fosse un dia-
metro della parabola, eioe 1' angolo dato uguale a zero, perche gli assi
coordinati cbe abbiamo adottati si ridurrebbero ad un solo: ma pren-
dendo per assi il diametro Ala: ( fig.2 ), e la parallela Ay alia tan-
gente applicata alia parabola in I, l'equazioni (l) e (2) del n: 1
diverranno
y = 2P ( x — a ) (1) , y =-cx (2) ,
ed eliminando x si oitiene
3 2 Pl ,
y ——y -r -2p*=o.
(*) I valori di t indicando le ascisse de' punti AI, le ascisse de' punti N che
abbiarao veduto ( a. 1 ) essere usuali a — ———^ — t . owero , nella pre-
IL'
1 pt1 xt
seute lpotesi.a—— — saranno indicate da
"* t —*
— d' +V*'t d'%
;+J —J + ci'+Y 4. d'1,
— d' XV —d'± Y -r d'%
lo che aovea aspettarsi per cio che si e detto nel n. 2 , che cioe, quando si
preucie d' coi segno — ia linea espressa dail' equazioue (4, 1) passa pe'punti N.
Or essendo u. una radice di. questa equazione, 1' altra sara —— <2,
ma le. ordinate de'punti P e Q sono uguali a quelle de' punti M
ed N , dunque u , e — a sono le ordinate de' detti punti: quin-
di, poicbe supponendo sempre cbe
} i . y = ax -|- b
sia I' equazione della BQ si rileva cbe dette y, y' le ordinate di






- V 1 +*+2ac
= 2d,
ovvero , ponendo per'brevna
ad.
= d'.
Y 1 4- a1 q- a ac
. — — U = d' ,
donde , tencndo presente cbe
u2 = 2p(f~a) (l'),
si ricava
pt -j- d' u — 2 p a — o :
equazione appartenente ad una retta.
Questa si costruisce facilmente poiche quando u = o avendosi
t == 2 cf., si vede cbe presa IE = IA la retta passa per E j inoltre
quando u = —d' risulta t = 2P* + d—_ ma dail'equazione (l')
per u = — d' si ba t = ^ j dunque poicbe 1' equazione
u = — d' indica la parallela all' asse delle x condotta pel punto di
mezzo della BC , cbe e la data retta 2d; ne siegue cbe presa
EF = DH il punto F ancbe. appartiene alia retta da costruirsi, cbe sara
in conseguenza la FE, edi punti Al, AI' uniti con A daranno le
rette cercate.
5. Dall' eqjiazione della MAI' si rileva cbe e paralleia alia tan-
gentc in D, e poicbe HD = DF le congiungenti i punti M,M' con
H saranno tangenti alia parabola: inoltre quando si prende — d' in
luogo di d' si determinano, come gia si e dimostrato, i punti
dunque presa AH' = AH le rctte cbe uniscono i punti IN jN"
con H' sono an'che tangenti alia parabola, e percio
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Se per tin punto A- di un diametro qualunque A.x si tiri unci
parallela alia tangente in I, condotte per un punto H cli questa
parallela due tangenti alia parabola , le congiungenti i punti di
conlatto 31, 31' con A incontrano-la parabola in due punti N,3?
tali, che le tangenti- applicate in essi alia parabola s' incon-
trano in un punto HI dslla AH distante da A quanto il punto H
Dippiu nell' equazione
pt-j2 d' u — 2 p x = o
che appartiene alle MM', ponendo u = o , si ha t = 2x, e quin-
di queste rette concorrono in uno stesso punto E del diametro Ax.
Avendo trovato che u essendo 1' ordinata del punto M, — — u
u
e quella del punto N, il loro rettangolo sara 2pt — u2 = 2px ,
cioe uguale al quadrato dell' ordinata che passa per E : similmente
rilevandosi dall'equazione ( 2, 4 ) che t e t = :c -f- —?
sono Ie ascisse de' punti M , 2? si vede che le loro ascisse rispetto ai
punto I sono t — oced^-—, onde il loro- rettangolo e uguale al
quadrato di AI; e quindi ne siegue che
Quando una retta seca una parabola , il rettangolo delle ordi¬
nate de3 punti d' incontro rispetto ad un diametro qualunque ,
e uguale al quadrato dell' ordinata condotla pel punto ove la
secante incontra d diametro , 0 per un punto del diametro ugual-
mente lontano dal vertice, se il primo e fuori la parabola. Ed
d rettangolo delle ascisse degli stessi punti , computate dal verti-
ce j. uguaglia il quadrato della parte del diametro intercelta fra
d vertice e la secante.
Questi ed altri teoremi potrebbero ricavarsi combinando diretta-
jmente 1' equazioni della parabola e di una retta qualunque.
6. Dobbiaraa aucora awertire cbe 1' andamento tenuto nel n. 2
per costruire-gli. asintoti dell7 iperbola espressa dall' equazione (4, 1)
si puo seguire. in tutti i casi. Difatti sia
V. u-r- -- ay* ~f" bxy 4- cx2 -f- dy -f-e x -rf= o
un'equazione qualunque di secondo grado , e sieno i coeflicienti a, b,
c tali che l primi tre termini possansi decomporre in faitori reali
di primo grado, talche 1' equazione possa mettersi sotto la forma
( my -f nx){m'y -j- n'x ) -p dy -f e x +/= 0 ,
e? chiaro cbe combinando 1' equazione
\ • my rj- nx = y r ovvero m'y -j- nJ x = y'
con la precedente si ottiene un equazione di primo grado , e per¬
cio le rette espresse da queste equazioni incontrano la curva in un
sol punto, cioe sono parallele agli asintoti: che se determineremo y , y'
in modo che il punto d' incontro sia situato ad una distanza iniinita
dall'origine , lo che avyiene , come e chiaro, quando
y m1 -J- d nt y1 m d ml
- • y n1 e n* y1 n -r e n' 3
le rette indicate dall'equazioni precedenti apparterranno agli asin¬
toti. Ugualmente se i coeliicienti a , b , c sono tali che i primi tre
termini, formano un quadrato perfetto , 1' equazione riducendosi alia
forma-
a (y ~i"mx T ~r dy + e x ~rf= ° >
-si vede che ogni retta parailela a quella daia dall' equazione
y -j- mx — 0 ,
incontra la curva in un sol panto, e percio questa retta e diame¬
tro della curva, che e eyidentemente una parabola, e quindi se trovato
il punto ove incontra la curva, si cerca la posizione deila tangente
in quel punto per mezzo deila data equazione , non resta piu che
ad assegnare un punto della curva aliinche possa descriversi. Questo
modo di costruire una equazione di secondo grado quando appar—
tiene all' iperbola o alia parabola ha, almeno in quanto alia bre—
vita , un vanta^gio su' metodi che troyansi esposti ne corsi di gco—
metria a due coordinate fondati sulla permutazione delle coordinate,
e percio crediamo che possa utilmente seguirsi nella maggior parte
de' cast , e noi ne daremo delle continue applicazioni. INon sara per-
tanto inutile di fare osservare che il trinomio ajr + bxy + car si
puo decomporre in fattori di primo grado e reali quando bz >4ac,
ed e un quadrato perletto se b~ = 4 ^ ? che sono le note rela—
zioni che passar devono fra i coefficienti a , b, c onde 1' equazione
esprima 1' iperbola 0 la parabola.
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Appendix 2
QUE SIT 0 2."
i ■»
PROBLEMA
Iscrivere in un triangolo dato di specie e di gran-
dezza tre cerchi, che si tocchino tra loro , e tocchi-
no due a due i lati del triangolo .
Anal. — Sia a a'a" il triangolo dato , e vi si suppongano * f.f.n.l.
iscritti i tre carchi come si e ricliicsto . Se vi fosse un altro
triangolo simile al proposto , clie lencsse in sc iseritli tre
cerchi come quelli , che si ccrca di iscrivere ncl primo , il
problema sarebbe immantinenti risoluto. Quindi assumendo un * f. l.n.2.
angolo A'AA" eguale ad uno dei Ire angoli del triangolo
dato , per escmpio ad n , cd iscrivendo in esso un corchio
BQII di qualsisia grandczza , il problema si convcrtira nel-
1' altro : di iscrivere due allri cerchi LCD , C'KE per modo
dell' angolo , e tali che la loro tangente comune DE sia paral-
lela a qualunque retta che compia coll' angolo A un triangolo
equiangolo ad aa'a".
fremetteremo alia soluzione di questo problema i seguenti
lemmi.
LEMMA 1."
i 'ft--2- Sia EL tamjente comunc di due ccrchi , che si toccano , a QY
una seennte distcsa pel coniatto C, dico : I° , che I' ancjolo QGY
risultnnle dall' incontro dclle cordc BQ , LYsia rctto : 11° , c
che GC sia pcrpcndicolarc a QY.
Dl1
Dtat. — Si unisca LC , e si distenda in H . Essendo i raggi
015 , Oil parallcli ad O'L , staran tra loro per dritto ; e quindi
1' angolo HQI5 sarh retlo : ma per ragione del contatto C e Q1I
parallela ad LY ; dunque anche 1' angolo QGY sara retto.
II." llisullando parimenti retto 1'angolo BCL, i quattro pun-
li B , C , L , G staranno alia circonferenza di un cerchio, e per
le note proprieta di ([ucsta eurva si avrii 1' angolo BCG = BLG
= YLA' = YCL . In conseguenza 1' angolo BCL sara eguale
all' angolo GCY, e questo retto al par di quello , com erasi pro¬
posto a dimoslrarc .
LEMMA 2.
LI Due ccrchi 0 , 0' sicn toccati da un lerzo ccrchio in C ,
C" , c da una rclta in B, L, Ic cordc BC', LC" concurrernn-
no in un panto X sulla circonferenza del terzo ccrchio .
DLl
Dm. — La BC' si distenda in X ; sara il raggio XO'' pa-
raralleto ad OB , e quindi ad O'L : sicche LC" passcra bu-
iiaiicho per X .
a
COJIOLLAIIIO d ■"




Suppongasi , clie anchc i cerclii 0 , 0' si tocchino Ira loro fig. 4.
in C , dovra la congiungcnte XC risullarc tangentc comunc a
cerchi mcdesimi ; cd in vero so si produca la C'C" in Z , a-
vendosi 1' nngolo XC'C" = LZC" =: BUX, i triaugoli XC C ',
XLJi saramio simili , c si avrii BX.XC = LX.XC . !Ua il
primo rctlangolu e ipianto la dilfcrcnza do quadrali di OX ,
OC, c 1' allro d quanto la dilTcrcnza do quadrali di O'X, O'C ;
aduuquc qucsle diifercnze saraiino ugliali ; c risuilando pernio
XC perpendicolarc ad 00' , dovra loocarc nul pimto C 1' uno
e I'altro coreliio 0 , 0' .
Corollario if.
^ ^ E chiaro adnnque che la CX sia il Inogo do punti da quali
eondotle le langcnli a' ccrnhi 0,0', ipiosle risultano cgnali
Ira loro. Di piti so la slossa CX si produca lino ad S sulla BL,
dovra bisccarla. risuilando ciascuna dollc SB, SL uguale ad SC.
L s n 3i i 3"
L 3 Sill G il yunto , in cm s inconira.no clue conic BQ . NC , di fig. 5.
mi envhio , cd U , S i concorsi dellc tangenti ncllc loro cslrc-
milii : i. trc pimti G , U , S staraiiuo per drilto.
Dim Si producano in A lc tangonti do punli B, Q, e si ti-
i ino lo UP , UR parallelo alio SQ , SC . Essendo AB = AQ ,
snrit L'B = UP ; siniilnicnlo si moslrera UN = UR : e dall' cs-
sere UB = UN, si conchiudera UP = UR ; ma qucste sono re-
spettivamente parallele alle SQ , SC , che son del pari eguali
tra loro , adunquc le QC , PR saranno parallele ; e la loro ra-
gione risultando eguale tanto a quella di QG a GP, quanto all'
allra di QS a PU, queste ragioni saranno egnali; e percio i ire






fig. 6. So la conginngente de' punti Q, C fosse nn diametro del cer-
cliio , le langcnti QS , CS risulterebbero parallele , ed in lal
caso la UG diverrebbe parallela alle tangenti medesime.
L e n x a 4.
fig./. Sia BQHI un rctlangolo iscritlo in un ccrchio, ed NM un dia-
metro parallelo ad uno dei suoi lati BQ . Da qualungue panto
G di qucslo lata cadan , passando per if, cd I le secanti GNC.
GIC, lc corde C'U , CM s' inconlreranno in an puma F suipici
lata medesimo.
Dim.—Sicno d , t , c i punti di concorso dolle tangenti in
h ut. 3. N , I ; C , C' ; II , M ; i punti G, d, I staran per dritto *.
Cio posto sia K il punlo , in cui s' incontrano le corde MC,
'roi .pixc. NC' , dovra risultare (K parallela alle Nd , Ma * . Si avra
quindi Kl: Nd :: KG : GN ; ma se si prolunghi KM in F si
lia KG : GN KF : FM ; stara dnnque KF : FM :: Kl : Nd,
ovvcro :: Kt : Me ; per esser Nd = Mc. E pero dovendo la tc
h:m. 3. passaro pel puuto F *, la C'll passera benanche pel punto i-
stcsso ; 11 che dovca dimostarsi.
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C 5
d 0 n 0 t l j n : o.
E cltiaro clic sc il punto G cada fuori del ccrchib , debbd
anche il punto F caiWue al di fuori , mentre i punti C,C'
debbono cadcrc sull' areo ICII. Sc poi il punlo G stia dentro
del ccrehio *, i puiili C , G' dovran Imvarsi sull'arco BPQ , c * fiy. S
quindi ancbe F stara dfinlro del cerchio .
A r r £ n t i a e br t o .
II punto £ , la di cui posizione dipende dal sito di G , sara
cbiamato in seguito per brevita punlo di concorso corrispon-
deiitc al pimto G .
P 11 0 B L E M L
Dato il ccrchio BOH iscrit'lo in an dato anqolo A , deseri- f.l.m.2>
PI i'crc due allri ccrchi , chc. si tocchino Ira loro , (occhino il
ccrchio dato , c f lad dell' anqolo , c tali chc la loro lanqcn-
tc comunc f'ormi coll anqolo A un triaiujolo equiangolo al dato
triungolo a aa'' (*) ■.
Anal.—Sieno 0', 0" i ccntri de' cerchi cercati. cite si toc-
chino tra loro in C", toccbino in C , C' il dato cerchio , in
(") l£ da notarsi , che questo problems di conversiene ammette di¬
verse ipotesi , e quindi diverse soluzioni. .Vella presente si suppone , cha
S due cerchi si toccbino ai di sotto di BQII , e si considera la loro
tangente comunc inferiore , cio corrispondendo al problcma proposto ;
ma potrebbe anche supporsi. che i due cerciii fossero superiori al
ccrchio BQH" ; potrebbero ancora considerarsi neil' un caso , e ncll' * fig. 10.
altro le tangenti superiori'; considerarsi del pari le tangenti trasYcrsa- 'f.ll.c I'l.
« *; e cobI far altre suppo6izioni . Di che sara dctto aitrove. * fig. W»
L, K i lali dell'angolo , ed abbiano una tangente comuno
I)E , cite formi coll' angolo A il triangolo A'AA" equiaugolo
ad a'aa". Si uniscano Ic DC , EC' ; queste dovranno incon-
lem. 2. trarsi in un punto P sulla circonferenza del cercliio 0 * ; e
r.1.1.2. poiclic la langcnte in P risullar dee parallela a DE * , il
punto P sara dato . Dovendo inoltrc le cordc PI?, DL incon-
Irarsi ad angolo retlo in un punto T, edessir: TC perpen-
!em. 1. dieolarc a I'D * , si avrii DP.PC = PT'. Similmente si vedrh
',■.2.1.2. risullare EP.PC'= PV' ; e per essere DP.PC = EP.PC' *,
si conebimlerU P'l" = PA'' ; ossia PT = PV .
Di piii si unisca LC , e si distenda ia II . Esseado rclto
I angolo DCIj , e <juintli anebe il suo conseguente BCII ; il
punlo II sara dalo , per esser dato il punto B. E cosi , cou-
giungendo KC' , e proluiigandola in 1 , qucslo punto sara d;.-
to per csser dato il punto Q.
Cio premesso anebe le corde QC , KC" dovranno incontrarsi
net punln Y snlla eireonferenza LCD ; la YC' dovra loccare i
due ccrclii 0, ()'■' nel punto C', e si avra QY.A'G = YC'' . Or
dovendo Ic corde QB , YL incontrarsi ad angoio rctto , e ri-
'
hm. I. sullar GC perpcndicolare a QA", essa dovra passare pel dalo
punto I; e si avra QY.YC = YG' . Sara quindi YG = YC' .
Ala sc nniscasi GC' , e pel punto N ovc incontra il ccrchio si
liri la langcntc NR , l'c anche NR = RC' ; sara dunquc Nil
pnrallcla a GY , c percio ii diametro , che passa per N sara
parallclo a BQ. Vale a dire il punto N sara dato. In egnal
modo , per csscrc rctto 1' angolo BFX, ed FC' perpendicolarc
a BX si vedra the FC' deblia passare pel dato pnnto II ; c
si vedra inollre , clic la FC debba incontrare il cerchio 0 nci
A 2
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dato punto M, estreMO del diamctrb parallelo a BQ , ch' e lo
stcsso diametro cte passu per N .
Intanto % chiarti , chc la itgura BQHI sia un riHlangoIo i-
scritto ncl cerchio t) , il cui diamctro NM c parallelo a
BQ : in consvgucnza essend'osi dal puuto G 1 iiale per I, N
le sccanli GIC , GNC', e poscia le CMF , C'llF , il punlo F
sard il jiunto di concors» corrrspondentc ai punto G * . Ma ji e iavv.pm ,
vedulo , clie debba ess'crte PT == PV , relti gli angoli PTL ,
PVK , e che sia dnto il pnnto P ; adunque k quistrone e ri-
condolla alia soluzione di quest' allro
P n 6 D leu d.
P ^ Trovare sulla BQ un punto G tale , chc elevate su di cssa da 1 fig. 9.G , e dal suo coirispondcntc punto di concorso F le pcrpendico-
lari GL , FK; cd abbassatc poi !c LT, KVpcrpcndicolari allc
'cordc PB , PQ , risulli PT = PV.
Anal. Suppongasi rinvenuto il punto G , come si b detto, b
sia C S tangente in C'; qucsta bisecliera In QK*. Si applichi poi * c.3.1.2*
al punto N la tangente NU > e si conduca UY parallela a QS .
Dovendo star per dritto i punti G , U, S * , si avra QG : GY * lem. 3.
:: SQ : UY , ovvero , presa QX = 2.UY , :: QK: QX, oppn-
rc , tirata XR parallbla a KY, :: QV : QR. Adnnque, dividen-
do, avremo QY : GY :: iRV : RQ. Cib posto si taglino le P
A "J V eSBa'i PQ , QR ; dovendo essere PT = PY , risultera
* Tr = YR ; e quindi stara,QY : GY :: Tr : rq , owero :: Gm :
mn , tirando le qn , rm paraltele a GT. Sicche si arra QYXw
= GYxGw.
Intanto essendo retti gli angoli BGL , BTL , i quattro punti
B, G, T, L staranno alia circonfercnza di un cerchio ; e perciu
si avra 1' angolo TGL zzv TBL = BIP. Essendo dunque GL pa-
vallela a BI , sara GT parallela a PI ; e perb le rctte rm ^ qn >
essendo dati i punti m , rt, saranno dale di sito . Quindi mn
sarii data di grandezza ; e con cio , essendo data QY , sara
dato il rctlangolo di GYr in Gm. In consegucnza sara pur datp
il punto G , e '1 problcma avr'a la scguenle
C o ,v r o s i z j o <v e.
Scunalo il diametro NM parallelo a BQ , la tangentc iNU ,
y V ultra in P , die formi coll' aiup'o A an triangolo cquiango-
lo ad a' aa" , si conduca UY parallcla ad AQ . Indi presa QK
doppia di UY, cd abbassala XR pcrpcndicolarc a PQ , si ta¬
glino lc Pi/+ qr eguali alle TQ , QR. Finalnicnte tiralc le ////.,
rm parallcle a PI, si rinvenga il punto G tale die sia G Y X *
— QY X mn. Sara G il punto ccrcalQ.
* /'./. n.2. Rinvcnuto qucsto punto si lireranno le GIC , GXC ; quindi
Ic 1ICL , IC'K, ed inoltre le LT , KV perpendicolari alle I'D,
PQ , che si produrranno finche incontrino in D, E le PC,PC'.
t ccrchi descritli inlorno ai triangoli CLD, C'KE si toeebe-
tanno tra loro , loecheranno il ccrcbio BQ1I , ed i lalj dell an¬
golo A, cd avranno per tangente comunc la DE, cbe formera col-
1' angolo stcsso il triangolo A'AA" equiangolo al dato triangolo
a aa"\ c dovendo csscre tulle le parti della figura compresa dal
triangolo A'AA'' proporzionali alle parti della figura simile ? j
che verrebbe ad csscr contcnuta dal triangolo a'aa" colla iscrir
zionc de tre ccrchi , clie si spnQ riehiesti , il problema princi¬
pal rimanc risoluto.
P R 0 B L E M A II.
5. Iscrivere (Fig. 5.) in un iriangoio ire cerchi, in modo che
ciascuno tocchi gii altri due , e due lati del Iriangoio.
Sieno AA'A" ii iriangoio daio, M, M', M" i ceniri de' cerchi
cercaii. Dovendo quesii cerciii toccarc rispeitivamente i lati AAf .
AA" -j AA', A'A" ; A'A" , AA" , Ie rctte AM , A'M' , A"M" di-
videranno gii angoii dci iriangoio per meta , e ooncorreranno per
conseguenza in uno siesso punio 0. ceniro dei cerchio iscriito nei
iriangoio.
Cio posio si prendano per assi la AA' e Ja Ar ad essa perpen-
dicolare , e si chiamino x , {2 le coordinate dei punio 0 : x -j- A
1'ascissa del punio A'; t. u: t', u' le coordinate de'punti M . M'.
Osservando che u , u' sono i raggi de* cerchi aventi M, M' per
centri , si otterra l'equazione
— £)2 ~r (**' —u)z =fu' + u)1,
ovvero
t' — t = 22 2\fuui , t' — t = o ,
secondoche neil* equazione precedente si da ad it il segno 4 o ii
segno —. Ma essendo i punti M, M' su le reue OA, OA' , abbiamo
u=.' t, u1 =—' t — A — a'),
X X'
dunque le equazioni trovate poc5 anzi si ridurranno ad
xu -j- x'u' 22 23\fuu' = p(a-r x:) , xu -j- x'u' = 3(x -j- «'). . . (l).
Simiimenie, se indicbiamo con u:' il raggio dei cerchio ciie ha
per centre M" , e con x 4 x" la A A" , essendo per conseguenza
A'A" = x' 4 x" , avrenio le a lire iue coppie di equazioni
x u -f a"u" 22 -~/uu-' = 3(x -f- x"), xu 4 *"u" = J(x 4 x"). .. (a;.
*V 4- *"«"4:-i*\/1ZuF= i(x'-r a";, x'w'4*'V=i(x'4x"}... (3j.
Espresse in lai guisa aigebricamente lutte le condizioni dei problems,
non resta che a ricavare da ire di queste equazioni, comhmaie in
tutti i modi possibiii , purche non si prendano neilo stesso tempo
le due equazioni (i) , o le (2), 0 le (3) , i vaiori di u , u', zz''.
Daila diversa combinazione deile suddette equazioni si oiterranno !e
varie soluzioni del problems proposto , la discussione deile quaii
volendo ora intraprendcre, cominceremo dal considerare ncile equa¬
zioni (1), (2), (3) le sole prime, ed i radicaJi in esse esistcnii coi
segno 4"> potendosi anche quesii setrni prendere in diversi modi.
Gib posto dovendo , per risoiverc ie accennate equazioni , eiimiuarne
i radicali , seguendo ie norme generaii dateci daii' Algebra, porremo
2y'uuf =x" , i\/uw' = x', 2\ju'u" = a:,
ovc per x , x'. x" intendiamo le deierminazioni aritmeticlic di que-
sti radicalise percio esse sono qiuntiia essenzialmenLC positive. Da fine¬
sse equazioni , ii ha
x'x"
/ j-.r' ;/ xx?
ix ' : 2.x" 1
e per conseguenza Ie equazioni in u . it' , u", divcrranno
x'x" xx'
X 4-x' —4. ix '= 4 *') ,■ix 1 ?.r J
lJx" xxj
* (- *" -rrX i-T = i(z 4. i")'JX 7.x" ' "
XXJ
a' 4 x" — - * x = 3(x' 4 x";.
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Ciascuna di quesie equazioni liherata da rotti e di terzo grado ,
onde par che ne sia piii diflicile la soluzione , ma si puo facilmente
pervenire ad equazioni che non sorpassino ii secondo grado. Di fatto
soramando 1c prime due e togiiendone la terza. si ottiene
x -r -r — r) = i'2x... (4;,
e simiimerite si avranno le aitre due
*' ^ + /3(x - x' ) — 2(3*' • • • (5),
Z~n + K* -fx' — x") = 25*"... (6).
Quesie equazioni oJtre ail' essere di un: estrema simmetna , godono
deila proprieta cnc ciascuna contiene una soitanto deile tre quan-
tita x. x'. x"; ma e da osservarsi che non sono le sole che possono
adempiere questa condizione; imperocche essendo x" la distanza che
il punto A" serba daila perpendicoiare abbassata suila AA" dai punio
0 . le quantiia x, x' , x" , ,3 non sono indipendenti , essendo gia
determinate ii punio A" ailorche sono date a, x', -2: e la reiazione
die passa fra esse , come e faciie determmare , e
x x' i (7)'
Quindi. fra questa equazione e due dcile equazioni trnvate eiimi-
nando x , x' ; x. x" , x' , x" succcssivamente , si ottcrranno altre
equazioni fra r. xJ, x"; ciascuna deile quali non contiene che una
deile tre quantiia x , x', a". Cosi prendendo dall' equazione (-) ii
vaiorc di a;'. si ha x" = e sosmuendoio neil'equazione (6),
si ottiene
+ »')^+(»'- ,<n(* T s< — x")=253(*+«').
la quale equazione, ordinata rispetto ad x', diviene
»' (<3 ifl+oqx+x'—x")-^1) — jfei+ ftx-f-x'—x")—* ) ,
e poiche la (5) da
,3(x-j-x»_x') = *(
eiiminandone x' , ne risulta
fx + x»- «<)( 0 ^+ x(x -r x' - X")- 2d>)
=( 2S — ^-)(a3a -i- f3(x -f- r1 — x") —-/j).
iNello svilupparc quest' equazione che , come vedesi , contiene soi¬
tanto x, raccogiieremo i coefticienti di 37 ec^ e> togiiendo i
termini che si distruggono , avremo
(ad. + ;J(x + +(ad. + + x' - 4^. .
— xiy — x 7 — 47-r '
ma in virtu deil' equazione (4) abbiamo
■1131 -- ?(x + x" — x") = a + 2/Jx" ,
x'x"
2/3x -|- ,a(x -f. x' — x") = x f- 2^x'
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dunque , sostituendo quesii valori nell' cquazione precedemc . c rt-
ducendo
, conseguiremo
apxs? -f- 2(3X3?' 4- 2xxJxu — 4p1x = 4£2x ,
ovvero
X(X~~T + + *") ~ = a*s'» •
la quale equazione in virtu deila (4) si riduce ad
XT — a(/3 — a) X = 2dx,
equazione semplicissima. e che ci deterraina il valore di x. Simii-
mente, attesa la simmetria aeile equazioni (4), (5), (6), e chiaro
che dovra aversi
XJ2 — 2(3 — a' )xJ = 2'3x' ,
-2(3 — x")x"=z 2-V.
Ricavando ora da queste equazioni i yalori di x, x7, x" . otterremo
* == {3 —• <x -f. a , x7 = i — 4- a7 , x" = $ — a77 4- a77. -.
a = y/31 -r ^ = V,;- -p s7i, a77 = y/f31 -f- s-'-.
^iei risoivere le equazioni in x, x7, x77 avremmo dovuto pren-
dere i radicali, e quindi le quantita a. a7, a77, col doppio setmo-r-.
ma come prendendo ii segno — nsuiterebbero negativi i vaion deile
igtiote x, x7, x77, e noi abbiamo gia avvertito che queste erano quan¬
tita assolutamente positive, cosi abbiamo Lraiasciato il segno—: del
resto non mancheremo in sesuito di soiegare, a che corrispondereb-
bero questi valori negatiyi, ed in quai naodo doYrcbbero combinarsi.
Trovati intanto i valori di x. x*. x'7,avremo immediatamente queili
di a, a' 7 u"; infatti, tenendo presenti le equazioni (4), (5), (6),
si otterra
u = —= i-/2* -f- x — x7 — rn =Jl (i-f-y-f-*77—$+■a — a7—a77),
ax a* v a* - ' '
a7 =^--= —,{2»7 4- x7—x — x*'n= -~{*-r*7—*"—;3 -\-a' —a —u77),
xr x*/v 2*' v
«"= —,=-l{2s"-i- s" -x—^=—3 +a"—a—a').2X 2* 2i
Da' valori di x, x7 , x77 si riieva che due di queste quantita co-
munque prese sono maggiori deila terza (*); e quindi i Yaiori di
u , u', a" sono tutti minori di 3, e per conseguenza essi esprimono
i raggi de' tre cerchi cercati che trovansi iscritti nel triangolo. Dai
medesimi valori, rifleuendo essere x77 = i' — t — PQ7, x' = QP77 ,
x = P'Q77, si deduce ancora che prese le rette AG, A'C', A77C"
rispettivamente uguali alle AB. A'B7, A77B" , si avra la PQ7 uguale
aiJa C"D" , la QP'7 uguale aila G'D7 , e la P7Q7/ uguale alia CD.
Volendo intanto passare ad accennare quali costruzioni grafiche deb-
bansi eseguire per la soluzione del presente problema , osseryeremo
che essendo t-=~u, si avra
i*
— 3 4- a — a1 — a77) ,
e quindi immediatamente si riieva la seguente
Composizione del problema.
Iscritto nel triangolo AA7A" il cerchio BB'B", si prendano sulle
A'O , A"0 le A'Gf , A"C" rispettivamente uguaii alle A'B7. A"B",
si prolunghi la AA7. in E hnche sia la A7E uguaie alia OA. e si ta-
gii la EF uguaie ad A'O piii C"D"; indi condotta alia AF pei suo
punto di mezzo la perpenaicoiare PM, si facciano le PQ' . AP"
uguali rispettivamente aila C"D" , ed alia AP piu C'D7, e si elevino
alle AA7, AA'7 le perpendicoiari Q7M',M77P7/. Saranno iM, M7, M" i
cenjtri de' cerchi richiesti, ed 31P , M'P7 . M"P" i rispettivi ra^gi. _
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Appendix 4:
A Few Remarks on Early Modern Science in Naples
The mathematical "analysis" of the moderns (Cartesian analysis, and Leibnizian-
Newtonian calculus later on) did not enjoy a great fortune in the Southern capital
during the eighteenth century. Indeed, the history of the mathematical sciences in
Naples during this period has been described as a gradual but inexorable "decline",
the reasons of which are still debated1. By looking at the early debates over the
introduction of Cartesian analysis and of calculus some hypothesis can be made
about the nature of such a "decline".
The "modern party" (novatores) had its leader, in the second half of the
seventeenth century, in Tommaso Cornelio (1617-1684), a physician and a
mathematician who had been reading Galileo, Descartes and Gassendi from his
university chair since 16532. According to the historian Giannone3, Cornelio
introduced in Naples "the freedom of philosophizing" (libertcis philosophandi), and
he showed the fruitful conjunction of geometry and physics. A contemporary wrote
about him: "He is a Cartesian, and great defender of the new things and, because of
that, he is hated by those who swore faith to their masters [the scholastics]"4.
However, Cornelio's suggestions entered a philosophical environment which was
already lively and significantly autonomous from the rest of the peninsula. It was
characterised by the tradition of the Southern "naturalism", that since Bernardino
Telesio (1509-1588) and Giambattista della Porta (1535-1615) onwards had created
the basis for an experimental approach to science which was alternative to that of
the Galileian school. As Ugo Baldini emphasizes,
the limits of this process [the introduction of modern science] resulted from
the animistic tone of the notion of nature held in those circles [...]; the
attribution of a sort of elementary psychism to matter made problematic the
mathematisation of qualities, which according to Galileo and Descartes is the
basis of the new science. It was the conceptual correspondent of the scarce
presence of mathematics in the cultural and didactic structure of the Southern
Italy, a strong differential trait with respect to the Central and the Northern
parts of the country.5
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Cornelio's main contribution was the conceptual re-shaping of some basic notion of
the natural philosophy such as "matter" or "nature" in quantitative terms.
Nevertheless, even in Cornelio and in those linked to him, "the extension of the
mathematization of phenomena remained far from the one present in the
Galileians"6. Cornelio was one of the founders of the Accademia degli Investiganti
(1663), to whom belonged everyone willing to defend the ideas of the moderns in
Naples, during the second half of the seventeenth century. The main goal of the
academy was the introduction of the experimental method into natural philosophy.
Among the academicians, libertas philosophandi became synonymous with a
"plurality of philosophies", and of not being exclusively connected to any particular
school. Also in 1663 Cornelio's Progymnasmata physica was published7. The place of
publication, Venice, was symptomatic of the resistance faced by the Neapolitan
moderns. The book contains the theorisation of sensorial experience and
geometrical method as the only legitimate sources of scientific knowledge. Thanks
to the activity of the academy, towards the end of the century there operated in
Naples a restricted group of noteworthy geometers, such as Antonio Monforte
(1644-1717) and Giacinto De Cristofaro (1650-?), who made the Neapolitan school of
geometry "one of the more advanced in Italy"8. But, writing about the later
professor Agostino Ariani (1672-1748), Amodeo remarks that "he converted many
noble young men to the study of the mathematical sciences [...], and he eradicated
the false opinion of the literati that Mathematics were magic and dark arts [Ariani
started lecturing in 1695]"9, which means that the 1680s campaign of the moderns
had been restricted to a sort of cultural elite: there were few connections between
these geometers, educated abroad, and the cultural reality of the Southern kingdom.
During the following decades, Baldini remarks, because of certain basic
"environmental limits", such as the lack of a connection between social forces and
scientific production, the Neapolitan school of geometry slipped into a backward
position, Bologna and Padua excelling Naples as mathematical centres. Baldini
points out the connections between economics and mathematics: in Southern Italy
certain disciplines strictly connected to advanced economies, such as hydraulic
engineering, civil engineering and applied mechanics hardly existed. It is
emblematic that, since the closure of the University of Messina (Sicily) in 1678, no
chairs of mathematics were instituted in the South of Naples until 175010.
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Why did mathematics decline in the Kingdom of Naples? The lack of
technological applications of the new science is an important aspect of the
question11. But this explanation needs further elaboration. Looking at the wider
cultural panorama around 1700, one realises that it was heavily shaped by a crucial
episode, the "trial against the atheists" (1688-1697), a most significant moment in
the local querelle des ancients and des moderns. Some secondary figures from the
professional middle-class were accused of atheism by the Inquisition, tried and
arrested, the real target of the Inquisition being Cornelio's followers. During the
process, the main theses defended by the moderns went under attack. The core of
the matter was the doctrine of corpuscularism, that in those very years became the
flag of the opposition to the political and ecclesiastical status quo. The moderns had
always remained a restricted group, without powerful supporters and with few
links with the local university, where they had to face a compact, powerful,
conservative block, fiercely devoted to the defense of its corporate interests. The
rupture with the traditional intelligentsia and authority was complete when it
became clear that the strong sensationalism of the moderns could be easily turned
into a form of full-blooded atomistic materialism. Furthermore, the methodological
claim that "the principle of things has to be searched for in the things themselves"
could be extended from the investigation of nature to that of man and society, and
this alarmed the political and ecclesiastical authorities in Naples. The trial resulted
in the prohibition of publishing any atomistic book (including Lucretius's poem).
The posthumous attacks on Cornelio were the most visible aspects of the repression
of the moderns, who were in the end turned into a sort of heretical sect. What is
most interesting for our present purposes is the nature of the cultural reaction
against the mathematising and quantitative science of the moderns. Let us consider
a couple of well-known (at the time of their publication) works by members of the
anti-modern side. In 1695, the erudite Matteo Egizio wrote a sceptical attack against
modern science which was published under the title of De scientiarum ambiguitate.
Here the modern argument of the empirical origin of scientific knowledge was
accepted, but its conclusions were turned upside down: the empirical sciences,
"invented by men", are unreliable "ut est humanae naturae miserrima conditio" 12.
Egizio also employed the term "libertas philosophandi" but to mean confusion,
endless debate and vain disputes instead of anti-dogmatic pluralism. There is no
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progress in scientific knowledge: only a succession of discordant opinions13.
Moreover the new science is damaging religious faith, and it supports the birth of
heresies14. What Egizio proposed was, in the end, a reestablishment of the
traditional hierarchy of knowledge. In the system of knowledge that he defended,
sciences only need to be studied if they make the philosopher more "virtuous". But
their place is definitely subordinate to metaphysical knowledge and to the revealed
truths of religion. In particular, considering the case of mathematics, Egizio wrote
that it has only to be studied enough for what "industrio Paterfamilias competit",
and not as a "superstitioso Pythagorico"15. Mathematics can be useful, but it does
not improve our understanding of the world. A second anti-modern work of some
interest is by Niccolo Sersale, not a full-blooded reactionary as Egizio, but a member
of a new scientific academy (the so-called "Accademia di Medinacoeli") founded in
Naples in 1698, after the cultural normalization which followed the trial against the
atheists. Sersale counterpoised the vanity of the human efforts to reach the truth by
means of continued experiences and accurate reasoning (he almost quoted the
famous words of Galileo), to the "only infallible truth of God and of His law"16. The
two levels of human knowledge and divine knowledge are no longer autonomous
and both legitimate (as in the Galileian metaphor of the "two books"); instead they
are hierarchically ordered, with human knowledge in a subordinate position
because of its being a consequence of original sin. The probabilistic character of
knowledge is a negative limitation, an a priori impossibility of reaching any
absolute truth, and the main reason for the spread of the "sects". The same
revolutionary assertion by Galileo about intensive and extensive knowledge is
rejected: truth and science simply he on two different ontological plains. The very
possibility of a progressive approximation to truth, which characterised the
moderns, is decidedly rejected by Sersale. In the changing atmosphere of the turn of
the century, the Neapolitan publisher Raillard, who had previously promoted the
experimental philosophy of the moderns, published a book such as the Apologetic
Letters in Defense of Scholastic Theology and Peripatetic Philosophy17.
The discussion on the status of scientific knowledge penetrated deeply into the
Neapolitan culture of the early eighteenth century. According to Eugenio Garin, it
was "a real crisis of the scientific revolution"18. The fact that philosophers and
historians such us Giambattista Vico and Pietro Giannone, entered the debate over
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the status of the sciences was a symptom of its centrality in Neapolitan culture. The
main issue was the extension of the "geometric method" from physics to other areas
of knowledge, like physiology, history or politics; i.e. the relation between
mathematics and experience. The intellectual atmosphere in Naples was hostile to a
quantitative conception of the sciences, as it clearly emerged in the influential
writings of Vico19 and in the more controversial work of Paolo Mattia Doria20.
Galileo, according to Vico, was an acute geometer but not a deep metaphysician.
And what he should have learned from metaphysics is that "things are not lines
and numbers", they can't be explained a priori, more geometrico, but only by means
of repeated experiences21. The main themes of Vico's writings book were to be
extremely influential in the following decades: every science has a different
methodology and a different status; every science needs a metaphysical foundation;
the "geometrical method" has not to be improperly extended to empirical reality.
The sciences of man and of history are not reducible to the study of the "human
machine". The 1710 edition of Galileo's Dialogo dei massimi sistemi, has been seen as
the extreme attempt to defend the now threatened libertas philosophandi, as "an
appeal to what had remained of the new science, when doubts and critics were
attacking it at the heart"22.
The fact that in the same years mathematical sciences experienced a progressive
decline can now be put in its cultural context. The "decadence" of mathematics, the
elementary level of teaching in the university, and more generally the
backwardness of scientific out-put from 1700 onwards can be seen as long-term
consequences of an explicit choice taken by the generation of mathematicians and
natural philosophers which was active after the 1690s. A choice matured in the
years of the cultural mobilisation against the mechanistic and atomistic philosophy
of the moderns and against their mathematisation of reality supported by the new
techniques of analysis. It was a complex process, during which the purely
geometrical approach to mathematics emerged as the "orthodox" one. "Analysis",
the new infinitesimal methods deriving from the algebraic approach to geometry,
was too closely linked to the "philosophy of the moderns" to be admitted in a
university from where that philosophy had been banished. With the new
mathematics, so suitable to "mix" with the other sciences, a philosopher could try to
explain the "machine of the world" and the "human machine" without referring to
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other principles than corpuscles and motions. The geometrical turn of Neapolitan
mathematics was grounded on the recognition that the calculus lacked a certain
logical basis, that it was too empirical, and that it would have polluted the Greek
ideal of pure mathematics. Neapolitan geometers, who had reached interesting
results in the development of Cartesian geometry during the 1680s and 1690s,
seemed unable to understand the new infinitesimal methods. "De Cristofaro",
according to Palladino, "had all the technical-instrumental premises to practice the
calculus, but he lacked the mentality to complete the passage from Cartesian
analytical geometry to infinitesimal analysis"; he preferred to study "the pure
geometry" because of its certainty, whereas the new methods are a "doubtful and
uncertain" philosophical matter23. Doria wrote that the new methods were
detrimental to geometry because they consider as geometrical lines those that are
only mechanical, and in so doing they "ruin in the human mind the idea of
geometrical proof, Logic, and Metaphysics". So, he hoped for a "return of Geometry
to the true Logic, and to the true Metaphysics, from which it has been separated by
the Moderns. And to obtain this, I want to prescribe the method of a Geometry
thought in abstract, from which the Mind can deduce the Logic, to be used as a stair
to ascend to the eternal Truths"24. It has also been argued that for Vico synthesis
had an epistemological priority with respect to Cartesian analysis, because it reflects
a metaphysical state of things25. Now, if the criticisms of philosophers such as Vico
and Doria were based on a rather superficial knowledge of mathematics, and could
be dismissed by as "external" to the real dynamics of the scientific debate, the
reticence of a first-rank geometer such as Cristofaro is certainly in need of a more
articulated explanation than that of "mentality".
Moving on to the period of the early reformism, say 1740s and 1750s, one sees
that relevant figures such as Cristofaro are missing. The general level of
mathematical teaching was low, particularly at the university level. One comes
across obscure figures such as Agostino Ariani, who held the only mathematical
chair existing in Naples between 1695 and 1720, teaching mainly Euclid. In
correspondence with the independence of the kingdom (1734) and the first
reformist projects, a new element entered the mathematical sciences: Newtonian
philosophy of nature. Ariani himself had began to introduce in Naples the
"abstruse Newtonian doctrines", i.e. themes from Newton's natural philosophy,
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calculus remaining extraneous to the official culture. In 1721 the chair of
mathematics went to Nicola di Martino (1701-1769). He published his lectures on
algebra (1725) and his lectures on mechanics (Elements of Statics, 1737), where the
most recent results were presented and commented upon for the students. The use
of infinitesimal methods ("methodus indefinite parvorum") in mechanics, as found
in Newton, Leibniz, de l'Hopital and the Bernoullis, was praised by the author. The
essential concepts of Newton's dynamics were presented and discussed, even
though under the mystifying cover of the scholastic terminology. He also published
his lectures in plane geometry and analytic geometry (the 1737 edition is dedicated
to the members of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris). Among his unpublished
papers, a treatise on integral and differential calculus has been found26. His brother,
Pietro di Martino (1707-1746), who had studied astronomy at the University of
Bologna, was appointed to a new chair of Astronomy and Nautical Science, the
second mathematical chair to be created at the RUN (1734). A third mathematical
chair (Arithmetic and Algebra) was to be founded around 1761, together with the
chairs of Physics and Experimental Physics. Pietro di Martino published on the vis
viva controversy27; but he was mainly interested in the didactic sector. He edited the
Elements of Euclid (1736), and wrote the Institutions ofArithmetic (1738), which had
numerous reprints. He also published a Newtonian textbook of physics: Philosophiae
naturalis istitutiones libri tres (1738). It was an openly anti-Cartesian and anti-
corpuscularist presentation of Newton's natural philosophy, characterised by an
unusual (for Neapolitan standards) stress on the mathematisation of empirical
reality. But this second feature of his Newtonianism found a cold welcome in
Naples, where an empiricist reading of Newton's work was being extremely
successful instead, based on the interpretations offered by Algarotti and
Musschenbroek. Significantly, Pietro di Martino's Newtonian textbook enjoyed a
much smaller success than his Euclid. The brothers Martino, were both moved from
the university to the military academies by order of the king himself. Nicola went to
the Royal Academy of Artillery (Regia Accademia di Artiglieria), founded in 1744, and
Pietro to the Royal Navy Academy (Regia Accademia di Marina), founded in 1735.
From the 1740s onwards they published only textbooks for their new courses. The
careers of both Martinos are indicative of the scientific policy of the new
government: the best human and material resources were constantly diverted
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towards the military sector, contributing to the process of de-professionalisation of
scientific teaching and research at the university. The military academies provided
courses in "practical geometry" and (later on) calculus, in order to train military
engineers and architects. Still, because of their specific function, they did not
support any kind of advanced research. The introduction of themes from Newton's
natural philosophy was then the main renewal which took place in the scientific
culture of the early reformist period, the philosophical opposition to the calculus
being too radical to be overcome in the passage of a few years. Things began to
change for the sciences only in the second half of the century, with the teaching of
Genovesi, and the emergence of Neapolitan political and economic reformism.
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